Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact : Racial and ethnic discrimination and the legal response thereto in Europe by Makkonen, Timo
  
Faculty of Law 
University of Helsinki 
 
 
 
 
Equal in Law, Unequal in Fact 
Racial and ethnic discrimination and the legal response  
thereto in Europe 
 
 
 
 
Timo Makkonen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
DOCTORAL DISSERTATION 
 
To be presented for public examination, 
by due permission of the Faculty of Law at the University of Helsinki 
in Porthania Hall III, on the 5th March 2010 at 12 o’clock. 
 
 
 
 
ii
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Supervisor: 
Martti Koskenniemi 
Professor of International Law 
University of Helsinki 
 
Pre-examiners: 
Tuomas Ojanen 
Professor of Constitutional Law 
University of Helsinki 
 
Christopher McCrudden 
Professor of Human Rights Law 
University of Oxford 
 
Opponent: 
Christopher McCrudden 
Professor of Human Rights Law 
University of Oxford 
 
 
© Timo Makkonen 
ISBN 978-952-92-6931-0 (paperback) 
ISBN 978-952-10-6108-0 (PDF) 
Helsinki University Printing House 
Helsinki 2010 
 
A limited number of copies of this dissertation have been printed in order to comply with the 
University of Helsinki’s requirements regarding publication of academic dissertations. This 
dissertation can also be viewed electronically at http://ethesis.helsinki.fi. A revised version of 
this thesis will be subsequently published by Brill as part of the Erik Castrén Institute’s 
Monographs on International Law and Human Rights series. 
 
 
 
 
iii
Acknowledgements 
”A conclusion is the place where you got tired of thinking”. This dissertation has been quite some time 
in the making. A key reason for this is that I never really got tired of thinking about equality and 
equality law and analysing the relationship between the two. And I really enjoyed, if not every second 
but most of them, of putting the pieces of this puzzle together and seeing a bigger picture starting to 
emerge therefrom. Though I can but acknowledge the fact that the resulting picture is not quite as clear 
and sharp as it could have been, the time inevitably had to come when this research undertaking had to 
be put to an end and the conclusions written.  
The other reason why the writing of this dissertation took so long is that most of it was written 
while working full-time on other things. What started as an ordinary research undertaking ended up 
more an exercise in ‘learning by doing’. Luckily enough, most of these other undertakings also dealt 
with equality, and even better still, they dealt with it from different vantage points: At different times, 
I have had the opportunity to work for several government departments, my own law and consultancy 
firm, NGOs, university institutions, and national and transnational businesses. In these contexts, I have 
had the opportunity to train, in several different countries, groups such as the judiciary, teachers and 
police officers on equality and equality law; I have had the opportunity to conduct research on these 
issues; I have had the opportunity to adjudicate discrimination cases as a deputy member of the 
national Discrimination Tribunal of Finland; I have had the opportunity to engage in the drafting and 
implementation of Finnish equality policies, and evaluate the policies of other countries; I have had 
the opportunity to engage in the drafting and revision of the Finnish Equal Treatment Act; I have had 
the opportunity to represent my country in the drafting of the ‘horizontal equality directive’ at the 
Council of the European Union and in the drafting of the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action at the 
UN World Conference held in South Africa; and I have had the opportunity to participate in many 
national and international working groups, in particular the European Network of Independent Experts 
in the Non-Discrimination Field. 
I think that the present study has benefited greatly from all these engagements and more 
particularly, that I benefited immensely from working with other people on these many different 
undertakings. I would therefore like to thank in particular the following individuals, groups and 
institutions: people at the Finnish League for Human Rights and its Board of Directors, in particular 
Kristiina Kouros, Mikko Joronen and Milla Aaltonen; people who were involved in the IOM-
Helsinki’s Legal Training –project and NetEffect Ltd’s Data Collection –project, in particular Niklas 
Reuter; everyone involved in the Making Equality a Reality (MERA) –project, including Meri-Sisko 
Eskola, Flaminia Bussacchini, Mikko Cortés Téllez, Claire Herrmann, Dr. Simo Mannila, Perttu 
Salmenhaara, Sue Scott, Dr. Patrick Simon, Daniel Wagman and Dr. John Wrench;  people working 
for the European Network of Independent Experts in the Non-discrimination Field, in particular Jan 
Niessen, Isabelle Chopin and Piet Leunis; folks at the Institute for Human Rights at the Åbo Akademi 
University and the Erik Castrén Institute for International Law and Human Rights at the University of 
Helsinki; members of the national Discrimination Tribunal of Finland, in particular Juhani Kortteinen; 
folks at the Legal Unit of the Ministry of the Interior, and in particular its equality team: Panu 
Artemjeff, Nexhat Beqiri, Sinikka Keskinen, Krista Murto, Katriina Nousiainen and Pasi Päivinen; 
everyone who was involved in the Equality Committee revising the Finnish Equal Treatment Act, in 
particular its chair Professor Matti Niemivuo, the chairs of the two sub-committees Tarja Kröger and 
Johanna Suurpää, and my colleagues Sini Kumpulainen, Anna-Elina Pohjolainen and Liisa Vanhala, 
as well as other colleagues at the Ministry of Justice. And many others deserve a thank-you too, 
 
 
 
 
iv
including but not limited to Professor Mark Bell, Professor Sandra Fredman, Professor emeritus Lauri 
Hannikainen, Txomin Hernández Bediaga, Rainer Hiltunen, Dr. Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, Professor 
Karmela Liebkind, Professor Kevät Nousiainen, Pirkko Mahlamäki, Professor Merja Pentikäinen, 
Johanna Ojala and Kirsi Tarvainen from the law firm Asianaiset, Devin ”Kyösti” Rice,  Dr. Reetta 
Toivanen and Professor Lisa Waddington. I would also like to thank Sara Norja for her most valuable 
help with the initial proof-reading of this manuscript. And yet there have been many others that 
perhaps should be mentioned, for instance people that I’ve talked with in one of the fifty or so 
international conferences and seminars that I’ve participated in during the last ten years. You know 
who you are: thank you too! 
Four distinguished law professors deserve a special mention. First, I would like to thank Professor 
Martin Scheinin for his support throughout all these years and for setting such an unrivalled example 
with respect to how to combine many different professional engagements in the endeavour to make 
rights a reality. He is also chiefly ‘responsible’ for my engagement with fundamental rights issues. 
Second, I would like to thank Professor Tuomas Ojanen, the preliminary examiner of my draft 
dissertation, for his many sharp and thus highly valuable comments. Third, I would like to thank 
Professor Christopher McCrudden for agreeing to act not just as a preliminary examiner but also as my 
opponent at the public defence of this dissertation. This is a great privilege and pleasure, particularly 
because his ground-breaking work on equality law and many other fundamental rights issues has 
become a reference point for the scholars in this field, including myself. And finally, I would like to 
thank Professor Martti Koskenniemi for supervising this work. Whatever merit that this doctoral 
dissertation has got is largely thanks to him, as he has – not just through his guidance but in particular 
through his scholarly work – challenged me to critically scrutinize not just international law but also 
my own analysis and conclusions. One could not hope more from a supervisor of an academic work. 
Finally, I would like to thank my wife Johanna, and our children Mimosa and Nikolas, particularly 
for bringing so much joy into my life. I guess you are just as happy as I am that I don’t have to work 
late hours with this thesis anymore; I promise I will never write another dissertation again! Thanks are 
also due to my parents, and in particular Johanna’s parents Kristiina and Paavo Haapiainen, for all 
their support. 
It is with great appreciation that I would like to acknowledge having received funding, at the initial 
stages of this research undertaking, from the Academy of Finland (research programme 
Marginalisation, Inequality and Ethnic Relations in Finland) and the Finnish Cultural Foundation. I 
would also like to thank the Erik Castrén Institute for International Law and Human Rights for 
providing me a workroom when I was finalizing this thesis, and the Ministry of the Interior of Finland 
for granting me a three weeks’ leave of absence in 2008 to write the final chapters of this dissertation. 
 
 
In Helsinki, 4 February 2010 
 
 
Timo Makkonen 
 
 
 
 
v
Contents
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................... iii 
Contents.................................................................................................................................................. v 
Abbreviations....................................................................................................................................... vii 
PART I: THE CHALLENGE 
1 Introduction.................................................................................................................................... 3 
1.1 The promise – and the practice .............................................................................................. 3 
1.2 About this study ..................................................................................................................... 4 
2 Diversity: Empirical and theoretical perspectives .................................................................... 11 
2.1 Diversity in Europe .............................................................................................................. 11 
2.2 Difference and the difference it makes ................................................................................ 13 
2.3 Conclusions.......................................................................................................................... 23 
3 Discrimination and equality: Theoretical perspectives ............................................................ 25 
3.1 Tension between equality and discrimination...................................................................... 25 
3.2 Discrimination...................................................................................................................... 26 
3.3 Equality ................................................................................................................................ 31 
4 Discrimination: Empirical perspectives..................................................................................... 37
4.1 Extent and characteristics of discrimination ........................................................................ 37 
4.2 The causes of discrimination ............................................................................................... 42 
4.2.1 Racism ............................................................................................................................. 42 
4.2.2 Prejudices ........................................................................................................................ 53 
4.2.3 Stereotypes ...................................................................................................................... 55 
4.2.4 Statistical discrimination ................................................................................................. 56 
4.2.5 Unintentional biases ........................................................................................................ 58 
4.3 The effects of discrimination ............................................................................................... 60 
4.4 Conclusions.......................................................................................................................... 65 
PART II: THE RESPONSE 
5 Anti-discrimination law: Preliminary issues ............................................................................. 68 
5.1 On the sources of law........................................................................................................... 68 
5.2 The hard but basic questions................................................................................................ 69 
5.3 On instruments and their interpretation and application in practice .................................... 75 
6 International human rights law.................................................................................................. 80 
6.1 Notes on the development of the principle of non-discrimination....................................... 80 
6.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights .............................................................................. 84 
6.3 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention................................................ 87 
6.4 Convention against Discrimination in Education ................................................................ 90 
6.5 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination ................................ 91 
6.6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ........................................................ 106 
6.7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights .................................... 118 
6.8 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms .............................. 124 
6.9 The European Social Charter (revised) .............................................................................. 140 
6.10 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities .................................... 144 
6.11 Other relevant instruments ................................................................................................. 149 
7 European Union law.................................................................................................................. 153 
7.1 Background........................................................................................................................ 153 
7.2 Non-discrimination as a general principle of EU law........................................................ 155 
7.3 The Charter of Fundamental Rights................................................................................... 157 
7.4 Directive 2000/43/EC ........................................................................................................ 158 
 
 
 
 
vi
8 Assessment.................................................................................................................................. 169 
8.1 Recapitulation .................................................................................................................... 169 
8.2 Structural properties of anti-discrimination law ................................................................ 177 
8.2.1 Theoretical undercurrents – doctrinal perplexity within a liberal political frame ......... 177 
8.2.2 New problems, old solutions: the capacity to tackle everyday discrimination.............. 186 
8.2.3 The nexus between international and domestic anti-discrimination law....................... 189 
8.2.4 Indirect effects: Reinforced essentialism and statism.................................................... 191 
8.2.5 The chief mischief: Individual litigation as the chosen model of enforcement ............. 193 
8.3 Conclusions: Of camouflage and loose cannons in the fight against discrimination......... 195 
PART III: RETHINKING THE RESPONSE 
9 Rethinking the response ............................................................................................................ 201 
9.1 Objectives .......................................................................................................................... 201 
9.2 Strategies............................................................................................................................ 203 
9.3 Tactics ................................................................................................................................ 208 
9.4 Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 209 
10 Collection of equality data ........................................................................................................ 211 
10.1 The policy case .................................................................................................................. 212 
10.2 Methods ............................................................................................................................. 219 
10.3 Challenges.......................................................................................................................... 226 
10.4 Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 238 
11 Positive action............................................................................................................................. 239 
11.1 The policy case .................................................................................................................. 241 
11.2 Methods ............................................................................................................................. 243 
11.3 Challenges.......................................................................................................................... 246 
11.4 Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 254 
12 Positive duties............................................................................................................................. 256 
12.1 The policy case .................................................................................................................. 256 
12.2 Methods ............................................................................................................................. 257 
12.3 Challenges.......................................................................................................................... 264 
12.4 Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 268 
13 Enforcement ............................................................................................................................... 270 
13.1 The legal infrastructure ...................................................................................................... 271 
13.2 Strengthening enforcement ................................................................................................ 274 
13.3 Informal invocation and enforcement of the law ............................................................... 280 
13.4 Conclusions........................................................................................................................ 282 
Table of cases ..................................................................................................................................... 284 
Bibliography ...................................................................................................................................... 289 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vii
Abbreviations 
ACFC Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities 
CEACR Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (ILO) 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
CEHR Commission for Equality and Human Rights (UK) 
CERD Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
CoE Council of Europe 
ECHR European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
ECRI European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
ECSR European Committee of Social Rights 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
EU European Union 
FCNM Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
FRA European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 
HRC Human Rights Committee 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
ICERD International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ILO International Labour Organization 
NGO Non-governmental organisation 
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
TEU Treaty on European Union 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
UDHR Universal Declaration on Human Rights 
UK United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland 
UN United Nations 
UNDP United Nations Development Programme 
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
US United States (of America) 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2
PART I 
THE CHALLENGE 
 
 
 
 
3
                                                       
1 Introduction 
1.1 The promise – and the practice 
The international community has embarked on a mission that is at once impressive, important and 
impossible. That mission is the elimination of racial and ethnic discrimination. 
International commitment against racial and ethnic discrimination is indeed impressive in many 
respects. It has a relatively long history: the 1945 Charter of the United Nations and the 1948 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, both of which built upon philosophical and political traditions 
developed during the preceding centuries,1 provided for equal rights without any discrimination on the 
grounds of ‘race’. These initial steps by the international community have been followed by an 
incredible amount of action, particularly by the United Nations. This action includes a number of 
dedicated resolutions, action plans, declarations and a Convention; three decades have been 
proclaimed as a Decade to Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination (1973–1983; 1983–1993; 
1993–2003); racism and racial discrimination were the subjects of UN World Conferences in 1978, 
1983 and 2001; year 2001 was proclaimed the International Year of Mobilization against Racism, 
Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance; and, indeed, 21 March is the International 
Day for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Much more action indicating international 
commitment is undoubtedly yet to come. The commitment against racial discrimination is also widely 
shared: 173 countries had ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (ICERD), the most significant international document in this area, by January 2010. 
And much action has been taken also outside the UN, for instance under the auspices of the Council of 
Europe and European Union. 
States have wanted to manifest their commitment not only though all these actions, but also by 
using exceptionally strong language in these contexts. In the ICERD Convention, which was drafted in 
the 1960s, states undertook “to pursue by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms”.2 This promise to eliminate racial discrimination in 
all its forms is reiterated in many other documents, including the 1993 Vienna Declaration and 
Programme of Action, which calls for the “speedy and comprehensive elimination of all forms of 
racism and racial discrimination”3 and the 2000 UN Millennium Declaration, which speaks of 
eliminating acts of racism and xenophobia.4 The record in this respect, however, is set by the 2001 
Durban Declaration and Programme of Action, which mentions elimination of racial discrimination 
more than 50 times.  
The promises that states have made in the international arenas have not translated well into 
practical action at the domestic level, as racial and ethnic discrimination is rampant everywhere in the 
world. The EU Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) conducted victim surveys in all 27 EU member 
states in 2008, and found that, on the average, 30 percent of the members of the surveyed immigrant 
 
1 Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
2 Article 2(1) of the Convention. 
3 Para 15 of the Declaration. 
4 Para 25 of the Declaration. 
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and ethnic minority groups had experienced discrimination in the course of the past 12 months.5 
Figures for particular countries and for particular groups were even more alarming: the survey found 
that more than 60 percent of the Roma in Czech Republic and Hungary had experienced 
discrimination in the past 12 months.6 The validity of these findings based on surveys of subjective 
experiences is corroborated by other evidence, such as discrimination testing studies, which show 
beyond any doubt that on the average at least every third employer in Europe discriminates against 
immigrant groups or at least some of them.7 Socio-economic indicators provide further, circumstantial 
as it were, evidence that points towards the same conclusion. There is plenty of evidence that shows 
how many immigrant groups and minorities fall in disproportionate numbers to the ranks of the 
underemployed, the underpaid and the undereducated.8 For instance the UNDP human development 
report on the situation of Roma in five European countries found Roma unemployment to average 40 
percent – ranging from a high of 64 percent in Slovak Republic to a ‘low’ of 24 percent in Romania.9 
Though it is impossible to know the precise extent to which inequalities in the outcomes across 
different key life domains are the result of discrimination, there is no question that discrimination 
plays a major part in them, as life in deprivation is seldom a personal choice. 
1.2 About this study 
 
Purpose of this study and the research questions 
 
This study sets out to map the gap between the promises and the practice in the field of combating 
discrimination. It analyses the current international and European legal response to discrimination and 
the reasons underlying its relative lack of success in achieving its goals. In so doing, it aims to shed 
light on the possible ways by which the gap may be narrowed down, and on the measures that those 
countries wishing to make further headway in combating discrimination could and should take. Thus 
this study addresses the following three sets of research questions: 
 
 
5 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EU-MIDIS: European Union Minorities and Discrimination 
Survey: Main Results Report (Vienna: FRA, 2009).  
6 Idem. Another noteworthy research result comes from Finland, where a victim survey found that altogether 
81% of those of Somali origin had experienced discrimination when applying for work. Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti – 
Karmela Liebkind – Tiina Vesala, Rasismi ja syrjintä Suomessa: Maahanmuuttajien kokemuksia (Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus, 2002), p. 87. 
7 In Europe, the country-specific net discrimination rates in access to employment, as found in discrimination 
testing research, have ranged from 33% to 41%. This means that immigrant jobseekers are discriminated against 
in more than every third application procedure. Discrimination testing studies involve a robust method that 
produces results high in validity and reliability, and there can be no doubt that racial and ethnic discrimination is 
widely practiced in Europe. See chapter 4.1 below for more details. 
8 See e.g. Lucinda Platt, Poverty and Ethnicity in the UK (Bristol: Policy Press, 2007), and European 
Commission, The Social Situation in the European Union 2007 – Social Cohesion through Equal Opportunities 
(Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2008). 
9 United Nations Environment Programme, Avoiding the Dependency Trap: The Roma in Central and Eastern 
Europe (United Nations, 2003). 
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(i) In light of empirical evidence, how does racial and ethnic discrimination manifest in 
contemporary Europe? What would appear to be its causes and consequences?  
(ii) What is the current legal response to discrimination in terms of international and European law? 
Is it geared to tackle the identified problems? Is the response effective?  
(iii) What, if anything, can be done to improve that response? Are there ways in which the anti-
discrimination law can be made more effective?  
 
The study is divided into three parts. The first part sets the scene by laying down the conceptual 
framework and by identifying the challenges that discrimination and its causes and consequences pose. 
To begin with, this part describes the nature of ‘racial’ and ethnic diversity in general and the scope 
and nature of that diversity in Europe in particular. By looking at the construction of ‘racial’ and 
‘ethnic’ differences and the way they are socially attributed meaning and significance, this part lays 
down the foundations for the subsequent analyses. This conceptual exploration is continued through 
the analysis of the concept of ‘discrimination’. The study introduces the different forms of 
discrimination, including direct, indirect, institutional and structural discrimination. It also looks at the 
concept of equality, which the concept of discrimination is often taken to be closely associated with. 
After this the study proceeds with an analysis of the extent and characteristics of discrimination in 
contemporary Europe. Particular attention is paid to what is called ‘everyday discrimination’, that is 
those subtle but significant and relatively frequent disadvantageous acts and practices that immigrants 
and persons belonging to minorities face in the course of their daily lives. This focus deliberately 
contrasts with popular beliefs – often spread by mass media – that depict racial and ethnic 
discrimination either in terms of major state-sponsored policies and practices such as Apartheid or 
racial segregation, or isolated violent events perpetrated by extremist hate groups. 
From there Part I of the study moves into an examination of the causes and consequences of 
discrimination. It shows how intimately discrimination is related to the same social and psychological 
processes through which we perceive and analyse the world around us and build our identities, how 
persistent and unconsciously activated prejudices and stereotypes can be, how even well-intending 
people can discriminate, and how even seemingly harmless practices of ‘everyday discrimination’ 
come to cause and sustain major social and economic disadvantages. It also shows how discrimination 
negatively affects also people other than its direct targets, how its effects are carried on across 
generations, and how knowledge of the existence of discrimination against a group can have a general 
demoralizing effect on the persons belonging to that group. It also shows how discrimination, the 
disadvantage it engenders, and the prejudices and stereotypes that disadvantages on their part feed, 
come to form a dangerous, self-sustaining vicious circle. 
The second part provides a detailed analysis of the international and European legal responses to 
discrimination. It examines how these pieces of law define discrimination, whether discrimination is 
prohibited in such key areas of life as employment, education and provision of services, and what 
these pieces of law say about enforcement and remedies. It documents the diversity manifested by 
these instruments, the openness of the language of the pertinent provisions, the development of related 
legal doctrines over time, and points out that it may be difficult for a Jane or John Doe on the shop 
floor to know exactly which kinds of actions constitute legally challengeable discrimination and which 
do not. On the positive side, the study finds that anti-discrimination law has broadened its scope by 
means of prohibiting not just direct but also indirect discrimination and harassment, and by extending 
the reach of the prohibition to such areas as education and provision of services. Moreover, it argues 
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that in particular the EU Racial Equality Directive removes many of the obstacles formerly associated 
with bringing legal action in discrimination cases, particularly by means of providing for the sharing 
of the burden of proof and by means of prohibiting retaliatory action against complainants 
(‘victimization’). On the other hand, it is argued that international and European instruments are weak 
on requirements relating to enforcement and positive action, the two most important factors for 
making equality a reality. The study concludes that the international and European legal response 
relies strongly on an ‘individual rights’ model of enforcement, which depends on the injured 
individuals to bring legal action to make things right. This study joins other studies that have argued 
that such an approach is inadequate, inter alia on the grounds that in some European countries only 1-
2 percent of those who have experienced discrimination take legal action, meaning that employers and 
service providers are under the individual rights model in practice at a liberty to discriminate without 
the fear of legal sanction.   
Part three points out that the international and European legal instruments define only the 
minimum level of protection against discrimination, and that more can, and indeed should, be done to 
render the protection more effective. On the basis of the findings on how discrimination has a major 
negative impact extending beyond the direct circumstances and persons involved, and on how 
discrimination and disadvantage reinforce each other, the study argues that action against 
discrimination must be proactive rather than reactive, that it must be extensive and target not just 
discrimination but also its causes and effects, and that remedial action must acknowledge that the 
group of people harmed by discrimination extends beyond the group of people who are its direct 
victims. Different proactive approaches, including positive action, equality duties and data collection 
are devoted chapters of their own. Each topic is discussed from a policy point of view (what are the 
pros and cons involved in taking for instance positive action measures) as well as from a legal point of 
view (for instance which kinds of positive action measures are considered legal). Overall, the study 
speaks in favour of an active, broad and reflexive approach to promoting equality, but warns that 
major advances may take time to take place and that it is probably the case that we will never 
eliminate racial and ethnic discrimination in its entirety - even if try we must.  
 
Prior research 
 
This study is situated in what has fast become a fairly well-established field of law. The subject area 
has come to attract attention from a broad range of scholars who approach the theme from a variety 
angles upon which this study is able to build. There are, to begin with, text books that set out to 
describe and explain international, European and/or domestic anti-discrimination law.10 Such books, 
 
10 Influential books in the area of international anti-discrimination law include the following: Warwick McKean, 
Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press); Andrew Koppelman, Anti-
Discrimination Law and Social Equality (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996); and Patrick Thornberry, 
International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991). What is striking, 
however, is the lack of in-depth legal commentaries of the main UN instrument on combating racial 
discrimination, the Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination. Its individual 
paragraphs have been analysed in a number of articles, and have been commented upon by the CERD 
Committee, but there appear to be no internationally recognized monographic treatments of the Convention apart 
from two books by Michael Banton that came out in 1994 and 1996 and that focused as much on the politics 
behind the Convention as on its contents. Individual anti-discrimination provisions, as they feature in the 
different international and regional human rights documents, have been the subject of analysis in a high number 
of books and articles.  
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which are often aimed for students and practitioners, purport mainly to describe the subject area in a 
manner that reflects the standard legal opinion, or is hoped to become the new standard. There are also 
academic publications, which are somewhat more doctrinally oriented and consist of a deeper 
elaboration of the core concepts, principles and specific parts of anti-discrimination law. A relatively 
well-established tradition of this kind of writing about anti-discrimination law emanates particularly 
from the U.S., and deals with themes such as affirmative action and the concept of disparate impact 
discrimination.11 A third relatively common approach is comparative anti-discrimination law, which is 
appropriate for a field such as this where the international and regional have strongly influenced the 
national, and vice versa.12 An important and recently popular line of research deals with the theory of 
anti-discrimination law, particularly its purposes, functions and underlying rationales.13 The adoption 
and national implementation of the EU Racial Equality Directive has prompted nothing short of an 
explosion of writing in the four above-mentioned genres, although it must be noted that the legal 
opinion is, as regards international and European law, in many respects still only at the stage of 
emergence.14 
Parts of this study share some common ground with the above-mentioned traditions and build 
upon them. However, its overarching idea of critical assessment of the impact and effectiveness of 
anti-discrimination law requires recourse to a mode of analysis that is not only internal to law but also 
external to it. The study of racial and ethnic discrimination, in disciplines such as sociology, social 
psychology and political philosophy, has developed into a veritable industry of its own, and this study 
taps into that research within the remit of the research problem. Particular and widespread use is made 
of empirical studies into the extent, causes and consequences of discrimination. 
 
Method and approach of this study 
 
The present study explores a complex social problem, racial and ethnic discrimination, and the equally 
complex matter of how the law is used, and can be used, to cope with it. It addresses a number of 
questions, some of which are essentially philosophical and political (what is equality?), some 
essentially sociological or socio-psychological (how much is there discrimination, what are its causes 
and consequences?), some essentially legal (what does the law say about discrimination?), whereas 
some are about legal politics (what should the law say about discrimination?). Ipso facto, the tackling 
of the research problem has warranted the deliberate, and for a primarily legal study perhaps 
 
11 See e.g. the collection of articles in Christopher McCrudden (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law (Aldershot: 
Dartmouth, 1991). 
12 See e.g. M.H.S. Gijzen, Selected issues in equal treatment law: a multi-layered comparison of European, 
English and Dutch law (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006); Lynn M. Roseberry, The Limits of Employment 
Discrimination Law in the United States and European Community (Copenhagen: DJOF Publishing, 1999); Titia 
Loenen – Peter Rodrigues (eds.) Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (The Hague: Kluwer, 
1999); See also Dagmar Schiek – Lisa Waddington – Mark Bell, Non-Discrimination Law: Cases, Materials and 
text on National, Supranational and International Non-Discrimination Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
13 Key publications include another collection of articles edited by McCrudden, in Christopher McCrudden (ed.), 
Anti-Discrimination Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2004) and monographic treatments of the subject by Sandra 
Fredman and Mark Bell: Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Mark 
Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002). 
14 See e.g. European Commission, Critical review of academic literature relating to the EU directives to combat 
discrimination (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2004), and other thematic reports of the European Network of legal 
experts in the non-discrimination field. 
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somewhat unconventional and innovative, use of a multidisciplinary and multimethod approach. This 
study hopefully testifies, for its part, to the thesis that it is highly useful if not a conditio qua sine non 
to adopt a multidisciplinary approach to examining questions such as these.15  
The crux of this study is the analysis of the structural properties of anti-discrimination law. This 
analysis is carried out through methods developed under three quite different traditions in the study of 
international human rights law and law in general. These traditions are, in no particular order, the 
following: (i) the ‘mainstream’ study of human rights law, (ii) critical legal studies, and (iii) the 
sociology of law. None of these partly mutually conflicting traditions is followed programmatically; 
rather, they are used where the tackling of the research problem has called for it. Initially, the law is 
analysed through ordinary methods of legal dogmatics, meaning that its content is interpreted 
following the generally accepted principles of legal interpretation. Yet, the point is not to provide a 
fresh reading of the content of the law or to systematize it – which is the business of ordinary legal 
dogmatics - but rather to describe how the law is presently construed and to subject that construction 
to a critical deep-analysis much like some forms of feminist legal studies have done with gender 
equality law. At all times, this study is conducted in full awareness of the social constructedness of the 
law and of social consequences of law. Law is an outcome of a variety of political projects and 
historical processes and events, and reflects certain preferences and copes with certain problems rather 
than others. The law can also be more or less effective in achieving its goals. It is therefore crucial to 
examine whether the law is geared towards tackling discrimination in all its forms, and whether the 
law has been designed in a manner that makes it an effective tool in the fight against discrimination. 
The description and closer analysis of the social problem that is the subject of this study – racial 
and ethnic discrimination, and its forms, causes and consequences -  has warranted extensive use of 
sociological and social psychological research and research methods. The method used in this respect 
might best be labelled as ‘meta-analysis’, since the making of this study has not involved the 
conducting of any primary research, such as opinion surveys, but has rather involved the cross-
analysis of the results of a high number of studies that have been conducted by others and that all 
focus on the subject at hand. The studies relied on and analysed have deployed a variety of research 
methods, including different kinds of quantitative and qualitative methods, but what they have in 
common is that they all have used a methodology that is rigid and sound in scientific terms. 
In terms of its approach, if not raison d´être, this study has been guided by two broad value 
orientations that align with the methodological choices made. These values are the critical orientation 
and the pragmatic orientation. 
The critical orientation shows in that this study, instead of playing the game – by means of 
analysing how international and European anti-discrimination law should apply in this or that 
particular situation – it analyses how the game is played, how ‘discrimination’ and remedies thereto 
are construed through law. It is critical also in the sense that it puts in question many unstated but 
popular social beliefs, such as the assumed tolerance of the majority of Europeans, the relative 
harmlessness of everyday discrimination, the sufficiency of a rights-based approach in combating 
 
15 Essed has quite rightly opined that when we are confronted with a problem as complex as racism, we cannot 
afford to let ourselves be constrained by the boundaries of specific disciplines. She has also taken note of the 
slow progress made in the development of interdisciplinary studies of racism. Philomena Essed, ‘Everyday 
Racism: A New Approach to the Study of Racism’, in Theo Goldberg - Philomena Essed (eds.), Race Critical 
Theories (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 176. See more generally, C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959). 
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discrimination, and the appropriateness of ‘colour-blind’ neutrality in bringing about equality. In 
consequence, this study shares some common methodological and substantive ground with the 
movement known as Critical Race Theory.16 
The pragmatic orientation of this study shows primarily in that it focuses on the actual problems as 
they appear in the real life. In seeking to find the best means of fighting discrimination, this study does 
not start off from a search of political, philosophical or ethical ‘first principles’ or other such sources 
upon which anti-discrimination laws and policies should somehow necessarily or preferably be 
grounded; rather, it proceeds from the fact that (i) states have drafted and agreed to be bound by 
international and European legal instruments that define, prohibit and set out to eliminate 
discrimination, and that (ii) discrimination, as defined in these instruments, still occurs in 
contemporary Europe, and that, in consequence, (iii) there is a need to analyse why these instruments 
fail to achieve their stated purposes and how this failure can be remedied. The pragmatic approach 
also underscores the need for an evidence-based approach, meaning that – when problems and 
solutions thereto are being identified – attention is placed upon close examination of actual social 
realities, in particular the experiences and situations of victims of discrimination, as evidenced by 
quantitative and qualitative research.   
These two value orientations, the critical and pragmatic, may appear to be in tension with each 
other.17 After all, the quantitative and qualitative studies that form the basis of the pragmatic analysis 
cannot themselves be put beyond all criticism. Indeed, scientific inquiries – let alone theories - can 
never fully capture the richness of our existence and experience.18 There is, for example, no method 
for precisely measuring the hurt felt by a person who has been subjected to racism. Moreover, the 
results of scientific inquiries, the findings, seldom if ever ‘speak for themselves’, meaning that they 
necessarily call for interpretation, which has a subjective dimension to it. The selective, interpreted 
and often simplified nature of all knowledge quite obviously invites quarrels of all sorts, and thus 
criticism. This means that the use of scientific findings cannot be fully divorced from subjective or 
cultural evaluations or ethical and political considerations. But this is precisely what this study aspires 
to point out; it hopes to challenge its readers to see how even the rules of the game that are most taken 
for granted are in fact more in the nature of temporary conventions than unchallengeable truths; 
conventions that we have a moral responsibility to scrutinize, particularly given the promises made. 
This means that when we are talking about seemingly isolatable issues, such as racial discrimination, 
we should actually include in the discussion a broader range of topics, and we should expose and 
where necessary challenge the underlying social conventions and structures on the basis of how they 
either promote or prevent the cause of equality. In this way, by means of revealing something 
 
16 The Critical Race Theory (CRT) is not a monolithic movement, but many scholars associated with the CRT 
emphasise the socially constructed nature of ‘race’ and ethnicity, the need to absolve all hierarchical inter-group 
structures, and critical examination of power structures embedded e.g. in apparently neutral liberal institutions. 
See e.g. Derrick Bell, Silent Covenants: Brown v. Board of Education and the Unfulfilled Hopes for Racial 
Reform (New York, Oxford University Press, 2004); Kimberle Crenshaw ‘Mapping the Margins: 
Intersectionality, Identity Politics and Violence Against Women of Color’ Stanford Law Review, Vol. 43, No 6 
(1991); Richard Delgado ‘The Ethereal Scholar: Does Critical Legal Studies have What Minorities Want?’ 
Harvard Civil Rights – Civil Liberties Review 22 (1987). 
17 Cf. however the approach of David Kennedy in The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International 
Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 
18 See e.g. Mary E. Clark, In search for human nature (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 53. 
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fundamentally important about the nature of social reality and human behaviour, the pragmatic 
orientation comes to serve the purposes of the critical orientation, and vice versa. 
The interplay of critical and pragmatic orientations also shows in how this study relates to 
concepts. We need concepts, from the pragmatic point of view, because they are convenient and 
relatively straightforward ways of bringing order to the otherwise chaotic mass of information. They 
also make everyday and scholarly discussions possible. But from the critical point of view, concepts, 
because they simplify and interpret a heterogeneous set of phenomena as essentially the same, can 
provide only for illusory precision and certainty. The use of concepts, such as ‘race’, ‘discrimination’ 
or ‘law’, creates false assumptions and expectations about order and ‘essence’ in nature and society, 
about some tight fit between the world of words and our everyday living environment. Furthermore, as 
concepts are socially constructed but subjectively held, people never understand them quite in the 
same way, however self-evident the meaning of a particular concept may appear to be to each one of 
them. Indeed, the inherent vagueness of concepts has sometimes led to calls that we should abandon 
concepts such as ‘culture’, ‘race’, and ‘ethnicity’. Yet, this line of action is neither advocated nor taken 
here, because the abandonment of concepts is a luxury that this study, and indeed the rest of the 
society, can’t afford, simply because it would render all communication difficult if not impossible. 
Rather, this study seeks to flesh out, for its part, the observation that concepts are, if anything, 
inherently imprecise and temporary social conventions and that their use and definition carry political 
and social implications. For instance, the use of the concept of ‘race’, which is subjected to critical 
scrutiny in this study and which is subjected to quotation marks whenever used as such, cannot be 
completely eliminated; although there are valid grounds for considering that there are no races in any 
biologically meaningful sense, there exists ‘racial discrimination’, that is discrimination that is based 
on the assumed ‘race’ of a person, and therefore the use of the concept of ‘race’ cannot be entirely 
avoided. 
The pragmatic orientation poses limits to the scope, intensity and purpose of the critical 
orientation, insisting that the ultimate aim of this study must be on finding solutions and answers, and 
even more than that, on finding solutions and answers that can be presumed to be effective in practice. 
The long tradition of political realism has been to argue that since the ends of individuals are many, 
and not all of these ends are in principle compatible with each other, the possibility of conflict - and 
tragedy - can never be wholly eliminated from human life.19 In effect, criticism can be potentially 
endless and, beyond a certain stage, pointless. Yet, as will be seen, it is the critical orientation that to a 
great extent informs the solutions, primarily by pointing out that we should prefer those problem-
solving strategies that are reflective and tailored to meet the specific historical, social, economic, 
cultural and political circumstances in which the problem is situated. 
 
19 Isaiah Berlin, Two Concepts of Liberty (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958). See the chapter on Morgenthau in 
Martti Koskenniemi, Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960 
(Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press, 2002). 
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2 Diversity: Empirical and theoretical perspectives 
2.1 Diversity in Europe 
Europe is, and has always been, ethnically diverse. The mainstay of ethnic diversity in Europe is due 
to three sources: the existence of indigenous peoples that existed before the formation of the nation-
states in Europe; the existence of ethnic groups that became minorities in the struggles that led to the 
formation of nation-states or at some point thereafter in consequence of territorial acquisitions; and 
immigration. The nation-building process that led to the emergence of strong nation-states, a process 
that has been exceptionally powerful in Europe, is intrinsically about rendering linguistically and 
culturally heterogeneous populations more homogenous, thus on the one hand suppressing diversity 
and on the other making remaining ethnic divisions more visible. Yet it should be recognized that 
subtler forms of diversity permeate the entire Europe, as evidenced by the still flourishing local 
dialects and cultures. 
The ethnic composition of Europe is not known with any great degree of precision. This is because 
most countries in Europe, with some exceptions, do not collect ethnic data through censuses, 
population registers or by any other means.1 Where such data exists it tends to be incomplete or 
contested because there are no straightforward methods for recording ethnicity.  
Yet it is clear that ethnic diversity is a reality in Europe today. To begin with, the indigenous 
people of Northern Europe, the Sami, number approximately 70 000 according to the estimate of the 
Swedish Sami Parliament.2 The Roma, who are generally held to constitute the largest minority in 
Europe, number possibly over 10 million in Europe, a population many times the size of the total 
population of a number of EU member states.3 Some overall estimates suggest that there are altogether 
340 national minorities in Europe and that every seventh European – more than 100 million people – 
belongs to one of these groups.4 
The ethnic make-up of Europe has changed substantially over the past sixty years, the main reason 
for this being international migration, migration being the result of a complex interplay of push and 
pull factors. After the Second World War and until the early 1970s the increased rates of immigration 
were fuelled by the demand for unskilled labour in the rapidly expanding industrialized countries of 
Western Europe. This labour migration to Europe took two main forms: government sponsored ‘guest 
worker’ schemes and the spontaneous immigration of ‘colonial workers’ to the former colonial 
powers. Whereas the economic recession in the early 1970s made many European states adopt stricter 
immigration laws, a number of individuals continued to arrive for reasons of family reunion or seeking 
political asylum.5 Starting from the 1990s many countries in Europe realized that they were again in 
 
1 Lack of data concerns particularly the indigenous peoples and national minorities, which makes it impossible to 
give a full and reliable account of the diversity in Europe. 
2 National Sami Information Centre, The Sami – an Indigenous People in Sweden (Västerås: Edita, 2005), p. 4. 
3 European Commission, The situation of Roma in an Enlarged European Union (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2004), 
p. 6.  
4 Christoph Pan – Beate Sibylle Pfeil, National minorities in Europe. Handbook, Ethnos Series Vol. 63 (Vienna), 
p. 10. 
5 David Turton – Julia González (eds.), Ethnic Diversity in Europe: Challenges to the Nation State (Bilbao: 
University of Deusto, 2000).  
 
 
 
 
12
.  
                                                       
need of foreign workers, given the demographic tendencies that involve low birth rates, aging 
population and thus a rapidly shrinking workforce, which has led to a relatively rapid increase in 
labour migration. The economic downturn that hit Europe in 2008 may slow that process down again, 
however, at least temporarily. 
In consequence of the above-mentioned processes, the number of immigrants has grown in many 
countries in Europe. Data on immigrants in Europe has traditionally focused upon the percentage of 
foreign citizens within the population, which is an inadequate approach because naturalization renders 
a substantial portion of immigrant-origin persons invisible in these statistics. Only recently has data 
become available that indicates the actual percentage of foreign-born in the total population, showing 
the size of the immigrant-origin population to be appreciably higher than is usually thought. 
According to the data for 2005 for the EU, the percentage of foreign-born people was between 1.8 to 
5.0 in Finland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Italy, Malta, Poland and Slovakia; from 5.1 to 9.9 in 
Belgium, Denmark, Greece, Iceland, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain and United Kingdom; from 
10.0 to 15.0 in Austria, Belgium, Estonia, France, Germany, Ireland, Sweden and the Netherlands; and 
19.5 in Latvia, 22.9 in Switzerland, 33.9 in Liechtenstein and 37.4 in Luxemburg.6 In absolute 
numbers more than 40 million foreign-born individuals lived in the European Economic Area in 2005; 
some 10 million lived in Germany, 6.5 million lived in France, 5.4 million lived in the UK, 4.8 million 
in Spain and 2.5 million lived in Italy. Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands each had between 1 and 2 
million foreign-born residents.7 Because these numbers do not include e.g. so-called second 
generation immigrants, born in the country of destination, the size of the immigrant-origin population 
is even greater than this. European countries have therefore managed to admit and absorb immigrants 
in considerable numbers in the past decades, more so than is usually recognized
The growth in the numbers of immigrants has been relatively rapid. For most OECD countries the 
size of the foreign-born population grew by at least 20% in 1996-2005.8 It is expected that Europe will 
grow increasingly diverse in the future, as is demonstrated by analyses conducted in different 
countries. For instance projections made by Statistics Norway estimate that the size of Norway’s 
immigration population will double or triple between 2005 and 2060, leading to 20 to 31 percent of the 
total population being of immigrant origin.9 
This relatively rapid increase in the ethnic diversity of Europe has not passed without notice. 
Immigration and integration policies have become hotly debated topics among the politicians, 
academics and the general public. That debate is highly polarized. The positive role of diversity is 
sometimes given recognition by pointing out how immigrants enrich national cultures and how the 
national economies depend on their contributions, and how diversity works as a driver of innovation 
and collective creativity. But diversity has also brought with it anxiety. Cultural, religious and 
linguistic diversity has become a highly visible and therefore undeniable facet of European societies, 
 
6 Rainer Muenz, Europe: Population and Migration in 2005 (Migration Information Source, June 2006). Jean-
Christophe Dumont (OECD) and Georges Lemaître (OECD), Counting immigrants and expatriates in OECD 
Countries: A New Perspective, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers (forthcoming). 
7 It is estimated that the Council of Europe member states altogether have more than 64 million migrants, 
representing 8.8% of the total population. Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly, political affairs 
committee: ‘The state of democracy in Europe: Specific challenges facing European democracies: The case of 
diversity and migration’ doc 11623, 6 June 2008.  
8 OECD, International Migration Outlook: Annual Report 2007 Edition (Paris: OECD, 2007). 
9 Statistics Norway, High growth in the number of immigrants. Available at http://www.ssb.no (accessed 
1.7.2009). 
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posing a fundamental challenge for the conception and even legitimacy of the nation-state, the concept 
of which has to a great extent rested on the perceived homogeneity of the nation.10 The long-term 
presence of ‘others’ among ‘us’ has forced all European societies to reflect upon their own identities: 
at what point do the ‘others’ that live with ‘us’ no longer be ‘others’ and become part of ‘us’, and what 
does that make ‘us’? Questions relating to the recognition and accommodation of cultural and 
religious differences have become widely debated in Europe, as reflected in the discussions about the 
legitimacy of state churches and references to God or Christianity in constitutions, Muslim women 
wearing veils while in public office, the teaching of religion in schools, and the electoral rights of 
immigrants.  
Another, but in many ways associated, major strand of discussion has focused on the question 
whether diverse societies are viable in terms of social solidarity and trust. Robert D. Putnam’s 
empirically grounded thesis that ethnically diverse societies suffer, at least on a short and medium 
term, from lower rates of trust (even of one’s own group), rarer altruism and community cooperation 
and a decreased number of friendships, has sparked much debate and undoubtedly confirmed many 
concerns about the deterioration of social solidarity in diverse societies.11 Whereas these and many 
other debates will continue long into the future, one thing is certain: many countries in Europe are 
facing an identity crisis which will both impact and be impacted by the fight against ethnic 
discrimination. Insecurity related to the present identity crisis is bound to negatively affect inter-group 
relations, whereas the successful fostering of a culture of equality will necessarily have to be one of 
the key ingredients in resolving the present crisis. 
2.2 Difference and the difference it makes 
Diversity across humanity is real, multifaceted and highly tangible. People differ in terms of a high 
number of personal traits and capacities, colour of skin, religion, sex, occupation, interests, sexual 
orientation, ethical, political and moral views, health status, body shape, cultural heritage, language, 
hobbies, family relationships, wealth, experiences and a limitless number of other traits and qualities. 
As these differences do not come in ready-made bundles, every single individual is, ultimately, unique 
even within her most immediate social environment. However, the meeting of our personal, social, 
economic, cultural and political needs calls for interaction and co-operation that promotes group-
formation. All the aforementioned differences have, at least in some societies, been attributed social 
and personal significance and have structured the formation of friendships, alliances and communities. 
The reality of overwhelming diversity and the drive for group-formation forces people to deal with the 
thorny issue of which differences matter personally, socially and politically. Over time, categorization 
systems have developed and continue to develop, helping people to cope with this diversity, to sort it 
 
10 Turton – González, cit. supra note 5. 
11 Robert D. Putnam ‘E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century. The 2006 Johan 
Skytte Prize Lecture’ Scandinavian Political Studies Vol. 30, No 2, 2007. On the other hand, Marc Hooghe and 
his colleagues conclude, also on the basis of empirical evidence, that “…for Europe ethnic diversity cannot be 
considered as a threat for the maintenance of social cohesion.” Marc Hooghe et al ‘Ethnic Diversity, Trust and 
Ethnocentrism and Europe: A Multilevel Analysis of 21 European Countries’. Paper presented at the 102nd 
Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Philadelphia, August 31–September 3, 2006. 
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out and to simplify and to bring order into life.12 Once this process is set in motion, the dynamics of 
group formation and maintenance come into play, leading to the accentuation of in-group 
commonalities and their importance, and attenuation of differences and their importance.13 
Proper analysis of the different forms of racial and ethnic discrimination and their causes and 
consequences, and the designing of effective counter-measures and remedies, requires an 
understanding of what ‘racial’ and ‘ethnic’ differences are all about and what role they play in social 
and personal contexts. Therefore it is of the essence to look at how these concepts originate from and 
are linked to real life, in the sense of fuzzy, but observable, biological, cultural and social structures. 
This can best be done by means of tapping into the findings and theories developed in the fields of 
anthropology, biology and sociology. 
 
The social construction of knowledge 
 
Before proceeding to examine the theories about human differences and their significance, it is 
essential to note how changes into these theories has been brought by means of major changes in the 
episteme of science, in the sense of basic beliefs and presumptions that often tacitly guide the 
production of and interpretation of knowledge. Many 18th and 19th century scientists were inspired by 
the Enlightenment values that embodied the belief that there was a certain order in the universe, 
natural laws for both mankind and nature, laws that could be discovered by means of reason. Much of 
contemporary theorizing on its part embodies the belief that one should be suspicious of any attempts 
to look for or forge universal theories, explanations or values, and that much if not all of our received 
‘knowledge’ is in fact socially constructed. In consequence, it is useful to understand that just like 
everything else, scientific theories about human nature are conditioned by slowly-changing values 
embedded in the deep structures of culture.14 
In the context of intergroup relations, what people think there ‘is’ is just as important, if not more 
important, than what there actually ‘is’. As will be seen in the following pages, ordinary peoples’ 
understandings of these matters often bear little resemblance to those offered by contemporary 
science. Rather, they have much to do with the knowledge acquired through socialization and 
experience, mediated by the specific social and cultural setting in which people live in, the lifeworld. 
Over time, the lifeworld in Europe has undergone several major changes: the development of nation-
states entailed a homogenisation process and the forging of an overarching national ‘superethnos’ that 
superseded smaller groups – without necessarily completely destroying them – and this process 
inevitably affected common but often tacit beliefs and experiences about ethnic matters; over time, 
modernisation and urbanisation processes have given people a chance to set themselves free from 
traditional social roles and ways of thinking, as these have came under the pressure of reflection, 
largely thanks to factors such as nation-wide and lengthy schooling;15 and finally, the gradual 
 
 
 
12 Judith A. Howard – Daniel G. Renfrow ‘Social Cognition’ in John D. DeLamater (ed.), Handbook of Social 
Psychology (New York: Kluwer-Plenum, 2003), p. 262. 
13 See in general Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1981). 
14 See e.g. Peter Berger – Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of 
Knowledge (New York: Anchor Books, 1966). Jurgen Habermas, Knowledge and Human Interests (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1987). 
15 See e.g. Jurgen Habermas ‘Private and Public Autonomy, Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty’ in Obrad 
Savic (ed.) The Politics of Human Rights (London: Verso, 2002), pp. 57–58; Ulrich Beck, Risk society: towards 
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emergence of post-nation-state societies, that is, societies that are self-consciously plural in ethnic and 
even in cultural and epistemological matters, where members of even the same family have come to 
have their own social networks as well as their own information sources (highly specialized education; 
internet; TV).16 All these processes have affected the type, amount and content of information and 
misinformation that people have had – and have – access to, and on the basis of which they form their 
understandings of racial and ethnic issues. It is important to understand that in contemporary Europe 
people do not share a common worldview: the worldview and the values of a retired farmer, a 
businessperson, a schoolboy and an anthropology student can be worlds apart from each other, even if 
they are next-door neighbours, and this affects how they understand phenomena such as ‘race’ and 
‘ethnicity’, and how they feel and act in intergroup situations. 
 
Difference and what we make of it 
 
The most important thing in the context of intergroup relations, however, is not the real or perceived 
racial or ethnic differences, but the difference these differences are thought to make. The interesting 
issue is not just how ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are explained, but how they are used to explain things, and 
in what way they are thought to be of personal, social, political and/or legal significance. A key 
question is: is the recognition of differences, in practice, intrinsically and inevitably connected to value 
judgements? Some of the theories explained in chapter 4.2 of this study suggest that stereotypes, 
tension, prejudices and also discrimination may indeed be closely linked to our understandings of 
ourselves and others. At the same time, these theories also suggest ways in which the negative 
potential of group divisions can be substantially reduced, in particular by means of adjusting our view 
of ourselves and others. 
The significance of ‘race’ and ethnicity is ambiguous in the field of politics. Nation-state ideology, 
which associated sovereignty with politicized forms of ethnicity (nationhood), has since the 19th 
century held a prominent foothold in Europe. Under that line of thinking, political boundaries, as 
represented by the boundaries of a sovereign state, should be congruent with the boundaries of a 
nation, represented by an ethnic group claiming sovereignty. Yet at the same time, Europe has been 
strongly influenced by political liberalism that emphasises such values as individual freedom, 
individual autonomy, tolerance and equality of rights and opportunities. It is commonly insisted by the 
liberal camp that the state should be neutral when it comes to choices relating to different conceptions 
of the good life. A liberal state, it is said, does not have its own vision of The Good; its purpose is to 
help its citizens realize their vision of The Good.17 For liberalism, ethnic diversity and ethnic 
communities have, as such, no political relevance. In consequence ethnicity plays a peculiarly 
ambiguous role in the field of politics in Europe: on the one hand it is reified as the foundation of the 
state, on the other its political significance is completely denied. This tension between reification and 
denial of ethnicity is, it is suggested, one key factor that conditions intergroup relations and debates 
about the meaning of equality in Europe. 
 
 
 
a new modernity (London: Sage, 1992), pp. 88–94; Stuart Hall, Identiteetti (Tampere: Vastapaino, 1999), pp. 
20–30. 
16 Cf. idem. 
17 See e.g. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 104. 
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‘Race' 
 
Race is one of the concepts by which people have tried to come to grips with the tangible reality of 
human diversity. 19th and early 20th century science, particularly physical anthropology, played a 
central role in the creation of the ‘racial worldview’.18 Whereas humankind has probably throughout 
its history shown a great interest in the differences and similarities across groups, it was these 
scientific theories that shaped, and still shape, popular conceptualizations of ‘race’. These 
conceptualizations were based on externally visible traits, primarily skin colour, features of the face, 
and the shape and size of the head and body. A linkage between perceived racial categories on the one 
hand and psychological and cultural characteristics on the other was often presumed. In this scheme it 
was perceived natural and irreversible that different races occupy different places in a hierarchy 
established by God or – as those influenced by Darwin’s evolution theory had it – Nature.19 Europeans 
and those of European origin associated superior traits with their own ‘race’ and inferior traits with 
other ‘races’,  and over time came to develop a deeply held racialized mindset. This mindset justified 
negative attitudes towards ‘racial others’ and legitimated existing and future practices that involved 
extermination, exclusion and subordination, including such extreme practices as slavery and later the 
Holocaust. 
Scientific evidence and analyses pointing out the arbitrariness and questioning the presumed 
‘naturalness’ of racial taxonomies and significance of racial differences from a moral point of view 
started to pile up at the end of the 19th century.20 One turning point from a scientific point of view 
came in 1942, when Ashley Montagu published his book Mankind’s Most Dangerous Myth: The 
Fallacy of Race. Montagu argued against the linking of genetics and culture and asserted that ‘race’ is 
largely a social construction and not constitutive of significant biological differences between people. 
He and others brought forward evidence pointing out that the physical features used to distinguish 
‘races’ from each other were not consistently correlated with each other: for instance, dark skin colour 
could or could not go with other anatomical traits typically associated with ‘Blacks’, such as particular 
type of hair texture, body proportions or certain facial features. 
By 1950 UNESCO decided that it was necessary to bring together some of the leading scientists of 
the time to speak out – and quite obviously: popularize – what was perceived to be the truth about 
 
18 C.C. Mukhopadhay – Y.T. Moses ‘Reestablishing ‘Race’ in Anthropological Discourse” American 
Anthropologist 99(3) (1997); American Association of Physical Anthropologists, ‘AAPA Statement on 
Biological Aspects of Race’ American Journal of Physical Anthropology, vol 101, 1996, pp. 569–570. It should 
be noted that the first ‘scientific’ racial taxonomies had been developed already in the 18th Century, notably by 
the Swedish botanist and physician Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778). Also many celebrated Enlightenment 
philosophers adopted and developed classifications of human races. See e.g. Immanuel Kant, Über die 
verschiedenen Rassen der Menschen (On the Different Races of Man) 1775. 
19 Mukhopadhayay, cit. supra note 18; American Anthropological Association, ‘Statement on ‘race” (May 17, 
1998), available at: http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm (accessed 1.1.2010). 
20 See e.g. Mukhopadhayay, cit. supra note 18, p. 518. Interestingly, Charles Darwin, the father of modern 
evolutionary theory, wrote in 1875 that “[a]s man advances in civilization, and small tribes are united into larger 
communities, the simplest reason would tell each individual that he ought to extend his social instincts and 
sympathies to all the members of the same nation, though personally unknown to him. This point being one 
reached, there is only an artificial barrier to prevent his sympathies extending to the men of all nations and 
races”. Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man (2nd Ed, 1875), pp. 187–8. 
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‘race’ in order to fight racism, a “major source of social tension likely to endanger peace”.21 The 
resulting Statement on Race, while not completely rejecting the idea that physical and physiological 
differences exist,22 concluded that “‘race’ is not so much a biological phenomenon as a social myth”23 
and emphasised that “the likenesses among men are far greater than their differences”24 and that “all 
men belong to the same species, Homo Sapiens.”25 The Statement was followed by the Statement on 
the Nature of Race and Race Differences in 1951 and by the UNESCO Declaration on Race and 
Racial Prejudice in 1978. The Declaration in particular condemned in clear terms all ideas and 
theories that either referred to the superiority of racial or ethnic groups or that sought to justify racial 
hatred and discrimination, and called for governments, the scientific community, the mass media, 
international organisations and all individuals to contribute towards the eradication of racial prejudices 
and discrimination. These and many other actions, such as comparable statements by the American 
Anthropological Association in 1998 and the American Association of Physical Anthropologists in 
1996, were taken with a view to assaulting the still prevailing racialized mindset and its 
consequences.26 Notably, the latest UNESCO statement that deals with human diversity, the 2001 
Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity, does not mention ‘race’ at all but focuses on cultural 
diversity instead.  
Recent scientific findings particularly in the field of genomics have strengthened the view that it is 
not reasonable to talk of separate human races. Among humans, the same biological variations – 
measured for instance at the DNA level – tend to be found across all population groups, and only a 
small fraction of the total variation, approximately 10%, can be related to intergroup differences 
between  so-called races.27 This means that there is a very good chance that one has less in common 
genetically with the next-door neighbour than with any randomly chosen person living on the other 
side of the planet. The evidence suggests that this is because all humans share a common ancestry and 
most genetic variation predated the relatively recent point in time when a core group of our ancestors 
left Africa.28 This has led Svante Pääbo, an eminent biologist, to remark that all humans are Africans, 
either residing in Africa or in diaspora.29 
 
21 UNESCO, UNESCO’s contribution to the struggle against racism, racial discrimination and apartheid (Paris, 
22 May 1982). Those who drafted and signed the document included such renowned scholars as Ashley 
Montagu, Claude Lévi-Strauss and Gunnar Myrdal. 
22 UNESCO, Statement on race, issued 18 July 1950, paras 2, 3 and 7. 
23 Para 14. 
24 Para 2. 
25 Para 1. The statement also suggests that it would be better to drop the term ‘race’ altogether and speak of 
ethnic groups instead (para 6). 
26 American Anthropological Association, Statement on ‘race’ (May 17, 1998), available at: 
http://www.aaanet.org/stmts/racepp.htm (accessed 1.7.2009); American Association of Physical 
Anthropologists, AAPA Statement on Biological Aspects of Race, American Journal of Physical Anthropology, 
vol 101, pp. 569–570, 1996. 
27 Francis Collins – Karin G. Jegalian, ‘Genomics and the Future’, Scientific American, December 1999. Chiara 
Romualdi et al, ‘Patterns of Human Diversity, within and among Continents, Inferred from Biallelic DNA 
Polymorphisms’ Genome Res. 2002 12:602–612. Richard Lewontin, Human Diversity (W.H. Freeman & Co, 
1995). 
28 This is likely because the gene pool in Africa contains more variation than elsewhere, and the genetic variation 
found outside Africa represents only a subset of that found within the African continent. Svante Pääbo, 
‘Genomics and Society: The Human Genome and Our View of Ourselves’ Science Vol 291. No 5507, pp. 1219–
1220 (16 February 2001). See also Collins - Jegalian, cit supra note 27.  
29 Idem (Pääbo). 
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The above evidence notwithstanding, it would be premature to pronounce racial theorizing entirely 
dead just yet. From time to time, some members of the scientific community develop and publish ideas 
about genetically based racial differences, though their credibility and conclusions tend generally to be 
put to question. But many more in the academic world subscribe to a far more subtle presumption that 
racial and ethnic distinctions nonetheless capture some small but still meaningful biological 
differences.30 Some population groups have been found to be more susceptible to particular diseases, 
an important finding that has as a by-product contributed to the re-ignition of the debate about ‘racial’ 
differences.31 It is, however, an open question to what extent these disparities in disease risk are due to 
the (small) genetic variations across populations, or whether they are due to differences in 
environmental and other factors relevant to health, including poverty and stress caused to some 
population groups by experiences of pervasive racism.32 
Nevertheless, the bottom line clearly is that there appear to be no scientifically sound grounds or 
reasons for ‘racialism’, that is, for the view that there exists separate ‘races’ and major innate 
differences between them. Yet, this evidence and the attempts to popularize these findings have not 
been successful at eliminating the quasi-scientific beliefs that have remained within the general public. 
This appears peculiar, given the high esteem enjoyed by science as the religion of our time. 
In some countries, such as the UK and the USA, the use of ‘racial language’ is indeed so common 
and widely accepted, both at the level of everyday speech and in legal and administrative practice, that 
they may be described as ‘race-centred societies.’33 Yet also in societies not so thoroughly permeated 
by racial thinking and language, such as many countries in Central and North Europe, a significant 
part of the population subscribes to a racialized worldview. European-wide surveys have found that 
some 15% of Europeans go so far as admitting that they are disturbed by the presence of people from 
‘other races’ in their societies.34 A survey that probed the attitudes of Finns, who were less prone than 
most other Europeans to have a problem with the presence of ‘people from other races’, found that 
almost one in two were of the view that people belonging to “certain races are not at all fit for living in 
a modern society”.35 Moreover, more than every third respondent agreed fully or in part with the view 
that some nations are superior to others in terms of intelligence.36 These respondents therefore not 
only believed in the existence of separate ‘races’ or nations to begin with, but they also believed that 
 
30 See e.g. Morris W. Foster – Richard R. Sharp, ‘Classifications as Proxies of Biological Heterogeneity’ 
Genome Res. 2002 12:844–850. 
31 See e.g. Neil Risch et al ‘Categorization of humans in biomedical research: genes, race and disease’ opinion, 
Genome Biology 2002:3 (1 July 2002). One of these diseases is sickle-cell anaemia, a genetically transmitted 
defect found in relatively high frequencies in certain populations in equatorial Africa, whereas it is virtually 
absent in North European populations. It appears that the high incidence of this condition in some populations is 
a result of genetic adaptation to a particular long-term environmental condition, namely malaria. See John W. 
Berry et al, Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002), pp. 260–261. 
32 See idem and Yin Carl Paradies, Race, Racism, Stress and Indigenous Health, PhD study, Department of 
Public Health, The University of Melbourne (July 2006). 
33 John H. Stanfield II ‘Methodological Reflections: An Introduction’ in John H. Stanfield – M. Dennis 
Ruthledge (eds.) Race and Ethnicity in Research Methods (California: Sage Publications, 1993).  
34 According to Eurobarometer 53 report, altogether 15% of the Europeans found the presence of people of 
‘another race’ to be ‘disturbing’. The national figures ranged from 5% (Spain) to 27% (Belgium), the figure for 
Finland being 11%. European Commission, Eurobarometer, Public Opinion in the European Union, Report 
Number 53 (October 2000).  
35 Magdalena Jaakkola, Suomalaisten suhtautuminen maahanmuuttajiin vuosina 1987 – 2003. Työpoliittinen 
tutkimus 286 (Helsinki: Työministeriö, 2005), p. 88 ff. 
36 Idem. 
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some populations are innately superior to the others. It is highly likely that less radical forms of racial 
thinking are much more prevalent still today. 
How is it possible that people in modern-day societies still cling to such questionable views about 
the existence of separate ‘races’ and their superior or inferior capacities? The answer is that, to a large 
degree, ‘race’ as a concept has acquired social, ethical, political and legal relevance in our societies. 
Racial categorization makes it possible to articulate certain needs and positions in various fields of 
life, including politics, identity-building and decision-making. In societies where racial thinking is 
salient, explains John W. Stanfield II, 
races are created as social and cultural constructions and used as political weapons. Generations of 
societal residents are socialized into the belief that it is “natural” to assume that real or imagined 
phenotypic features predict values, personality, intellectual attributes, behaviour, moral fiber, and 
leadership abilities. In this sense, race is not only a category but an organising principle of 
everyday life, because it facilitates decision making in such matters as self-concept, concept of 
others, residential choice, hiring and firing in labour markets, and selection of mates and friends.37 
 
A key factor that bolsters everyday racial thinking is that what looks like evidence of racial divisions 
is everywhere: everybody knows about the vast differences in average living standard between people 
living in, say, Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa; they see ‘racially’ based social stratification in their 
own societies; and they see the dominance of African-origin athletes in many types of sports, and – in 
their ethnocentrism - the dominance of European-origin scholars in intellectual debates. It is easier to 
attribute the source of these differences to innate abilities than to a complex interplay of 
environmental, cultural and social factors. 
A perhaps even more important factor that explains racialism is racial discrimination itself. Racial 
discrimination is a massive social phenomenon; it is experienced, observed, investigated, dealt with in 
courts and by other competent authorities, reported by the media, fought against by governmental and 
non-governmental organizations in a variety of ways such as awareness raising campaigns, and 
politicians, philosophers and legal scholars debate how best to fight it. 
Through these measures the use of racial language rather inevitably becomes part of the culture of 
politics, opening the door to the use of racial language in the field of law and its enforcement. 
Domestic statutes and constitutional provisions in many countries explicitly refer to ‘race’, as do 
several international human rights documents, such as the UN Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination. Many governments and NGOs publish reports about ‘race 
discrimination’, and some countries also collect racial data through censuses and other data collection 
mechanisms. In the UK and USA, racial or ethnic data is collected by some employers for the 
purposes of complying with anti-discrimination law. All of this can have the effect of sustaining the 
racial mindset still prevalent in modern-day world. 
At the end of the day, two conclusions regarding the existence of ‘races’ suggest themselves. First, 
we should steer clear of the perception that real biological differences belie racial distinctions; 
whatever biological differences there may be are of such a minor order as to be of no relevance for 
us.38 Second, we should recognize that social conceptions of ‘race’ are alive and well and are at play 
 
37 Stanfield, cit. supra note 33, p. 15. 
38 This conclusion appears warranted except perhaps in the field of medical science, where ‘origin’ can function 
as a proxy for differences in environmental and other factors of relevance to health. 
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in everyday situations, in good and bad. People can frame their and others’ social identities in terms of 
race and can give these identities significance in their dealings with the other people. It is therefore not 
just the ‘truth’ about ‘race’ that matters; what people believe to be the truth matters as well, probably 
even more than the truth itself. The content and importance of racial categorisations is not determined 
by biological realities but by social, economic and political forces. At the same time it must be 
recognized that as a social construct, ‘race’ does not have a single essential meaning: what we have is 
a heterogeneous group of racial beliefs and a number of racial taxonomies reflecting skin colour, place 
of recent ancestral origin, parental language, religious identity of one’s parents, or whatever 
determinant happens to be socially signified.39 
 
Ethnicity 
 
‘Ethnicity’ has become the most commonly used concept across various disciplines to describe human 
diversity, and has to a large extent displaced the concept of ‘race’ in Europe in the field of social 
sciences, although it must be noted that these two terms are usually not considered to be synonymous. 
Despite its popularity, or perhaps precisely because of it, ‘ethnicity’ has been conceptualized in many 
different ways and some scholars have even concluded that it is better to not even try to define it.40 
From an ethnological point of view an ‘ideal type’ of an ethnic group would be a population group 
that is characterized by biological self-production and a shared culture. The people of Iceland and 
other peoples inhabiting relatively isolated areas come closest to this type of a group, but also there 
and particularly elsewhere in the world the reality is that all communities are characterized by mixed 
origins, intermarriages, multiple cultural influences and internal cultural and biological diversity. 
Moreover, human populations that have been labelled as ethnic groups have been organized – or to be 
more exact, have been seen by scholars as being organized – in highly different ways. Some scholars 
have found ‘objective’ markers to be of importance: these may include cultural markers (language, 
religion, values, norms), territorial markers (region, land, nationality), biological markers (descent, 
race, tribe) and/or historical markers (oppression, war); others have pointed out that it is the group 
boundaries and the social idea-forces that create and maintain them that matter, not any of the 
‘objective’ factors as such; and yet others have maintained that at the end of the day it is the subjective 
self-identification that matters, and that what really constitutes a community is therefore a multitude of 
individual acts of self-identification, no matter what prompts these identifications.41 Moreover, the 
‘objective’ markers are often imagined, meaning that even where a population appears to be united by 
common origin, it is more probably united by the belief in a common origin, and where a population 
 
39 Berry et al, op. cit. note 31, p. 264. Moreover, the various social conceptions of ‘race’, i.e. the classifications 
used by people in everyday situations, do not match the small biological differences across ‘races’. See generally 
on the scientific utility of racial and ethnic identities in the construction and analysis of genomic resources, 
Foster – Sharp,  cit. supra note 30. 
40 Karmela Liebkind, ‘Some problems in the theory and application of cultural pluralism: the complexity of 
Ethnic Identity’ in Juha Pentikäinen – Marja Hiltunen (eds.), Cultural Minorities in Finland: An Overview 
towards Cultural Policy (Helsinki: Sivén, 1995), p. 32. 
41 Idem (Liebkind); Fredrick Barth, Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture 
Difference (Bergen: Universitetsforlaget, 1969); Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and Ambivalence (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1991); Timo Makkonen Identity, Difference and Otherness: The Concepts of ‘People’, ‘Indigenous 
People’ and ‘Minority’ in International Law. Eric Castrén Institute Research Reports 7/2000 (Helsinki: 
University Press, 2000), pp. 14–31; Alan B. Anderson ‘The Complexity of Ethnic Identities: A Postmodern 
Reevaluation’ Identity: An international journal of theory and research 1(3) 2001, pp. 209–223. 
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appears to be united by a common culture, it is more probably united by the belief in a common 
culture, as the stories about origin tend to incorporate mythical elements and as the cultural markers 
are always contested.42 
A related complicating factor is that we do not have any principles that could tell us how ethnic 
groups differ from nations, tribes or indeed ‘races’. Gerd Baumann, in his review of the dictionary 
definitions of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘nation’ across 12 languages - including Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, German, Spanish and Russian - found that both ethnic groups and nations are defined in terms 
of common descent, distinct looks, shared cultural traits (language, outlook), common destiny, and 
membership that is acquired from birth, the distinction being that a nation is basically one or more 
ethnic groups that have a responsibility for a state.43 Another challenge is that there are no universal 
and absolute principles for determining which ethnic group a particular person belongs to: if your 
mother belongs to group x, and your father to group y, do you yourself belong to group x, y, both or 
neither? These kinds of questions are becoming more and more relevant in the increasingly 
multiethnic Europe that is characterized by intermarriages and an intermingling of cultural influences. 
All these complexities do not mean, however, that there are no ethnic groups to begin with, 
because the kind of social group-formation does take place in real life that can usefully be described as 
‘ethnic’. But it means that ‘ethnicity’ is a descriptive label used by scholars and lay individuals to 
describe and explain a heterogeneous set of phenomena; ‘ethnicity’ is not some independent force of 
nature that in some principled way acts upon humankind to produce distinct communities in some 
orderly manner. In addition we must remember that the use of these concepts is not just theory-laden, 
but value-laden as well. Martin Bulmer and John Solomos sum up this well:  
Race and ethnicity are not ‘natural’ categories, even though both concepts are often represented as 
if they were. Their boundaries are not fixed, nor is their membership uncontested. Race and ethnic 
groups, like nations, are imagined communities. People are socially defined as belonging to 
particular ethnic or racial groups, either in terms of definitions employed by others, or definitions 
which members of particular ethnic groups develop for themselves. They are ideological entities, 
made and changed in struggle. They are discursive formations, signalling a language through which 
differences may be named and explained.44 
 
Ethnic identity 
 
Complexities relating to ethnicity notwithstanding, it tends to be an important component of the social 
identity of individuals. Identity can usefully be described as a tool by which individuals or groups 
categorize themselves and present themselves to the world.45 Verkuyten has identified four 
dimensions or aspects of ethnic identity. These include being, which refers to the ethnic label that 
people use for themselves on the basis of their descent or for instance visible characteristics; feeling, 
which refers to how a person feels towards his or her ethnic identity (fundamentally, acceptance or 
 
42 Idem. 
43 Gerd Baumann, The multicultural riddle: rethinking national, ethnic and religious identities (New York: 
Routledge, 1999), pp. 30–31. 
44 Martin Bulmer and John Solomos, ‘Introduction: Re-thinking Ethnic and Racial Studies’ Ethnic and Racial 
Studies, Vol. 21, No 5, 1998, p. 822. 
45 Timothy Owens ‘Self and Identity’, in John Delamater, Handbook of Social Psychology (New York: Kluwer, 
2003). 
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of his or her group.46 
y.49   
                                                       
non-acceptance); doing, which concerns involvement in the social life and cultural practices of the 
ethnic in-group; knowing, which is about the person’s interest in and knowledgeability about the 
culture and history 
The different aspects of ethnic identity can combine in different ways and create unique profiles.47 
The four aspects are not only dimensions by which people’s ethnic identities may be described, but 
they also provide the accounts or repertoires that people use when they ‘negotiate’ what their group is 
all about and who exactly should be considered its ‘real’ members.48 Typically, ‘being’ and ‘doing’ 
are contrasted, since the aspects of ‘feeling’ and ‘knowing’ provide less practical (or less accessible) 
bases for determining group identit
There are thus many different ways in which individuals identify with an ethnic group. Whether 
others recognize one as a member of that group is another matter. Sometimes a group is able to agree 
on a visible cultural marker, such as a particular type of dress or headgear, the wearing of which is 
taken as a presumptive sign of committed membership.   
A certain tendency has become visible among many immigrants in Europe lately. While an 
overwhelming majority of immigrants continue to identify themselves in ethnic terms, and feel 
strongly about it, this ethnic identification is often only weakly correlated with personal participation 
in distinctive cultural practices, such as language, religion and dress. As for instance Verkuyten has 
observed, ethnic identification can persist while increasingly becoming drained of cultural content.50 
Even more fundamentally, we should note that cultural diversity is not born just out of ethnic 
diversity, as it is not only the interaction among members of an ethnic group that creates culture, but 
any community from lawyers to street gangs may become the basis of specific subcultures.51 Indeed, 
as Verkuyten has pointed out, one implication of this is that all groups and societies – even nation-
states - are characterized by internal cultural diversity.52 
Yet, it must also be noted that there are people who seek to revive and maintain their distinct 
traditional culture. Particularly people coming from collectivist cultural contexts tend to see the 
maintenance of the group and its culture as a moral obligation.53 In addition, present and aspiring 
community leaders often espouse essentialist and highly conservative conceptions of the culture of the 
group, often because their power depends on that.54 Essentialist arguments are powerful, since they 
portray the group and its culture as natural and non-negotiable.55  
 
46 Maykel Verkuyten, The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity (Hove: Psychology Press, 2005), pp. 198–200. 
47 Ibid, p. 200. 
48 Ibid, p. 201. 
49 To give an example, in a group of people who identify themselves as Roma, some may be of the view that to 
be a Roma it is enough to have parents who are Roma, whereas another part of the group may consider that in 
addition to having Roma parents one must also follow Roma traditions (and/or speak a Roma language) to be 
considered a ‘real’ Roma. 
50 Verkuyten, cit. supra note 46, p. 201. We may observe a similar process in relation to religious identity and 
secularization: in the Nordic countries many people have retained formal adherence to their religious identities, 
even though the substantive meaning of these identities has largely faded away. Pippa Norris – Ronald Inglehart, 
Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 18. 
51 Harry C. Triandis, Culture and Social Behaviour (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994), p. 19. For instance, most 
occupations have some aspects of distinct cultures, such as special vocabulary and a shared set of assumptions. 
52 Verkuyten, cit. supra note 46, p. 230. 
53 Idem, p. 104. 
54 Ibid, pp. 104, 124. 
55 This is also why essentialist arguments are used by groups that seek public recognition and accommodation of 
their cultural and religious needs. 
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The coming together of people with different cultural backgrounds can initially create tension and 
conflict.56 Yet, it appears to be the norm and not the exception that in the long run intercultural 
encounters lead to cultural adaptation, through renegotiation of cultural conventions that create space 
for different cultural understandings. Yet this will not take place insofar as racism, prejudices and 
discrimination prevail to the extent that they form a barrier to successful interaction between groups. It 
will also not take place insofar as people cling to essentialist and exclusivist conceptions of ‘race’, 
‘ethnicity’ and ‘nation’ that leave no room for such renegotiations.  
2.3 Conclusions 
Human diversity is a fascinating and peculiar phenomenon. On the one hand, diversity is a visible and 
tangible part of everyday life, also and increasingly in Europe. A diverse array of religions are 
observed (and unobserved), hundreds of languages and thousands of dialects are spoken, and endless 
cultural variations flourish in the context of everyday life. In short, diversity is part and parcel of daily 
experience.57 
On the other hand, diversity is a deeply complex phenomenon. ‘Race’ and ‘ethnicity’ have become 
the key concepts by which people describe and try to cope with that reality. But it is in the nature of 
that diversity that it is difficult to capture by words. In effect, what we have are highly elusive, 
imprecise and arbitrary concepts and the kind of diversity the nature of which is far too overwhelming 
to yield fully to human perception and analysis.  
 ‘Races’ and ethnic groups are primarily projections in the minds of individuals, projections of 
ideas that are socially constructed and that reflect some existing or past patterns of behaviour and 
create new ones. Collective identities develop in the fragile, dynamic and fuzzy shape of a decentred, 
even fragmented public consciousness.58 Group formation does not precede human action but it is 
born out of that action, and for each group of people who interact out of a sense of community, there is 
a project of group formation and maintenance that creates that sense of community. Communities and 
ways of describing and naming them are intrinsically the results of human action, and stir up further 
action. Recognition of this social constructedness of group formation implies the recognition that also 
political and legal actors and structures participate in its making: as we will see, anti-discrimination 
laws and anti-discrimination policies not just reflect but affect how we perceive diversity and deal 
with it. It should be realized that our societies are to a great extent racialized and/or ethnicized, and 
that everything we do may have a positive or a negative impact on intergroup relations.59 
Complexity tends to drive people to look for simplistic solutions that make life more manageable. 
There is a continuous temptation to think of ‘race’ and ethnicity as an essence, as something fixed, 
 
56 See also Putnam, cit. supra note 11. 
57 Also Flash Eurobarometer 217, the fieldwork for which was conducted in November 2007, concludes that 
“[d]ay to day interaction among people belonging to different cultures is a reality in Europe” on the basis of the 
result that two thirds of EU citizens were able to recall interaction with at least one person either of a different 
religion, ethnic background or nationality than their own in the seven days prior to being questioned. European 
Commission, Intercultural dialogue in Europe: Summary. Flash Eurobarometer 217, December 2007.  
58 Jurgen Habermas, ‘Private and Public Autonomy, Human Rights and Popular Sovereignty’ in Obrad Savic 
(ed.) The Politics of Human Rights (London: Verso, 2002), p. 59. 
59 Michael Omi – Howard Winant, ‘Racial Formation’ in Philomena Essed – David Theo Goldberg (eds.) Race 
Critical Theories: Text and Context (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 127. 
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concrete, and objective. And there is also an opposite temptation, a temptation to imagine ‘race’ and 
ethnicity as mere illusions, purely ideological constructs which some ideal nonracist social order 
would eliminate.60 Yet ‘racial’ and ethnic phenomena are both imaginary and real. Projects and 
processes – in our case laws and policies – that treat diversity as if it does not exist (‘colour-blind’ 
approaches) are out of touch with reality, just as are projects and processes that treat it as fixed and 
unchangeable (essentialist approaches). It must be realized that social structures and political actions 
contribute to the formation, maintenance and dissolution of groups and structure intergroup relations.
Laws and policies therefore have a profound impact on intergroup relations, and one challenge that 
anti-discrimination laws and policies face is that they should embrace both the reality and fiction of 
diversity. This insight is of major consequence in the consideration of the legal response to 
discrimination in the chapters to come.   
 
 
 
60 Ibid, p. 123. 
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3 Discrimination and equality: Theoretical perspectives 
3.1 Tension between equality and discrimination  
An intriguing and fundamental tension characterizes human interaction. On the one hand, all human 
societies have status hierarchies and make divisions between ingroups and outgroups.1 No society is 
thoroughly equal, and throughout history most people have probably lived in hierarchically ordered 
societies. This may be the case because ingroup favouritism, and consequently subordination of 
outgroup members, may be functional in the course of community building since it can enhance 
ingroup solidarity and, in certain circumstances, contribute to the overall well-being of the group.2 On 
the other hand, also aversion to inequality appears to be a human universal and has been shown to 
prevail in a wide variety of circumstances. Also this propensity is functional for community building, 
as equal reciprocal relations are critical for building cooperation and trust, and therefore during the 
evolution of cooperation it may have become critical for individuals to compare their own efforts and 
pay-offs with those of others (i.e. to diagnose whether they have been treated equally). That such 
sensitivity to inequality developed a long time ago in the course of evolution is suggested, inter alia, 
by some experimental studies which have shown that brown capuchin monkeys – a highly co-
operative species like humans – react negatively when they are given inferior rewards than their fellow 
monkeys for the same efforts.3 Both the propensity to make distinctions and the ability to feel injustice 
in face of unjustified distinctions, though therefore deep-seated and universally found, show 
substantial cultural variation in the particulars.4 
This fundamental tension between egalitarian and inegalitarian impulses has given rise to a 
tremendous amount of both empirical and theoretical research, particularly in the past decades. 
Theoretically oriented undertakings have expanded and deepened our understanding of the political, 
philosophical and moral issues that are at stake when we are dealing with equality and discrimination. 
At the same time, empirical research has produced a wealth of information about the characteristics, 
extent, causes and effects of discrimination. Due to these two strands of inquiry, nowadays much more 
is understood about the dynamics of discrimination. This study relies heavily on both the empirical 
and theoretical research traditions in order to examine the basic research question, the effectiveness of 
the law in tackling racial and ethnic discrimination. 
In the following, this study will give a general introduction to the concept of discrimination, and 
discuss more specific notions such as direct and indirect discrimination, and institutional and systemic 
discrimination. Also the relationship between the principle of non-discrimination and various 
conceptions of equality will be discussed. After this, chapter 4 will engage in a thorough examination 
 
1 Douglas Kenrick et al ‘Evolutionary Social Psychology: Adaptive Predispositions and Human Culture’, in John 
Delamater (ed.), Handbook of Social Psychology (New York: Kluwer, 2003), p. 113; Harry C. Triandis, Culture 
and Social Behaviour (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1994); Peter B. Smith and Michael Harris Bond, Social 
Psychology Across Cultures (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 1998), p. 74. 
2 See e.g. John Duckitt, The Social Psychology of Prejudice (New York: Praeger, 1992), pp. 4–5. 
3 Sarah F. Brosnan – Frans B.M. de Waal ‘Monkeys reject unequal pay’ Nature, Vol 425, 18 September 2003, 
pp. 297–299. 
4 Idem; Duckitt, cit. supra note 2. 
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of the dynamics of discrimination in practice, for the purposes of examining what it would take to 
combat discrimination more successfully. 
3.2 Discrimination 
Terms ‘discrimination’ and ‘equality’ hold prominent places in contemporary political, legal and 
everyday vocabularies. Most of the present discussions, particularly policy discussions, take it for 
granted that it is already settled if not self-evident what discrimination or equality ‘is’. Yet a closer 
analysis reveals that it is not at all well-established what ‘discrimination’ and ‘equality’ mean. Like 
most other concepts, they stand for abstract, socially constructed but subjectively held ideas that do 
not have objective or a priori meanings. There is a deep truth to the aphorism that equality is not an 
abstract concept for those who have been denied it. But it is equally true that the subjective feeling of 
inequality can never fully be put down into words and that even if it could, it could not be 
operationalized into a single, precise definition capable of mustering general agreement. What 
represents an instance of discrimination for one person may not represent it for another. This view 
appears indisputable, given the many profound, apparent and on-going disagreements about what 
exactly constitutes discrimination and what equality or equal treatment is all about. 
Discrimination, and the associated concept of equality, can be given, and have indeed been given, 
a range of meanings. These concepts have been defined differently in different legal, social science, 
political and philosophical contexts and are used in different senses in everyday discussions. Given 
that there is no universal, or even general, agreement in matters of justice, no single definition of 
discrimination or equality can claim absolute, universal priority over the others. In consequence, the 
question which actions, omissions or states of affairs constitute discrimination, for instance for the 
purposes of the law, is and should be a matter of an ongoing debate. 
The diversity of theories notwithstanding, a degree of convergence in legal and public policy 
contexts has been achieved through the adoption and national implementation of international and 
European legal instruments. One of the core aims of the present study is to examine how the 
international and European law defines ‘discrimination’ and what sort of equality it (openly or tacitly) 
promotes. For this purpose it is useful to make here some analytical distinctions that refer to different 
aspects and/or conceptions of discrimination. These conceptual distinctions are meant to work as a 
heuristic toolkit that can help to analyze and understand the subject area. They do not represent an 
overall theory of what discrimination - legally, politically or philosophically – ‘is’ or what it should be 
taken to be.5 
 
Discriminating between discriminations 
 
To begin with, it must be noted that the word ‘discrimination’ has two basic but broad meanings in the 
English language. The first one has positive connotations and refers to the ability and power to make 
fine distinctions between two or more things or individuals that to a less discerning eye look the same. 
In this sense one can speak of, for instance, ‘discriminating readers’ who are picky in terms of what 
 
5 It should also be noted that the different concepts are to an extent overlapping and do not form a coherent, 
monolithic entity. 
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they choose to read. This use of the word ‘discrimination’ appears however to be fading out, perhaps 
in part because ‘discrimination’ is nowadays predominantly understood in its second meaning as a 
reference to unfair treatment, in consequence of which the concept has acquired a predominantly 
negative connotation. ‘Discrimination’ is, in this study, used exclusively in the latter sense.  
 
Direct and indirect discrimination and everyday discrimination 
 
For the purposes of this chapter, racial and ethnic discrimination can be given a working definition as 
being about treating a person or a group of persons adversely on the basis of ‘race’ or ethnicity. In 
broad terms, discrimination can be identified by the ‘but-for’ test: discrimination has occurred where, 
but for their racial or ethnic origin, persons would not have been subjected to a disadvantage. For 
instance, if an employer tells an immigrant that the position she wishes to apply for has already been 
filled, but later on tells an applicant belonging to the ethnic majority that the post is still vacant, that is 
some evidence of discrimination. 
It is common nowadays to distinguish between direct and indirect discrimination. In broad terms, 
direct discrimination occurs where a person or a group of persons is put at a disadvantage directly on 
the grounds of their origin. This takes place where, for instance, an employer tells a job applicant that 
she will not hire persons who belong to a certain minority because she thinks they are unreliable or 
because she is afraid that her business might be harmed because her clientele might not accept persons 
with an ethnic minority background. Indirect discrimination occurs where a rule, criterion or practice, 
which is neutral at face value, puts persons of a particular ethnic origin unduly at a disadvantage. This 
could take place, for instance, where an employer advertises job openings in a newspaper that is only 
or primarily read by people belonging to the ethnic majority, or where the employer requires a 
successful candidate to speak the national language as a mother tongue, a requirement which puts 
immigrants at a manifest disadvantage. 
This study focuses on a widely neglected phenomenon that can perhaps best be called everyday 
discrimination. The term ‘everyday discrimination’ was coined by Philomena Essed to describe the 
recurrent, familiar practices of inequality that persons belonging to marginalized groups face in the 
course of their daily lives.6 Such situations can be relatively minor but still be significant. Examples of 
everyday discrimination include name-calling, racist jokes, harassment and exclusion from social 
activities and networks, but can also take place in such contexts as hiring and firing or access to 
housing. Unlike major, overt instances of discrimination, everyday discrimination encompasses events 
which may for outsiders appear to be ‘trivial’ or even ‘normal’. The difficulty in identifying this kind 
of discrimination arises because, as will be argued later on in more detail, prejudices and stereotypes 
permeate every facet of life, as they are socially constructed, culturally transmitted and subjectively 
and often unconsciously held, and come to inform rules, regulations, policies, practices, decisions, 
arrangements and conceptions. In consequence, manifestations of discrimination can be subtly 
intertwined with seemingly neutral or innocent social phenomena.7  
 
6 See e.g. Philomena Essed ‘Everyday Racism: A new approach to the study of racism’ in Philomena Essed – 
David Theo Goldberg (eds.) Race Critical Theories (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), p. 177. 
7 Even calls for colour-blindness and ‘racial’ and ethnic neutrality may in fact cover hidden or invisible forms 
and patterns of discrimination. See David Theo Goldberg – Philomena Essed, ‘Introduction: From Racial 
Demarcations to Multiple Identifications’ in Philomena Essed – David Theo Goldberg (eds.) Race Critical 
Theories (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
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The emphasis on everyday discrimination should not come at the cost of overlooking the threat 
posed by overt forms of discrimination, organized hate groups or racist violence. There is plenty of 
evidence of hate-based violence in Europe.8 Rather, the purpose of emphasizing everyday 
discrimination is to bring to light a problem that often receives little attention from the media, scholars 
or the authorities, but that nevertheless affects a large number of individuals and that can have 
widespread damaging effects. Everyday discrimination is something that often goes under the radar, 
without public attention. 
 
Institutional and structural discrimination 
 
The prevailing understanding of discrimination is that it is something that occurs at a specific point in 
time within a particular field of life and typically involves a limited number of individuals, i.e. the 
direct victim(s) and the perpetrator(s). This view, which could be characterized as ‘the episodic view 
of discrimination’, quite likely derives from the field of law, where – for the purposes of determining 
liability - the identification of a specific legally meaningful event is crucial, as is the identification of 
particular individuals as ‘complainants’ and ‘respondents’. However, the episodic and individual-
centred view of discrimination hides from sight structural and institutional problems that cannot be 
seen by looking at individual events alone, in addition to which it strips discrimination of the wider 
context in which it occurs. The episodic view, just like the law, is only concerned with specific events, 
the fact scenarios of which meet legal or some other definition of ‘discrimination’, and is unconcerned 
with the more general mechanisms, patterns, causes and consequences that underlie or contribute to 
the specific events.9 Yet discrimination, and its impact on the lives of the individuals concerned and 
on the society at large, cannot be properly understood unless discrimination is viewed in its broader 
context and as a dynamic process that functions over time in several, often unexpected, ways.  
Several important philosophical, political, legal and social science contributions have lately 
pointed towards a need to analyze those societal, institutional and cultural structures, patterns and 
processes that produce or maintain disadvantages for immigrants and minorities.10 These phenomena 
are usually treated under such headings as ‘structural discrimination’, ‘institutional discrimination’ or 
‘institutional racism’.11 There seems to be a great variety in what different actors mean when they use 
such terms.12  
For the purposes of this study, institutional discrimination refers to a collective failure of an 
organization (such as a public body, business or university) to implement the principle of equal 
treatment, this failure being in practice often due to a combination of factors such as ignorance, 
 
8 See Michael McClintock, Everyday Fears: A Survey of Violent Hate Crimes in Europe and North America 
(Human Rights First, 2005). 
9 Cf. the analysis of racist violence in EUMC, Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States (EUMC, April 2005), p. 
186. 
10 See e.g. Paul Lappalainen, Det blågula glashuset – strukturell diskriminering i Sverige (Stockholm: Elanders 
Gotab, 2005); Mark Bell ’Combating Structural Racism through Law’, ENARgy Issue 17; Sir William 
Macpherson of Cluny, The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry: Report of an Inquiry by Sir William Macpherson of Cluny 
(London: The Stationery Office 1999).  
11 For an analysis of the main terms of the debate, see John Wrench, Diversity Management and Discrimination: 
Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in the EU (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007). 
12 Idem. 
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thoughtlessness, prejudice and racism.13 The latter factors do on occasion become ingrained into the 
very culture of the organization, which means that institutional discrimination can have systemic 
properties that cannot be explained simply in terms of individual-level factors, even though it is 
always individuals that maintain it. Institutional discrimination can also be rooted in rules and 
procedures, meaning that it can exist independently of individual attitudes.14 Sometimes it is 
appropriate to speak of institutionalized discrimination, namely in cases of intentional and systematic 
discriminatory policies, particularly if they are enforced by law as was the case in South Africa during 
the Apartheid system. 
Because institutional discrimination is often embedded in practices and policies that represent 
‘business as usual’ and that do not appear blatantly racist, it tends to become visible to the public only 
in exceptional circumstances or through specific inquiries that function as eye-openers. One such 
exceptional circumstance arose in 2005 when an extraordinarily deadly and costly hurricane named 
Katrina hit the United States.15 As many of the areas that suffered major loss of life and economic 
damage were populated predominantly by ethnic minorities, and as the governmental preparation for 
and response to the hurricane was widely criticized as grossly inadequate, the possible role played by 
institutional discrimination was raised in public and scholarly discussions.16 In the United Kingdom 
the existence of institutional discrimination and even institutional racism has not only been discussed, 
but has become widely and publicly acknowledged in the aftermath of the so-called Macpherson 
inquiry that looked into the investigation of the racist murder of a Black teenager named Stephen 
Lawrence. The inquiry found the British Police Force guilty of ‘institutional racism’, which was not 
attributable to individual acts of overt discrimination by police officers but stemmed instead from the 
occupational culture of the police.17 This finding has had a major impact in Britain in terms of the way 
in which discrimination, racism and their countermeasures are conceived.18 It is not to be thought for a 
second that the British Police Force is uniquely plagued by racism; it is unique only in acknowledging 
it.  
Structural discrimination, for its part, is understood in this study as obstacles that prevent or 
impair the enjoyment of equal rights and opportunities by immigrants and persons belonging to ethnic 
minorities because of the way some part of the societal make-up (rules, policies, practices, criteria, and 
informal conventions) functions. Such obstacles come in many forms, but they thrive particularly well 
in traditionally bureaucratic branches of administration such as those in charge of immigration and 
 
13 This definition owes much to the definition of institutional racism in the so-called Macpherson report, where it 
is characterized as “The collective failure of an organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to 
people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be seen or detected in processes, attitudes, and 
behaviour which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist 
stereotypes which disadvantage minority ethnic people.” Macpherson, cit. supra note 10, para 6.34. 
14 Frank Asbrock et al ‘The Road to Negative Behaviour: Discriminatory Intentions in the German Population’ 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence Vol. 1(1) 2007, pp. 4-18. 
15 Katrina was the costliest and fifth deadliest hurricane to ever hit the United States. Richard D. Knabb et al, 
Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Katrina (National Hurricane Center, 20 December 2005, updated in 10 
August 2006).  
16 Kristin E. Henkel et al, ‘Institutional Discrimination, Individual Racism, and Hurricane Katrina’ Analyses of 
Social Issues & Public Policy Dec 2006, Vol. 6 Issue 1, pp. 99–124. Samuel R. Sommers et al, ‘Race and Media 
Coverage of Hurricane Katrina: Analysis, Implications, and Future Research Questions’ Analyses of Social 
Issues & Public Policy Dec 2006, Vol. 6 Issue 1, pp. 39–55. Maya Wiley – John A. Powell ‘Tearing Down 
Structural Racism and Rebuilding Communities’, ENARgy Issue 17, July 2006. 
17 Bob Hepple, ‘Race and Law in Fortress Europe’ Modern Law Review, Vol 67, No 1, January 2004, p. 12. 
18 See e.g. Barbara Cohen, ‘The Stephen Lawrence Inquiry – lessons to be learned’ ENARgy Issue 17, July 2006. 
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immigrant matters. Examples of structural barriers include unduly complicated, costly or lengthy 
procedures for naturalization or obtaining residence or work permits; lack of recognition or negative 
evaluation of education obtained abroad; citizenship requirements for being employed as a civil 
servant; inadequate public funding of schools in poorer areas populated by minority groups; and loss 
of residence permits in the event of unemployment, a policy that in practice steers immigrants to 
accept jobs for lower pay and worse conditions than nationals. Clear evidence of the existence of 
structural discrimination comes from Sweden, where a governmental inquiry found structural 
discrimination in the areas of labour market, housing, politics, the legal system, education and the 
welfare system.19 The result of this inquiry is all the more noteworthy because not long after the 
inquiry Sweden fared best in a comprehensive survey that looked at the performance of 28 countries, 
including all EU countries, in the area of immigrant integration.20 Given that even the group leader 
acknowledges having major problems in this area, there is reason to believe that structural 
discrimination is a major problem in the other countries too.21 
It is of essence to note that the dynamics of unequal treatment extend beyond individual events, 
institutional discrimination and structural discrimination. This study will illustrate, in particular, (i) 
how discrimination experienced by victims in one field of life (e.g. employment) can cause 
disadvantages for them in other fields of life (e.g. housing), (ii) how the effects of discrimination may 
be passed on from one generation to the next, and (iii) how discrimination negatively affects not just 
its direct victims but also other members of the family of the discriminated-against persons, others 
from the same ethnic group, businesses, and even the society at large. Finally, it is argued that 
discrimination and its causes and effects form a vicious circle that is hard to stop once it is set in 
motion. 
Just as it must be acknowledged that discrimination can have far-reaching effects, it must be 
equally acknowledged that this does not mean that discrimination could not take on very subtle forms. 
Indeed, as unequal treatment has increasingly become socially unacceptable and subject to more 
stringent anti-discrimination laws and other interventions, discrimination has began to take more 
covert and subtle forms than before.  
In effect, it is highly challenging to investigate the nature and extent of discrimination in the 
society. As argued by Wrench and Modood: 
Even when racism and discrimination are conscious and intentional, they are usually difficult to 
identify, often subtle and hidden. Some aspects are only discovered through specific investigations. 
Other types of discrimination are unintended, indirect, or institutional, and these often need 
relatively complex investigation and theorising in order to identify the processes that lead to 
exclusion or disadvantage for some groups.22 
 
19 Lappalainen, cit. supra note 10. 
20 Jan Niessen – Thomas Huddleston – Laura Citron, Migrant Integration Policy Index (Brussels: British Council 
and the MPG, 2007). 
21 Some, but not all forms of institutional and structural discrimination fall within the scope of international and 
European anti-discrimination law. Bell, cit. supra note 10. 
22 John Wrench – Tariq Modood, The Effectiveness of Employment Equality policies in Relation to Immigrants 
and Ethnic Minorities in the UK. International Migration Papers 38 (Geneva: ILO, 2000). 
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3.3 Equality 
Equality is one of those disturbing concepts the meaning of which almost everyone has a general 
theory about, but no-one a theory that is generally accepted. Equality has been described as a “popular 
but mysterious political ideal” by Ronald Dworkin,23 and as “at once the simplest and the most 
complex idea that shapes the evolution of law” by George Fletcher.24 Political controversies over 
equality are usually not about whether to be in favour or against equality, but about what form of 
equality to favour.25 A highly useful description of the concept of equality is provided by Amartya 
Sen, who writes that “equality is judged by comparing some particular aspect of a person (such as 
income, or wealth, or happiness, or liberty, or opportunities, or rights, or need-fulfilments) with the 
same aspect of another person”.26 His conceptualization, while useful, is, however, unnecessarily 
limited, as equality does not need to be conceived solely in individualist terms: the comparisons that 
equality judgments entail may also take place between groups. We can - and many think we should – 
be concerned not only with individual equality but also with group equality.27 
A key challenge is that people can have equal political and other rights, enjoy equal opportunities, 
have equal levels of wealth, find equal satisfaction in their lives, have their community-based cultural 
and religious needs met equally, but they cannot have all of that at the same time. In effect, people can 
become equal (or at least more equal) in one way with the consequence that they become unequal (or 
more unequal) in others.28 If people have equal income, for example, they will certainly differ in the 
amount of satisfaction they find in their lives.29 All societies and political theories that subscribe to the 
ideal of equality must therefore set out which form of equality is, in the end, prioritized over the 
others.30  
Bearing the above analysis in mind, we can usefully distinguish between several possible kinds or 
dimensions of equality. These are termed here ‘moral equality’, ‘civil rights equality’, ‘market 
equality’, ‘material equality’, ‘political equality’, and ‘cultural equality’. It should be noted that this 
typology is meant to be illustrative; however, it is not the only possible typology, nor is it necessarily 
exhaustive and there is a degree of overlap - and also tension - between the different enumerated 
dimensions of equality.31 
 
 
 
 
 
23 Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: the theory and practice of equality (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2002), p. 11 
24 George P. Fletcher, cited in M.H.S. Gijzen, Selected issues in equal treatment law: a multi-layered 
comparison of European, English and Dutch law (Antwerpen: Intersentia, 2006), p. 3. 
25 Amartya Sen, Inequality reexamined (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); John Rawls, A Theory of 
Justice (London: Oxford University Press, 1973). 
26 Ibid (Sen), p. 2. 
27 See e.g. Christopher McCrudden, ‘The New Concept of Equality' (2003) 3 ERA-Forum 9. 
28 Dworkin, cit. supra note 23, p. 11. 
29 Idem. 
30 Sen, cit. supra note 25. Although some conceptions of equality are mutually incompatible, this is not always 
the case, as will appear from the discussion below. 
31 For another account of the possible meanings of ‘equality’ as a legal concept, see Christopher McCrudden, 
Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal Change (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 512–515. 
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Moral equality 
 
Moral equality is an assertion about what people are, not about what they have or should have. It 
conveys the idea that people are, irrespective of their particular characteristics, of equal moral worth. 
This assertion is at the heart of the very idea of human rights, a key motif of which is that all persons 
are equal in dignity and worth.32 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is particularly 
straightforward in articulating this vision: Article 1 of the UDHR famously proclaims that “[a]ll 
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights”, in addition to which the preamble asserts 
that “recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the 
human family” is the “foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.” These tenets are 
reiterated in other key human rights instruments, including the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights, and the 
International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination.33 These 
instruments stand for the doctrine that no matter what we are or do or where we come from, we are all 
members of the same human family, and on that basis – and on that basis alone – of equal worth.34 In 
other words, they refer to an abstract and universal notion of ‘a human being’. 
The belief in the equal moral worth of all human beings is not a prerogative of the human rights 
discourse. Few, if any, modern-day major moral or political theory questions it by asserting that some 
people are of lesser worth simply by virtue of their origin. From a historical perspective we can also 
note that many religious leaders, philosophers, political figures and laywomen and laymen have 
developed, taught and stood for doctrines about common humanity, unique human worth and universal 
responsibility towards fellow human beings.35 That said, many more have questioned and rejected 
such beliefs, and throughout history most people have probably lived in societies based on various 
kinds of hierarchical structures antithetical to any idea of equal worth.36 Transatlantic slavery, 
colonialism and other forms of de facto exploitation are paradigm examples of large-scale practices 
that brought about major profits to members of some groups by means of inflicting major suffering on 
members of some other groups, and that were directly justified by theories and attitudes based on 
assumed inferiority of the ‘racial other’.37 
 
 
 
32 This does not mean that human rights could not be viewed as grounded on some other premises or value than 
equal moral worth of human beings, or none at all. For instance John Rawls asserts that human rights do not 
depend on any particular comprehensive moral doctrine or philosophical conception of human nature such as 
human beings having equal worth. Instead, Rawls sees international human rights as expressing “a minimum 
standard of well-ordered political institutions for all peoples who belong, as members of good standing, to a just 
political society of peoples”. John Rawls, ‘The law of peoples’ in Obrad Savic (ed.) The Politics of Human 
Rights (London: Verso, 2002), p. 32. For another point of view, see Joseph Raz, Human Rights Without 
Foundations (March 2007), Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 14/2007. 
33 It is the UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice that articulates these premises most forcefully. 
Article 1 of the Declaration asserts that “[a]ll human beings belong to a single species and are descended from a 
common stock. They are born equal in dignity and rights and all form an integral part of humanity.”  
34 This idea contrasts with beliefs according to which any degree of respect must be for instance earned or 
inherited. On the other hand, the idea only conveys equal worth as a human being; it does not postulate that all 
human qualities or everything that people do should be seen as equally worthy. 
35 See Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998). 
36 Idem, p. 28 in particular; Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 
4–5.  
37 See e.g. idem (Lauren). It was indeed protests against practices like colonialism, segregation and Apartheid 
that, together with piling evidence demonstrating that the previously held doctrines about superiority of the 
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Although the idea of equal moral worth is accepted – or at least not explicitly rejected – by almost 
all quarters of contemporary Europe, its political, legal and social implications – beyond rejection of 
the most blatant forms of exclusion and subordination – cannot be articulated without some further 
explicit or implicit theory of justice, which means that the concept of equal worth does not by itself 
yield anything like a set of first principles on which to found a political theory of equality. It is 
therefore necessary to examine other possible dimensions of equality. 
 
Civil rights equality 
 
One widely accepted implication of the recognition of equal moral worth of individuals is the 
recognition of the equal rights of individuals. International human rights instruments in particular draw 
an intrinsic link between equal moral worth and equal rights. This is apparent in view of the fact that 
the preambles of these instruments speak of the equal worth and dignity of all human beings and in 
that they purposively use universal terms such as ‘every human being’, ‘everyone’, and ‘no-one’ in 
framing rights and freedoms set out therein.38 This approach was apparent already in the Charter of the 
United Nations, which defines one of the four purposes of the UN as being the achievement of 
international co-operation in “promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion” in the interests of 
“reaffirming faith … in the dignity and worth of the human person”.39 The UDHR, as already noted, 
explicitly juxtaposes equality of worth and equality of rights by proclaiming that “all human beings 
are born … equal in dignity and rights”. The human rights instruments, for the purposes of bolstering 
the equal enjoyment of rights, almost without exception prohibit discrimination, inter alia, on the 
grounds of ‘race’ as concerns the provision and enjoyment of the rights set out in these instruments. 
The contiguity of recognition of equal worth and equal rights has also been an essential quality of 
equality movements from the American civil rights movement to the feminist movements across the 
globe, particularly affecting constitution-making with regard to fundamental rights and freedoms. 
 
Market equality 
 
Another possible and widely endorsed dimension of equality may be termed ‘market equality’. This 
dimension of equality is essentially about equal treatment in the markets for labour, education and 
commodities. It is about ensuring equal opportunities, about ensuring that discrimination based on, 
inter alia, ethnic origin does not compromise the opportunities of people to access and operate in the 
market place. Many countries in Europe and elsewhere have already for a number of years had, in 
their penal laws, employment laws and/or civil laws, provisions prohibiting discrimination in these 
key spheres of life. 
 
 
‘white race’ were scientifically wrong, led to the recognition of the equal worth of all human beings, and 
eventually, when combined with the idea of natural rights, to the conception of equal rights for all irrespective of 
racial origin. 
38 See e.g. the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 6 of which provides that “[e]very 
human being has the inherent right to life”, Article 7 of which provides that “[n]o one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, and Article 9 of which provides that 
“[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person.” 
39 Preamble and Article 1(3) of the Charter, signed at San Francisco on 26 June 1945.  
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Material equality 
 
Material equality is essentially about the distribution of income and wealth in a society. This 
redistributive paradigm has been a major theme in the discussions about equality in the recent 
decades. That discussion has in the past focused mainly on the inequalities of distribution between 
people belonging to different classes, with those supporting libertarian equality holding that there 
should be free market competition and minimal redistributive state intervention, and those supporting 
the equality of outcome holding that the state should actively reduce or even eliminate differences in 
outcomes by means of robust redistributive measures supported by heavy taxation, and with the rest by 
and large supporting an equality of opportunity doctrine that stands in between these two contrasting 
policy approaches. 
We may also focus on inequalities of distribution between different ethnic groups. Again we can 
usefully distinguish between different major policy responses to ethnic inequalities in outcomes: (i) 
the state should not actively intervene in the free operation of the market and the distribution of 
material well-being that ensues from it (libertarian conception of equality); (ii) the state should 
contribute towards the creation of a socio-economic environment based on free and fair market 
competition secured in part by the banning of discrimination, but should not do more than that to 
reduce inequalities in outcomes between groups (liberal, procedural equality of opportunity); (iii) the 
state should actively prevent, remove and remedy unjustified disadvantages linked to racial and ethnic 
origin, whether or not these are directly the result of past or present discrimination, these measures 
presumably leading to greater equality in terms of outcomes (welfarist, substantive equality of 
opportunity); and (iv) the state should proactively eliminate differences in outcomes across groups, for 
instance through the use of robust measures such as quotas that place an emphasis on the fairness of 
the group outcomes instead of individual procedural fairness (equality of outcome).  
 
Cultural equality 
 
The redistributive paradigm as the dimension of equality has in recent years been somewhat displaced 
by what might be called the recognition paradigm. This paradigm is concerned with the politics of 
identity and culture and the unequal distribution of power in the society seen from a group perspective. 
This paradigm takes seriously the view that in a basic liberal democratic state, even though it 
guarantees political and civil rights on an equal basis (‘one man, one vote’) to all citizens irrespective 
of their origin, societal structures – as shaped by legislation, culture and market forces – are moulded 
to reflect and respond to the needs and values of the dominant groups. The choice of national holidays, 
days of rest, official languages and languages spoken at work and at the shop floor, and many other 
choices form a social environment that follows from and appeals to the attributes of the dominant 
groups.40 If one were to put it ironically, one could say that in a basic liberal democracy both 
majorities and minorities are, on an equal basis, entitled to participate in the society created by the 
majority. But there is no irony in that this is the case in the real world and that the majority itself is 
blind to this cultural bias. This ethnocentric blindness develops because people are raised in particular 
cultures and are socialized into particular sets of local knowledge, norms and traditions, all of which 
 
40 On this, see e.g. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1995). 
 
 
 
 
35
                                                       
come to seem normal and enduring.41 In consequence, the majority tends to see itself as the rule, not 
the exception, and in effect its ideas, beliefs and attributes form the self-evident and undiscussed 
parameters against which it measures the behaviour of minority groups.42 This raises a fundamental 
question: are people equal, irrespective of whether they belong to the majority or to the minority, in 
terms laid down by the majority, or should people be equal in terms laid down by themselves? Is 
‘equality’ compatible with assimilation and nation-state values or does it call for some form of cultural 
pluralism? 
 We can present a typology of policy responses to the challenge posed by this culturalist 
strand of equality: (i) a policy of monoculturalism, which stresses the need to forge, maintain and 
cherish a single national identity and culture and aims at absorbing cultural minorities into the cultural 
mainstream; (ii) a policy of integration, which stresses the need to incorporate cultural minorities in 
the mainstream society while emphasising that it is important that they can participate in its making, 
without however the preservation of minority identities being valued as a goal in its own right; (iii) a 
policy of recognition, which goes beyond a policy of integration by means of positively affirming 
diversity and by means of adopting positive measures with a view to accommodating the practices and 
traits of cultural minorities; (iv) a policy of multiculturalism, which effectively sees  the society as an 
ethnic mosaic, composed of a number of different ethnic groups and which asserts that each group has 
the right to retain its own culture and identity, however under institutions that are common to all 
groups; (v) a policy of communitarian pluralism, which is more radical in its recognition of cultural 
diversity than the other approaches, in that it posits that since different cultures are not necessarily 
compatible with each other, and since all cultures are equal, it must be recognized that all groups 
cannot have their needs met by common institutions, and therefore some or all communities must be 
granted (some form of) autonomy.43 
 
Political equality 
 
Political or participatory equality is yet another possible dimension of equality. It is concerned with 
the various means by which immigrants and persons belonging to ethnic minorities can participate in 
decision-making. As a system of political democracy based on majority rule may, particularly without 
the accompanying ‘checks and balances’, in some circumstances turn into a tyranny of the majority 
and abuse of minorities, political equality must be concerned with the protection of the interests of 
such vulnerable groups. In short, political equality is about giving these groups a voice especially in 
matters that are of particular concern to them, with a view to preventing their de facto 
disenfranchisement from decisions that have a profound effect on their life. The possibility to 
influence political and governmental decisions may be seen to require the adoption of mechanisms of 
participation of immigrants and minorities in the political and governmental decision-making. 
Particularly deliberative and communicative forms of democracy are often expected to lead to laws 
 
41 Jacob T. Levy, The Multiculturalism of Fear (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 6. 
42 Maykel Verkuyten, The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity (Hove: Psychology Press, 2005), p. 59. 
43 This autonomy could either cover a particular geographic area or one or more material areas of law, such as 
family law and/or criminal law. For a discussion of the different legal models, see Ayelet Shachar, Multicultural 
Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women’s Rights (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
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and policies that are, at the very least, acceptable to members of the minorities.44 Given that the other 
possible dimensions of equality are determined in the various policy-making processes, it is arguable 
that political equality should play a primary role in the discourses about equality. 
 
Equality and non-discrimination 
 
The focus of this study is on European and international anti-discrimination law, not on equality as 
such. Non-discrimination law can, however, contribute towards the achievement of the different 
dimensions of equality. The examination of the question of to what extent it does so is one of the key 
themes of this study. 
 
 
44 This policy could also include some form of consensus decision-making, which not only seeks the agreement 
of most participants, but seeks to resolve or mitigate the objections of the minority in order to achieve the most 
agreeable decision. 
 
 
 
 
37
                                                       
4 Discrimination: Empirical perspectives 
4.1 Extent and characteristics of discrimination 
Racial and ethnic discrimination have become major areas for empirical research during the past 
decades. Victim surveys, socio-economic statistics, discrimination testing studies and other forms of 
quantitative and qualitative research have been able to document and shed light on the extent, nature, 
causes and effects of discrimination, rendering the previously largely hidden problems more visible. 
Whereas it is now for the first time possible to try to paint a fairly comprehensive picture of 
discrimination and its dynamics, major gaps and uncertainties in our knowledge base still exist, 
underlining the need for further research in this area.1 
The following sections look at the existing evidence of the extent and nature of discrimination by 
tapping into a variety of information sources. 
 
Evidence from complaints statistics 
 
All European countries have mechanisms in place for handling complaints about ethnic 
discrimination.2 Precise statistics indicating the number of discrimination cases that are tried in the 
regular courts of law across Europe are, however, not available. Yet, several sources consistently point 
towards the finding that volume of court proceedings is low, in comparison to the extent of 
experienced discrimination, across Europe.3 Somewhat more cases appear to be dealt with by 
specialized judicial bodies such as Discrimination Tribunals. For instance, of the ‘race’ discrimination 
claims handled by the UK Employment Tribunals between April 2007 and March 2008, discrimination 
was established in 121 cases and settlement was reached in 1 295 cases.4 
The picture changes drastically when complaints filed with specialized bodies are focused upon, as 
the latter typically represent what one might call low-threshold bodies. The number of recorded cases 
is significantly higher, although there are major differences between the EU member states in terms of 
the number of complaints received by the specialized bodies. In 2007, the greatest amount of 
complaints was received by the specialized bodies in Belgium, France and the United Kingdom, each 
of which received more than 1 000 claims regarding discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic 
 
1 Timo Makkonen, European Handbook on Equality Data (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007). 
2 For the EU countries, the availability of judicial and/or administrative mechanisms is required by Article 7 of 
the EU Racial Equality Directive. All EU countries combine judicial proceedings – ‘regular’ civil, criminal 
and/or administrative proceedings – with quasi-judicial or non-judicial proceedings. Typical quasi-judicial and 
non-judicial bodies that are charged with the enforcement of anti-discrimination law include Equal Treatment 
Commissions, Ombudsmen, Human Rights Institutions and Labour inspectorates. Mark Bell et al, Developing 
Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States compared (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007), p. 66. 
3 Bell et al, cit. supra note 2, pp. 69–70; FRA, Report on Racism and Xenophobia in the Member States of the 
EU (Vienna, 2007), p. 20 ff. The number of claims involving indirect discrimination processed in the EU 
member states was surveyed and found low in Timo Makkonen, ‘Measuring Discrimination: Data Collection and 
EU Equality Law’  (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007). 
4 A high number of cases were also withdrawn, possibly because of out-of-court settlements. Employment 
Tribunals, Employment Tribunal and EAT Statistics (GB). Source: http://www.employmenttribunals.gov.uk 
(accessed 10.1.2010).  
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origin.5 More than 900 complaints were registered in Sweden. From 100 to 500 applications were 
registered in Austria, Cyprus, Finland, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands. Less than one hundred 
complaints were registered in the other EU countries.6 Proceedings before these bodies often end up, 
where discrimination is found, either in out-of-court settlement or the issuing of non-binding 
observations or recommendations.  
The usefulness of this type of complaints data for the purposes of analyzing the extent of 
discrimination is severely compromised by two factors: under-recording and under-reporting. It is well 
documented that the relevant authorities, such as police officers, do not always record complaints 
reported to them or fail to do so properly; this is known as under-recording. More importantly, data on 
complaints only tell about reported cases of discrimination, whereas discrimination is an example par 
excellence of an activity that often remains hidden because it is not reported to the authorities; this 
phenomenon is known as under-reporting. There are two main reasons for the latter state of affairs: (i) 
there is evidence pointing to the fact that people may not even know it when they are being 
discriminated against, and cannot therefore be expected to file a complaint in the first place,7 and (ii) 
even where a person is aware of the fact that she has been discriminated against, she may have various 
reasons for not pressing charges or otherwise coming forward with a formal complaint. At the end of 
the day, complaints data can only reveal the proverbial tip of the iceberg.  
 
Evidence from victim surveys 
 
A much more useful method for investigating the existence of discrimination in the society is to 
survey the people concerned directly about their experiences. With a view on this, the EU Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) surveyed in 2008 over 23 000 individuals from ethnic minority and 
immigrant groups about their experiences of discrimination and racist crime in the EU.8 People from 
up to three different groups were surveyed in each country.  
On the average, 30 percent of the respondents reported having experienced discrimination because 
of their ethnicity in the course of the past 12 months. Figures for particular groups and particular 
countries were even more alarming: more than 60 percent of the respondents with Sub-Saharan origins 
in Malta or with Roma origins in Czech Republic and Hungary reported having experienced 
discrimination during the past year. The Roma emerged as a particularly discriminated-against group 
across the EU: of the Roma respondents, on the average 38 percent reported that they had experienced 
discrimination in access to work, 19 percent said they had been discriminated against at work, 11 
 
5 FRA, Annual Report 2009 (Vienna: FRA, 2009), pp. 21 ff. 
6 No specialized body had been set up, or the body was not operational before the end of the year 2007, by Czech 
Republic, Spain and Luxemburg. Idem. 
7 Many researchers have argued that as a result of increased legislative and other measures in this area, 
discrimination is increasingly taking subtle and less easily recognizable forms. See e.g. National Research 
Council, Measuring Racial Discrimination: Panel on Methods for Assessing Discrimination (Washington DC: 
National Academies Press, 2004), p. 71. 
8 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EU-MIDIS: European Union Minorities and Discrimination 
Survey: Main Results Report (Vienna: FRA, 2009). Other notable victim surveys in Europe include the 
following: European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Migrants’ Experiences of Racism and 
Xenophobia in 12 EU Member States. Pilot Study (EUMC, 2006); Anders Lange, Migrants on Discrimination II 
(Edsbruk, 1997); Birgit Møller – Lise Togeby, Oplevet Diskrimination: En undersøgelse af etniske minoriteter 
(København: Nævnet for Etnisk Ligestilling, 1999); and Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti – Karmela Liebkind – Tiina 
Vesala, Rasismi ja syrjintä Suomessa: Maahanmuuttajien kokemuksia (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2002). 
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percent reported that they had been discriminated against when looking for a house or apartment to 
rent or buy, 14  percent indicated that they had experienced discrimination by healthcare personnel and 
20 percent identified discrimination when in or trying to enter a shop, during the past year. 
Discrimination against the Roma was intense, with those Roma who indicated that they had 
experienced discrimination reporting on the average eleven different incidents in the course of the 
preceding twelve months alone. Discrimination was however not exclusively directed against Roma or 
people with Sub-Saharan origins: 36 percent of respondents with origins in North Africa, 23 percent of 
respondents of Central and East European origin, 23 percent of respondents with Turkish origins, 14 
percent of respondents of Russian origin and 12 percent of respondents of Ex-Yugoslav origin 
indicated that they had experienced discrimination during the past year.9 This is some evidence for the 
fact that discrimination in Europe is not simply a Black and White ‘race’ issue.  
According to the FRA’s report, only 18 percent of those who had experienced discrimination had 
reported it to the authorities or at the place where it happened. There were major national differences 
in the propensity to report discrimination: in Portugal, virtually nobody in the Sub-Saharan and the 
Brazilian respondent groups filed a complaint, whereas in France more than every third victim from 
the Sub-Saharan group had done this.10 
A particularly interesting line of survey research has recently focused upon the nature of 
contemporary discrimination. Many earlier studies focused upon egregious but apparently increasingly 
infrequent acts perpetrated by individuals with blatantly racist attitudes. This has had the undesired 
effect that the more prevalent but subtle forms of discrimination, called ‘everyday discrimination’ in 
this study, escaped attention. This also led to an underestimation of the prevalence of discrimination. 
Some recent empirical studies have focused particularly on everyday discrimination, and have indeed 
provided persuasive and disheartening evidence of the existence of such discrimination for instance in 
the workplace.11 These studies have found, inter alia, that African American workers in the US 
experience substantially higher overall rates of mistreatment (not just blatant discrimination) than their 
ethnic majority counterparts across different types of jobs. The findings suggest that major proportions 
of discrimination are subtle, ambiguous and pervasive.12 
A further line of surveys have focused on potential discriminators instead of potential victims, 
with equally noteworthy results. For instance, surveys conducted among employers in the Netherlands 
show that approximately one third of personnel staff acknowledges that they discriminate in 
recruitment and selection process.13 Given that we can presume that many people do not report 
engagement in socially and legally sanctioned behaviour, the actual share of discriminating personnel 
staff may even be higher than that.   
Although victim surveys are instrumental in assessing the dark figure of discrimination, it must be 
underlined that they measure only the subjective experiences of the respondents. Therefore, on the one 
hand, the actual prevalence of discrimination may be lower than indicated by the responses, as 
 
9 Idem (FRA). 
10 Idem. See also European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, Migrants’ Experiences of Racism 
and Xenophobia in 12 EU Member States. Pilot Study (EUMC, 2006). 
11 See e.g. the three studies presented in Elizabeth A. Deitch, ‘Subtle Yet Significant: The Existence and Impact 
of Everyday Racial Discrimination in the Workplace’ Human Relations, Vol. 56, No. 1, 1299–1324 (2003). 
12 Idem. 
13 Lilian Goncalves-Ho Kang You – Louise Mulder ‘Positive Action: the Dutch Experience’ in Appelt, Erna –
Monica Jarosch (eds.) Combating Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe (Oxford: 
Berg, 2000), p. 173. 
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individuals may sometimes erroneously attribute a negative event to discrimination even if 
discrimination played no part in it; on the other hand, the prevalence of discrimination may be higher 
than indicated by the responses, as the respondents may not always be aware of having been 
discriminated against or may at any rate not be sure enough about it to file a report. Indeed, there is 
evidence suggesting that victim surveys underestimate the prevalence of discrimination.14 
 
Evidence from discrimination testing studies 
 
Discrimination testing is an exceptionally robust and reliable method for exposing even well-
concealed forms of discrimination.15 It is a form of social experiment in a real life situation, and 
involves the use of two or more individuals (‘testers’) that are closely matched for all relevant 
characteristics except for their ethnic background. The testers apply for a job, an apartment or some 
other good or service, and the outcomes and the treatment they receive are closely monitored. As this 
method allows for good control over different causal variables, there can be little if any other 
explanations for resulting differences in treatment than racial or ethnic origin. 
The International Labour Organisation (ILO) has, since the early 1990s, sponsored discrimination 
testing studies in several countries, including Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain 
and Sweden, in order to study discrimination faced by immigrants in access to employment. The test 
group representing the immigrant testers was youngish Moroccan men in the case of Belgium, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Spain, youngish Turkish men in the case of Germany, immigrants from North and 
South Africa in the case of France, and second-generation immigrants from Middle East in the case of 
Sweden.16 The majority and minority testers were closely matched in terms of human capital, and the 
treatment they received during the entire span of the recruitment and selection procedure (application 
by phone/possible personal interview/outcome of the selection) was documented across a high number 
of test situations in order to rule out the possibility that differences were due to sheer chance. For 
instance in Italy altogether 633 valid tests were performed. The studies focused on semiskilled 
occupations, in which it could be presumed that competition was high and where the employers were 
therefore more likely to be able to ‘afford’ to discriminate.17 
 
 
 
14 Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti et al, Rasismi ja syrjintä Suomessa: Maahanmuuttajien kokemuksia (Helsinki: 
Gaudeamus, 2002), p. 44. Research has also found a strong, positive correlation between women’s perceptions 
of the gender income differences they were experiencing and econometric estimates of those differences. See 
Mary B. Hampton – John S. Heywood ‘Do workers accurately perceive gender wage discrimination?’ Industrial 
and Labour Relations Review, Vol. 47, No.1 (Oct., 1993), pp. 36–49. 
15 This method is also referred to as ‘audit testing’, ‘situation testing’, ‘in-situ verification testing’ and ‘paired 
testing’. 
16 These groups were chosen because they constitute sizable immigrant-origin groups in these countries and 
because there was already evidence suggesting discrimination against them. 
17 Open vacancies were mainly found through newspaper advertisements, as the services of employment 
agencies could not be used since the use of these services tended to require the showing of official identity 
documents. Frank Bovenkerk et al, Discrimination against migrant workers and ethnic minorities in access to 
employment in the Netherlands. International Migration Papers 4 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1995). 
Colectivo IOE, Labour market discrimination against migrant workers in Spain. International Migration Papers 
9 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1995). Goldberg et al, Labour Market Discrimination against foreign 
workers in Germany. International Migration Papers 7 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1996). Peter 
Arrijn et al, Discrimination in access to employment on grounds of foreign origin: the case of Belgium. 
International Migration Papers 23 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1998). E. Allasino et al, Labour market 
discrimination against migrant workers in Italy. International Migration Papers 67 (Geneva: International 
Labour Office, 2004). E. Cediey – F. Foroni, Les discriminations á raison de ‘lórigine dans les embauches en 
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The net discrimination rate was found to be very high across all countries, ranging from 33% 
(Belgium) to 50% (France).18 This means that immigrant jobseekers were discriminated against in 
more than every third application procedure in each country. The only exception to this trend was 
Sweden, where the net discrimination rate – for both immigrant women and men – was 16%, a high 
figure nevertheless but half of that of the next lowest country.19 As in each country the testers had 
been matched across all employment-relevant criteria and they used the same methods for gaining 
employment, differences in outcomes could not be explained by such factors as inadequate education 
or training, lack of access to networks and connections to employers, and/or inadequate command of 
host country’s language. 
 
Other evidence 
 
Official statistics that enable comparisons between immigrants and ethnic minorities on the one hand, 
and ethnic majority on the other, provide further evidence, circumstantial as it were, about 
discrimination and other challenges that these groups face. To begin with, statistics from the EU 
countries show that immigrants and minorities have difficulties in accessing the labour market. This 
shows already in the participation rates in the labour market: statistics for 2004/2005 show that 
employment rate of non EU-nationals was 55%, whereas it was 65% for the EU nationals. Those non 
EU-nationals in the labour market were almost two times more likely to be unemployed (17%) than 
EU-nationals (9%).20 The economic downturn of 2008/2009 hit non EU-nationals particularly hard, 
leaving some 20% of non EU-nationals unemployed in 2009.21 But it seems that the Roma are even 
worse off in the labour market. A 2003 UNDP human development report on the situation of Roma in 
five European countries found Roma unemployment to average 40%, ranging from a high of 64% in 
Slovak Republic to a ‘low’ of 24% in Romania.22 
Statistics also show major disparities in educational attainment between majorities and 
immigrants. Whereas 35% of the EU nationals had low education, this figure was 47% for the non 
EU-nationals.23 There are also disparities in domains such as health and wellbeing, and these 
disparities have tangible effects. For instance a 2008 European Commission report concludes that “it 
seems beyond any doubt that life expectancies of the Roma are some 10-15 years lower than those of 
 
France: Une enquête nationale par tests de discrimination selon la méthide du bureau international du travail 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 2007). 
18 The results from Germany are not included here, as the German testing procedure did not cover all the stages 
of the recruitment, unlike the other country studies. The results portrayed here are rather well in line with the 
results of respective studies from the United States, where net discrimination rate against Blacks, Asians and 
Arabs has never been found to be less than 25%. P. A. Riach & J. Rich, ‘Field Experiments of Discrimination in 
the Market Place’ The Economic Journal 2002, p. F499. 
19 International Labour Office, Synthesis report: Discrimination Against native Swedes of immigrant origin in 
access to employment (International Labour Office, 2006). 
20 European Commission, Europe’s Demographic Future: Facts and Figures on Challenges and Opportunities 
(Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007). 
21 European Commission, Employment in Europe 2009 (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2009), p. 40. 
22 United Nations Environment Programme, Avoiding the Dependency Trap: The Roma in Central and Eastern 
Europe (United Nations, 2003). 
23 European Commission, cit. supra note 20. See also European Commission, The Social Situation in the 
European Union 2007 – Social Cohesion through Equal Opportunities (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2008). 
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majority populations”.24 It should be noted that in fact most immigrant and minority groups are, across 
almost all indicators of well-being, worse-off than the dominant groups. 
It must nonetheless be borne in mind that minority and immigrant groups are not always and 
everywhere in a disadvantaged position in the society. There are immigrant and minority communities 
that do better, sometimes much better, in terms of employment, education and wellbeing than the 
majority.25 And there are individuals within disadvantaged groups that do well in economic and other 
terms. It is not a natural law that immigrants and minorities are always marginalized and deprived, 
though persons belonging to these groups do clearly face particular challenges. Were there such a 
natural law, an ethnically equal society would ultimately be unattainable. 
The reality behind the statistics is complex and does not allow for monocausal explanations, but 
unless there are groups that somehow collectively choose to be poor, to be under- and unemployed, to 
live in cramped conditions, to suffer ill health and to die prematurely, we must accept there must be 
something in the society and the way it works that advantages some and disadvantages others. Given 
the other evidence about discrimination, it is beyond reasonable doubt that discrimination is a major 
source of the disadvantages experienced by immigrants and persons belonging to minorities. 
4.2 The causes of discrimination 
Having now discussed the findings related to the extent and characteristics of discrimination, it is of 
the essence to examine the factors that underlie that discrimination. To understand the causes of 
discrimination it is essential to look at what stands behind (i) intentional discrimination, including 
racism, prejudices, negative stereotypes and self-interested cost/benefit calculations and (ii) 
unintentional discrimination, including subtle stereotypes and neutral-looking business practices. 
Whereas the distinction between intentional and unintentional forms of discrimination is not 
watertight, and is of diminishing importance in the field of law, as will be seen, it helps to underline 
the point that discrimination is not always or perhaps even predominantly a matter of bad intentions. 
4.2.1 Racism 
Racism is a relatively recent concept, as the first recorded English language usage is from the 1930s 
and the term became more widely used only in the 1960s.26 That said, beliefs, practices and actions 
that today would be labelled racist did also occur before, but it was not until evidence questioning 
‘scientific’ racial theories started to pile up together with reports describing how these theories were 
 
24 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, ‘Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed 
commitment Community Instruments and Policies for Roma Inclusion’ Brussels 2.7.2008, SEC(2008) 2172, p. 
3. 
25 See e.g. Jonathan Wheatley, ‘The Economic Status of National Minorities in Europe: a Four-Case Study’ 
Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe 1/2007. 
26 Robert Miles, Racism (London: Routledge, 1989); Michael Omi – Howard Winant, ‘Racial Formation’ in 
Philomena Essed – David Theo Goldberg (eds.) Race Critical Theories: Text and Context (Oxford: Blackwell, 
2001), p. 133. 
 
 
 
 
43
                                                       
used to justify horrific Nazi campaigns against what they regarded as ‘inferior races’ that the use of 
the concept become more widespread.27 
In its original and most well-established meaning racism refers to a more or less organized 
collection of beliefs and ideas. Racism in this sense is composed of two primary components:  
(i) A belief according to which human beings belong to mutually exclusive races that are 
distinguished by innate and immutable group characteristics (‘racialism’). These group 
characteristics are typically seen to include physical traits such as skin colour and psychological 
and social characteristics such as particular levels of intelligence and criminality. As these traits 
are perceived to be inherited, the group boundaries are held to be unbridgeable and 
insurmountable, making preservation of ‘racial purity’ a typical value held by those infected by 
racialist thinking. 
(ii) The attribution of negative or positive value to the perceived ‘racial’ characteristics. The 
evaluation of racial differences is taken to justify the creation of a hierarchy of races, which on its 
part is taken to justify the discriminatory treatment of the ‘inferior’. As both the belief in the 
existence of separate races and the value basis for their evaluation are often rather unquestionably 
held, this kind of racism considers inequality and discrimination to be natural and self-evident. 
 
Pierre-André Taguieff, among others, has by means of analysing racist discourses pointed out that 
racist theories no longer necessarily rely on inherited biological and psychological traits in their 
argumentation to justify discrimination and exclusion.28 Another form of racism has emerged which 
does not focus on racial difference but on cultural difference. Cultures are seen as constitutive of a 
nation and as mutually exclusive and incompatible. Every nation is considered to have its own, 
specific culture, the maintenance of which is that nation’s duty. In other words, national cultures are to 
be protected from alien or inauthentic elements. As one comprehensive meta-analytical study 
concluded, this form of racist ideology often reflects awareness of basic anti-racist norms and rejects 
blatant expressions of racial inequality.29 In fact, culturally oriented racism argues that all cultures are 
equal and important; the problem with it is that it also claims that cultures – and therefore the peoples 
(nations) that go with them – should preferably be kept separate.30 
Culturally oriented racism shares many features with biologically oriented racism, as both 
essentialize and reify group identity and see groups as homogenous and closed entities separated by 
insurmountable and unbridgeable differences. Empirical studies suggest that these two forms of racist 
argumentation are actually very close to each other and that the same people tend to accept both lines 
 
27 Idem (Miles). 
28 Pierre-Andre Taguieff, ‘New Cultural Racism in France’ Telos Spring 90, Issue 83; Martin Barker, The New 
Racism (London: Junction Books, 1981); Etienne Balibar – Immanuel Wallerstein, Race, Nation, Class: 
Ambiguous Identities (London: Verso, 1992). 
29 See e.g. Jessica ter Wal ’Conclusions’, in EUMC, Racism and cultural diversity in the mass media. An 
overview of research and examples of good practice in the EU Member States, 1995-2000 (Vienna: EUMC, 
2002). 
30 For instance one Neo-Nazi went on record at a rally in Bochum, Germany in June 2005 as stating that: “As a 
National Socialist, I can understand the Jews wanting to have their own nation and putting their interests first; 
then one must allow the same for the German people…” Federal Ministry of the Interior of Germany, Annual 
Report 2005 on the Protection of the Constitution, p. 60. Available at: http://www.verfassungsschutz.de 
(accessed 1.1.2010). 
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of argumentation.31 One crucial difference exists, though: while biologically oriented racism seeks to 
justify discrimination and subordination, culturally oriented racism seeks primarily to justify the 
exclusion or full assimilation of the culturally different. But even this difference actually affirms the 
common core of the two lines of argumentation. We can see that both serve the same higher-level 
function: they are essentially and primarily ways to justify group supremacy.32 The culturally oriented 
argumentation is only a more recent and presently socially acceptable justification, as speaking about 
‘racial inferiority’ has become unacceptable in mainstream Europe. The lesson here is that people 
justify or disguise their discriminatory behaviour in ways that change over time under the pressure of 
what is considered socially acceptable. 
The common core of these two conceptions of racism, among other considerations, has led a wide 
range of scholars to see racism more broadly as any justification or reproduction of domination and/or 
disadvantage or exclusion along perceived racial or ethnic lines.33 Under this line of thinking, what is 
important are not individual prejudices, hatred, bad intentions or irrational beliefs, but outcomes, the 
way in which it tends to be the interests of one group rather than those of the other groups that are 
satisfied in the society.34 Racism can then reside not just in ideologies but in social structures, 
everyday practices and even in cognitions and concepts. For instance, for some critical race theorists 
Racism is viewed not only as a matter of individual prejudice and everyday practice, but as a 
phenomenon that is deeply embedded in language and perception. Racism is ubiquitous and 
inescapable feature of modern society, and despite official rhetoric to the contrary, race is always 
present even in the most neutral and innocent terms. Concepts such as ‘justice’, ‘truth’, and 
‘reason’ are open to questions that reveal their complicity with power.35 
 
Whereas some argue that this broader conception of racism is improperly expanded because it departs 
from the original usage of the term,36 it is by no means in any way necessary or even useful to 
 
31 John Duckitt, The Social Psychology of Prejudice (London: Greenwood, 1994), p. 21. 
32 On the nature of racism as an ideological defence of domination and subordination, see Martin Bulmer – John 
Solomos (eds.), Racism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), and Colette Guillaumin, ‘Race and Nature: 
The system of Marks. The Idea of Natural Group and Social Relationships’ Feminist Issues 8, No. 2 (1998), pp. 
117–135. 
33 According to David T. Wellman, the essential feature of racism is not hostility or misperception, but rather the 
defence of a system from which advantage is derived on the basis of race. David T. Wellman, ‘Toward a 
sociology of white racism’, in Martin Bulmer – John Solomos (eds.) Racism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1999), p. 181. For Teun A. van Dijk, racism is “a specialized relation between social groups of which the 
dominant one has preferential access to, or control over scarce social resources, such as residence, nationality, 
jobs, capital, housing, education, knowledge, health or culture. Racism is the system of inequality that 
perpetuates this domination of one group (typically white Europeans) over others (in our case non-Europeans).” 
Teun A. van Dijk, ‘Theoretical Background’, in Ruth Wodak – Teun A. van Dijk (eds.) Racism at the Top: 
Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States (Klagenfurt: Drava, 2000). Philomena Essed 
sees racism by definition as “the expression or activation of group power” and more precisely as “cognitions, 
actions and procedures that contribute to the development and perpetuation of a system in which Whites 
dominate Blacks.” Philomena Essed ‘Everyday Racism: A new approach to the study of racism’, in Philomena 
Essed– David Theo Goldberg (eds.), Race Critical Theories (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), pp. 179, 181. 
34 Ibid (Essed), p. 183.  
35 Citation from Dimitrina Petrova ’Racial Discrimination and the Rights of Minority Cultures’ in Sandra 
Fredman (ed.), Discrimination and Human Rights: The Case of Racism (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2001), p. 46. 
36 E.g. Robert Miles describes these theories as ‘inflated’. Robert Miles Racism (London: Routledge, 1989), pp. 
41 ff. 
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deepfreeze a concept by defining it in terms of some historical ‘ideal types’.37 In a contemporary 
setting it is not very useful to define racism in terms of Nazism, Apartheid or even xenophobic far-
right argumentation as if they embodied timeless, absolute and exclusive forms of racism.38 In any 
event it is absolutely necessary to recognize that indeed many kinds of action and practices may create 
or reproduce hierarchical ethnic structures,39 and that it is the outcomes rather than causes that quite 
likely are the primary concern for most members of the disadvantaged groups. Given the evidence 
there is about major intergroup differences in wellbeing across the different domains of life, there is a 
need for a more innovative and comprehensive analysis of the causes of these differences. A focus on 
institutional (macro-level) racism and everyday (micro-level) racism appears to be a useful and 
necessary opportunity to draw lessons about our contemporary societies,40 much like feminism has 
been able to make major headway by virtue of analysing and criticising structures, social cognitions 
and everyday practices instead of focusing only on blatant gender stereotypes and patriarchal 
ideologies and practices.    
 
Explanations of racism 
 
A complex phenomenon such as racism requires complex theorizing about the factors that contribute 
to it. A useful distinction can be made between three kinds of explanations: micro-level explanations 
that relate to individuals and their propensities; meso-level explanations that relate to societies; and 
macro-level explanations that relate to human nature and other factors that can be thought to transcend 
the two previous levels. 
Micro-level explanations focus on the individual and what makes particular individuals susceptible 
to racist beliefs. These include: 
 
(i) Prejudices. Prejudice refers to unfairly or unreasonably formed negative opinions, assumptions 
and/or feelings towards a group of people, and can lie behind discrimination. There are racist 
prejudices but not all prejudices are racist, which is why prejudices will be separately addressed 
below. 
(ii) Other individual-level factors. Research and profiling data on offenders of racist crimes paint a 
fairly uniform picture of the offenders. Offenders tend disproportionately to be young males; to be 
unemployed or in poorly paid, low-skilled and casual employment; to suffer from educational 
underachievement; and to have a history of prior offending. Many offenders are also under the 
influence of alcohol at the time of offending.41 Yet there are many individuals who fit the above-
mentioned profile but who nevertheless do not show racist attitudes or engage in racist actions, 
which is why simplistic causal explanations should be avoided. 
 
 
37 Philip Cohen ‘It’s Racism What Dunnit’ in Martin Bulmer – John Solomos (eds.) Racism (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), p. 271. 
38 Howard Winant, ‘Racism today: Continuity and change in the post-civil rights era’, Ethnic and Racial Studies 
Vol 21, No 4 (1998). 
39 This is argued e.g. by Howard Winant, cit. supra note 38. 
40 van Dijk, cit. supra note 33. 
41 See e.g. EUMC, Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States: A Comparative Overview of Findings from the 
RAXEN NFP Reports 2001-2004 (Wien: Floramedia, 2005). 
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Meso-level explanations focus upon a range of society-specific factors that are thought to contribute to 
the conditions in which racism can flourish. These include: 
 
(i) The legacy of particular historical economic, cultural, political and social factors. In this analysis, 
slavery and the slave trade, segregation, Apartheid, imperialism, colonial conquests, economic 
exploitation, forced labour and genocidal practices are seen to underlie contemporary racism and 
racial discrimination. The precise nature of the relationship between historical events and 
contemporary racism is often not – and indeed probably cannot - be explained in any explicit 
terms,42 but undoubtedly the history of domination, exploitation and even extermination can be 
presumed to create the cognitive and material conditions that form a fertile ground for intergroup 
animosity and racism.43 Yet, it must be remembered that racism and discrimination thrive also in 
societies that have not to any major degree been involved in practices such as the trans-Atlantic 
slave trade or colonialism.  
(ii) Present-day economic, cultural, political and social factors. Various factors are thought to create or 
contribute to conditions in which racism can thrive. One factor that has garnered interest is the size 
of the minority population. It is sometimes assumed that rapid increases in the size of the minority 
population increases hostility towards ‘outsiders’. Whereas there is evidence that points towards 
this conclusion, there is also contra-evidence showing that increases in size have not had this effect 
and that also small minorities – such as the Jews in Europe – are a major target of racism.44 Yet 
another society-specific factor that can have an effect is the degree to which the majority 
population feels confident in itself: a confident majority can be presumed to be more tolerant 
towards minorities. Indeed, in established multiethnic communities, outgroup members are 
evaluated the more positively the more secure the ingroup members are about their own group and 
culture.45 Mary E. Clark, an expert in biology and conflict resolution, has pointed towards a related 
society-specific circumstance that may be relevant: according to Clark, low stress levels in a 
society tend to lead to egalitarianism, high stress levels to hierarchy with more aggressive 
behaviours.46 The meta-analysis conducted by John W. Berry and others found that the following 
factors tend to exacerbate the potential for intergroup violence, especially for those identifying 
strongly with their in-group: great relative inequalities between groups; perceived conflict between 
group interests; strong norms of physical retribution for perceived injustice; perceptions of group 
potency; deteriorating material conditions of existence; firmly entrenched scapegoating ideologies 
concerning the outgroups, along with dehumanizing beliefs about the values that characterize out-
 
42 See however Daniel Goldhagen’s account of how anti-Semitism that had developed in preceding centuries 
contributed to the Holocaust. Daniel Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust (London: Little, Brown and Company, 1996). 
43 United Nations, Report of the Seminar on the political, historical, economic, social and cultural factors 
contributing to racism, racial discrimination and apartheid (New York: United Nations, 1991). EUMC, cit 
supra note 41, p. 185. Ruth Wodak – Martin Reisigl, ‘Discourse and Racism’ in Ruth Wodak – Teun A. van 
Dijk (eds.) Racism at the Top: Parliamentary Discourses on Ethnic Issues in Six European States (Klagenfurt: 
Drava, 2000), p. 36 ff. 
44 EUMC, cit supra note 41, p. 184. Karmela Liebkind et al, ‘Group Size, Group Status and Dimensions of 
Contact as Predictors of Intergroup Attitudes’ Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 2004 Vol 7(2) 145–159. 
45 Peter B. Smith - Michael Harris Bond, Social Psychology Across Cultures (Essex: Pearson Education Limited, 
1998), p. 186; Karmela Liebkind ‘Some problems in the theory and application of cultural pluralism: the 
complexity of Ethnic Identity’ in Juha Pentikäinen – Marja Hiltunen (eds.) Cultural Minorities in Finland: An 
Overview towards Cultural Policy (Helsinki: Sivén, 1995). 
46 Mary E. Clark, In search of human nature (Routledge, London, 2002), particularly p. 97. 
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group members.47 Intergroup hostilities, racism and discrimination may also be sparked by local, 
national or even international incidents and media reports of those incidents.48 Indeed, the conflict 
between Israel and Palestinians has resurfaced around the world in many different locations, and 
the 9/11 attacks and the London bombings were in many places found to increase hostility towards 
Muslims and those that were thought to be Muslims.49 But perhaps the most important variable is 
that of the general social attitude towards racism: if the local or national community actively or 
passively condones manifestations of intolerance and racism, then these are much more likely to 
occur.50 
 
Macro-level explanations explain racism more or less in terms of human nature and those human 
propensities that are presumed to be universal and therefore not contingent on time and place. 
 
(i) Conflict Theory. The Conflict Theory, also known as the Competition Theory, holds that 
competition for scarce resources – this meaning any material or non-material good, benefit or 
entitlement such as career opportunities – produces conflict. People want to pursue their self-
interests to the maximum extent, and because they perceive their interests generally to coincide 
with those of their ingroup, they react in negative ways to any real or perceived outgroup 
competition. There is some empirical support for the Conflict Theory: attitude surveys have found 
resistance to multicultural society to be stronger in countries with a high level of ethnic 
competition, as indicated by a relatively high level of unemployment, a relatively low GDP per 
capita, and a relatively high proportion of non-western non-nationals.51 Also people on low 
incomes or at the fringes of the society – who can be presumed to be particularly unwelcoming to 
any further competition – tend to be less favourably disposed towards immigrants and minorities. 
Yet, support for the theory is not conclusive, as – in opposition to what would be predicted on the 
basis of the Conflict Theory – the data show that negative attitudes are more prevalent in rural 
areas where people often have little if any contact with and thereby competition from immigrants 
or ethnic minorities.52 It is therefore possible that negative attitudes reflect people’s generic fears 
and insecurities instead of actual competition.53 
(ii) Social Identity Theory. Social identity theory, as developed by Henri Tajfel and others, is 
concerned with explaining why and when individuals identify themselves and others as being parts 
of social groups and how this affects how they behave towards members of their own groups 
(ingroups) and members of other groups (outgroups).54 As Tajfel put it, although individuals deal 
with individuals, they are not necessarily dealing with each other as individuals.55 Social Identity 
Theory proposes that there are three fundamental psychological mechanisms that lead to ingroup 
 
47 John W. Berry et al, Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 196. 
48 See e.g. EUMC, cit. supra note 41, p. 186. 
49 Idem. 
50 Idem; Duckitt, cit. supra note 31. 
51 Marcel Coenders et al, Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in the old 15 EU Member States: results from 
the standard Eurobarometers 1997-2000-2003 (Vienna: EUMC, 2005), pp. 40–41. 
52 EUMC, Majorities’ Attitudes Towards Minorities: Key Findings from the Eurobarometer and the European 
Social Survey: Summary (Wien: Manz Crossmedia, 2005), p. 22. 
53 Ibid, p. 23. 
54 Henri Tajfel, Human Groups & Social Categories (Cambridge University Press 1981). 
55 Ibid, p. 228. 
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favouritism and outgroup discrimination. The first process is that of categorization, that is a 
cognitive grouping of people into categories. Categorization makes the world more manageable 
and offers people a foundation upon which to build the social part of their identity. The second 
process is that of social comparison. Categorization into distinct groups makes it possible to 
compare groups in terms of their attributes and relative status and power. The third process relates 
to achieving and keeping a positive self-esteem. As it is a general human characteristic to try to 
achieve and keep as much of a positive self-image as possible, one tends to value ingroup 
attributes more positively than those of outgroups. This biased evaluation, and perhaps even more 
generally the psychological need to advance the relative position of one’s own group, can also 
inform action and motivate discrimination against members of outgroups.56 There is ample support 
for the Social Identity Theory, particularly from the so-called minimal group studies. These studies 
have shown that even in situations where people are randomly assigned into groups, they start to 
show ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination once they are made aware of their group 
membership. Yet the real-life relevance of the results obtained from these controlled and 
oversimplified experimental situations is not fully clear. In real life, a person’s social identity is 
derived from multiple group memberships, which in practice means that loyalties criss-cross each 
other and group boundaries become less meaningful. On the other hand, as the salience of any one 
social identity depends on the context,57 in such societies where a particular type of categorization 
is highly salient, as is the case with ‘race’ in the United States, Social Identity Theory may have 
stronger explanatory value. Also the conflict of interests and previous hostility may factor in.58 
(iii) Anxiety produced by cross-cultural encounters. Cross-cultural interaction may produce anxiety, as 
the immediate psychological result of being in a new situation is lack of security.59 Particularly 
ethnocentric, aggressive and insecure people appear to be affected by this.60 Intercultural 
encounters may cause distressing experiences and prompt social distance particularly insofar as 
people do not have knowledge about each other’s cultural codes.61 The greatest shock may, 
however, be the encounter with one’s own cultural heritage and the resulting awareness of the 
degree to which one is a product of it.62 
(iv) Selfish genes. There is a genre of writing on ‘selfish genes’ and more generally on the theory of 
evolutionary biology that asserts that all organisms, including human beings, are driven by the goal 
of genetic self-preservation.63 Many writings use these theories to explain kin selection, a form of 
natural selection that favours altruistic behaviour toward close relatives resulting in an increase in 
the altruistic individual’s genetic contribution to the next generation. As such, these theories offer 
what appears a ‘natural’ explanation for positive ingroup and negative outgroup bias. Whereas 
there are findings that could perhaps be interpreted in favour of these theories,64 the evidence is at 
 
 
 
56 Ibid, p. 174. 
57 See Maykel Verkuyten, The Social Psychology of Ethnic Identity (Hove: Psychology Press, 2005), p. 175. 
58 Tajfel, cit. supra note 54, p. 268 
59 Smith – Bond, cit. supra note 45, p. 232. 
60 Ibid, pp. 237, 232. 
61 Discomfort may be produced by a cycle of misattributions (people talk too much or too little, or about the 
wrong topics). This calls for learning, self-awareness, personal growth and cross-cultural adaptation. Ibid, p. 245. 
62 Smith & Bond, cit. supra note 45.  
63 See Richard Dawkins, Selfish Gene (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
64 For instance, children living with a stepparent are approximately 40 times more likely to suffer physical abuse 
than those living with two genetic parents, and are 40–100 times more at risk of homicide. Kenrick – Ackerman 
– Ledlow ‘Evolutionary Social Psychology: Adaptive predispositions and Human Culture’ in John Delamater 
(ed.) Handbook of Social Psychology (New York: Kluwer Academic, 2003), p. 107. The authors also point out 
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best inconclusive and at worst contradictory, as the theory of selfish genes fails to explain many 
common phenomena from the use of contraceptives and the general decline of the birth rate in the 
affluent countries to soldiers joining up against hopeless odds in a battle.65 Also in other species 
than humans one comes across behaviour that seems incompatible with direct or indirect self-
interest, and for instance Berry et al conclude from all of this that genes are not a deterministic 
force that pre-empt moral choices.66 
 
On the basis of the above analysis, it must be clear that there is no single explanation of racism, but 
rather that the different forms of racism are produced and reproduced by the interaction of criss-
crossing social, psychological and possibly even biological factors. Any action against racism must 
take this into account and avoid simplistic accounts of racism and its remedies. 
 
Who are racist? 
 
Biologically oriented racism is most commonly associated with openly racist movements such as Neo-
Nazism and various factions of Skinheads.67 These movements typically combine mystical ideas with 
pseudo-scientific argumentation about races and nations. Skinhead and Neo-Nazi groups may 
apparently be found all over Europe, but for most EU countries either the size of these groups is not 
known or this information is not released to the public by the relevant national authorities. One of the 
few countries where this information exists and is released is Germany, where the calculations from 
the Ministry of Interior shows that there were 31 000 right-wing extremists in 2007, some 10 000 of 
whom were considered to have a propensity to use violence.68  
The second type of racism, cultural racism, is most often associated with extreme rightwing 
political movements. Political parties that have been accused of anti-immigrant and even xenophobic 
argumentation have gained a foothold across Europe in recent years. These include Freedom Party in 
Austria, Flemish Block in Belgium, Danish People’s Party in Denmark, National Front in France, 
Northern League in Italy, and British National Party in the United Kingdom. Many of these fairly 
well-known parties are perhaps better described as ‘far right’ or ‘ultra-nationalist’ rather than ‘extreme 
rightwing’ parties, but they do tend either to encourage or tolerate extremist individuals among their 
midst. Whereas one should be very careful not to conflate the two kinds of extremist movements 
together – if not for any other reason but because the political extremists often denounce or at any rate 
distance themselves from the open racism and racist violence of Neo-Nazis and Skinheads - they are 
both met with open suspicion and disapproval in many quarters of the mainstream society and are 
 
that all human cultures have systems for reckoning kinship, and norms for differential treatment of individuals 
according to kinship status. Ibid, p. 113. 
65 See generally on this Clark, cit. supra note 46. 
66 Berry, cit. supra note 47, p. 282 
67 Skinheads and Neo-Nazis should not be conflated with each other. Whereas racist attitudes and shared racist 
beliefs are typical elements for both movements, skinhead groups typically represent a subculture of loosely-knit 
young men distinguished by particular kind of clothing and music, whereas neo-Nazis typically represent a better 
organized group with aggressive support for extreme nationalism and/or National Socialism in some form. One 
should note that there are also anti-racist Skinheads in Europe, many of which identify with the SHARP 
(Skinheads Against Racial Prejudice) movement. See e.g. Stefan Rühl – Gisela Will, National Analytical Study 
on Racist Violence and Crime. European Forum for migration studies, Institute at the University of Bamberg.  
68 Bundesministerium des Innern, Verfassungsschutzbericht 2007 (Berlin: Bundesministerium des Innern), p. 51. 
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monitored by state authorities and anti-racist organizations.69 There are, of course, no guarantees that 
these groups will always remain at the fringes of the society, a fact that has proven itself in practice, as 
representatives of many extremist parties have in several countries garnered sufficient popular support 
to enter Parliaments and national governments. 
Though they are in some respects at the margins of the mainstream society, the impact of these 
movements is by no means marginal. One way to assess their significance in real life is to look at the 
extent of right-wing extremist criminal activity recorded by the police in different countries. Whereas 
Austria, Germany, France and Sweden are the only EU countries that collect and publish statistics 
about these kinds of activities on a yearly basis, already this narrow pool of evidence shows that 
extremist groups are not just alive and well but highly active: the most recent data available at the time 
of writing shows that an extraordinary 17 176 ‘right-wing extremist crimes’ were recorded in 
Germany in 2007; 387 such crimes were recorded in Sweden, 280 in Austria and 247 in France.70 The 
overwhelming majority of these offences appear to have been crimes involving illegal propaganda 
activities or incitement to hatred and violence.71 Qualitative information shows that the use of internet 
to promote racism and to facilitate communication by the right-wing extremist groups is a clear trend 
throughout Europe.72 Yet another powerful indicator of the impact of extremist groups is the degree of 
support they find in the mainstream society. Research evidence from Finland shows that ten percent of 
the population openly accepts Skinheads’ actions (i.e. not just arguments) against foreigners.73 
The above evidence notwithstanding, it would be a gross mistake to attribute racism solely to 
Skinheads, Neo-Nazis and extreme far-right parties. The price of over-identifying racism with the 
activities of extremist groups is that the more mainstream racism is downplayed or even denied. The 
existence of mainstream racism is evident for instance in the results of the 1997 Eurobarometer survey 
that asked randomly chosen respondents in the then 15 EU member states to indicate how racist they 
felt they were. The respondents fell rather evenly into three equally large categories: those that 
indicated that they were ‘quite’ or ‘very racist’, those that said they were ‘a little racist’, and those that 
said they were not at all racist.74 This point is worth rephrasing: those who feel that they are not at all 
racist constitute a minority in Europe. In another Eurobarometer survey, from the year 2000, every 
seventh respondent went so far as to say that they feel that the presence of people of another ‘race’ is 
‘disturbing’.75 Other opinion surveys, such as the 2003 European Social Survey, suggest that these 
measures for self-assessed racism cannot be attributed to excessive self-criticism: a majority of the 
 
69 Paul Gilroy, ‘The End of Antiracism’ in Philomena Essed – David Theo Goldberg (eds.) Race Critical 
Theories: Text and Context (Wiley-Blackwell, 2001), p. 252; EUMC, Racist Violence in 15 EU Member States: 
A Comparative Overview of Findings from the RAXEN National Focal Points Reports 2001-2004 (Wien: 
Floramedia, 2005), p. 184. 
70 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, Annual Report 2009 (Vienna: FRA, 2009), p. 27. 
71 An upward trend in extremist criminal activity since the year 2000 has been recorded in Germany (+9.8%) and 
Austria (+1.2%), whereas a downward trend has been recorded in France (–17.9%) and Sweden (–1.5%). Idem. 
72 Ibid, p. 127. EUMC, Trends and Developments 1997-2005. Combating Ethnic and Racial Discrimination and 
Promoting Equality in the European Union (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, 2007), pp 37 ff. 
73 Magdalena Jaakkola, Suomalaisten suhtautuminen maahanmuuttajiin vuosina 1987–2003. Työpoliittinen 
tutkimus No 286 (Helsinki: työministeriö, 2005), p. 90. 
74 European Commission, Eurobarometer Opinion Poll no 47.1. Racism and Xenophobia in Europe (European 
Commission, 1997). 
75 European Commission, Eurobarometer No 53 (European Commission, 2000). 
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respondents in Europe expressed resistance to diversity and immigrants and perceived the existence of 
a collective ethnic threat.76 
The above-mentioned findings are corroborated by the results of attitude surveys that have posed 
more specific questions about belief in racist statements. Such surveys have been conducted for 
instance in Finland and Germany. In Finland surveys have found considerable agreement with 
biologically oriented racism, as almost half of the population was found to agree with the view that 
“certain races are not at all fit for living in a modern society” and as every third person agreed with the 
statement that some nations are more intelligent than others.77 In Germany every seventh person 
agreed with such blatantly racist statements as “whites are justifiably the leading group in the world” 
and “there are population groups that are worth less than others”.78 There is also support for the 
culturally oriented racism: in Germany more than every fourth person was of the view that immigrants 
should be sent back home when jobs are in short supply, and that foreigners living in Germany should 
not be allowed to participate in any aspect of political life. Two out of three were of the view that 
foreigners should assimilate more with the German lifestyle.79 In Finland every fourth person was of 
the view that people from different cultures should live separately and not mix, and that the practice of 
Islam should not be allowed because it threatens “our own culture”.80 In Germany half of the 
population reported that they would feel uncomfortable about moving to an area with a high 
percentage of Muslims.81 
The role of mainstream racism becomes even more apparent in light of the fact that members of 
extremist groups account only for a small portion of all discrimination. Evidence from Finland, 
France, the Netherlands and Sweden – the only EU countries for which this kind of information is 
available – shows that members of extremist groups are responsible for 5%–18% of all racist crimes.82 
Furthermore, as the majority of racist crimes involve either propaganda, threats or assaults, not 
discrimination, it is likely that extremists are responsible for an even smaller portion of all 
discrimination, because profiling data for Skinheads and Neo-Nazis shows that they are not very likely 
even to be in a position where they could discriminate, such as being a banker or a HR director at a 
major company. There is therefore strong evidence for the view that it is the ‘ordinary people’ who are 
responsible for the overwhelming majority of cases of discrimination, not the extremists.83 
 
76 The survey was conducted in the then 15 EU countries and selected candidate countries. EUMC, Majorities’ 
Attitudes Towards Minorities: Key Findings from the Eurobarometer and the European Social Survey. Summary 
(Wien: Manz Crossmedia, 2005). 
77 Jaakkola, cit. supra note 73, p. 90.  
78 Wilhelm Heitmeyer, Deutsche Zustände - Folge 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 2002). 
79 Statistisches Bundesamt, Datenreport 2002 (Bonn, 2002). 
80 These findings should be interpreted in light of the results of the Eurobarometer surveys, according to which 
Finns tend to hold the most positive views about immigration in the EU and have more positive attitudes towards 
minority groups than people in the EU in the average. European Commission, Special Eurobarometer Survey 
273, European Social Reality, p. 71. EUMC, Attitudes towards minority groups in the European Union. A 
special analysis of the Eurobarometer 2000 survey (Vienna: SORA, 2001). 
81 Frank Asbrock et al ‘The Road to Negative Behaviour: Discriminatory Intentions in the German Population’ 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence Vol. 1(1) 2007, p. 9. 
82 In France, only 9% of racist incidents were attributable to the extreme right in 2002;  In the Netherlands, less 
than 5% of all discriminatory offences and racists acts that took place in 2002 could be attributed to extremists; 
In Sweden, 18% of “xenophobic crimes” (excluding anti-Semitism) were connected with the White Power 
movement. Data from Finland shows that Skinheads commit less than ten per cent of all racially motivated 
crimes, and three fourths of these cases were assaults, not acts of discrimination. Tuunia Keränen, Poliisin 
tietoon tullut rasistinen rikollisuus Suomessa 2004 (Helsinki: Edita 2005). 
83 See also EUMC, cit. supra note 41.  
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The excessive focus on extremist groups serves essential social and psychological functions: one 
of them is that it allows for the externalization of racism and discrimination, which allows the 
‘mainstream society’ and its members to maintain a positive, rational and tolerant self-image.84 
Racism is always located somewhere else: in the past (slavery, colonialism), abroad (Apartheid), at the 
margins of the political life (extreme right wing) or at the margins of the society (Neo-Nazis, 
Skinheads).85 Whereas most people do formally acknowledge that they are at least somewhat racist, 
meaning that they recognize that they have negative feelings towards those who are ethnically 
different, they commonly attempt to justify these negative emotions in terms of pseudo-rational 
arguments, meaning that they see their own racism more in terms of ‘wise caution’ than prejudices. At 
the same time they appear to acknowledge that the truth value or persuasiveness of their arguments is 
questionable; otherwise they would not recognize racism in themselves.86 Typical pseudo-rational 
arguments for exclusion include all-familiar statements such as “immigrants exploit the social security 
system”, “immigrants take away employment from others”, “immigrants commit more crimes than 
members of the mainstream society”, “I have nothing against immigrants personally, but my 
employees dislike them, and therefore I can’t hire them”, “I am not racist, my best friend is Black, but 
we should not take in more immigrants”.87 Denial of racism, through these various argumentative 
strategies, is probably its most common form. As this denial serves to let biased practices and attitudes 
to go on unchecked, the society-wide failure to recognize racism and to react to it become key 
elements of structural racism. 
That said, it would be misleading, ethically problematic and unwise to label all or nearly all 
individuals and societies as ‘racist’. As Dimitrina Petrova has pointed out, racist beliefs and attitudes 
can be present in a person’s mind with varying degrees of conviction, awareness, scope and 
intensity.88 Furthermore, people tend to have mixed attitudes: whereas most Europeans acknowledge 
that they are at least somewhat ‘racist’, a clear majority of two thirds is also of the view that ethnic 
diversity enriches national culture and that measures are needed to provide equal treatment in the field 
of employment.89 A person can therefore harbour both racist and egalitarian beliefs and attitudes. 
Similarly, while patterns, policies and measures that disadvantage immigrants can be identified in all 
societies, together with a collective failure to fully remedy them, all countries in Europe have adopted 
legislation and policies with a view to combating racism and discrimination. There is certainly a point 
 
84 The perception of racism as an anomaly in the otherwise (mostly) healthy society committed to equality often 
also figures in the speeches and writings of those in the anti-discrimination camp, and has long traditions there. 
For instance, Martin MacEwen writes about Gunnar Myrdahl’s classic study “The American Dilemma” 
(published in 1944) that it characterises racism as “the repairable failure of the liberal, democratic practices in 
respect of black rights to coincide with liberal, democratic theory.” Martin MacEwen, ‘Promoting equal 
opportunity: the enforcement agency’, in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1997), p. 9. 
85 Cf. Teun A. van Dijk ‘Denying Racism: Elite Discourse and Racism’ in Philomena Essed – David Theo 
Goldberg (eds.) Race Critical Theories: Text and Context (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001), p. 310. 
86 Timo Makkonen ’Ennakkoluulojen ja jälkiviisauden välissä: Suomalaisten ulkomaalaisasenteista’ 
Maailmanpyörä 3/2002. 
87 Not only adults but also young people tend to offer these explanations for their prejudices, see e.g. Marek 
Fuchs – Siegfried Lamnek – Ralf Wiederer, Querschläger. Jugendliche zwischen rechter Ideologie und Gewalt 
(Leverkusen: Leske & Budrich, 2003). 
88 Dimitrina Petrova ‘The Denial of Racism’ in Claude Cahn (ed.) Roma Rights: Race, Justice, and Strategies for 
Equality (Amsterdam: IDEA, 2002), p. 208. 
89 European Commission, Eurobarometer: Discrimination in the European Union, Special Eurobarometer 263, 
fieldwork June-July 2006 (European Commission, 2007). 
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after which societies and individuals can be described as ‘racist’, but given the totalizing properties 
and the ultimate moral condemnation implied by the label ‘racist’, that point should not be reached too 
easily. 
4.2.2  Prejudices 
Prejudice refers to unfairly or unreasonably formed negative opinions, assumptions and/or feelings 
towards a group of people. It often has to do with lack of knowledge: when faced with incomplete, 
inconsistent or inexistent information, people may base their actions on whatever instinctive feelings 
or intuitions they happen to have instead of engaging on a search for more information. Some people 
prefer their gut feelings even over solid information or its rational analysis. The downside of all of this 
is that the instincts and emotions that come into play may represent faulty or incorrect generalizations 
or rigid and inflexible attitudes that constitute poor bases for making judgements. Whenever they form 
a certain tendency or a pattern, they may be called prejudices.  
One way to understand prejudices is to break the concept down into three constitutive components. 
These are:90 
(i) Negative stereotypes (cognitive component). Stereotypes are standardised mental pictures held 
in common by members of a group about another group or phenomenon. Stereotypes typically 
represent oversimplified or over-generalized opinions: the perceived group characteristics are 
assumed to apply to each member of the group.  
(ii) Negative feelings (affective component). Research indicates fear and anger to be the emotions 
that are the most central elements in prejudices.91 Negative feelings may result from a 
negative evaluation of the stereotypes attached to a group: the more we believe outgroups are 
dissimilar to our ingroup standard, the more hostile we are toward
(iii) Behavioural patterns, such as keeping social distance (behavioural component). The notion of 
social distance refers to the absence of, in particular, voluntary contact between the prejudiced 
person and members of the group against which he/she is prejudiced.93 Contemporary social 
psychology has found that prejudices are reduced by voluntary intergroup contacts, especially 
if the contacts are of sufficient frequency, duration and closeness and take place between 
people of equal status.94 Particularly intergroup friendships have been found to be important.95 
 
90 See e.g. Duckitt, cit. supra note 31, and Berry et al, cit. supra note 47, p. 371 ff. 
91 Asbrock et al, cit. supra note 81, p. 15. 
92 Smith & Bond, cit. supra note 45, p. 192. 
93 Social distance can be defined as a reflection of the preferred degree of closeness in interpersonal contact and 
relationships with members of other group. Duckitt, cit. supra note 31. 
94 See e.g. T. F. Pettigrew – L.R. Tropp ‘Does intergroup contact reduce prejudice? Recent meta-analytic 
findings’ in S. Oskamp (ed.), Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 2000). 
It should, however, be noted that contact can also have negative effects: even a single experience with prejudice 
can have a considerable, negative impact on how group members feel in intergroup contexts, and on their 
expectations for future cross-group interactions. Linda R. Tropp ‘The Psychological Impact of Prejudice: 
Implications for Intergroup Contact’ Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2003 Vol 6 (2), pp. 131–149.  
95 See e.g. the special issue on intergroup contact of the journal Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2003 
Vol 6(1). 
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These three components typically reinforce each other, forming a prejudiced attitude, but the relevance 
of each of them probably varies from person to person and situation to situation. That said, recent 
research has emphasised the affective component as the core element of prejudice.96 The three 
components have systemic properties, as negative feelings lead to social distance (avoidance of 
contact), which in its turn creates the necessary space for the development and maintenance of 
negative stereotypes, which again serve to reinforce negative feelings. 
Early theories of prejudice, developed by Theodor Adorno and his colleagues, explained 
prejudices in terms of special personality types. Adorno proposed that certain family conditions, 
particularly the experience of excessively harsh and moralistic parenting, produce an outlook on life 
which is over-deferential towards authority, socially conservative, hostile towards minorities or other 
non-dominant groups and dominated by a simplistic and categorical perceptual and cognitive style.97 
Field research and laboratory experiments have indeed established a positive correlation between 
authoritarianism and prejudices.98 A report on the European Social Survey found that so-called 
‘intermediate characteristics’ play a part as well: 
the more people perceive decreases in their personal safety, or the more they distrust other people 
or distrust political leaders, or the more they consider themselves to be politically right-wing, or the 
more they perceive ethnic minorities to pose a collective threat, the more they favour ethnic 
exclusionism.99 
 
Surveys often find demographic variations in the levels of prejudice: studies have quite consistently 
found men to be more prejudiced than women, older individuals to be more prejudiced than young 
adults, the less educated to be more prejudiced than the well-educated, and people living in rural areas 
to be more prejudiced than urban people. According to some survey results, people on low incomes 
and people who are in manual jobs or self-employed tend in general to have more negative 
attitudes.100 Some studies, but not all, have also found a difference in the levels of prejudice between 
people who have different political l
Important findings point towards the conclusion that prejudices against different societal groups 
are interrelated. This means that if a typical European male, a nominally Christian middle-class 
heterosexual man, is prejudiced against ethnic minorities, he is also likely to be prejudiced against 
women, sexual minorities, religious minorities and even the homeless.102 Studies also indicate that 
those who harbour intense prejudices are often not at all ashamed of it; it is the less prejudiced 
individuals who are self-critical about their departures from the egalitarian standards.103 
 
96 Asbrock et al, cit. supra note 81, p. 7. 
97 Theodor W. Adorno et al, The Authoritarian Personality, Abridged edition (New York: Norton, 1982), p. 11. 
98 Karmela Liebkind – Juha Haaramo – Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti, ’Kannattaa tutustua paremmin’, in Karmela 
Liebkind (toim.) Monikulttuurinen Suomi: Etniset suhteet tutkimuksen valossa (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2000), pp. 
56–61.  
99 M. Coenders. et al, Majorities’ attitudes towards minorities in European societies: results from the European 
Social Survey 2002-2003 (Vienna: EUMC, 2005), paragraph 4.0.  
100 EUMC, Majorities’ Attitudes Towards Minorities: Key Findings from the Eurobarometer and the European 
Social Survey. Summary (Wien: EUMC, 2005). 
101 Asbrock et al, cit. supra note 81. 
102 Ibid, p. 7. 
103 Smith & Bond, cit. supra note 45, p. 195. 
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While individual personality dynamics therefore have been found to have a considerable role to 
play, it is social norms rather than these personality dynamics that determine the overall levels of 
prejudice in particular groups and societies. This is because our opinions are strongly influenced by 
such factors as the opinions of those around or near us, the norms of our group, and the relationships 
between our group and the other groups.104 Levels of prejudice also appear to be lower in societies that 
are also low on measures of hierarchy and conservatism and high on civic participation and 
tolerance.105 These findings indicating the importance of social factors align well with historical 
experiences, ranging from Nazi Germany to the genocide in Rwanda, that have shown that levels of 
socially shared prejudices and hatred can skyrocket in a matter of months, even weeks, which 
indicates that prejudices cannot be explained simply in terms of relatively stable personality traits. 
4.2.3 Stereotypes 
Stereotypes may involve beliefs about the traits, values, behaviours, opinions or indeed beliefs of 
typical persons from a group.106 It is useful and necessary to distinguish prejudices from stereotypes. 
The latter are not necessarily negatively loaded or completely out of touch with reality, but can also be 
positive and have an element of truth in them.107 Stereotypes serve at least two functions: they 
facilitate the formation of social identity by making it possible to compare essentialized ingroup and 
outgroup traits, and they reduce uncertainty and guide behaviour by means of offering pre-established 
expectations.108 Stereotypes can originate from the culture in which people are socialized, from 
observed intergroup differences (e.g. cultural and socio-economic differences) and also from a 
cognitive bias resulting from the very process of categorical differentiation between groups of people. 
Because of their socially constructed character, stereotypes are often culturally specific, which means 
that a complete analysis of prejudices in a particular context requires the taking into account of a 
complex mix of historical, political, economic and social structural forces that are at work in that 
context. 
Stereotypes can be harmful because the very act of stereotyping necessarily involves and calls for 
intergroup comparisons and evaluation. It is particularly beliefs about the values of outgroup members 
that matter: a perception that benevolence and universalism are part of an outgroup’s value base is 
associated with lower rejection of those group’s members.109 Large differences in terms of perceived 
values and perceived humanity appear to be critically dangerous for intergroup harmony; the view of 
the enemy as evil sustains all group conflicts.110 On the other hand, a moderate difference in terms of 
perceived values may even be socially necessary for the purpose of maintaining social identities, in 
 
104 Rupert Brown, Prejudice – Its Social Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 11. 
105 Smith & Bond, cit. supra note 45, p. 195. 
106 Ibid, p. 185. 
107 See e.g. Duckitt, cit. supra note 31, p. 118. 
108 Cf. Smith – Bond, cit. supra note 45, pp. 186–187. 
109 Ibid, p. 193. Readiness for outgroup social contact among Jews and Arabs in Israel has been found to be 
positively associated with universalism and self-direction domains of values and negatively with tradition, 
security and conformity values. Ibid, p. 194. 
110 Ibid, pp. 186–187. 
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addition to which it has been submitted that interacting social groups often come to hold positive 
stereotypes about one another.111 
 
Relationship between attitudes and discrimination 
 
The relationship between attitudes (such as prejudices) and behaviour (such as discrimination) is a 
complex one. Research into this suggests that there is a causal connection between prejudices and 
discrimination: prejudices arguably determine the overall tendency of a person to discriminate, but 
cannot predict specific single acts with much accuracy.112 A prejudiced person does not necessarily act 
in accordance with the prejudices: a prejudiced person may be barred from discriminating in an 
environment where discrimination is generally deemed unacceptable and where other people might 
come to react to it. In another environment, for instance in a peer group of like-minded individuals, or 
where there is no social control, or where there is impunity on part of the police or the society at large, 
the same person is more likely to engage in discrimination. A prejudiced person may have mixed 
motives, in which case the motive to discriminate is just one among many. A person who is strongly 
motivated to observe the law, and who knows that discrimination is illegal, may be thus precluded 
from taking discriminatory action. 
Overall, the present mainstream scholarly opinion appears to be that the relationship between 
prejudices and discrimination is substantial: prejudices tend to generate discrimination.113 Prejudices 
and stereotypes are dangerous also because they can be used to justify and legitimize existing 
imbalances in the social and power relations within a society.114 They may therefore explain a portion 
of the reluctance to combat and remedy discrimination in an effective way.  
Simplistic responses such as awareness raising campaigns that aim at providing accurate, 
stereotype-busting information are not necessarily the right or sufficient antidote to prejudices, as 
people attend to, and rehearse, prejudice-consistent information more frequently than inconsistent 
information.115 Instead, one useful approach is to motivate people to attend to individual differences 
instead of category-based stereotypes.116 
4.2.4 Statistical discrimination 
Statistical discrimination is a phenomenon that has been studied particularly in the field of 
economics.117 It occurs when people purposefully use overall beliefs about a group – stereotypes - to 
make decisions about an individual from that group. The individual may or may not correspond to the 
stereotype, and therefore predictions and decisions that rest on statistical discrimination carry the risk 
that they will prove entirely wrong. Those that engage in statistical discrimination are willing to take 
 
111 Ibid, pp. 185–186. 
112 Duckitt, cit. supra note 31, p. 41. 
113 See Asbrock et al, cit. supra note 81, p. 8 and the references cited therein. Deitch, cit. supra note 11, p. 1301. 
114 Smith – Bond, cit. supra note 45, p. 188. 
115 Ibid, p. 191. 
116 Ibid, p. 237. 
117 See e.g. David A Strauss ‘The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for 
Numerical Standards’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed.) Anti-Discrimination Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2004). 
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the risk, because they believe that they will hit the mark more often than they will miss it – hence the 
term statistical discrimination.  
We all use statistical predictions every day, as they appear to make life easier. We assume, for 
instance, that a person with a university diploma must be of a certain intellectual capacity. Yet, even in 
this rather straightforward scenario we might be wrong, for instance if the diploma was forged or if, 
upon closer scientific examination, having a university degree does not correlate positively with 
intellectual capacity. When employers, service providers or for instance the police - profiling being 
closely related to statistical discrimination – act upon ethnic stereotypes they are on even more shaky 
grounds, as ethnic origin usually doesn’t correlate well or at all with factors that are relevant for 
decision-making, unlike having a university degree.  
That said, statistical discrimination can sometimes be based upon knowledge of actual 
distributions of characteristics within different population groups, not just beliefs about such 
distributions. An employer might, for instance, have observed that many immigrant groups, on 
average, have more children than the majority population – and be right about it – and deduce from 
this that an immigrant worker would be more likely than a majority worker to take time off work to 
take care of her children in the event of one of them falling sick, and on the basis of this analysis 
prefer to hire a majority worker. Our employer would quite likely think that this would be a perfectly 
rational and legitimate decision,118 but could be wrong because not all immigrants have large families, 
and many of those that do, have extended families that can take care of the children when they get 
sick. 
The main problem with acts of statistical discrimination is not the prejudices but the fact that they 
often rest on shaky assumptions and unfairly disadvantage entire groups of individuals. To operate on 
the basis of shaky presumptions when other people’s major events of life are at stake shows a high 
level of indifference, and suggests that there is a fine line between prejudices and incorrect statistical 
assumptions.119 A further problem is that sometimes differences between groups, for instance in the 
average level of educational achievement, are themselves the result of discrimination, and statistical 
discrimination in those circumstances simply adds to the injustice. Statistical discrimination can also 
lead to underinvestment in education and other human capital among members of worse-off groups, 
because individuals adjust their aspirations and expectations in view of the fact that their individual 
efforts are not necessarily recognized and rewarded because of their affiliation with a particular 
group.120 Because of these considerations, the use of group characteristics to make decisions about 
individuals, for instance in the context of employment, is usually not allowed under contemporary 
anti-discrimination laws. 
An analogous problem arises when decision-makers have differing amounts of information about 
different groups. If an employer deems persons belonging to a minority to be just as talented as 
persons belonging to a majority, but she herself is from the majority group and therefore finds it easier 
to identify talented members of that group, it is likely that she will seek new employees from the ranks 
of the majority. While the employer may find this practice rational in terms of cost/efficiency-
 
118 Larry Alexander ‘What makes wrongful discrimination wrong? Biases, preferences, stereotypes, and proxies’ 
in Christopher McCrudden (ed.) Anti-Discrimination Law (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2004). 
119 Melissa S. Williams, ‘In Defence of Affirmative Action: North American Discourses for the European 
Context?’ in Erna Appelt –Monica Jarosch (eds.) Combating Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a 
Model for Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), p. 64. 
120 Strauss, cit. supra note 117, p. 311. 
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calculation, it unfairly disadvantages persons belonging to the minority on account of their group 
membership, and is suspect on those grounds. 
4.2.5 Unintentional biases 
Evidence has recently started to come in showing that not all discrimination, or perhaps even most of 
it, can be attributed to racism, prejudices, opportunistic ‘statistical’ calculations or other forms of 
intentional discrimination.121 Whereas we probably still can’t fully grasp the dynamics and importance 
of unintentional discrimination, scientific research has recently produced important findings in this 
respect.122 
Contrary to what perhaps most people would expect, even well-meaning individuals who do not 
knowingly harbour prejudices may engage in discrimination on account of the stereotypes they have. 
One of the reasons for this is that people can act on internalized but unconsciously operating and 
subtle stereotypes. Because stereotypes are socially created and maintained, we can presume that a 
good portion of individuals in any given society share them. Research evidence suggests that socially 
learned biased cognitive categories and associations may persist and be engaged automatically, in the 
matter of milliseconds, and that this shapes the behavioural responses of even good-intentioned 
persons.123 If a stereotype is available in the memory, relevant cues such as a job applicant’s foreign 
name can activate it without need of awareness, intention, effort or control.124 Stereotypes are 
activated just too quickly, even automatically, for us to prevent them from having an effect, although it 
appears to be the case that if specifically and effectively primed to think about them, people internally 
motivated to avoid stereotypes are able to reduce their salience and effect.125 This can take place 
through self-regulation of stereotyping involving deliberate corrective processes that overturn 
activated stereotypes or automatic processes.126 Much also depends on the strength of the stereotype 
(which category dominates if a person is perceived as belonging to multiple categories) and on the 
social context (whether social knowledge places emphasis on a particular category).127 
Expectation States Theory, a well-established theory in the field of social psychology, provides 
one explanation of how status stereotypes can come to play in group interaction situations without us 
being aware of their involvement. This theory holds that people align performance expectations, such 
as making good decisions, with status characteristics, such as being wealthy, even when the two do not 
 
121 See e.g. National Research Council, Measuring Racial Discrimination. Panel on Methods for Assessing 
Discrimination. (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004), and the references mentioned therein; 
Matthew D Lieberman, et al ‘An fMRI investigation of race-related amygdala activity in African-American and 
Caucasian-American individuals’ Nature Neuroscience, Vol 8 No 6 June 2005. 
122 The different reasons that are reviewed here appear in no particular order, as we do not know the precise 
extent to which each one of them explains discrimination.  
123 See National Research Council, Measuring Racial Discrimination. Panel on Methods for Assessing 
Discrimination. (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004), and the references mentioned therein; 
Matthew D. Lieberman et al. ‘An fMRI investigation of race-related amygdala activity in African-American and 
Caucasian-American individuals’ Nature Neuroscience, Vol 8 No 6 June 2005. 
124 Susan M. Andersen et al ‘Automatic Thought’, in E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (eds.), Social 
psychology: Handbook of basic principles (New York: Guilford Publications, 1996), p. 141. 
125 Ibid, p. 148. 
126 Ibid, p. 144. 
127 Ibid, p. 149. 
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in fact correlate positively. Empirical research has found, for instance, that in group interaction 
situations, the ideas of people who talk more in groups are often judged to be more valuable than those 
offered by less talkative members; that people with more prestigious jobs are more likely to be chosen 
leader of a group, such as a jury, even when their job has little if anything to do with the task at hand; 
and that ideas are often thought to sound better when offered by someone perceived to be attractive.128 
Further, group experiments have shown that the arbitrary allocation of differential pay levels to 
participants creates corresponding influence hierarchies among them during interaction.129 This 
underlines how status differentials create performance expectations even when status is not in fact 
linked to actual personal performance. Given that many minority and immigrant groups suffer from a 
negative public image and poor socio-economic status, it is clear that their social status tends to be low 
and that the members of these groups are put at a disadvantage on those grounds. 
The aforementioned performance expectations shape behaviour in a self-fulfilling fashion. The 
greater the performance expectation of one actor compared to another, the more likely the first will be 
given chances to speak up and offer task suggestions, the more likely his or her suggestions will be 
positively evaluated, and the less likely he or she will be to be influenced when there are 
disagreements.130 Therefore members of an economically better-off group gain a systematic advantage 
in gaining influence and esteem in the majority of situations involving individuals from several 
groups. Indeed, Shelley Correll and Cecilia L. Ridgeway conclude that members of ethnic minorities, 
due to status beliefs, must actually perform at higher levels than members of status groups to be 
judged as equally competent.131 This of course flies in the face of the prevailing conception of Europe 
as the bastion of meritocracy, where only individual ability and ambition matter.  
The concept of discrimination, also in the field of law, as will be seen, has become detached from 
discriminatory intentions. Indirect forms of discrimination are of particular relevance here because 
they encompass practices and criteria that appear neutral but have an unjustifiable adverse effect on 
members of a group. This form of discrimination can be very difficult to detect, since by definition 
members of all groups are treated in the same way, ‘neutrally’, and the disadvantage that results can 
often be rendered visible only through statistical means that reveal the differential impact the treatment 
has upon some group. For instance, informal recruitment through word-of-mouth, a widely used 
business practice that as such does not look suspect, can have discriminatory effects where the existing 
workforce consists mainly of members of the majority: immigrants are excluded from the start from 
the potential pool of job applicants, because they will be outside the existing contact networks and 
never learn about the job openings. In this way, subtle forms of discrimination can be an integral part 
of the very culture of an organisation without anyone ever intending it. What is at stake here is 
negligence or ignorance rather than prejudices or outright racism.  
The extent and impact of unintentional forms of discrimination are very difficult to measure.132 
Given however the fact that many of the psychological and social psychological mechanisms that are 
 
128 Shelley Correll – Cecilia L. Ridgeway ‘Expectation States Theory’ in John Delamater (ed.), Handbook of 
Social Psychology (New York: Kluwer, 2003), p. 29. 
129 Ibid, p. 38. 
130 Ibid, p. 31. 
131 Ibid, p. 41.  
132 Discrimination testing experiments can indeed reveal instances of both intentional and unintentional 
discrimination, but they cannot tell to what extent each form of discrimination is responsible for the overall 
discrimination. 
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at work here appear to be universal, there is reason to believe that its impact is substantial and 
generally underestimated. 
4.3 The effects of discrimination 
Research into the dynamics of discrimination tends to disproportionately focus upon perpetrators and 
the causes of discrimination instead of focusing on the victims and the effects of discrimination.133 Yet 
it is not possible to fully understand the factors that contribute to discrimination without looking at the 
impact of discrimination, as the two are connected. It is therefore absolutely necessary to investigate 
how discrimination affects the individuals and groups concerned and even the entire society. 
 
Individual and group level effects 
 
Discrimination has a range of effects upon its victims. To begin with, discrimination constitutes the 
denial of an opportunity, benefit or some other good, such as employment. In that way, it prejudices 
the rights and opportunities of its victims and is intrinsically liable to produce a negative social and 
economic impact. Discrimination can even trigger or contribute to a downward spiral in which loss of 
employment leads into loss of many other things, from housing to employment-related social 
networks. Indeed, discrimination in one field of life can have an impact on other fields of life, and its 
effects may be passed on from one generation to the next.134 As an example: 
Discrimination in access to employment, or discrimination in the conditions of work (such as the 
payment of a lower salary), may lead to a situation where the discriminated-against person has to 
relocate, with his/her family, to a less expensive neighbourhood. This neighbourhood probably has 
greater concentrations of people who face various degrees of deprivation, providing for a 
potentially hostile environment. The services in the area, including health services, are likely to be 
inferior to those provided in the better-off neighbourhoods. The children of the family are likely to 
attend a lower-quality school that has fewer teachers and material resources and where the general 
attitude climate poses low expectations in terms of educational achievement. This is likely to 
impact their success in the school, and later on limit their employment opportunities.135  
 
As this example highlights, disadvantages in general tend to reinforce each other. But it is essential to 
notice that discrimination not only has tangible material consequences but is also a direct assault upon 
the victim’s identity, as it is on that basis that the person is discriminated against. Discrimination 
 
133 See e.g. Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti – Karmela Liebkind – Tiina Vesala, Rasismi ja syrjintä Suomessa: 
Maahanmuuttajien kokemuksia (Helsinki: Gaudeamus, 2002), p. 42.  
134 On the intergenerational transmission of disadvantages, see e.g. European Commission, The Social Situation 
in the European Union 2007 – Social Cohesion through Equal Opportunities (Luxembourg: OOPC, 2008). 
135 Example inspired by National Research Council, Measuring Racial Discrimination. Panel on Methods for 
Assessing Discrimination (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004) and Frank Bovenkerk, A Manual 
for International Comparative Research on Discrimination on the Grounds of “Race” and Ethnic Origin 
(Geneva: International Labour Office, 1992). On the interrelationships between origin, discrimination and socio-
economic status, see David R. Williams ‘Race, Socioeconomic Status, and Health: The Added Effects of Racism 
and Discrimination’ Annals New York Academy of Sciences 1999; 896: 173–188. 
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embodies, in essence, a denial of the victim’s equal moral worth. A substantial amount of research has 
recently investigated the psychological effects that such an assault produces.136 On the basis of a 
systematic meta-analysis of 138 studies Yin Paradies has concluded that experiences of discrimination 
are associated, on an individual level, with symptoms relating to stress and depression.137 Further 
research suggests that the negative health effects of everyday discrimination are equally, if not more, 
profound than those of more blatant forms of discrimination.138 The impact of perceived 
discrimination on psychological states has been found to be direct, strong and instant, while it is more 
indirect and slower on overall physical health status.139 These negative health effects add to the 
negative material effects engendered by discrimination. 
Yet the impact of discrimination on its victims goes even further than this. Jan Döring has 
theorized, on the basis of empirical findings, that many individuals who experience acts of racial or 
ethnic discrimination or violence, interpret these experiences as manifestations of more general and 
widespread hostility towards their group, an interpretation that is likely to trigger negative feelings 
towards the outgroups. His data provides strong support for the view that experiences with 
discrimination lead immigrants and persons belonging to minorities to perceive greater bias within 
public institutions and the majority group.140 The inability of the law to prevent discrimination from 
taking place appears not just to erode confidence in the public authorities, but also more generally in 
the legal system and even the society as a whole.141 Such experiences also engender a feeling of 
economic exploitation, lead to a generalized expectation of discrimination and make people less likely 
to identify with the mainstream society, hampering the integration of minorities into the society at 
large.142 Perception of the society as racist may also lead to politicization of social identity.143 All of 
this means that victims of discrimination become more aware of the existence of discrimination and 
more likely to grow increasingly sensitive towards racist jokes and other such signs of inequality. 
Discrimination also quite self-evidently fosters intergroup tensions and leads to social disintegration.  
People who experience discrimination cope with it in various ways in terms of psychological 
reactions and behavioural responses.144 Active behavioural responses, such as seeking professional or 
peer support or reporting of the incident to the relevant authorities, appear in general to be positively 
correlated with the mitigation of the negative health effects of discrimination, although also other 
 
136 Jasinskaja-Lahti et al, cit. supra note 133, p. 45. 
137 Yin Paradies ‘A systematic review of empirical research on self-reported racism and health’ International 
Journal of Epidemiology 2006 35(4), pp. 888–901. 
138 Deitch, cit. supra note 11, p. 1302. It has been suggested that everyday discrimination is a major stressor 
because it consists typically of events, such as exclusion from the social activities at the workplace, whose cause 
is not evident, unlike what is typically the case with more blatant forms of discrimination. This is because it may 
be easier to cope with the thought that one was mistreated because of irrational prejudices held by another person 
than with the thought that one was mistreated because the other person disliked one’s personality. See ibid, p. 
1305. 
139 Inga Jasinskaja-Lahti – Karmela Liebkind – Riku Perhoniemi, ‘Perceived ethnic discrimination at work and 
well-being of immigrants in Finland: The moderating role of employment status and work-specific group-level 
beliefs’ International Journal of Intercultural Relations 31 (2007), p. 225. 
140 Jan Döring ‘Influences of Discriminatory Incidents on Immigrant’s Attitudes Toward German Society’ 
International Journal of Conflict and Violence Vol 1(1) 2007, pp. 19–31. 
141 Idem (Döring); See also Kurt Salentin ‘Determinants of Experience of Discrimination in Minorities in 
Europe’ International Journal of Conflict and Violence Vol 1(1) 2007, pp. 32–50. 
142 Idem (Salentin); Döring, cit. supra note 140. 
143 Marie-Claude Gervais, The Drivers of Black and Asian people’s perceptions of racial discrimination by 
public services: A qualitative study (West Yorkshire: Communities and Local Government Publications, 2008). 
144 Jasinskaja-Lahti et al, cit supra note 139. 
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factors play a role.145 In the extreme, however, active coping may predict militant protest, especially 
when discrimination is perceived as widespread, the majority as hostile and the own ingroup as 
relatively deprived.146 This leads to poorer socio-cultural adaptation and constitutes a barrier to 
integration.  
Many cope with their experiences more passively, however. For many discrimination is a 
humiliating experience that they do not want to deal with in public. Yet for others discrimination may 
be such a frequently recurring event that it has become an almost daily experience. Some may explain 
their experiences in terms other than discrimination, and may even blame themselves for their 
experiences. What is common for these victim groups is that they are not likely to take action, such as 
filing a complaint. Indeed, only a small minority of those who have experienced discrimination take 
legal action.147 
The fact that victims of discrimination may not take legal action does not mean that their 
experiences would not affect their behaviour. One typical behavioural response is to engage in a so-
called strategy of avoidance, by which the person concerned seeks to – knowingly or not – avoid 
situations in which the likelihood of ending up discriminated against is particularly high.148 For an 
example, a person engaging in avoidance strategies may seek only jobs for which there is less 
competition – typically the less well-paid jobs – where it is thus less likely that an employer can 
‘afford’ to discriminate. These self-imposed restrictions may be ‘effective’ in decreasing the 
likelihood of being discriminated against, but they also severely limit the opportunities of the persons 
concerned and are dysfunctional from the point of view of the society. Also people who have 
encountered forms of prejudices can be presumed to be more likely to engage in avoidance strategies, 
even if they have not experienced outright discrimination.149 In addition, and perhaps even more 
importantly, also people who have not themselves experienced discrimination or prejudices, but who 
are aware of the existence of widespread discrimination and prejudices against members of their 
group, may also engage in avoidance strategies. It is only rational for people who anticipate low future 
returns to skills to be reluctant to invest time and energy in acquiring those skills.150  
 
Organization and society level effects 
 
It is increasingly recognized that ethnic and racial discrimination is bad for business. First of all, 
discrimination in hiring and firing practices means that the organization is not using all the available 
 
145 The results across different studies are, however, equivocal to some extent. Idem. 
146 Smith – Bond, cit. supra note 45, p. 281. 
147 One study, conducted by the EUMC and covering 12 European countries, found that, on average, only 14% 
of those who reported having experienced ethnic discrimination had reported the incidents to the competent 
authorities. Significant differences between countries in the propensity to report were found, being as ‘high’ as 
37% in the UK and as low as 1% in Spain. EUMC, Migrants’ Experiences of Racism and Xenophobia in 12 EU 
Member States. Pilot Study (Wien: EUMC, 2006).  
148 According to the results of the EU-MIDIS survey, one in three Roma, one in four Sub-Saharan African and 
one in five North African living in the EU area employ avoidance behaviour for fear of being a victim of racist 
crime. European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EU-MIDIS at a glance: Introduction to the FRA’s EU-
wide discrimination survey (Budapest: Elanders, 2009), p. 12. 
149 Linda R. Tropp ‘The Psychological Impact of Prejudice: Implications for Intergroup Contact’ Group 
Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2003 Vol 6 (2), pp. 131–149. 
150 See National Research Council, Measuring Racial Discrimination. Panel on Methods for Assessing 
Discrimination (Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004), and the references mentioned therein. 
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talent, as decisions are made on the basis of irrelevant factors not related to job performance. 
Workforce diversity is also widely believed to boost creativity and productivity, and these benefits are 
obviously not reaped where there is discrimination.151 Harassment and other discrimination in 
workplaces, whether perpetrated by the co-workers or the employer itself, is likely to degenerate staff 
morale, decrease the time spent on actual work and is likely to lead to absences and to increased staff 
turnover when the discriminated-against individuals no longer can or will tolerate being treated in that 
way.152 Businesses that are known to discriminate can also experience the deterioration of their 
corporate image and reputation and thereby the loss of interest on the part of some of its 
constituencies. Discriminating businesses may also have to become involved in costly legal 
proceedings. All of this is, of course, bad for business.153 
That said, businesses and other organisations may sometimes also benefit from discrimination, 
particularly in the short run. As John Gardner argues, immigrants and minority people are often 
cheaper to hire or to do business with than majority people because they have fewer valuable options 
to choose from, and often lower expectations.154 This makes them vulnerable for discrimination. 
Abuse of cheap labour distorts competition, however, by imposing an unfair burden on law-complying 
businesses and therefore undermines the functioning of the market forces. The macro-economic 
effects do not stop there, as discrimination – because the right people are not matched to the right jobs, 
or may not even have jobs to begin with – leads to suboptimal use of human resources, leading to 
decreased tax revenues and increased social and health expenditure.155 It is in the interests of each 
member of the society that immigrants and persons belonging to minorities do not remain 
undereducated, underemployed and underpaid. The society, as a whole, should be understood to be 
one of the victims of discrimination, and reversely, it should be understood to have a major stake in 
fighting it. 
 
The vicious circle of discrimination and disadvantage 
 
The above-described discussion has shown how discrimination is not just a menace to its victims but 
also to the society at large. It has also illustrated how discrimination at one point in time can have 
repercussions across several fields of life and across multiple generations. In effect, these processes 
limit opportunities, perpetuate stereotypes and prejudices and sustain social and economic disparities, 
 
151 For instance in a survey conducted in Finland, 90% of the respondents (who were HR managers at private and 
public sectors) believed that workplace diversity boosts creativity, and 82% were of the view that it increases 
productivity. Ari Haapanen, Monimuotoisuusbarometri 2007 - ikä ja monikultuurisuus haasteena ja 
voimavarana (Espoo: Frenckell, 2007). 
152 Research indeed suggests the existence of such organizational costs. Being targeted for everyday 
discrimination at the workplace negatively impacts several facets of well-being (including job satisfaction), and 
appears to lead to absenteeism and other withdrawal behaviours and a more general lowering of organizational 
commitment. Deitch, cit. supra note 11. 
153 European Commission, The Business Case for Diversity: Good practices in the workplace (Luxembourg: 
OOPEC, 2005). 
154 John Gardner ‘Private Activities and Personal Autonomy’ in Bob Hepple and Erika Szyszczak (eds), 
Discrimination: The Limits of Law? (London: Mansell 1992), p. 166. 
155 It is difficult to quantify in any exact terms how much racial and ethnic discrimination costs to societies. The 
approximate cost of disproportionately lower levels of employment of older people, resulting from structural 
factors and outright age discrimination, has been estimated in the United Kingdom to cost the country’s 
economy £19-31 billion every year in lost output and taxes and increased welfare payments. National Audit 
Office, Welfare to work: Tackling the Barriers to the Employment of Older People (September 2004). 
thus multiplying the effect of the individual events of discrimination. In the worst-case scenario, on 
the societal level, widespread discrimination triggers a vicious circle where the different forms of 
discrimination lead to accumulation of material disadvantages on part of the minority and immigrant 
groups, which increases social distance (lack of voluntary contact) and reinforces stereotypes and 
negative attitudes, which then again increases the likelihood of discrimination, and so on, ad infinitum, 
as described in the following figure. 
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Figure 1. Vicious circle of discrimination 
 
This figure is illustrative of some of the social forces that play a part in creating the circumstances in 
which discrimination continues to thrive. It is by no means exhaustive, in that it does not take into 
account the role played by intervention measures or the extent to which other factors than 
discrimination explain socio-economic disadvantages experienced by immigrants and persons 
belonging to minorities – indeed, it should be noted that disadvantages as such feed stereotypes and 
prejudices, irrespective of their root cause.156 It should also be realized that not all discrimination leads 
 
156 There can be, for instance, broad cultural value patterns that either favour individual achievement or 
commitment to collectivist goals, that may to some extent explain variations in levels of ambition on an 
individual level. While it may safely be assumed that discriminated-against groups are worse off than they would 
be if they were not discriminated against, it is remarkably difficult to tell the effect of the different factors from 
each other. Some researchers have used regression analyses in an attempt to control the other relevant variables, 
such as the average level of education, in an effort to estimate the extent to which disparities in e.g. income or 
employment level result from discrimination. For a case study of how immigrants’ human capital and social 
capital are linked to their deprivation, see Perttu Salmenhaara, ‘From Horizontal to Vertical Divides: Immigrant’ 
Employment in Finland in the 1990s’, Finnish Journal of Ethnicity and Migration, Vol. 3, No1/2008. 
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to material disadvantages.157 Yet, the figure shows why exactly all the efforts made by countries over 
the years and even decades to fight discrimination have not been successful. The vicious circle formed 
by the causes, forms and consequences of discrimination is simply so strong, the relationship between 
discrimination and disadvantages just so intimate, that racial and ethnic discrimination is hard, if not 
impossible, to overcome. In particular, a social order that simply concentrates upon individual events 
of discrimination, without taking measures to address institutional and structural discrimination and 
the causes and consequences of discrimination, is inherently incapable of putting an end to 
discrimination. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The evidence examined above gives rise to the following five broad conclusions. 
First, discrimination is highly pervasive in 21st-century Europe. The evidence from discrimination 
testing studies, victim surveys and other forms of quantitative and qualitative research is simply too 
strong to allow for any other conclusions.158 The evidence has demonstrated the negative economic, 
social and health effects of discrimination, and how discrimination affects not just its direct targets, 
but also people who are related to them, people who come from the same social groups, businesses 
and the society at large. It has also shown that discrimination is not perpetrated by a few extremists 
that belong to fringe groups, but that it is the average Joe and Jane who are responsible for the 
majority of instances of discrimination. It has also shown that discrimination cannot simply be 
explained in terms of individual racism or prejudices, as also unconscious stereotypes, organisational 
cultures and social structures play an important part.  
Second, there is a need to recognize ‘everyday racism and discrimination’. The evidence suggests 
that contemporary forms of discrimination are increasingly subtle and difficult to detect, which also 
means that they are patently difficult to prove legally. Victims are not necessarily aware of the fact 
that they have been discriminated against, or at any rate they may not be confident enough about it to 
take legal action. Perpetrators, on the other hand, are not necessarily aware of the fact that they have 
engaged in discrimination. It could be, for instance, that a particular neutral-looking recruitment 
method that an employer uses impacts a particular group negatively and thereby constitutes indirect 
discrimination. In effect, it can be difficult to detect discrimination. 
Third, there is a need to see discrimination and unequal treatment in a broad perspective. The 
episodic analysis of discrimination is clearly insufficient and must be replaced with one that sees the 
individual episodes in their broader social, economic and historical context. The society should be 
concerned not only with individual events of discrimination, but also with the institutional and 
systemic properties of discrimination and its causes and consequences. The fight against 
 
157 This would categorically be the case with some types of discrimination, such as denying access to a 
restaurant, which is unlikely to have a socio-economic impact. It is also true for many individuals that they 
increase their efforts when they experience or expect to experience obstacles. A persistent job-seeker may be 
repeatedly discriminated against in access to employment, except for once, and thus in the end be able to obtain a 
position that matches his or her qualifications. Therefore even repeated events of discrimination may not always 
lead to tangible differences in outcomes. 
158 Similarly, Harry Holzer – David Neumark ‘Assessing Affirmative Action’ Journal of Economic Literature, 
Vol 38, No 3 (Sep. 2000), pp. 483–568. 
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discrimination can proceed successfully only upon a recognition of the social origin of stereotypes, 
prejudices and racism, and of the way in which most, if not all, members of our societies partake in 
them, and of the way in which many everyday practices and actions disadvantage immigrants and 
minorities, even if all of this does not correspond to the positive, ‘civilized’ self-image of 
Europeans.159 There is also a need to acknowledge that not all racism and discrimination can be 
attributed to outright prejudices, as powerful but hard-to-identify group identity dynamics and socially 
learned unconscious stereotypes may influence behaviour.  
Fourth, evidence suggests that racial and ethnic discrimination cannot be eliminated, at least not in 
the short run. Yet that is exactly the reason why this should be attempted. The evidence shows how 
discrimination prejudices the rights and opportunities of its victims and assaults their health and 
wellbeing, places their families at risk of social and economic disadvantages, undermines the 
achievement, aspirations and integration of the discriminated-against groups, leads to a waste of 
human resources, distorts competition, causes social disintegration and unrest, and damages the public 
economy by compromising productivity, increasing social and health expenditure and decreasing tax 
revenues. Any of these reasons alone would be a sufficient reason for zero tolerance of discrimination, 
but their combined effect requires society to take discrimination seriously and to spare no effort in an 
attempt to eliminate discrimination. 
Finally, the fight against discrimination requires action on a broad front and the proactive and 
innovative use of a wide range of measures. Perhaps the most central problem in the fight against 
discrimination is passivity and the narrow selection of measures used that are over-optimistically 
hoped to do the trick. The failure to design and implement proactive strategies to fight discrimination 
is quite evidently linked to the above-mentioned failure to appreciate the pervasiveness of 
discrimination, the failure to see racism and discrimination in their broader social, cultural and 
historical context, and the failure to recognize structural, institutional and everyday forms of racism 
and discrimination. 
The finding that various forms of discrimination are so pervasive in the present-day Europe flies, 
of course, in the face of the widespread belief that Europe is the champion of modernism, rationalism, 
individualism and egalitarianism, and a bastion of meritocracy where individual achievement is based 
solely on individual ability and ambition. Indeed, there is palpable and widespread reluctance in 
Europe to recognize everyday discrimination and racism, and even more so institutional and structural 
discrimination, and the way they permeate our societies at all levels. This reluctance is at least partly 
cultural, cognitive and psychological in origin: Europeans want to see themselves as civilized, rational 
and tolerant – particularly when contrasted with ‘others’ that are supposed to be violent and intolerant, 
such as Arabs and Muslims - and at any rate not racist, particularly when contrasted with Neo-Nazis or 
the South-African Apartheid regime, the ‘paradigmatic’ representatives of racism.  
 
 
159 Studies conducted by Stanley Milgram and others proved, already in the 1960s, the futility of the ‘civilized’ 
self-image of the western world. Milgram and his colleagues showed through real-life experiments that people 
are predisposed to inflict severe pain on others, even against their own personal convictions, when told to do so 
by an authority figure. Stanley Milgram, Obedience to Authority: An Experimental View (London: Printer and 
Martin, 2005). 
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5 Anti-discrimination law: Preliminary issues 
5.1 On the sources of law 
The previous chapters have shown racial and ethnic discrimination to be pervasive, complex and 
ultimately probably ineliminable problems in contemporary Europe. The purpose of the following 
chapters is to examine and assess the effectiveness of the international and European legal response to 
these problems. The primary focus will be on international and EU law. 
Sources of international law, also in the field of human rights, are generally taken to include 
international conventions, international custom and general principles of law.1 The analysis will focus 
primarily on treaty law, given the high number of international and European conventions that deal 
with the subject area at hand, but occasional references will be made also to customary law and 
general principles of law. Also the EU law will be approached both from the perspective of legal 
instruments and general principles. 
The prohibition of discrimination has come to form an elementary part of contemporary 
international and European law, and is explicitly dealt with by almost every legal instrument that deals 
with human rights and fundamental freedoms. The main focus of this study is on these instruments and 
their provisions. Yet it is useful to take note of the fact that the principle of non-discrimination is not 
only bolstered and enforced by the specific provisions that explicitly deal with it, but implicitly by 
almost every single human rights provision, as these are usually worded in universal language, such as 
“everyone has the right to education” and “no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or 
exile”. In these two ways, explicitly and structurally, the principle of equality and non-discrimination 
runs through all human rights treaties and declarations like a red thread.  
This study will focus on eleven documents, most of which are legally binding. These are the 
following: Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ILO Convention No 111 on Discrimination 
(Employment and Occupation), UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in Education, 
International Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, European Social Charter 
(revised), Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, European Charter of 
Fundamental Rights, and EU Racial Equality Directive. Two of these legal instruments, the UN 
Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination and the EU Racial Equality 
Directive, focus exclusively on racial and ethnic discrimination, whereas the other instruments are of a 
more general nature.  
Despite the elementary character of the principle of non-discrimination, these instruments and their 
non-discrimination provisions differ from each other to the extent that it will be necessary to review 
 
1 This is the conventional view on sources, and is based on Article 38(1) of the Statute of International Court of 
Justice. Article 38(1) also mentions “judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists 
of the various nations” as subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. The conventional view is 
somewhat limited, however. See Jan Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the making of international law’ No 
Foundations No. 5, 9 April 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
69
                                                       
them separately. As will be seen, the many differences do not allow us to construct a uniform, 
systematic approach to anti-discrimination law as if it had a single common core, although a degree of 
convergence has emerged in some respects particularly through scholarly and institutional 
interpretative practices. With a view to the differences of the various instruments, it must at this point 
be emphasized that an individual is always entitled to the best protection provided by any applicable 
instrument. The fact that another legal instrument provides for weaker protection cannot compromise 
the protection provided by an applicable instrument.2 
5.2 The hard but basic questions  
In everyday discussions the notion of discrimination is used in a straightforward manner. It is more or 
less presumed that it is relatively clear and settled what the notion ‘discrimination’ means. Definition 
of discrimination as, say, ‘unfair treatment’, might garner a good deal of popular support. Yet, like all 
abstract notions, also ‘discrimination’ turns out to be a lot less intuitively clear and straightforward 
when it is subjected to closer scrutiny. If discrimination is taken to be about unfair treatment, then 
what is ‘unfair’? Is making racial and ethnic distinctions always unfair? Are there situations in which 
making distinctions is not unfair, but allowed? More fundamentally, are there situations where reasons 
of fairness not only allow but require the making of ethnic distinctions? Equally fundamentally, is 
discrimination unfair because it is based on irrational or morally reprehensible motivations, or is it 
unfair because it causes undeserved harm to its victims – should the society, and the law, be concerned 
with motives or outcomes? And if discrimination is about unfair treatment, what is meant by 
‘treatment’? Does it encompass acts of omission as well as acts of commission? Does it encompass 
practices such as informal and haphazard recruitment methods? Does it cover the substance of laws or 
only their application, or both? And in which situations should the prohibition of discrimination 
apply? Should we consider, for instance, that there is a sphere of private life within which individuals 
must be left alone to act, if they so wish, upon their personal biases, however reprehensible we might 
think these biases to be? Most people in contemporary Europe would probably hold that anti-
discrimination law should not say anything about the ethnic mix of our personal networks, but should 
the law say something about treating people equally when selling a house? And would it in that 
context make a difference if the seller was a private person or a realtor? What is discrimination and 
what is not? To what extent should people be protected from it by law? And how?  
Whereas people engaged in everyday discussions have the luxury of choosing whether or not to 
address the above questions, this is not the case with those charged with applying or otherwise dealing 
with the law. Decisions will have to be made, questions must be answered, cases be found for the 
plaintiff or the respondent. Sometimes the legislator has explicitly taken (a more or less clear) stand on 
the above questions or some of them; often scholars have come to develop (a range of) doctrinal 
positions on them; but at the end of the day the individual judges have to take a stand on them. One of 
the key values that arguably guides the making and application of law in Europe today is the aspiration 
 
2 One must also keep in mind that a particular treaty or a provision may not be binding upon a particular state 
because of non-ratification or a reservation. 
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to achieve a good degree of predictability and legal certainty.3 This value calls for a principled 
approach to questions of law and a measure of precision in legal matters. One of the key questions, 
therefore, is whether, and if yes, to what extent, international and European anti-discrimination law 
provides for legal certainty in the matters at hand.  
 
The questions 
 
The purpose of the following chapters is to examine the international and European legal response to 
racial and ethnic discrimination. A structured approach is adopted and each instrument is analyzed 
with respect to the following five sets of questions: 
 
(i) The concept of discrimination 
 
The first issue to be examined with respect to each legal instrument is how it conceptualizes 
‘discrimination’. Under this heading the analysis will address – albeit sometimes only tacitly – three 
more specific questions. First, how the provision is worded; is it formulated openly, in broad and 
general – or even vague and confusing - terms, in which case it leaves much room for doctrinal 
developments, interpretations and controversies, or is it ‘closed’, in which case the drafters have 
sought to prescribe the criteria that are to be considered when the law is applied.4 Answering this 
question will give us some insights about the nature of anti-discrimination law and whether that has 
something to do with its relative lack of success in eliminating discrimination. 
Second, given the need to tackle everyday discrimination, which can come in relatively subtle 
forms and in acts and practices that appear neutral but are discriminatory in their effects, it must be 
examined whether these instruments recognize and prohibit indirect discrimination and practices such 
as harassment. Another important question in this respect is whether the definition of discrimination is 
of such a character that it manages to cope with institutional and systemic forms of discrimination. In 
particular, is the definition of discrimination capable of being applied not just to acts of commission 
but also to acts of omissions, and not just to rigid rules or decisions, but also to less formal practices?5 
The third aspect addresses the potential weaknesses that come in the form of provisions and 
doctrines that provide for exceptions, derogations and justification of actions and practices that would 
 
3 This is clear, for instance, in the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, which requires that for a 
domestic law to be considered ‘a law‘ for the purposes of the European Convention and its many clauses that 
allow limitations to rights if they are “prescribed by the law” or “in accordance with the law”, that ‘law’ must be 
accessible, clear and predictable in its application. See e.g. ECtHR, Times Newspaper and others v. United 
Kingdom, judgment of 26 April 1979. That the law, also and in particular international law, often fails to achieve 
predictability and legal certainty is another matter. See Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia. The 
Structure of International Legal Argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
4 Both the ‘open’ and ‘closed’ formulations may be problematic. Open formulations leave much room for 
discretion to those applying the law and remove many key questions beyond democratic decision-making and 
control. Closed formulations are risky in that the legislator cannot possibly foresee all the situations in which the 
provision in question will be applied, and therefore the application of rigid provisions may lead to results not 
intended by the legislator.  
5 Another interesting set of questions relates to segregation, the provision of ‘equal’ services separately for 
different groups, also for instance with respect to de facto residential segregation, a phenomenon that is familiar 
in all the metropolises of the world. 
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otherwise constitute discrimination. Are they so broad or is their impact so unclear that they 
compromise effective protection against discrimination?  
 
(ii) Material scope 
 
A key factor that determines the impact of anti-discrimination law is the material scope of application 
of that law. Given our specific focus on everyday discrimination, it must be examined whether, and to 
what extent, the principle of non-discrimination applies in the fields of employment, education and 
provision of goods and services. In relation to this, it is crucial to examine, with respect to each 
scrutinized instrument, whether it requires the state to provide protection – in these fields - in relations 
between private parties, or whether it is confined to the exercise of public power.6 If the law does not 
reach to areas such as employment and provision of services, or if it does not reach into the relations 
between private individuals, then the law will not be able to cope with everyday discrimination. These 
questions are not moot legally, as international law is primarily about legal relations between states 
and as treaty provisions cannot bind private individuals, and as discrimination is something that each 
country has to tackle with domestically. 
 
(iii) Grounds 
 
There are two issues that merit our attention under this heading. Firstly, and quite obviously, it must be 
examined whether the instruments at hand prohibit discrimination on the grounds of ‘race’ and 
ethnicity. They can do that either explicitly or implicitly. In relation to this it will be examined 
whether these concepts have been defined (with varying degrees of authority) either in the instruments 
themselves, or in the practice of the supervisory organs or the pertinent legal literature relating to these 
instruments. This will not be done simply for the sake of satisfying academic curiosity, but for the 
sake of addressing the thorny problem that the law, imbued with the desire for legal certainty, has to 
grapple with these highly elusive concepts. There are genuine legal problems here: if the law prohibits 
indirect discrimination on the grounds of ‘race’, and defines indirect discrimination in terms of 
disparate impact inflicted upon (persons belonging to) a particular ‘race’, then demonstration of it can 
often only take place by means of statistics that compare the situations of persons belonging to 
different ‘races’. But if there are no separate ‘races’ to begin with, or if at any rate the boundaries of 
such groups cannot be drawn in any even remotely objective way, as has been argued in chapter 2, 
how can group categories be constructed for the purposes of preparing the kind of group-based 
statistics that the demonstration of indirect discrimination requires? 
Secondly, it should be examined whether the law is able to cope with intersectional discrimination. 
Evidence from different countries shows that such claims can constitute up to 50% of all 
 
6 In the US, for instance, racial discrimination in the use of public powers has been forbidden since 1868, but it 
was long held that the Congress could not legislate against private discrimination or affirmatively to promote 
‘race’ equality. It was only in 1964 that the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to reach certain forms 
of private conduct. Louis Henkin ‘National and International Perspectives in Racial Discrimination’ Human 
Rights Journal 4 (1971), p. 265. 
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discrimination claims.7 Therefore attention will be paid to how the law takes into account the fact that 
‘race’ and ethnicity may intersect with other factors such as gender to produce very specific types of 
discrimination.8 
 
(iv) Enforcement and remedies 
 
It is often simplistically assumed that for society to tackle undesirable behaviour, all it has to do is to 
enact a law prohibiting such behaviour, and that will be the end of it because people will abide by the 
law. Such a naïve belief in the power of the law to bring about social change by itself is manifestly 
unfounded. Evidence to this effect is abundant. For instance in the United Kingdom, the police records 
some five million crimes - acts defined as punishable by the penal law – each year, and the British 
Crime Survey, whose figures can be assumed to be closer to the correct mark on the extent of actual 
crime, estimates that in fact approximately 11 million crimes are made each year.9 The situation is 
similar in all other countries as well. It is therefore obvious that the simple enactment of a law 
prohibiting certain kind of behaviour is not enough to eliminate that behaviour. 
The effectiveness of the law depends to a great extent on how it is enforced, on the chosen 
methods of ensuring or compelling observance of and obedience to that law. It is not enough to simply 
proclaim theoretical ‘rights’ and ‘freedoms’ that are not enforced or that possibly even cannot be 
enforced. In this respect it is pertinent to examine how the legal instruments under scrutiny envisage 
the ensuring of observance of anti-discrimination law. Do they envisage setting up special 
enforcement agencies, charged with overseeing the observance of the law? Do the instruments give 
their intended beneficiaries the right to a remedy, both in the procedural sense of availability of 
judicial or other mechanism for the enforcement of the law, and in the substantive sense of redress? 
Do they envisage specific sanctions to be imposed on perpetrators of discrimination?  
This study focuses on domestic remedies, not on state responsibility in the sense of remedies that 
come into play when a state has breached its obligations under international law. The existence of 
international monitoring mechanisms – political, quasi-judicial and judicial - is important for the 
purposes of holding state parties accountable for the implementation of the obligations they have 
assumed and for the purposes of guiding the construction of legal opinion as to what, in more precise 
terms, is the scope and nature of these obligations. However, from the point of view of victims of 
discrimination, it is the existence of domestic remedies that is of chief importance. Of course, 
domestic remedies may not exist if the state concerned has not fulfilled its international obligations, 
and that is where the existence of international monitoring and complaint mechanisms is 
indispensable. But even then, the starting point is the existence and primacy of national remedies, and 
international mechanisms form only the second line of defence.10 Not focusing upon domestic 
 
7 Ontario Human Rights Commission, An Intersectional Approach to Discrimination. Discussion paper, 9 
October 2001. Available at:  http://www.ohrc.on.ca (accessed 1.1.2010). 
8 See generally on multiple and intersectional discrimination, European Commission, Tackling Multiple 
Discrimination: Practices, policies and laws (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007). 
9 See e.g. Home Office, Crime in England and Wales 2008/09 (edited by Alison Walker, John Flatley, Chris 
Kershaw and Debbie Moon, Home Office, July 2009). 
10 As a rule, a complainant must have exhausted domestic remedies before complaining to the international treaty 
bodies; this reinforces the primacy of the domestic remedies. 
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remedies would be to completely misunderstand the nature of human rights and the prevalence of 
everyday discrimination: international monitoring mechanisms are always complementary in relation 
to the domestic protection of human rights.11   
 
(v) Nature of state obligations 
 
It is generally though not uncritically accepted, also in the human rights circles, that international 
human rights law forms part of the general regime of public international law.12 However, unlike most 
other parts of international law, human rights instruments primarily create obligations towards 
individual right-holders rather than towards other states. This may be described as creating a vertical 
relationship between a state and its subjects, rather than a horizontal relationship between states. 
State obligations in the human rights sphere are generally described in terms of negative 
obligations – what states must refrain from doing – and positive obligations – what states must do in 
order to comply with the law.13 Under a fairly common doctrine, rights, and in particular economic, 
social and cultural rights, impose three kinds of more specific obligations upon states bound by them: 
(i) the obligation to respect, which is basically a negative obligation to refrain from infringing a right; 
(ii) the obligation to protect, which is a positive obligation to protect individuals particularly from 
third-party infringements and may call for legislative action; and (iii) the obligation to fulfil, which is a 
positive obligation to ensure the effective enjoyment of rights through the creation and promotion of 
circumstances in which individuals can in fact enjoy their rights and which may call for the use of 
governmental means such as policy programmes.14 However, the exact scope and nature of 
 
 
 
11 See e.g. Allan Rosas - Martin Scheinin, “Implementation Mechanisms and Remedies” in Asbjørn Eide - 
Catarina Krause - Allan Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook (2nd ed, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2001), p. 452. 
12 For instance the Vienna Declaration puts international human rights instruments squarely within the context of 
general international law by stating that the protection and promotion of human rights should be conducted “in 
conformity with international law” (Article 7). Also the various treaty bodies have on many occasions referred to 
general principles of international law, as embodied for instance in the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. See also the position adopted by the International Law Association in its Resolution No 4/2008 
International Human Rights Law and Practice, adopted at the 73rd Conference of the International Law 
Association, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 17–21 August 2008. That said, many human rights bodies and 
scholars have, particularly in matters relating to the interpretation of human rights treaties and the reservations 
made to such treaties, seen a need to adapt the principles of general international law to better accommodate the 
special nature of human rights instruments. See e.g. the approach of the ECtHR, including the separate opinions, 
to questions of interpretation in the Golder case. For a systematic review of the various theoretical positions, see 
Martin Scheinin ‘Human Rights treaties and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties – Conflicts or 
Harmony?’ in Venice Commission (ed.), The status of international treaties on human rights (Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe Publishing, 2006). See also Louis Henkin ‘Introduction’ in Louis Henkin (ed), The 
International Bill Of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1981), pp. 14–17. 
13 The issue of positive obligations, while nowadays widely accepted, used to be controversial. See with respect 
to the European Convention, Francis G. Jacobs - Robin C.A. White, The European Convention of Human Rights, 
3rd Ed, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 38.  
14 In particular the Committee on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights nowadays interprets, as a matter of solid 
practice, the provisions of the UN Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights in light of this model, as is 
clear from its General Comment 12 (1999) and several subsequent comments. See also Maastricht Guidelines on 
violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Maastricht, January 22-26, 1997; see also Asbjørn Eide, 
‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights as Human Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.)  Economic, social and 
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responsibilities varies from one treaty provision to another, and also to some extent generally from one 
treaty to another. Indeed, to examine the specific state obligations under each treaty or its provisions, 
one will have to examine those provisions instead of resorting to some generalized doctrine, which has 
value as a heuristic model but not as a source of state obligations. 
International human rights instruments, or general principles of public international law, do not lay 
down any general rules regarding the specific means by which treaty obligations are to be given effect 
in the national legal order.15 Only exceptionally, as will be seen, does a specific treaty or a specific 
provision prescribe specific obligations of conduct.16 In this sense conventions mainly set forth 
obligations of results rather than obligations of conduct or of means.17 How a specific treaty is given 
effect in the domestic context is a matter of the constitutional norms, principles and traditions of each 
state. In this respect, a basic distinction can be made between ‘monist’ and ‘dualist’ countries.18 In 
monist countries international rules, accepted for instance by way of ratification of a treaty, are part 
and parcel of the national legal order and can be directly applied and invoked in courts. In these 
countries treaties do not need to be ‘translated’ into national law. In dualist countries international law 
and national law are considered to be separate, and therefore international norms need to be 
‘translated’. This can be done in several ways: for instance, by means of incorporation, by which a 
treaty is made, as such, a part of the domestic law and by which the terms of the document are retained 
intact and given formal validity in the national legal order; or transformation, by means of which new 
legislation is enacted or existing legislation is amended in order to give effect to the treaty.19 
Though international law is therefore silent on the modalities of domestic implementation, some 
international human rights bodies and some legal scholars working in this area are clearly is in favour 
of monism.20 This is understandable, as under monist systems international law usually prevails over 
contradicting domestic law, whereas under dualist system more recent domestic law prevails, due to 
the lex posterior principle, over law enacted by means of incorporation or transformation. A monist 
state is also at a lesser risk of violating international law because its judicial and other competent 
 
cultural rights: A textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), pp. 23-24. By way of comparison, the UN 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, concluded in 2006, states in Article 1 that its purpose is to 
“promote, protect and ensure the full and equal enjoyment of all human right and fundamental freedoms by all 
persons with disabilities” (emphasis added). 
15 See e.g. J.G.  Merrills – A.H. Robertson, Human rights in Europe: A study of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, 4th ed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), p. 24; Oscar Schachter, ‘The obligation 
to implement the covenant in domestic law’ in Henkin (ed.) The International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia U.P., 1981); Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on civil and 
political rights: CCPR Commentary (Kehl: N.P. Engel, 1993), p. 53. Although methods by which the rights and 
freedoms are given effect in domestic legal order are left to the discretion of the states, the means used must be 
appropriate in the sense of producing results which are consistent with the full discharge, in good faith, of its 
obligations by the state party. Article 26 of VCLT. 
16 See in particular chapter 6.5 of this study. 
17 See e.g. Nowak, cit. supra note 15, p. 53. 
18 The dichotomy between ‘monistic’ and ‘dualistic’ countries is largely regarded as outdated, see Martin 
Scheinin ’International Human rights in National Law’ in Raija Hanski – Markku Suksi (eds.), An Introduction 
to the International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook (Turku: Åbo Akademi University Institute for 
Human Rights, 1999), pp. 417–428 (2nd revised edition). 
19 One should also be aware of the fact that there are also states that tend to do nothing specific at all to give 
effect to its international obligations in national law. See e.g. CESCR, General Comment No. 9 (1998), para 6. 
20 HRC, General Comment No.31 (2004), para 13; Rosas – Scheinin, cit. supra note 11, p. 452. 
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bodies can, and must, apply that law directly: in those countries where conventions are part of the 
domestic law, treaty provisions that are capable of direct application by the courts become in that 
sense ‘self-executing’.21 Because the way in which a treaty is given effect in the domestic legal order 
may affect the domestic remedies, these two questions will, where necessary, be examined together in 
the following chapters. 
EU law represents, as regards the nature of obligations that it creates on the member states, quite a 
different story. Regulations, which are a type of secondary legislation (legislation adopted on the basis 
of the constitutive treaties of the EU), are directly applicable, which means that they do not need any 
acts of implementation by the member states, but instead automatically become part of their legal 
system.22 Directives, which represent another type of secondary legislation, require national 
implementation, but leave to the national authorities the choice of form and methods of 
implementation.23 Directives have a range of effects which will be explored in chapter 7.4 in greater 
detail. 
5.3 On instruments and their interpretation and application in practice 
A major aspiration of this study is to analyze international and European anti-discrimination law and 
its effectiveness in achieving the objectives that it has set for itself. This exercise, a kind of impact 
assessment, calls for an analysis of how these pieces of law are interpreted and applied in practice. Yet 
that assessment must take into account that norms are not, for many reasons, applied in a uniform 
manner across, or even within, the countries that are legally bound by them. The process of putting 
any norms, including international and European norms, into effect is affected by both centrifugal 
forces, factors that work towards divergence of interpretation and application, and centripetal forces, 
factors that work towards uniform interpretation and application. An even-handed effort to analyse the 
practical impact of law ought to take both into account.24 
A basic starting point is that international and European norms are implemented – and therefore 
‘used’ – primarily nationally, and that members of the legislative, judicial and administrative branches 
in the different countries participate in the process of putting these norms into effect. This 
decentralized implementation, the non-existence of supranational executive and judicial institutions 
(with some exceptions, such as the European Court of Justice) ensuring uniform application, means 
that these norms are inevitably interpreted and ‘applied’ by a wide variety actors and in a wide variety 
of ways. 
The interpretation of law, including international human rights law, is not an exact science. It is 
notoriously known that human rights instruments in particular tend to be couched in general, abstract 
and therefore inherently indeterminate language,25 a fact which in itself does not necessarily 
 
21 See e.g. Schachter, cit. supra note 15, pp. 326–327. 
22 Article 288 TFEU (ex Article 249 TEC). See also Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the 
European Union (Harlow: Pearson, 2002). 
23 Idem. 
24 Cf. Thomas Morawetz (ed.), Law and Language (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2000). 
25 See e.g. Martti Koskenniemi ‘Human Rights, Politics, and Love’ Mennesker & rettigheter 4/2001. 
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undermine the usefulness of human rights instruments as means of achieving certain ends,26 but which 
emphasizes the role of interpretation in putting these instruments and their provisions into effect.27 
The same applies to EU law, as the EU texts are often extremely vague and general in their language 
as well.28 It must indeed be realized that law – both case law and statutory law - is expressed in 
language, and therefore the effective transmission and understanding of the law depends on the clarity 
and transparency of language.29 Languages, and indeed individual words, are socially constructed and 
learnt particularly through imitation in processes known as primary and secondary socialization, with 
repeated confirmation in interaction contributing towards the emergence of shared understandings.30 
Law schools, symposia and courts of law are important places for secondary socialization in the field 
of law,31 though they cannot create anything like a tightly-knit legal culture, if not for any other reason 
but because people attend different law schools and symposia. In addition, we are not just learners and 
users of our language, but its makers.32 Each of us loads any text we write and every single expression 
we use with significances that derive from prior experience of language and life, significances that are 
not necessarily transmitted through the text, the reader of which then comes to attach her own 
significances to it.33 In this way we all come to play our own variations on a common theme, and 
construct rather than find meanings for texts and expressions. In effect, partly due to this socially 
constructed nature of language, terms – including legal terms - never carry irreducibly objective, or 
entirely subjective, meanings.  
In the field of law, the freedom of an interpreter to pick an interpretation is constrained by rules 
and principles that are referred to as ‘canons of interpretation’.34 Such rules and principles may be laid 
down in law or may have come into being through judicial and scholarly practices. When it comes to 
international human rights law, even the very canons of interpretation are subject to a fundamental 
controversy.35 Whereas it is nowadays rather widely agreed that the general rules of interpretation of 
 
26 David Kennedy, The Dark Sides of Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2004), p. 8. 
27 In the words of Martin Scheinin: “Among formulations of rights, human rights tend to be rights of a higher 
level of abstraction. They employ notions that are connected to morality and are, hence, open to moral 
judgement. Within the family of rights, interpretation plays an even greater role in relation to human rights than 
with respect to other groups or classes of rights.” Martin Scheinin, “Women’s Economic and Social Rights as 
Human Rights” in Lauri Hannikainen and Eeva Nykänen (eds.), New Trends in Discrimination Law: 
International Perspectives (Turku: Turku Law School, 1999), p. 26. 
28 See e.g. Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union (Harlow: Pearson, 2002), p. 202. 
29 Tom Morawetz ‘Introduction’ in Tom Morawetz (ed.), cit. supra note 24. 
30 James Boyd White, ‘Law as Expression: Thinking about our language’ in Tom Morawetz (ed.), cit. supra note 
24, p. 18. 
31 Kaarlo Tuori, Critical Legal Positivism (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), pp. 172–3. 
32 White, cit. supra note 30, p. 5. 
33 Ibid, p. 17; David Couzens Hoy ‘Interpreting the Law: Hermeneutical and Poststructuralist Perspectives’, in 
Tom Morawetz (ed.), cit. supra note 24, p. 173. 
34 Stanley E. Fish, ‘The Annual John Randolph Tucker Lecture - Force’ in Tom Morawetz (ed.), cit. supra note 
24, p. 273. 
35 For a discussion of these matters, see Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the 
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, Report of the Study Group of the International Law 
Commission, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, 13 April 2006, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682; Menno T. Kamminga – 
Martin Scheinin, The Impact of Human Rights Law on General International Law (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009); Ineta Ziemele (ed.) Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: 
Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2004). 
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international treaties, as reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties, constitute a point of departure for the interpretation of human rights conventions, it is also 
widely held that these rules do not adequately take into account the specific nature and purpose of 
human rights instruments.36 At any rate it must be made clear that one cannot somehow mechanically 
‘extract’ the practical meanings of provisions of any legal instrument, let alone a human rights 
instrument, with or without recourse to the Vienna Convention. The principles of the Vienna 
Convention have even less relevance in the field of EU law, where the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has not favoured literal or historical interpretation, which feature prominently in the Vienna 
Convention, but has developed its own style of teleological and contextual interpretation.37 At any rate 
the controversies regarding the applicable rules of interpretation add to the indeterminacy of the law, 
as rules of interpretation function as one of the centripetal forces, diminishing the uncertainties of the 
law.38 Yet, on the other hand, research experiments have found that legal reasoning is clearly 
constrained by ‘common sense’ in exactly the same way as everyday reasoning is.39 The process of 
interpretation is, overall, neither fully determined nor fully indeterminate. 
The question of how to interpret human rights treaties aside, it must also be asked who has the 
legitimate authority to interpret them. Theoretically speaking, the exclusive right of states to interpret 
the obligations they have assumed is often grounded on state sovereignty.40 Yet, there are some 
institutional arrangements that surpass national autonomy in this respect. In Europe, the ECJ hands 
down legally binding interpretations of the Community law, and the European Commission exercises a 
monitoring role in that it is empowered to bring infringement proceedings against non-complying EU 
states. Also the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights are legally binding on the state 
party to the proceedings. These institutional arrangements work towards greater uniformity of 
interpretation and application across different countries, although it must be kept in mind that even the 
entire body of hitherto accumulated case law, dealing as it does with the application of specific norms 
in specific circumstances, does not authoritatively answer all or even most questions about the 
interpretation of the law.    
There are institutional arrangements that work towards greater uniformity in application also in the 
field of international law. Most of the international human rights conventions discussed in this study 
include a specific type of an institutional arrangement for the monitoring of contracting states’ 
performance of their obligations arising from that convention. These so-called treaty bodies typically 
 
36 See International Law Association, Resolution No 4/2008 International Human Rights Law and Practice, 
adopted at the 73rd Conference of the International Law Association, held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 17–21 
August 2008. The special nature of human rights instruments was pointed at by the European Court of Human 
Rights in its oft-cited judgment in Ireland v. UK (18 January 1978, para 239): “Unlike international treaties of 
the classic kind, the Convention comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting states. It 
creates, over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words of 
the Preamble, benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’”. 
37 See e.g. Douglas-Scott, cit. supra note 28, pp. 207–224. 
38 As H.L.A. Hart observes, canons of interpretation can diminish legal uncertainties but cannot eliminate them, 
because these canons themselves are couched up in general terms which themselves require interpretation. 
H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 123. 
39 Robert Dingwall ‘Ethnomethodology and Law’ in Reza Banakar - Max Travers (eds.) An Introduction to Law 
and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p. 231. 
40 Baak Çal - Alice Wyss ’Authority of International Institutions: The Case for International Human Rights 
Treaty Bodies’ (4 October 2008).  Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1278582 
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have three types of functions: (i) they consider country reports that states are required to submit 
periodically, and give recommendations and policy advice with a view to helping each country to 
better fulfil its obligations; (ii) they issue General Comments (with respect to some bodies these are 
called ‘General Recommendations’), in which they seek to develop a more fully fledged doctrinal 
elaboration of particular treaty provisions; and (iii) they handle individual complaints (often called 
‘communications’ in the language of the respective conventions) and submit views as to whether the 
respondent state has acted in conformity with its obligations under the convention. Some of the treaty 
bodies are also entitled to consider state-to-state complaints, but this mechanism has hitherto not been 
used. 
The purpose of the above-mentioned treaty body mechanisms is to assess the situation in the states 
parties and to encourage and help them to implement their international legal obligations. The 
reporting mechanism in particular may provide direct input into the development of national laws and 
policies, and allows national and international scrutiny of government policies. The views and 
comments made by the committees, while not legally binding as such,41 are increasingly - though still 
only occasionally - referred to by the national and regional courts and tribunals.42 The guiding role of 
the committees, in short, promotes a more uniform interpretation of international human rights 
instruments.43 That said, the impact of the work of the treaty bodies is limited if not compromised in 
some respects. To some extent this is because many states accept the human rights treaty system on a 
formal level but do not engage with it, or do so in a superficial way, sometimes because of sheer lack 
of political will. Only a fraction of states are in full compliance with their reporting obligations, for 
instance.44 It also appears that the international monitoring system is little known outside academic 
circles, government officials directly interacting with the system, specialized lawyers and NGOs, all of 
this diminishing its impact in practice. Moreover, the committees are overburdened with work, but 
under-resourced and composed of part-time, unremunerated experts, which means that they can’t 
 
41 However, it has been pointed out that inasmuch as states acquiesce to these views, this acquiescence may 
constitute “subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties 
regarding its interpretation” within the sense of Article 31(3)b of the VCLT, which means that these views may 
attain weight in interpretation. International Law Association, Committee on International Human Rights Law 
and Practice, Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on General International Law. 
Proceedings of the Rio de Janeiro Conference (2008).  
42 See Concept paper on the High Commissioner’s Proposal for a Unified Standing Treaty Body, report by the 
Secretariat, Fifth Inter-Committee Meeting of the human rights bodies, Geneva 19-21 June 2006, 
HRI/MC/2006/2, para 13. 
43 To give an example, the Human Rights Committee sees its role and authority, in the context of the 
consideration of individual petitions, as follows: “The views of the Committee under the Optional Protocol 
represent an authoritative determination by the organ established under the Covenant itself charged with the 
interpretation of that instrument. These views derive their character, and the importance which attaches to them, 
from the integral role of the Committee under both the Covenant and the Optional Protocol”. Human Rights 
Committee, General Comment No. 33 (2008), para 13. 
44 As of February 2006, only 4% of states were up to date with their reporting obligations. Moreover, only 39% 
of the reports submitted were deemed to be in compliance with the reporting guidelines issued by the respective 
committees. Concept paper, cit. supra note 42, para 24. Some states also show disregard of the individual 
petition procedure; see e.g. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 33 (2008), paras 10 and 18 in 
particular. 
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delve into each deserving question with a sufficient degree of breadth and depth.45 It has also been 
suggested that there are problems with the composition of the different committees which may 
undermine their perceived authority.46 All of this means that the ability of the treaty bodies to promote 
a more uniform interpretation of treaty obligations is, in practice, compromised to some extent.  
The following chapters examine the different international and European legal instruments that 
pertain to racial and ethnic discrimination. The different provisions will be analyzed in light of the 
preparatory works of the instruments, the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice, the European 
Court of Human Rights and the treaty bodies, as well as legal opinions expressed in text books and 
other scholarly writings. These are the materials that contribute the most to the formation of the 
mainstream legal opinions in matters of international and European law. Some, but for reasons of 
space by no means all, existing or potential points of contention are explicitly addressed. This 
approach had to be chosen because the entire repertoire of legal opinions could not be entertained here 
for reasons of space. 
The chosen line of approach should not overshadow the fact that in reality the pertinent norms are 
not interpreted and applied in a uniform manner, and that there is a continuous struggle between 
interpretations and for the authority to give them. It should also not be taken as implying that the 
opinions that are referred to are legally valid or persuasive or not, or more fundamentally, that there 
would necessarily have to be one, and only one, legally valid answer to each legal question. Quite vice 
versa, the field of human rights is, as much if not more than the other fields of law, prone to prolific 
and, to an extent, healthy disagreement. Reasonable lawyers often disagree about the matters of law, a 
fact which is also manifested by the fact that the lines of interpretation adopted by judicial and treaty 
bodies tend to change over time, as demonstrated by this very study, for its own part. 
 
 
 
45 Concept paper, cit. supra note 42, para 18. It has been observed that treaty bodies often have insufficient 
information to enable them to undertake a full analysis of implementation by the state party, and that as a result 
the subsequent recommendations of treaty bodies may lack the precision, clarity and practical value required to 
enhance implementation. Ibid, para 25. 
46 Committee members are elected by states parties from candidates nominated by states from among their 
nationals, and it has been suggested that the composition of treaty bodies has been uneven in terms of 
geographical distribution, representation of the principal legal systems, gender balance, expertise and 
independence. Ibid, para 22. 
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6 International human rights law1
6.1 Notes on the development of the principle of non-discrimination 
The 1776 US Declaration of Independence famously proclaims that “[w]e hold these rights to be self-
evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable 
Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness.”2 What was self-evident at 
the time was, however, that there were free, property-owning ‘White’ males, that African-origin slaves 
were considered mere ‘property’ of some such males, and that any equality between the two groups 
was out of the question.3 The drafters may or may not have intended the passage to be aspirational or 
promissory, but the fact is that it was only later on invoked in justification of the abolition of slavery 
and much later on in defence of equal treatment irrespective of ‘race’ and sex.4 Much in the same way, 
the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, adopted by the National Assembly of France 
in 1789, proclaims in Article 1 that “[m]en are born and remain free and equal in rights.” And just as 
the American Declaration, it was first not considered to imply the abolishment of slavery or the 
granting of rights to women, but was later on invoked in that purpose. 
Similar phrases and references to equality before the law and equal protection of the law have 
since become common elements of democratic constitutions and, most essentially for our purposes, 
international instruments.5 Whereas persons like las Casas in the 16th century had drawn international 
attention to the wrongfulness of the subjection of indigenous peoples of the Americas by colonial 
powers – a form of racism, in hindsight - and whereas some international treaties concluded in the 16th 
 
1 The term ’international human rights law’ is used here without prejudice to the ongoing debate about whether 
human rights constitute a specific sub-field of international law or not.  
2 The Declaration continues by asserting that “to secure these rights, governments are instituted among Men”, 
implying the conception that rights precede political decision-making and therefore that equality of men (sic) is 
not something a government can grant but something that people are entitled to as a birthright. On the possibility 
of ‘pre-political rights’, see Martti Koskenniemi ‘Human Rights, Politics, and Love’ Mennesker & rettigheter 
(4/2001).  
3 Analyses often point out that, at that time, equality and liberty were considered to be inherent in individuals 
only by virtue of their rationality, a conception which allowed the exclusion of many groups on account of their 
perceived lack of full capacity to reason. It has also been noted that whereas Locke, who undoubtedly was one of 
the persons from whom the Declaration drew inspiration, wrote that “[m]en are, by Nature, free, equal and 
independent”, he did not see this statement to contradict hierarchical relations between a husband (“Master”) and 
his wife, children and slaves. See John Locke, Two treatises (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), p. 
95. More broadly, one must consider not just the meaning but also the purpose of the passage, and in this respect 
one must keep in mind that the Declaration should be read in the context of the war between the American 
colonies and Great Britain, and particularly the challenge to the monarchy. 
4 Speaking in 1857 – more than 80 years after the adoption of the Declaration of Independence - Abraham 
Lincoln commented upon the passage in the following terms: “They did not mean to assert the obvious untruth 
that all men were then actually enjoying that equality yet or that they were about to confer it immediately upon 
them. In fact they had no power to confer such a boon. They meant simply to declare the right so that the 
enforcement of it might follow as fast as circumstances permit. They meant to set up a standard maxim for a free 
society…” Cited in Warwick McKean, Equality and Discrimination under International Law (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1983), p. 83. 
5 Some of these documents echo the US Declaration of Independence in that they also proclaim equality of all 
human beings to be ‘self-evident’. See e.g. the preamble to the Durban declaration.  
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and 17th century sought to provide a measure of protection and rights to particular non-majority groups 
and/or their members,6 it were the so-called Minority Treaties, concluded around the 1919 Treaty of 
Versailles and Paris Peace Conference, by which equal treatment and protection of distinct ethnic 
groups really entered the realm of modern positive international law.7 However, the efforts to include 
the principle of non-discrimination in the Covenant of the League of Nations, drafted in 1919, were 
not successful. 
The aforementioned Minority Treaties were designed to safeguard the rights of ethnic minorities in 
specific countries, particularly in Europe, for a great part in the interests of securing the maintenance 
of international peace.8 Minority treaties explicitly required these countries to provide equal treatment 
for the minorities in question in several walks of life. For instance the Minorities Treaty concluded 
between the Allies and the Republic of Poland in 1919 required Poland to “undertake to assure full 
and complete protection of life and liberty to all inhabitants of Poland without distinction of birth, 
nationality, language, race or religion”, proclaimed that “[a]ll Polish nationals shall be equal before the 
law and shall enjoy the same civil and political rights without distinction as to race, language or 
religion” and that “Polish nationals who belong to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall enjoy 
the same treatment and security in law and in fact as other Polish nationals”.9 It also provided for 
linguistic and religious freedoms.10 Similar provisions were included in the other Minorities 
aties.11 
At that time equality was conceived broadly to include both equal treatment (non-discrimination) 
and what is now known as ‘minority rights’, that is the right of minorities to preserve their group 
characteristics and traditions. This conception was expressed by the Permanent Court of Int
The idea underlying the treaties for the protection of minorities is to secure for certain elements 
incorporated in a State, the population of which differs from them in race, language or religion, the 
possibility of living peaceably alongside that population and cooperating amicably with it, while at 
the same time preserving the characteristics which distinguish them from the majority, and 
satisfying the ensuing special needs. In order to attain this object, two things were regarded as 
particularly necessary, and have formed the subject of provisions in these treaties. The first is to 
ensure that nationals belonging to racial, religious or linguistic minorities shall be placed in every 
respect on a footing of perfect equality with the other nationals of the State. The second is to ensure 
for the minority elements suitable means for the preservation of their racial peculiarities, their 
 
6 See particularly the peace treaties that made up the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. 
7 See generally e.g. Nathan Lerner, Group rights and discrimination in international law (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 
1991), p. 7 ff; Patrick Thornberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1991), p. 25 ff; Asbjørn Eide ‘The Framework Convention in Historical and Global Perspective’ in Marc 
Weller (ed.) Rights of Minorities: Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).  
8 At the Paris Peace Conference president Woodrow Wilson stated that “nothing is more likely to disturb the 
peace of the world than the treatment which might in some circumstances be meted out to minorities”, cited in 
Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 95. 
9 Articles 2(1), 7(1) and 8(1). 
10 Articles 2(2), 7(3) and 9. 
11 Lauren, cit. supra note 8, p. 95. Lerner, cit. supra note 7, p. 13. 
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traditions and their national characteristics. These two requirements are indeed closely interlocked, 
for there would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of 
its own institutions, and were conse
 
Since 1920 individuals or associations acting on behalf of a minority group could submit petitions to 
the Council of the League of Nations in relation to the Minority Treaties.13 Nearly nine hundred 
petitions were submitted.14 Major problems confronted the League system of protection of minorities, 
however. First of all, the system was not of general application but was applied with respect to some 
countries, which raised the objection about double standards, as countries subjected to the treaty 
provisions complained that they were unfairly held to standards not applied to the majority of 
countries.15 Another problem was that the these treaties were in the end not capable of ensuring peace 
and security, as the substance of the treaties did not reflect the range and gravity of threats to 
minorities,16 and as they were in the end even used as a pretext for military intervention.17 Eventually
th
 
N
 
The United Nations, which was created in 1945 in the aftermath of the Second World War and the 
horrors of fascism and National Socialism, has since its very beginning placed the battle against 
discrimination in the forefront of its human rights activities.19 Indeed, one of the purposes of the UN, 
as they are enunciated in the UN Charter, is to promote and encourage the respect for human rights 
and fundamental freedoms for all “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion”.20 The 
principle of non-discrimination, as referred to above, is actually the only clue given by the drafters of 
the Charter as to the substance of the rights and freedoms whose respect is to be promoted and 
encouraged by the UN. Notably, in Articles 55 and 56 the members of the UN “pledge themselves to 
take joint and separate action” for the achievement of “universal respect for, and observance of, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or 
religion”. It is the basis of these articles that the International Court of Justice condemned, in its 1971 
Advisory Opinion on Namibia, the Apartheid policy pract
 
12 PCIJ, Advisory Opinion, Minority Schools in Albania, dated April 6th, 1935, Ser. A./B., No. 64, 1935. 
13 Lerner, cit. supra note 7, p. 13. 
14 Lauren, cit. supra note 8, p. 95. 
15 See e.g. Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 38 ff. 
16 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 50–51. 
17 See e.g. Marc Boyssuyt, ‘Comprehensive examination of thematic issues relating to racial discrimination: The 
concept and practice of affirmative action’, Commission on Human Rights 19 June 2000, para 77. 
18 Lerner, cit. supra note 7, 11; Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 46–54. 
19 Lauren, cit. supra note 8. Manfred Nowak, U.N. Covenant on civil and political rights: CCPR Commentary 
(Kehl: N.P. Engel, 1993), p. 460. 
20 Article 1(3) of the Charter of the United Nations. 
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ely based on grounds of race, 
colour, descent or national or ethnic origin which constitute a denial of fundamental human rights 
Rights and the two 1966 UN Covenants.25 Another aspect of international human rights law that 
underlines the fundamental importance of the prohibition of discrimination is that for instance the 
                                                       
Under the Charter of the United Nations, the former Mandatory [i.e. South Africa] had pledged 
itself to observe and respect, in a territory having an international status [i.e. Namibia], human 
rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race. To establish instead, and to 
enforce, distinctions, exclusions, restrictions and limitations exclusiv
is a flagrant violation of the purposes and principles of the Charter.21 
 
It is widely accepted that the principle of non-discrimination on racial grounds has acquired the status 
of a general principle of law.22 This means that no state may engage in racial discrimination in 
violation of that principle even if it has not ratified any convention to that effect. In fact, in the 1970 
Barcelona Traction case the International Court of Justice submitted that protection from racial 
discrimination is an obligation erga omnes of contemporary international law, an obligation of such 
importance that its performance is “the concern of all States” and is owed to “the international 
community as a whole”.23 Moreover, the principle of non-discrimination on racial grounds is often, 
but not always, considered to be one of the least controversial examples of a peremptory norm of 
international law from which no derogation is permitted (jus cogens).24 The exact contours of the 
principle are by no means clear, but it has been argued that it extends at least to systematic state-
sponsored violations of the rights and freedoms recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human 
 
21 Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971, para 131. 
22 See e.g. Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990), pp. 598 ff, and 
the references cited therein; B.G. Ramcharan ‘Equality and non-discrimination’ in Louis Henkin (ed.) The 
International Bill of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia U.P., 1981), pp. 
249–250. See also Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (adopted at the World Conference on Human 
Rights in June 1993, A/CONF.157/23), para 15, which states that “[r]espect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms without distinction of any kind is a fundamental rule of international human rights law”. One of the 
first analyses promoting the existence of this principle in the area of international law was made by Judge 
Tanaka in his dissenting opinion in the 1966 South West Africa case (Second Phase), ICJ Reports (1966), p. 299 
ff. It is often also maintained that a policy of racial discrimination violates customary law, see Patrick 
Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 322–326. 
23 ICJ, Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgement, I.C.J. Reports 1970, p. 3, paras 33 
and 33. The Court reiterated its position in the 2006 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (New Application: 2002): Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the Application (delivered on 3 
February 2006). 
24 Brownlie, cit. supra note 22, 512 ff; Mckean, cit. supra note 44, p. 283; Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, pp. 
249–250, 269; Hernández-Truyol, “Human Rights Through a Gendered Lens: Emergence, Evolution, 
Revolution”, in Askin - Koenig, Women and International Human Rights (New York: Transnational Publishers, 
1999), p. 19; Marc Weller ‘Conclusion: Advancing minority rights at regional and universal level’ in Marc 
Weller, (ed.) The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 616; Lauri Hannikainen, 
Peremptory norms (jus cogens) in international law: Historical development, criteria, present status (Helsinki: 
Finnish Lawyers’ Publishing Company, 1988); For a critical view, see Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 326–
328. Jus cogens norms have not been authoritatively catalogued anywhere, and there is no general agreement 
regarding how a norm reaches the status of jus cogens.  For the meaning of jus cogens, see Article 53 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
25 See Weller, cit. supra note 24, p. 617; and implicitly, Brownlie, cit. supra note 22, pp. 598-599; Thornberry, 
cit. supra note 7, pp. 322–326. 
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International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) expressly prohibits derogations from 
the principle of non-discrimination even in times of public emergency.26 
6.2 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
Introduction 
 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly on 10 November 1948, is perhaps the most influential human rights document to date. Its 
impact on national policies and laws across the world remains inestimable, and its non-discrimination 
provisions have served as a model for subsequent human rights instruments. 
 
Concept of discrimination 
 
The non-discrimination provision in Article 2 of the UDHR reads as follows: 
Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or 
social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
Article 7 on its turn provides for equality before the law: 
All are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to equal protection of the 
law. All are entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of this Declaration 
and against any incitement to such discrimination. 
 
The UDHR was drafted at a time when gross and often state-sponsored racial discrimination was still 
rampant. Examples abound, and include lynching of African Americans and the bolstering of white 
supremacy through the ‘separate but equal’ doctrine in the United States, the Apartheid and treatment 
of Indians in South Africa, and the subjection of many African and Asian peoples by Western powers 
– who played a prominent role in the drafting of the UDHR - through colonialism.27 This background 
could not but affect the drafting of the non-discrimination provisions of the UDHR, and led to many 
controversies.  
The drafting of Articles 2 and 7 raised many difficult questions and the articles took many forms 
during the drafting and raised many questions.28 To begin with, some of the delegates that participated 
in the drafting were unclear as to why it was necessary to have two separate articles and what the 
 
26 Article 4(1) of the ICCPR. 
27 See Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), p. 92 ff. 
28 The range of controversies was so substantial that even the travaux préparatoires are at times rather obscure. 
Jacob Th. Möller ‘Article 7’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
Commentary (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992), p. 115. 
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difference between them was. According to the travaux, they were explained that Article 2 set forth the 
general principle of non-discrimination, whereas Article 7 ensured individuals’ protection against 
discrimination within their own country.29 Article 2 is also more limited in scope than Article 7, as the 
latter deals with the (domestic) law in general whereas the former deals only with the rights and 
freedoms set out in the Declaration itself. It was also unclear whether it was of significance that 
Article 2 prohibits the making of any kind of distinctions, whereas Article 7 prohibits discrimination. 
Along this line of thinking, Article 2(1) would express the more general and rigid conviction and 
principle that human rights belong to everyone, without any distinctions, whereas Article 7 is more 
open to discussion about which kinds of distinctions in law in general constitute unequal treatment and 
which do not.30 Yet the French language version, in which the Declaration was proclaimed together 
with the English and Russian versions, uses the words ‘sans distinction’ not just in Article 2 but also in 
the first sentence of Article 7, using the word ‘discrimination’ only in the second sentence of Article 7, 
whereas the English language version uses ‘discrimination’ throughout Article 7, a fact which 
weakens the case for such an interpretation.  
Similarly it was not clear, at least for some of the delegates, whether the principle ‘equal 
protection of the laws’ required the law to be the same for everyone.31 Since then, the interpretation 
that the law (particularly statutory law) should treat people in the same way except where there is 
reasonable justification for not doing so has become widely endorsed.32  
However, what amounts to a reasonable justification, and what is the scope of application of that 
principle, is not clear. Historically, the principle of equal protection of the law had made its way into 
national constitutions starting with the adoption of the 14th Amendment to the US Constitution in 
1868.33 The 14th Amendment, which provides that “[n]o State shall … deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”, was motivated by the need to abolish laws, enacted by 
many individual states in the aftermath of the American Civil War and the abolition of slavery, that 
restricted the legal powers of African Americans.34 Was Article 7 of the UDHR inspired by, or even 
meant to correspond to, the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment? If yes, is its reach 
similarly limited in that relationships between private parties, for instance in the field of employment, 
are excluded from its scope?35 Principles such as these are not self-explanatory, as is clear from the 
extensive, complex – and politically highly charged - jurisprudence that the 14th Amendment has 
spawned in the US.36  
 
29 Sigrun Skogly ‘Article 2’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.) The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: A 
Commentary (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992), p. 63. 
30 Cf. Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 283 ff. 
31 Möller, cit. supra note 28, pp. 122 and 125. 
32 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 285; Mckean, cit. supra note 44, p. 139. 
33 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 459. 
34 Idem. 
35 The Equal Protection Clause has indeed been interpreted, in the field of employment, as applying only to 
public-sector employees and to legislation governing the employment relationship. See Lynn M. Roseberry, The 
Limits of Employment Discrimination Law in the United States and European Community (Copenhagen: DJOF 
Publishing, 1999), p. 23. 
36 Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, p. 247. The US Supreme Court has in several cases interpreted the Equal 
Protection Clause; in the 1896 case Plessy v. Ferguson the Supreme Court upheld a law that required segregation 
of ‘Blacks’ and ‘Whites’, whereas in the 1954 case Brown v. Board of Education the Court effectively declared 
de jure racial segregation unconstitutional on the grounds that it violates the Equal Protection Clause. 
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The central idea of the principle ‘equality before the law’, which originated from the American 
and French revolutions, appears to have been less controversial in its meaning for the drafters,37 
though it is by no means self-explanatory either. The principle is generally interpreted to mean that 
courts and other bodies applying law shall treat people equally except where the law provides 
otherwise.38 This means, for instance, that persons with a minority background should not be 
sentenced more harshly than persons belonging to a majority for similar crimes, an ideal state of 
affairs that courts often fall short of.39 
It is generally agreed that Article 7 was not intended to imply material equality in fact.40 
 
Grounds 
 
Unlike Article 1(3) of the UN Charter, the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination in Article 2 of 
the UDHR is relatively wide and open-ended. The expressly mentioned grounds include ‘race’, colour 
and national origin. During the drafting a controversy arose as to whether the notion of ‘race’ covered 
colour, with some delegates expressing the view that discrimination on the basis of colour was not 
identical to that of race, and some others expressing the view that since the notion of ‘race’ had no 
scientific basis, people used colour as a marker of ‘race’ and thereby colour was covered by ‘race’.41 
In the end, the term colour was included in the list of grounds, apparently to make it absolutely certain 
that it was covered, as there was no agreement as to whether it had a meaning distinct from the notion 
of race.42 There was also considerable controversy around the meaning of the term ‘national origin’ 
and whether it should be replaced by some other term. In the end, the reference to it was retained, and 
it was explained as referring not to the citizenship of a state but to ‘national characteristics’, thus 
linking the notion to cultural, religious and linguistic characteristics.43  
 
Material scope of application 
 
Article 2 of the UDHR is not free-standing, but is, in a way, accessory to the other articles of the 
Declaration. Its scope is nevertheless extensive, as the rights guaranteed in the Declaration cover to a 
 
37 The studies on the drafting of Article 7 do not mention that the principle was debated by the drafters. 
38 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 285; McKean, cit. supra note 44, p. 139. For instance in Attorney General v. 
Lavell, the Canadian Supreme Court held that “equality before the law” in the Canadian Bill of Rights meant 
“equality of treatment in the enforcement and application of the laws of Canada”, [1974] S.C.R. 1349, p. 1350. 
On the other hand, the Australian Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (as amended), which is closely linked with the 
ICERD Convention, defines “rights to equality before law” as having to do with “persons of a particular race, 
colour or national origin” as not enjoying a right that is enjoyed by “persons of another race, colour or national 
or ethnic origin”, or enjoying it to a more limited extent, by reason of a law or a provision thereof (section 10 of 
the Act).  
39 See e.g. Lars Holmberg – Britta Kyvsgaard ‘Are Immigrants and their Descendants Discriminated against in 
the Danish Criminal Justice System?’ Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention 
Vol. 4, No 2 (2003). 
40 See e.g. Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, p. 253. 
41 Skogly, cit. supra note 29, pp. 60–61. 
42 Morsink, cit. supra note 27, pp. 102–103. 
43 See Morsink, cit. supra note 27, pp. 104–105, and the references cited therein. 
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great extent the range of what are recognized as human rights and fundamental freedoms today.44 
These include “right to equal access to public service”, “right to work, to free choice of employment, 
to just and favourable conditions of work and protection against unemployment”, “equal pay for equal 
work”, “right to education” and the right to an adequate standard of living, including in the area of 
housing.45 
 
Complementary equality provisions 
 
Several other articles of the Declaration are also relevant from the point of view of this study. Article 
23 addresses pay equality separately and provides that “[e]veryone, without any discrimination, has 
the right to equal pay for equal work”. Article 26, which provides for free elementary education, 
touches upon prevention of discrimination when it specifies that education shall “promote 
understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups”. 
Article 8 declares that everyone “has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national 
tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the constitution or by law”. The 
formulation of Article 8 is strong, as it explicitly requires the remedies to be of judicial nature and 
requires that remedies are provided not just with respect to violations of rights granted by the 
Declaration but with respect to all rights granted by the constitution or by law, which is a demand of 
great intensity, keeping in mind the ever expanding number of rights provided in the national legal 
systems in Europe.46 
6.3 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Convention 
Introduction 
 
The ILO Convention No 111 on discrimination was adopted in June 1958 and was ratified by 169 
countries as of January 2010.47 The substantive articles of the Convention are often read in light of 
Recommendation R111, which accompanied the Convention, as well as the comments of the 
Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions and Recommendations (CEACR),48 the task 
of which is to examine compliance by ILO member states with this and other ILO Conventions.49 
 
 
44 Asbjörn Eide - Allan Rosas, ‘Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Universal Challenge’, in Eide et al 
(eds.) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: a Textbook (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1995), p. 15. 
45 Articles 21(2), 23(2), 25(1) and 26(1). 
46 See also generally on Article 8, Göran Melander ‘Article 8’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.) The Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights: A Commentary (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, 1992). 
47 Source: www.ilo.org/ilolex (accessed 1.1.2010). 
48 Established in 1926, and composed of 20 independent members, the Committee of Experts is a legal body 
responsible for the examination of the compliance by ILO member states with ILO Conventions and 
Recommendations.  
49 This examination takes place for instance on the basis of reports sent by governments pursuant to 
questionnaires prepared by the ILO Governing Body. 
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Concept of discrimination 
 
Convention No 111 was the first international document where the term ‘discrimination’ was 
expressly defined. According to Article 1(1) discrimination refers to “any distinction, exclusion or 
preference made on the basis of race” that has “the effect of nullifying or impairing equality of 
opportunity or treatment in employment and occupation”. Neither the Convention nor the 
accompanying recommendation define the core terms ‘equal opportunities’ or ‘equal treatment’, which 
brings a degree of uncertainty into the definition. Special measures are referred to in Article 5, 
according to which special measures designed to meet the particular requirements of persons who are 
“generally recognized to require special protection or assistance” do not constitute discrimination. 
Distinction, exclusion or preference with respect to a particular job based on its inherent requirements 
does not constitute discrimination.50  
The definition, which places an emphasis on effects and thereby on what is happening in the ‘real 
life’, is rather broad. The CEACR has come to interpret it as encompassing most situations identified 
as direct and indirect forms of discrimination.51 
 
Scope of application 
 
In light of Recommendation R111, the Convention aims for the elimination of discrimination with 
respect to all aspects of employment, including access to employment and terms and conditions of 
employment and security of tenure. It is also intended to cover the benefits and welfare facilities that 
are provided in connection with employment.52 Also vocational guidance and placement services are 
to be made available to all on an equal basis.53 In light of the interpretative practice of the CEACR, the 
Convention covers both public and private sectors.54 
 
State obligations 
 
In Article 2 states parties undertake to “declare and pursue a national policy designed to promote, by 
methods appropriate to national conditions and practice, equality of opportunity and treatment in 
respect of employment and occupation, with a view to eliminating any discrimination in respect 
thereof.” What is particularly noteworthy is that the undertaking is not couched in terms of individual 
 
50 Article 1(2). 
51 CEACR, Individual Observation on Saudi Arabia, 2007, document No 062007SAU111, para 3. See also 
CEACR’s Individual Observation on Hungary, 2007, document no 062007HUN111, where the Committee asks 
the Government of Hungary to provide information on the number of teaching and non-teaching staff, 
disaggregated by sex, which were dismissed due to the 1995 austerity measures. The Committee points out that 
whenever public employment must be reduced due to budgetary constraints, an assessment of the impact of 
measures needs to be made “in order to avoid dismissals contrary to the principle of equality of opportunity and 
treatment”, in de facto recognition of the concept of indirect discrimination. 
52 ILO, R111 Discrimination (Employment and Occupation) Recommendation, 1958. CEACR, Individual 
Observation, India, 2007 (document no. 062007IND111). CEACR, Individual Observation on Saudi Arabia, 
2007 (document no 062007SAU111). 
53 R111, para 2(b)(i). 
54 See e.g. CEASR, Individual Observation on Lithuania, 2007 (document no 062007LTU111), para 6. 
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rights, but in terms of a national policy that the contracting states undertake to declare and pursue with 
a view to eliminating any discrimination with respect to employment and occupation. 
Recommendation R111 specifies that the national policy “should be applied by means of legislative 
measures, collective agreements between representative employers' and workers' organisations or in 
any other manner consistent with national conditions and practice.”  
Article 3 sets out further and more detailed obligations for the contracting states. Under the said 
article governments undertake, inter alia, to seek the co-operation of the social partners in promoting 
the acceptance and observance of the national policy; to enact such legislation and to promote such 
educational programmes as may be calculated to secure the acceptance and observance of the policy; 
and to repeal any provisions and modify any administrative instructions or practices that are 
inconsistent with the policy. They also undertake to report, in their respective country reports, on the 
action they have taken. 
At least prima facie, Article 2 leaves the contracting states much room for discretion in the choice 
of measures by which to pursue the national equality policy. This is counterbalanced by the fact that 
the obligations are demanding, as the Convention is ambitious in that the required policies are to aim 
at the elimination of discrimination, and in that it and the Committee place an emphasis on securing 
observance of anti-discrimination laws and policies in practice. In its dialogue with the states parties, 
the Committee has taken the opportunity to advocate the adoption of legislative measures. In view of 
the Committee, ”legal protection from discrimination through effective mechanisms and procedures is 
an important element of any national policy to promote and ensure equality of opportunity in 
employment and occupation, as envisaged by the Convention”.55 Furthermore, the Committee is of the 
view that governments should take the necessary steps to ensure that anti-discrimination and equality 
provisions are properly enforced and that the legislation is “known, understood and observed in 
practice”.56 It has also recommended that effective means of redress be provided.57 It should also be 
noted that the Committee has, in its individual observations, called for the adoption of a “flexible 
complaints mechanism that takes into account the difficulties that the worker has in producing 
evidence of discrimination and the need to protect complainants, so as to guarantee the effectiveness 
of the procedure.”58 
The Committee has in fact made it clear that in its view, for a country to be in compliance with its 
obligations, it is not sufficient for it simply to adopt anti-discrimination legislation. It has called for 
comprehensive measures, including the following: adoption of “concrete and proactive measures” 
such as educational and awareness-raising programmes;59 measures that seek, inter alia, to promote 
equal access to vocational training;60 measures that address stereotyped behaviours and prejudicial 
 
55 CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Croatia, 2007 (document no 062007HRV111). Emphasis added. 
56 Idem, and CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Lithuania, published 2007 (document no 
062007LTU111). 
57 See e.g. CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Saudi Arabia, 2007 (document no 062007SAU111), para 
3. 
58 See CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Uruguay, 2007 (document no 062007URY111), para 2. 
59 CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Cameroon, 2007 (document no 062007CMR111), para 1. 
60 See R111 Article 2(b)(i). See also CEACR, Individual Observation concerning El Salvador, 2007 (document 
no 062007SLV111, para 4), in which the Committee expressed its hope that the Government would pay 
“particular attention to equal access to vocational training, which is key to gaining access to the labour market.” 
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attitudes and promote respect and tolerance for ethnic minorities;61 and monitoring of the progress 
made in the implementation of domestic policies through the collection of statistics disaggregated by 
race, ethnicity and sex.62 For the Committee, the ultimate test is whether equal opportunities and equal 
treatment are enjoyed in practice.63 To assess whether this is the case, it is customary for the 
Committee to ask the governments to report information, such as information relating to judicial 
decisions and statistics, which allows it to appreciate the application of the Convention in practice.64  
6.4 Convention against Discrimination in Education 
Introduction  
 
The Convention against Discrimination in Education was adopted by the General Conference of the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in December 1960. By 
January 2010 it had been ratified by 96 countries.  
 
Concept of discrimination 
 
Discrimination is defined in Article 1 of the Convention as follows:  
For the purposes of this Convention, the term `discrimination' includes any distinction, exclusion, 
limitation or preference which, being based on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or 
other opinion, national or social origin, economic condition or birth, has the purpose or effect of 
nullifying or impairing equality of treatment in education.65 
 
This definition bears a degree of resemblance with the definition of discrimination included in the ILO 
Convention, but speaks of ‘limitations’ in addition to distinctions, exclusions and preferences, and is 
broader in that it covers also actions, the purpose - not just effect - of which is to impair equality of 
treatment. 
 
61 See e.g. CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Saudi Arabia, 2007 (document no 062007SAU111); 
CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Senegal, 2007 (document no 062007SEN111); CEACR, Individual 
Observation concerning Bulgaria (document no 062007BGR111), para 6. 
62 See e.g. CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Chad, 2007 (document no 062007TCD111), para 3; 
CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Mauritania, 2007 (document no 062007MRT111), para 1. 
63 See e.g. CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Morocco, 2007 (document no 062007MAR111), para 5; 
CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Poland, 2007 (document no 062007POL111), para 5. 
64 General Report of the CEACR, 2007, para 45. CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Germany, 2007 
(document no 062007DEU111); CEACR, Individual Observation concerning Greece, 2007 (document no 
062007GRC111). 
65 The definition sets out in more detail an exemplary list of situations that constitute discrimination. These 
include: (a) depriving any person or group of persons of access to education of any type or at any level; (b) 
limiting any person or group of persons to education of an inferior standard; (c) subject to the provisions of 
Article 2 of the Convention, establishing or maintaining separate educational systems or institutions for persons 
or groups of persons; or (d) inflicting on any person or group of persons conditions which are incompatible with 
the dignity of man. 
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An important clarification is made in Article 2 of the Convention, which provides that the 
establishment and maintenance of religious educational institutions is not to be considered 
discrimination, provided that attendance at such institutions is optional and that the education provided 
confirms to applicable official standards.  
 
Grounds and material scope 
 
The Convention prohibits discrimination on the grounds of ‘race’, colour and national or social origin. 
These terms are not defined or explained in the Convention. Consequently, it is not clear in what way 
‘race’ is different from ‘colour’ or whether national origin refers to minorities, immigrants, to both or 
neither. 
The Convention specifies that the term ‘education’, for the purposes of the Convention, refers to 
all types and levels of education, and includes access to education, the standard and quality of 
education, and the conditions under which it is given.66 
 
State obligations 
 
The Convention requires states parties to abrogate any provisions, instructions and practices which 
involve discrimination in education and to ensure, “by legislation where necessary, that there is no 
discrimination in the admission of pupils to educational institutions.”67 The Convention 
acknowledges, albeit in soft terms, the importance of special measures by stating that the contracting 
states undertake to “formulate, develop and apply a national policy which, by methods appropriate to 
the circumstances and to national usage, will tend to promote equality of opportunity and of 
treatment”.68 The Convention envisages that this is to be done, in particular, by means of making 
primary education free and compulsory and by ensuring that the standards of education are equivalent 
in all public institutions of the same level.69 There is no obligation for the state to provide financial or 
other assistance to minorities to carry out their own educa
6.5 Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination 
Introduction 
 
The Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination, concluded in 1965, is 
widely regarded to be the principal international instrument concerning racial discrimination.71 The 
 
 
 
66 Article 1(2) of the Convention. 
67 Article 3.  
68 Article 4. Emphasis added. 
69 Article 4(a) and (b). 
70 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 290. 
71 The paramount importance of the CERD Convention is recognized e.g. in the Durban declaration and plan of 
action. See also e.g. Michael O’Flaherty ‘The UN Committee on the Elimination of All forms of Racial 
discrimination as an implementation agency’ in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement 
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Convention has also become one of the most widely ratified human rights instruments in the world: by 
January 2010, 173 countries altogether had ratified the Convention.72 By virtue of these two facts the 
Convention and its provisions will be examined here in some detail. 
Preparations for the Convention started in the 1960s, prompted primarily by a wish to respond to 
an epidemic of anti-Semitic incidents taking place in Europe at that time.73 The broader backdrop for 
the Convention was the recognition of the need to condemn also some other particularly topical forms 
of discrimination, in particular colonialism and the discrimination associated therewith, and apartheid, 
segregation and other “government policies based on racial superiority or hatred”, the latter term 
expressing concern over Nazism and fascism and their possible re-emergence.74 The raison d’être of 
the Convention was therefore twofold: first, to secure international condemnation of systematic, often 
state-sponsored, expressions of racism, racial superiority and related phenomena including 
colonialism, and second, to curb the actions of individuals, groups and organisations that were 
spreading racial hatred and acting on that basis. At the time of its adoption, discrimination was viewed 
by many states as a social pathology that afflicted states other than their own, and the struggle against 
racial discrimination was seen as belonging primarily within their foreign policy.75 It has been 
observed that it was widely thought that racism was solely about the consequences of Western 
imperialism, an assumption which inevitably placed the Convention in a fraught political 
environment.76 The Convention is a child of its time also in the sense that it is strongly integrationist, 
almost assimilationist, in its spirit and does not expressly provide for cultural rights, a fact that is 
alleviated only to a small degree by the recent references by the CERD Committee to such rights.77 
The CERD Committee monitors the domestic implementation of the ICERD in particular through 
the following three facets of its work: (i) consideration of periodic reports submitted by states parties, 
 
(Aldershot: Avebury, 1997), p. 210. The future importance of ICERD was anticipated also in the drafting phases 
of the Convention: Thornberry notes that “[i]t is clear from the history of the preparation of the Convention that 
it received a thorough consideration at various levels in the United Nations hierarchy and constitutes as near an 
authentic expression as possible of the general view at the United Nations in 1965. Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, 
p. 259.  
72 Source: http://treaties.un.org (accessed 1.1.2010). 
73 Lerner, cit. supra note 7, p. 46. 
74 Preamble to the Convention. Also noteworthy are Article 3, which condemns segregation and apartheid, and 
Article 15, which envisages a mechanism under which the CERD was to give opinions and recommendations to 
petitions submitted by inhabitants of Trust and Non-Self Governing Territories. See also Michael Banton, 
International action against racial discrimination (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 68. The UN Declaration 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, which was adopted in 1963, i.e. just a few years before the 
CERD Convention, and to which the latter explicitly refers to in its preamble, expressly - though not 
exhaustively - links racial discrimination with state-sponsored practices including colonialism, “apartheid, 
segregation, and separation” and “promotion and dissemination of racial superiority and expansionism”. In this 
context it is also noteworthy that Article 5 of the Declaration requires that “An end shall be put without delay to 
governmental and other public policies of racial segregation and especially policies of apartheid, as well as all 
forms of racial discrimination and separation resulting from such policies”. 
75 Banton, cit. supra note 74, pp. 68 and 306. 
76 Kevin Boyle – Anneliese Baldaccini ‘A Critical Evaluation of International Human Rights Approaches to 
Racism’ in Sandra Fredman (ed.) Discrimination and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 
150. 
77 The Committee urges, in its General Recommendation on self-determination (a right that the CERD 
Convention does not deal with as such), governments to be sensitive towards the rights of persons belonging to 
ethnic groups, particularly the right to preserve their culture. 
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(ii) consideration, under the optional individual complaints system, of complaints (called 
“communications” in the Convention), and (iii) by means of issuing general recommendations on 
thematic issues, in which the Committee has the opportunity to outline its interpretations of the content 
of the provisions of the treaty in a more systematic fashion. 
By January 2010, 53 states parties, including 19 Member States of the European Union,78 had 
recognized the competence of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination to consider 
complaints (called “communications” in the Convention) against them. Such communications may be 
submitted, after having exhausted available domestic remedies, by groups or individuals who consider 
that their rights have been violated by a state party under whose jurisdiction they are. The number of 
communications has remained peculiarly low: since 1982, when the communication system became 
operational, until November 2009, only 45 communications had been submitted; 10 had been found to 
disclose a violation of the Convention, 14 had been found not to disclose a violation, 17 were 
considered inadmissible and 4 were pending (‘living’).79 Despite the low volume of complaints, the 
procedure has allowed the CERD committee the opportunity to build up its jurisprudence. 
 
Concept of discrimination 
 
Racial discrimination is defined in Article 1(1) of the Convention as follows: 
In this Convention, the term ‘racial discrimination’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion, 
restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which has the 
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal 
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural or 
any other field of public life. 
 
This definition is based on the definitions of the previously mentioned ILO and UNESCO documents. 
Although Article 1(1) is careful to point out that the definition was adopted only for the purposes of 
the Convention itself, it has become an almost standard definition of racial discrimination in the field 
of international human rights. The definition is broad, complex and imbued with illusory precision, in 
that it consists of several different elements and is couched in general terms, which render both its 
analysis and application a challenging exercise. In consequence, the definition is at least in theory 
capable of being applied in a relatively wide range of situations, but its application in those situations 
is not straightforward because of the openness of its language.  
The reference to enjoyment of rights ‘on an equal footing’ contains the comparative element that is 
often taken to be at heart of discrimination: to constitute racial discrimination, an infringement must 
have put an individual or a group at a disadvantage on ‘racial’ grounds. It also emphasises the fact that 
what is at issue here is not a requirement of identical or similar treatment, but equal treatment, which 
allows a measure of differential treatment in order to accommodate genuine individual or group-based 
characteristics and needs. In examining whether discrimination has taken place, the Committee 
 
78 These were: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden. Source: 
http://treaties.un.org (accessed 1.1.2010). 
79 OHCHR, Statistical survey of individual complaints. Available at www.ohchr.org (accessed 1.1.2010). 
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generally uses the legitimation test: differentiation of treatment is taken to constitute discrimination if 
the criteria for such differentiation, judged against the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are 
not considered legitimate.80 This approach, of course, leaves the Committee much discretion. 
In any case, the concept of discrimination in the Convention is broad in that the taking of action 
that is deliberately aimed at infringing the rights of an individual or a group, on racial grounds, 
constitutes racial discrimination even if the intended results never materialize. The making of a 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference may also constitute an act of racial discrimination even 
if the resulting infringement of rights or freedoms was not purposeful.81 The Committee has in its 
practice eventually moved beyond what is perhaps the most obvious literal reading of Article 1(1), and 
interpreted the Convention to also prohibit indirect discrimination, defined as any action (i.e. not just 
distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic 
origin) that has an unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin.82 In its General Recommendation No XIV the Committee stated that in its 
view 
particular actions may have varied purposes. In seeking to determine whether an action has an 
effect contrary to the Convention, it [the Committee] will look to see whether that action has an 
unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or 
ethnic origin.83 
 
The Committee used this kind of an approach in B.M.S. v. Australia, where it set out to examine 
Australia’s policy of setting a quota for medical doctors trained overseas, in order to determine 
whether it was possible to “reach the conclusion that the system works to the detriment of persons of a 
particular race or national origin”. 84 In L.R. et. al. v. Slovakia the Committee elaborated upon its 
view and opined that “the definition of racial discrimination in Article 1 expressly extends beyond 
measures that are explicitly discriminatory, to encompass measures that are not discriminatory at face 
value but are discriminatory in fact and effect, that is, if they amount to indirect discrimination.”85 The 
Committee has stated that when it is assessing whether indirect discrimination has taken place, it will 
take full account of the particular context and circumstances of the petition, as “by definition indirect 
 
80 CERD, General Recommendation XIV (1993), para 2. 
81 Under the terminology adopted in this study, this (an act based on e.g. ‘race’ but without mens rea that has a 
disparate impact upon the members of a group) does not constitute indirect discrimination, but direct 
discrimination, as the latter is about the making of distinctions on the grounds of ‘race’ which do not need to 
have been committed with mens rea whereas indirect discrimination is about acts that appear neutral (do not use 
‘race’ as a criterion) but that nevertheless unjustifiably disadvantages the members of a group. 
82 E.g. Nathan Lerner, a specialist in the drafting history of the Convention, submits that “distinction, exclusion, 
restriction and preference” are four types of acts prohibited by the Convention, and adds that “the intention of the 
drafters of Article 1 was to cover in its first paragraph all kinds of acts of discrimination among persons, as long 
as they were based on motivations of a racial nature, in the broad sense of the word”. See Lerner, cit. supra note 
7, pp. 48–49 (emphasis added). 
83 See also CERD, General Recommendation No. 20, paragraph 2, where the Committee interprets Article 5 of 
the Convention and submits that “Whenever a State imposes a restriction upon one of the rights listed in article 5 
of the Convention which applies ostensibly to all within its jurisdiction, it must ensure that neither in purpose nor 
effect is the restriction incompatible with article 1 of the Convention”. General Recommendation No. 20 (1996). 
84 CERD, B.M.S. v. Australia, Communication No. 8/1996. Emphasis added. 
85 CERD, L.R. et. al. v. Slovakia, Communication No. 31/2003. 
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discrimination can only be demonstrated circumstantially”.86 The Committee’s approach, the rejection 
of the formalistic approach according to which discrimination must be linked to acts which in one way 
or the other single out (by means of a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference) members of a 
particular group, significantly expands the scope of the definition of discrimination in the CERD 
Convention.  
Although the definition of discrimination encompasses also preferences based on ‘race’, such 
preferences are allowed if they constitute special measures envisaged in Articles 1(4) and 2(2). Indeed, 
one of the innovations of the ICERD was the incorporation into the very definition of discrimination 
of a provision allowing special measures targeted at particular groups; in this way, special measures 
cannot be construed as narrowly-interpreted exceptions to the principle of non-discrimination.87 
Article 1(4) spells out the legitimacy and limits of special measures: 
Special measures taken for the sole purpose of securing adequate advancement of certain racial or 
ethnic groups or individuals requiring such protection as may be necessary in order to ensure such 
groups or individuals equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms shall 
not be deemed racial discrimination, provided, however, that such measures do not, as a 
consequence, lead to the maintenance of separate rights for different racial groups and that they 
shall not be continued after the objectives for which they were taken have been achieved. 
 
This Article has caused much confusion: some commentators have been concerned over the question 
of whether it prohibits minority rights, i.e. standing rights that aim at guaranteeing minorities the 
opportunity to preserve and develop their cultural, linguistic and religious identity and heritage.88 This 
concern arises because minority rights inherently target particular ethnic groups and are not of a 
temporary nature, as is required by Article 1(4). On the other hand, other commentators have hailed 
said article as an express recognition of the legitimacy of such rights.89 While the literal reading of 
Article 1(4), when read alone, might indeed seem to rule out minority rights, it is plausible to interpret 
Article 1 as implying that minority rights do not constitute discrimination to begin with, as the purpose 
or effect of special measures is not to nullify or impair the recognition, enjoyment or exercise of 
human rights or fundamental freedoms within the meaning of Article 1(1) but to ensure them.90 State 
practice and the practice of the Committee also support the interpretation that minority rights and 
related action are by no means in breach of the Convention.91 Indeed, the Committee has explicitly 
stated that special measures should not be confused with minority rights or other specific rights 
pertaining to certain categories of person.92 ‘Special measures’ as a term used in the Convention 
 
86 Ibid, para 10.4. 
87 McKean, cit. supra note 44, p. 159. 
88 See e.g. the debates reviewed by Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 266 ff. 
89 Mckean, cit. supra note 44, p. 159. 
90 Although Article 5 of the Convention mentions several civil and political rights guaranteed by the ICCPR, but 
not the right of minorities to maintain and develop their identities laid down in Article 27 of ICCPR, there are no 
apparent legal grounds for arguing that Article 27 would not be one of the rights that come within the purview of 
the CERD Convention, including Articles 1 and 5. 
91 See also Ryszard Cholewinski, ‘The Racial Convention and the Protection of Cultural and Linguistic Ethnic 
Minorities’, Revue de Droit International (69) 1991. 
92 CERD, General Recommendation No. 32 (2009), para 15. 
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merely refers to such measures that aim to eliminate inequalities that jeopardize the full and equal 
enjoyment of all human rights and fundamental freedoms.93 
 
Grounds and the personal scope of application  
 
The grounds covered by the ICERD are exhaustively enumerated; these are race, colour, descent, and 
national or ethnic origin. Despite the fact that these notions therefore in a crucial manner delimit the 
scope of application of the Convention, the Convention itself does not define them and no definitions 
have been formulated by the CERD Committee either.  
Whereas ‘race’ or the other terms have not been defined in the Convention, it defines ‘racial 
discrimination’ as discrimination based on race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin.94 The 
Convention, including its preamble, reflects popular conceptions of its time, and treats ‘races’ as 
distinct, real entities. This is evident in the frequent and unqualified references to ‘races’ and ‘racial 
groups’ in the text of the Convention.95 Moreover, the Convention is clear to condemn only doctrines 
of racial superiority, not racial thinking as such, its very raison d’être being the elimination of 
discrimination linked to such doctrines.96 The drafters had been reminded of the fact that scientifically 
speaking there was no such thing as ‘race’,97 which suggests that either they were unconvinced of the 
truth value of that statement or that they nevertheless chose to use that term as a kind of useful legal 
fiction.  
Banton, a long-time member of the CERD Committee, has made an effort to interpret what the 
Convention means by ‘race’. In his view the notion of ‘race’ should not be understood along the lines 
of biological objectivism, because the Convention addresses actions that are based on assumed race or 
some other group-related ascription of a person or a group of persons.98 In his vocabulary, ‘race’ is a 
way of defining otherness, a generic idiom for structures of social differentiation.99 Indeed, the 
Convention prohibits “distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race”, not for instance 
actions targeted at individuals or groups “distinguished by race”. Again, it is relevant that the drafters 
 
93 Ibid, para 11 ff. 
94 Some commentators are of the view that the Convention defines ‘race’ as ‘race, colour, descent or ethnic or 
national origin’, but this reasoning is manifestly erroneous, if not for any other reason but for its circularity. Yet 
other commentators a bit more cautiously submit that the concept of race under the Convention ‘encompasses’ 
colour, descent and national or ethnic origin, a statement which can be misunderstood to convey the same idea. 
See e.g. Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 47; Kristin Henrard ‘The Impact of International Non-Discrimination 
Norms in Combination with General Human Rights for the Protection of Minorities: The European Convention 
on Human Rights’, Strasbourg 25 October 2006, DH-MIN(2006)020, p. 5. 
95 For instance Article 2(1) (e) speaks of eliminating “barriers between races”, Article 4(a) requires states to 
criminalize acts of violence “against any race” and Articles 1(4), 2(2) and 7 speak of “racial groups”. 
96 The Convention nowhere condemns racial thinking as such, but the preamble to it famously proclaims that the 
states parties to the Convention are “[c]onvinced that any doctrine of superiority based on racial differentiation is 
scientifically false, morally condemnable, socially unjust and dangerous, and that there is no justification for 
racial discrimination, in theory or in practice, anywhere”. Therefore the Convention took a different stand than 
the preceding Declaration, the preamble of which condemned “any doctrine of racial differentiation or 
superiority” (emphasis added).  
97 Lerner, cit. supra note 7. 
98 Banton, cit. supra note 74, p. 52; Banton ‘The causes of, and remedies for, racial discrimination’, 
E/CN.4/1999/WG.1/BP.6, para 1. 
99 Banton, cit. supra note 74, pp. 76–79. 
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had been reminded of the fact that there are no such things as ‘races’, and that they nevertheless 
deemed it necessary to use that concept in the Convention.100 Under that view, discriminatory action is 
based on social and/or personal, not natural or ‘real’ conceptions of ‘race’. The same conclusion could 
also be made with regard to the other grounds enumerated in the Convention. Along that line of 
thought, it should usually not be necessary, for the purposes of establishing that racial discrimination 
has taken place, to prove that the aggrieved person actually belongs to a particular ‘racial’ or ethnic 
group – a task that would scientifically speaking be rather senseless in case of the second term and 
entirely senseless in the case of the first.  
Of the enumerated grounds, the notion of ‘descent’ does not appear in comparable international 
instruments of the time, for instance the UN Declaration on Race, but was apparently taken aboard in 
order to cover caste-type arrangements.101 Care must be taken to distinguish between ‘citizenship’ and 
‘national origin’: differential treatment on the basis of citizenship is not as such prohibited by the 
Convention, whereas differential treatment on the basis of national origin is. That said, there were 
major differences of opinion during the drafting stages as to the meaning of the term ‘national origin’. 
For some, the term referred to groups that were distinct from the majority population in terms of 
mother tongue and culture; For others, the term referred to groups that were associated with another 
country through past citizenship. In all cases, however, it was clearly understood that the term 
‘national origin’ did not refer to current citizenship status.102 Article 1(2) expressly provides that the 
Convention “shall not apply to distinctions, exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a State 
Party to this Convention between citizens and non-citizens”. The Convention is also without prejudice 
to domestic laws concerning nationality, citizenship and naturalization, provided that such laws do not 
discriminate against any particular nationality.103  
Distinction based on nationality was at issue in the 1991 case of Diop v. France, where the CERD 
took the view that a French law which stipulated that only citizens of France could accede to the legal 
profession in France did not violate the Convention because the refusal to admit the petitioner was 
based on nationality and not on any of the grounds enumerated in Article 1.104 This said, the 
Committee has reminded through its case law and general comments that also non-citizens are to be 
protected from racial discrimination as it is defined in the Convention, and that distinctions based on 
citizenship should not be allowed to be used as a pretext for racial discrimination as that would 
undermine the basic prohibition of discrimination as defined in the Convention. In the 1999 case of 
Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark the Committee took the view that nationality was not the most 
appropriate criterion for assessing the petitioner’s will or capacity to repay a loan, and proceeded to 
examine whether the real reasons for the refusal to grant a loan to the petitioner constituted 
discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.105 
 
100 The point that there is no such thing as race but that the notion would nevertheless have to be used in the 
convention was made by the Finnish delegate. See Lerner cit. supra note 7, p. 49, particularly footnote 19.  
101 See CERD, General Recommendation No. 29 (2002); McKean, cit. supra note 44, p. 156; Thornberry, cit. 
supra note 7, p. 262. 
102 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 262–263. 
103 Article 1(3). 
104 CERD, Diop v. France, Communication No 2/1989. 
105 CERD, Ziad Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark, Communication No. 10/1997. 
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Furthermore, the Committee has construed Article 1(2) narrowly on the grounds that the ICERD 
should not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and freedoms recognized and 
enunciated in other human rights conventions, since human rights are, in principle, to be enjoyed by 
all persons, irrespective of nationality, which means that States parties are under an obligation to 
guarantee equality between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of human rights.106 In view of 
the CERD, states should also take into consideration that in some cases denial of citizenship for long-
term or permanent residents could result in creating disadvantages for them in access to employment 
and social benefits, in violation of the Convention’s anti-discrimination principles.107 On these 
grounds the Committee has concluded that differential treatment based on citizenship or immigration 
status may also constitute discrimination under the Conventio
Despite the fact that specific anti-Semitic events occurring in Europe were a major factor behind 
the adoption of the ICERD, the Convention does not prohibit discrimination on the basis of religion, 
which means that such discrimination is left to be dealt with by other international instruments.109 The 
same applies to language. Given the close linkage between ethnic or national origin and linguistic and 
religious differences, difficult issues relating to drawing boundaries are bound to arise. It is clear, 
though, both in light of Article 1 and CERD’s practice, that multiple discrimination, involving 
discrimination on the grounds of religion, language, sex, age or any other grounds, falls within the 
scope of the Convention insofar as discrimination on the grounds of race, colour, descent, or ethnic or 
national origin is also involved. The Committee has indeed lately recognized, both in its ‘case law’ 
and its general recommendations, the interface between the grounds recognized in the Convention and 
the other grounds.110 In A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, the Committee expressly pointed out that “it would 
be competent to consider a claim of ‘double’ discrimination on the basis of religion and another 
ground specifically provided for in Article 1 of the Convention”, although in that specific case the 
Committee was forced to conclude that the case was outside its competence because it involved 
exclusively discrimination on the basis of religion.111 The fact that racial discrimination can have 
another dimension such as gender or age does thus not in any way inhibit the Committee from 
addressing such discrimination.112 As long as the difference in treatment is in any way connected to 
‘race’ or the other grounds explicitly mentioned in the ICERD, it is considered ‘racia
The implementation of the Convention, for instance in the context of implementation of special 
measures, may give rise to a need to identify which racial or ethnic group a person belongs to. In this 
connection the CERD Committee has opined that it is not up to the state or third parties to determine 
 
106 CERD, General Recommendation No. 30 (2004). 
107 Idem. 
108 Ibid, paragraph 4. However, a general reference to ‘foreigners’ is not at present considered to single out a 
group of persons on the basis of a specific race, ethnicity, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin within the 
meaning of Article 1. CERD, Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, Communication No. 33/2003. 
109 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 264. Boyle and Baldaccini, cit. supra note 76, pp. 148–9. 
110 For instance in its General Recommendation on gender-related forms of racial discrimination, the Committee 
noted that “racial discrimination does not always affect women and men equally or in the same way. There are 
circumstances in which racial discrimination only or primarily affects women, or affects women in a different 
way, or to a different degree than men.” CERD, General Recommendation No. 25 (2000), para 1. See also 
CERD, General Recommendation No. 30 (2004), para 8, and Banton, cit. supra note 74, pp. 191–2. 
111 CERD, A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark, Communication No. 37/2006. 
112 See also CERD, Concluding observations on Austria (CERD/C/60/C/1, 21 May 2002), para 9; CERD, 
General Comment No. 32 (2009), para 7. 
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this: in its General Recommendation No 8 it submitted that “the identification shall, if no justification 
exists to the contrary, be based upon self-identification by the individual concerned.”113 The 
Committee has reiterated its position in subsequent recommendations, but it has not elaborated upon 
the reasons underlying its opinion or the circumstances in which it would be justified to depart from 
the principle of self-identification.114 
The Committee has also been of the view that it is not up to the state to determine which groups 
are to be regarded as racial or ethnic groups for the purposes of the Convention: this is to be 
determined by objective criteria.115 In this regard the Committee has noted that the recognition of 
some groups and the exclusion of others may give rise to a violation of the Conventio
  
Material scope of application 
 
One of the main ambiguities of the Convention relates to its material scope of application. By the 
wording of the definition of discrimination, its sphere of application is limited to the political, 
economic, social, cultural and other fields of “public life”, and more particularly to the enjoyment of 
“human rights and fundamental freedoms” in those fields. Unfair treatment outside these fields, or 
treatment that prejudices the enjoyment of some right not considered to be a human right,117 does not 
constitute discrimination for the purposes of the Convention. The express reference to ‘public life’, 
which does not appear in the otherwise similar definition of gender discrimination in the CEDAW 
Convention adopted more than a decade after ICERD, would seem to exclude from the scope of the 
Convention discrimination that takes place in the sphere of private life. Indeed, according to Banton, 
this was the intention of the drafters.118    
The material scope of application of the ICERD is dealt with in more detail in Article 5 of the 
Convention which enumerates a broad but non-exhaustive list of civil, political, economic, social and 
cultural rights, to the enjoyment of which the prohibition of discrimination applies. The list 
enumerates, inter alia, the following rights: 
 
 
113 CERD, General Recommendation VIII (1990). 
114 See, in particular, CERD, General Recommendation No. 32 (2009), para 34. 
115 CERD, General Recommendation XXIV, para 3. For a point of comparison, Article 1, subsections 1 and 2, of 
the ILO Convention No 169 (Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention), defines ‘indigenous peoples’ in both 
objective (descent from certain populations) and subjective (self-identification as indigenous) terms. 
116 CERD, General Recommendation XXIV, para 3. 
117 The question which rights qualify as human rights has not been authoritatively and exhaustively been defined 
anywhere. Presumably the list of rights and freedoms mentioned in Article 5 was developed exactly because of 
this.  
118 Also some governments have read the Convention this way. For instance the reservation made by the United 
States of America upon its ratification of the CERD Convention supports this reading by referring on the one 
hand to its “extensive protections against discrimination” and its protections of individual privacy and freedom 
from governmental interference in private conduct on the other, and submitting that it “understands that the 
identification of the rights protected under the Convention by reference in article 1 to fields of ‘public life’ 
reflects a similar distinction between spheres of public conduct that are customarily the subject of governmental 
regulation, and spheres of private conduct that are not”. The reservation goes on to submit that to the extent that 
the Convention calls for a broader regulation of private conduct, the United States does not accept any obligation 
under the Convention to enact legislation or take other measures under it. 
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– the right to equal treatment before organs administering justice; 
– the right to security of person and protection by the State against violence or bodily harm; 
– political rights, in particular the right to participate in elections (to vote and to stand for election); 
– right to freedom of movement; 
– the right to housing;  
– the right to education and training;  
– the rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work, to 
protection against unemployment, to equal pay for equal work, to just and favourable remuneration; 
– the right to marriage and the choice of spouse; 
– the right of access to any place or service intended for use by the general public, such as transport, 
hotels, restaurants, theatres and parks; and 
– the right to inherit. 
 
As is clear from the last three ‘rights’ in particular – last two of which are not recognized in the 
UDHR, the ICCPR or the ICESCR119 – the Convention goes a long way into what is often considered 
the realm of private life. At least prima facie, this stands in direct contrast to the reference to ‘public 
life’ made in Article 1. That said, the idea of Article 5 has been interpreted to be not the creation of 
new rights, but the acknowledgement of rights as they have been set forth in the core human rights 
documents and constitutional traditions of the states parties. This view is held by the CERD, for 
instance, which has submitted that “[i]t is not within the Committee’s mandate to see to it that these 
rights are established; rather, it is the Committee’s task to monitor the implementation of these rights, 
once they have been granted on equal terms.”120 If Article 5 is interpreted in this way, then the 
contradiction with Article 1 is softened somewhat, as the reference to ‘public life’ would then simply 
convey the idea that whenever a country provides for a particular right, then that right comes within 
the purview of ‘public life’ for that particular country, and thereby also within the purview of the 
 
119 The UDHR (Article 16) and the ICCPR (Article 23) recognize the right to marry, but do not explicitly 
mention the right to the choice of spouse, even though both instruments underline that marriage shall only be 
entered into with the consent of the intending spouses. The right to choose one’s spouse is explicitly referred to 
in the preamble of the UN Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of 
Marriages, concluded in 1962. The reference in the ICERD to the right to choose one’s spouse was apparently 
added by way of reference to the laws that banned marriages between persons who were considered to be of 
different races. Such laws had existed in Nazi Germany (the so-called Nuremberg laws) and continued to exist, 
at the time of the adoption of the ICCPR, in many parts of the USA and South Africa. 
120 CERD, Yilmaz-Dogan v. the Netherlands, Communication No. 1/1984, para 6.4. It should also be noted that 
Article 5 does not delimit the competence of the Committee to consider individual complaints: In The Jewish 
Community of Oslo et al v. Norway, Communication No 30/2003, paragraph 10.6, the Committee noted that it 
“considers that its competence to receive and consider communications under article 14 is not limited to 
complaints alleging a violation of one or more of the rights contained in article 5.” 
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Convention in respect to that country.121 The Committee, in its General Recommendation No. 32 
(2009), took this view and submitted that “[t]he list of human rights to which the principle [of non-
discrimination] applies under the Convention … extends to any field of human rights regulated by the 
public authorities in the State party.”122 
Article 5, explicitly and in an unqualified manner, refers to employment, housing and provision of 
services, the areas of life that are of particular interest from the point of view of this study. The 
Convention requires states to not only refrain from discrimination in these areas, but to take action to 
prohibit and bring to an end discrimination perpetrated by private parties. This is clear in light of 
Article 1(d) of the Convention, which explicitly requires each state party to “prohibit and bring to an 
end … racial discrimination by any persons, group or organisation.” The Committee has also had no 
difficulties in finding that a state had not fulfilled its duties in a case where the authorities had not 
taken due action in a situation involving discrimination perpetrated by a private employer, or to 
consider that a “condition of racial segregation” which states are obliged to eradicate under Article 3 
of the Convention “can also arise without any initiative or direct involvement by the public 
authorities”.123 The reference to public life in Article 1 appears redundant and confusing also from this 
perspective. 
 
State obligations  
 
The Convention lays down a wide array of both negative and positive obligations. 
Article 2 is the main operative paragraph of the Convention and sets out the key obligations that 
states undertake by means of ratification. Under Article 2(1), contracting states agree to condemn 
racial discrimination and to pursue “by all appropriate means and without delay a policy of 
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races” and to 
take a variety of measures in order to give the Convention effect.124 In subparagraphs (a)–(e) they 
specifically undertake (a) to refrain from engaging in racial discrimination, (b) not to sponsor, defend 
or support racial discrimination by any person or organisation, (c) to review policies and amend, 
rescind or nullify laws and regulations which have the effect of creating or perpetuating racial 
discrimination, (d) to prohibit and bring to an end racial discrimination by any persons, groups or 
organisations, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances, (e) to 
encourage, where appropriate, integrationist multiracial organisations and to discourage anything 
which tends to strengthen racial division. The thrust of sub-paragraph (d), the subject area of which is 
of the outmost importance for our purposes, is somewhat compromised by the references indicating 
that the means used should be ‘appropriate’ and that there is an obligation to adopt anti-discrimination 
legislation only where circumstances so require, as these two qualifications allow states to defend their 
choice not to enact legislation by claiming that legislation would not be the appropriate response to the 
situation or that the situation is not so grave as to warrant its adoption. In this context the CERD 
Committee has simply opined that the bottom line is that the equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms 
 
121 Cf. Banton, cit. supra note 74, p. 195; Boyle – Baldaccini, cit. supra note 76, p. 159 ff. 
122 CERD, General Recommendation No. 32 (2009), para 9. 
123 CERD, General Recommendation No. 19 (1995), para 3. 
124 Emphasis added. 
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referred to in Article 5 “shall be protected” by each state party and that protection may be achieved “in 
different ways”.125 The Committee has nevertheless called for “comprehensive anti-discrimination 
legislation … in particular in the fields of housing, health care, social security (including pensions), 
education and access to public services”.126 Like subparagraph (d), subparagraph (e) is compromised 
by the addition of the phrase ‘where appropriate’ and vague language; factors that can potentially 
“strengthen racial division” are many and there is no general agreement as to what they may be.  
Article 2(2), which deals with special measures, is closely associated with Article 1(4) despite 
many subtle differences in wording between the two.127 It is an original and even radical provision in 
that it expressly makes taking special measures one of the fundamental obligations of the Convention. 
It requires state parties to take, “when the circumstances so warrant … special and concrete measures 
to ensure the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to 
them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms.” It further specifies that these measures “shall in no case entail as a 
consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the 
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved”.  
The meaning of Article 2(2) has remained unclear and its impact modest, both in light of academic 
doctrines and state practice. One might be tempted to explain this in terms of the complex wording of 
the Article, which the CERD Committee and the academic commentators have done little to elucidate 
until lately.128 Article 2(2) indeed has its share of compromissary phrases and obscurities,129 but even 
a basic literal reading appears to suggest primarily two things. The Article recognizes that to be able to 
enjoy their rights and freedoms in practice, (i) ‘racial groups’ must be protected by the state from 
anything and everything that endangers their enjoyment of those rights, such as vigilante groups trying 
to interfere with their right to freedom of assembly, and (ii) that ‘racial groups’ must be targeted for 
positive/affirmative action in so far as any condition, for instance poor material conditions or below-
 
125 CERD, General Recommendation 20 (1996), para 5. 
126 It has done this particularly in the context of the consideration of periodic state reports. CERD, Concluding 
observations on Estonia, (19 October 2006), CERD/C/EST/CO/7, para 11. See also CERD, Concluding 
observations on Ukraine (8 February 2007), CERD/C/UKR/CO/18. Theo van Boven, a former member of the 
CERD Committee, observes that the Committee “has repeatedly called upon States Parties to enact 
comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, not only in the criminal sphere to suppress incitement to racial 
hatred and discrimination and acts of racial violence, but also in the area of civil and administrative law”. Theo 
van Boven, ‘The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: Trends and Developments’ Roma 
Rights 1–2, 2003. 
127 Some of the terminological differences – which are not explained – between Article 1(4) and Article 2(2) are 
the following: ‘special measures’ v. ‘special and concrete measures’, ‘securing adequate advancement’ v. 
‘ensuring adequate development and protection’, ‘separate rights’ v. ‘unequal or separate rights’, ‘racial or ethnic 
groups’ v. ‘racial groups’, and ‘equal enjoyment or exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms’ v. 
‘equal enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms’. The CERD Committee has opined that these 
“nuances of difference… do not disturb [the] essential unity of concept and purpose” of the two provisions. 
CERD, General Recommendation No. 32 (2009), para 29. 
128 Lerner, cit. supra note 7, p. 163 ff; Boyle – Baldaccini, cit. supra note 76, pp. 156 ff. It was only in 2009 that 
the CERD issued a General Recommendation on Articles 1(4) and 2(2), viz. General Recommendation No. 32. 
129 Article 2(2) employs some open phrases, such as “when the circumstances so warrant” and “adequate 
development”. It is not entirely clear from the Convention whether, and if yes why, the obligation to take special 
measures was deliberately restricted only to “racial groups”. In view of the CERD, special measures should as a 
matter of principle be available to any group or person covered by Article 1 of the ICERD, not just “racial 
groups”. See CERD, General Recommendation No. 32 (2009), para 24. 
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average educational attainment levels, effectively prevents members of these groups from the 
enjoyment of their rights or freedoms. What has made it so difficult for states to embrace this article 
might therefore not be its obscure wording; the reason may also be political and doctrinal. Article 2(2) 
poses difficulties for many states, because it comes close to recognition of group rights and because it 
places positive obligations upon them. Article 2(2) may be experienced as problematic also from a 
doctrinal point of view, because the general thrust of the other articles of the Convention is to prohibit 
the making of distinctions on the basis of ‘race’ and the other associated criteria, whereas the 
implementation of Article 2(2) in practice may indeed require the making of such distinctions.  
The ICERD condemns racial segregation and apartheid in Article 3. That article obliges states 
parties to “prevent, prohibit and eradicate all practices of racial segregation”, and the Committee has 
in its respective General Recommendation No 19 opined that a condition of racial segregation can also 
arise without any initiative or direct involvement by public authorities, for instance as an unintended 
by-product of the actions of private individuals linked with residential patterns influenced by group 
differences in income.130 Accordingly the Committee has invited states to monitor all trends that can 
give rise to segregation and to work for the eradication of any negative consequences that ensue. 
Article 4 requires states to “condemn all propaganda and all organizations which are based on 
ideas or theories of superiority of one race or group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin or which 
attempt to justify or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any form”; the specific actions to be 
undertaken are enumerated in subparagraphs a–c. The Committee has sought to clarify the obligation 
under Article 4, and has considered that state parties are required to penalize four categories of 
conduct: (i) dissemination of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred; (ii) incitement to racial 
hatred; (iii) acts of violence against any ‘race’ or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin; 
and (iv) incitement to such acts.131 Article 4 was an outcome of a difficult compromise after long 
discussions,132 and some of its aspects have been viewed as an infringement of the fundamental rights 
of freedom of speech and freedom of association, which is why several countries made reservations in 
this respect upon the ratification of ICERD.133 These critical positions have been challenged by the 
Committee, according to which the prohibition of the dissemination of ideas based upon racial 
superiority or hatred is compatible with the right to freedom of opinion and expression.134  
Article 7 places an obligation upon states parties to adopt “immediate and effective measures, 
particularly in the fields of teaching, education, culture and information”, with a view to “combating 
prejudices”, “promoting understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial and ethnical 
groups” and “propagating the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All 
 
130 CERD, General Recommendation 19 (1995). 
131 Threats and remarks were deemed to constitute incitement to racial discrimination and to acts of violence 
contrary to Article 4(a) in CERD, L.K. v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 4/1991. 
132 Lerner, cit. supra note 7, p. 53. 
133 USA is one of these countries. 
134 See further CERD, General recommendation XV (1993), where the Committee also emphasized that 
provisions of Article 4 are of mandatory character and should be effectively enforced. What is also of legal 
relevance in this dispute is that Article 4 specifies that the actions enumerated in subparagraphs a–c are to be 
undertaken “with due regard to the principles embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this Convention”, including therefore freedom of expression and freedom 
of assembly and association. 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination, and this Convention”. This educative obligation is wide-reaching and 
theoretically speaking of high importance, but has been largely neglected in practice.135 
 
Domestic enforcement and remedies 
 
Article 6 of the Convention requires states to provide effective national remedies for acts of racial 
discrimination: 
States Parties shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction effective protection and remedies, 
through the competent national tribunals and other State institutions, against any acts of racial 
discrimination which violate his human rights and fundamental freedoms contrary to this 
Convention, as well as the right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate reparation or 
satisfaction for any damage suffered as a result of such discrimination. 
 
Article 6 requires the availability, nationally, of judicial mechanisms. Any judicial avenue, whether of 
criminal, civil or administrative nature will presumably do, provided that individual complainants have 
the right to seek just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any damage incurred and that 
protection and remedies can be deemed to be effective.136 The Committee seems to implicitly favour a 
legal system where several different types of legal avenues are available.137 To assess the effectiveness 
of national remedies, the Committee routinely asks states parties to report on the number of complaints 
and prosecutions processed, and where it finds a low number of proceedings, it usually requests the 
state party to consider whether the lack of formal complaints may be result of victims’ lack of 
awareness of rights, lack of confidence in police or judicial authorities, or the authorities’ lack of 
attention, sensitivity, or commitment to cases of racial discrimination.138 With respect to civil 
proceedings the Committee has increasingly begun to recommend that states provide for a shift in the 
burden of proof in order to alleviate the difficulties associated with establishing discrimination.139 
Whereas a literal reading of Article 6 would result in the absurd view that an act of racial 
discrimination would already have to be legally established before a petitioner would be entitled to 
 
135 Many academic commentators deal with Article 7 in passim, and for instance McKean describes Article 7 as 
“mere hortatory portmanteau clause of little normative importance”, cit. supra note 44, p. 165. The CERD has 
also noted that only few states have reported of the measures they have adopted to give effect to Article 7, and 
has emphasised the importance of Article 7 by opining that measures envisaged therein are “important and 
effective means of eliminating racial discrimination”. CERD, General Recommendation V (1977). To complete 
the picture, Boyle and Baldaccini have recorded an “almost total neglect of Article 7” also on part of the CERD, 
cit. supra note 76, p. 154. 
136 van Boven, cit. supra note 126. 
137 The Committee has, for instance, called states parties to consider giving victims of racial discrimination the 
opportunity to use parajudicial procedures for conflict resolution, including mediation and conciliation. General 
Recommendation 31 (2005), para 16. See e.g. CERD, Concluding observations on Finland, CERD/C/304/Add. 
107 (1 May 2001), para 15. 
138 See e.g. CERD, Concluding observations on Czech Republic CERD/C/63/CO/4 (2003), para 11; CERD, 
Concluding observations on Bahrain CERD/C/BHR/CO/7 (14 April 2005), para 18. 
139 See CERD, General Recommendation XXX, para 24. See also CERD, Concluding observations on Australia, 
CERD/C/AUS/CO/14, 14 April 2005, para 15. 
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protection and a remedy, the Committee has taken the position that Article 6 provides protection to 
alleged victims if their claims are ‘arguable’ under the Convention.140 
A considerable number of communications submitted to the Committee have dealt with the 
requirements posed by Article 6 and the nature of state obligations in this respect. In the case of Gelle 
v. Denmark the CERD noted the following on the nature of state obligations: 
The Committee observes that it does not suffice, for purposes of article 4 of the Convention, merely 
to declare acts of racial discrimination punishable on paper. Rather, criminal laws and other legal 
provisions prohibiting racial discrimination must also be effectively implemented by the competent 
national tribunals and other State institutions. This obligation is implicit in article 4 of the 
Convention, under which State parties "undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures" to 
eradicate all incitement to, or acts of, racial discrimination. It is also reflected in other provisions of 
the Convention, such as article 2, paragraph 1(d), which requires States to "prohibit and bring to an 
end, by all appropriate means," racial discrimination, and article 6, guaranteeing to everyone 
"effective protection and remedies" against acts of racial discrimination.141 
 
In several cases the Committee has emphasized the duty of states to investigate claims of 
discrimination, where a matter falls under the purview of national criminal law, promptly, thoroughly, 
effectively and with due diligence and expedition.142 It has also pointed out that there is a duty to 
ensure the impartiality of the judicial process and of the juries in particular, and has submitted that 
there is a need to have simple enough procedures to deal with complaints of racial discrimination, in 
particular where more than one recourse measure is available.143  
The Committee has, in the interests of promoting the effectiveness of domestic remedies, also 
called for states parties to take following measures: to offer procedural status for associations for the 
protection of the rights of victims; to grant victims legal aid and an interpreter free of charge; to 
protect victims and their families against any form of victimization (intimidation or reprisals); to 
supply the requisite legal information to persons belonging to most vulnerable social groups, and to  
promote centres that provide free legal help and/or conciliation and mediation services.144
The Committee has, in no uncertain terms, been of the view that states also have more general 
enforcement duties (in sensu lato) that are linked to their general obligation to eliminate 
discrimination. It has, for instance, been of the view that where there is evidence of disproportionate 
levels of unemployment among migrant and minority groups, the state concerned should assess the 
extent to which the disproportionate level of unemployment is the result of discrimination, and then 
take measures to combat this phenomenon.145 With regard to housing, it has asked states to provide 
 
140 CERD, Durmic v. Serbia and Montenegro, Communication No. 29/2003, para 9.6. 
141 CERD, Gelle v. Denmark, Communication No 34/2004, para 7.3. See also CERD, L.K. v. The Netherlands, 
Communication No. 4/1991, paras 6.4 – 6.7; CERD, Yilmaz-Dogan v. Netherlands, Communication No. 1/1984. 
142 CERD, Jama v. Denmark, Communication No. 41/2008, para 9; CERD, Durmic v. Serbia and Montenegro, 
Communication No 29/2003, para 10; CERD, Ms. M.B v. Denmark, Communication No. 20/2000; CERD, Ziad 
Ben Ahmed Habassi v. Denmark, Communication No. 10/1997; CERD, L.K. v. The Netherlands, 
Communication No. 4/1991. 
143 CERD, Z.U.B.S. v. Australia, Communication No. 6/1995. 
144 CERD, General Recommendation 31 (2005), paras 6–9, 17. 
145 See e.g. CERD, Concluding observations on Denmark (19 October 2006), para 16. 
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information on measures taken to prevent ghettoization/segregation in housing.146 These examples 
suggest that in view of the CERD there exists a pattern of responsibility where each state has to 
monitor the realisation of a particular right in practice and to investigate any imbalances that are 
found, and if the investigation forecloses that the imbalance is due to discrimination, then there is an 
obligation to take measures with a view to eliminating discrimination.  
6.6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 
Introduction 
 
After the proclamation of the UDHR, preparations were started with a view to making the rights and 
freedoms enunciated in it legally binding. In that process there were intense debates about whether to 
have a single, comprehensive instrument, or whether it would be better to have two separate 
instruments, one dealing with civil and political rights and the other with economic, social and cultural 
rights. In the end the latter opinion prevailed, primarily because some state representatives viewed at 
that time that the two sets of rights were of a different nature.147 The standard argument evoked in 
support of this view was that the rights in the first group are absolute and immediate, justiciable 
(capable of being applied by courts and other relevant bodies) and relatively inexpensive to 
implement, whereas the latter set of rights are programmatic, to be realized gradually, not justiciable 
and having more substantial financial implications.148 Many human rights documents and academic 
commentaries have since challenged this view, in the interests of promoting the principle that all 
human rights are indivisible and interrelated,149 though it is often also acknowledged that differences 
remain.150 In any case the reality is that the ‘international bill of rights’ consists of the UDHR and two 
 
146 CERD, Concluding observations on Denmark (19 October 2006), para 17; CERD, Concluding observations 
on Portugal (19/08/2004), para 12; CERD, Concluding observations on Luxemburg (18/04/2005), para 17. 
147 See Asbjørn Eide, ‘Economic, Social and cultural rights as Human Rights’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.), 
Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001); See also Eide – Rosas, cit 
supra note 44.  
148 See e.g. idem (Eide), p. 10.  
149 For instance the Vienna Declaration proclaims, in Article 5, that “[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible 
and interdependent and interrelated”. 
150 E.g. Eide and Rosas submit that one cannot deny that there are some significant differences of emphasis 
between the typical civil rights on the one hand and some of the economic, social and cultural rights on the other, 
particularly as regards the role of the state and justiciability of some of the latter rights. Asbjørn Eide - Allan 
Rosas, cit supra note 44, pp. 4-6. According to Scheinin the underdeveloped justiciability of international 
treaties is due to the vague wording of many of the provisions and the relatively weak international monitoring 
mechanisms under the treaties in question. Scheinin, ‘Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights’, in Asbjørn 
Eide et al (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001). The 
reality in any case is, that many states do still make a distinction between the two sets of rights. For instance 
Christopher McCrudden has recorded “continuing unease” in the UK over socio-economic rights, see 
McCrudden, ‘Mainstreaming Human Rights’ in Colin Harvey (ed.) Human Rights in the Community: Rights as 
Agents of Change (Oxford: Hart, 2005). 
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separate instruments, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the 
International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights (ICSECR). 
The ICCPR was concluded in 1966 and it had been ratified by 165 countries as of January 2010.151 
The opinions issued by the Human Rights Committee (HRC), established to monitor the 
implementation of the Covenant, have gained considerable authority, at least within the human rights 
circles and most of the academic world. The practical importance of the ICCPR and the HRC is further 
emphasised by the existence of the individual complaint mechanism provided for in an Optional 
Protocol. More than one hundred countries have recognized the competence of the Committee to 
receive and consider individual complaints. An individual can submit a communication after having 
exhausted all available domestic remedies, which emphasizes the primacy of domestic remedies. More 
than 1 800 communications have been filed.152 The inter-state complaint procedure, set out in the 
ICCPR, has never been used.  
 
Concept of discrimination 
 
Much like the UDHR, the ICCPR contains two main provisions on non-discrimination, in addition to 
which several articles underline the equal enjoyment of particular rights.153 The first main provision is 
Article 2, which relates to the obligation to ensure the rights recognized in the Covenant to all 
individuals without any distinction: 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, 
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. 
 
Article 26, for its part, provides for equal protection of the law and a prohibition of discrimination: 
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. 
 
The fundamental role of the prohibition of discrimination is underlined by Article 4, which provides 
that under no circumstances, even in times of a public emergency, is it allowed to pursue measures 
which “involve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social 
origin”.154 
Article 2 requires that the rights recognized in the Covenant are to be respected and ensured 
without ‘distinction’ of any kind, whereas Article 26 requires states to prohibit ‘discrimination’. A 
 
151 Source: http://treaties.un.org (accessed 1.1.2010). 
152 Report of the Human Rights Committee (Sessional/Annual report of the Committee, Vol. 1, 2009), A/64/40.  
153 These include Articles 3, 4(1), 14(1 and 3), 23(4), 24 and 25. 
154 See HRC, General Comment No 29 (2001) for the Committee’s interpretation of Article 4. 
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disagreement broke out in the drafting of Article 2 as to whether it should prohibit ‘distinctions’ or 
‘discrimination’.155 Those who favoured the term ‘distinction’ argued that this more rigid term be used 
because the term ‘discrimination’, for which there was no generally adopted test at the time, would 
open the door to legal arguments defending arrangements such as Apartheid on the grounds that they 
do not constitute discrimination but are legitimate distinctions that for instance simply take into 
account the distinct nature of different groups.156 In this view it was therefore necessary to prohibit all 
‘distinctions’. Those who favoured the term ‘discrimination’ argued that the use of the term 
‘distinction’ would close the door not just from Apartheid and other unjust arrangements, but also 
from positive special measures such as affirmative action that may involve the making of distinctions. 
In the end the term ‘distinction’ was chosen for the purposes of Article 2, possibly in order to align it 
with Article 2 of the UDHR,157 but with the majority opinion favouring the view that the use of the 
term nevertheless did not rule out special measures but only arbitrary or unjust distinctions.158 Travaux 
préparatoires, the practice of the HRC, and academic literature all support the reading that the 
difference in wording between Articles 2 and 26 is in this respect of no great relevance, and that both 
provisions are to be interpreted as prohibiting only arbitrary or otherwise unjust distinctions.159  
Article 26 of the ICCPR and its reference to the principles ‘equality before the law’ and ‘equal 
protection of the law’ derive from Article 7 of the UDHR.160 These principles were again debated 
during the drafting stages in “long, controversial discussions” that “not infrequently climaxed in a 
crucial vote.”161 One of the points not fully clear from the start was again whether the two principles 
preclude the making of any distinctions on the mentioned grounds.162 It was explained that these 
principles deal with equality, not identity of treatment, and that they therefore do not rule out 
reasonable differentiation between individuals and groups.163 There were also debates about the 
 
155 See e.g. Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, p. 258 ff; Nowak, cit. supra note 19, pp. 43–44. 
156 This argument was indeed made by the government of South Africa on numerous occasions. In its 
submissions to the International Court of Justice in the South West Africa cases, South Africa defended its policy 
of differentiating between groups on the grounds that the different groups were at completely different stages of 
development and on the grounds of the “desire of the various groups to retain their separate identities”. See 
International Court of Justice, South West Africa Cases, Volume II (1966), Section B. Pleadings, 5. Counter-
Memorial filed by the Government of the Republic of South Africa, submitted on 10 January 1964, para 22 ff. 
Similarly, in its written statements to the International Court of Justice in Advisory Opinion on Namibia the 
government of South Africa contended that the Apartheid policy was pursued in the interests of the inhabitants 
of Namibia. See International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of 
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory 
Opinion of 21 June 1971, paras 128–131.  
157 Skogly, cit. supra note 29, p. 63. The word ‘distinction’ is also used in the Constitution of France, a fact 
which might also have played a part, as the French Constitution was often regarded as a model for the drafting of 
the ICCPR. See Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, pp. 258–259 and the references cited. 
158 Dominic McGoldrick, The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), p. 275; Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 
281 ff; Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, pp. 258–259. 
159 See e.g. HRC, General Comment 18 (1989), para 8 in particular; Dominic McGoldrick, cit. supra note 158, p. 
275; Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 281-286; Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22. 
160 See HRC, Zwaan-de Vries, Communication No.182/1984; Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, p. 254. 
161 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 462. 
162 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 284–285; Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, p. 254.  
163 Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, p. 254; Nowak cit. supra note 19, p. 464. 
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meaning of the two principles, and it was explained that they are directed on the one hand on those 
who apply the law, such as judges and administrative officials, and the legislature on the other.  
The specific meaning of the second sentence of Article 26, which provides that “the law shall 
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against 
discrimination”, has also raised questions.164 By its wording it appears to include an obligation to 
prohibit discrimination by enacting special laws and an obligation to afford effective protection 
against discrimination.165 These very broad lines of interpretation are supported by the travaux, the 
practice of the HRC and the legal commentaries.166 By way of an example, the HRC submitted in 
Zwaan-de Vries that Article 26 “prohibits discrimination in law or practice in any field regulated and 
protected by public authorities” and that Article 26 is “thus concerned with the obligations imposed on 
States in regard to their legislation and the application thereof.”  
As mentioned, Article 26 employs the concept of ‘discrimination’, a notion that is not self-
explanatory or defined in the Convention itself. The Human Rights Committee, finding itself in need 
to clarify that term, elaborated a definition in its General Comment No 18 (1989). Under the apparent 
influence of the CERD Convention, the CEDAW Convention, and implicitly also the ILO and 
UNESCO Conventions, it submitted that 
the Committee believes that the term “discrimination” as used in the Covenant should be 
understood to imply any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and 
freedoms.167 
 
In this General Comment, the Committee went on to reiterate that the enjoyment of rights and 
freedoms “on an equal footing” does not mean identical treatment in every instance.168 In its opinion 
“not every differentiation of treatment will constitute discrimination, if the criteria for such 
differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate 
under the Covenant.”169 The Committee has followed this broad and flexible line of reasoning, which 
leaves it a considerable amount of discretion, also in its case law. For instance in the 2008 decision in 
Süsser v. Czech Republic it stated that “[t]he Committee reiterates its jurisprudence that not all 
differentiations in treatment can be deemed to be discriminatory under Article 26. A differentiation 
which is compatible with the provisions of the Covenant and is based on objective and reasonable 
grounds does not amount to prohibited discrimination within the meaning of Article 26.”170 
 
 
 
164 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 475. 
165 Ibid, p. 476. 
166 See Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, pp. 254–256; Nowak, cit. supra note 19, pp. 464–465. 
167 HRC, General Comment No. 18 (1989), para 7. 
168 Ibid, para 8. 
169 Ibid, para 13. 
170 HRC, Communication No 1488/2006, para 7.2. See also HRC, Vjatseslav Tsarjov v. Estonia, Communication 
No. 1223/2003; HRC, Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, Communication No.182/1984, paragraph 13; HRC, X 
v. Colombia, Communication No. 1361/2005. Sometimes the HRC uses a slightly different wording, and 
requires that for a distinction not to constitute discrimination, it “must be justified on reasonable and objective 
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The above considerations apply best where direct discrimination is at issue. The HRC has 
eventually, after long and complicated developments, come to embrace the concept of indirect 
discrimination. The complications and inconsistencies in the HRC’s approach are probably at least 
partly attributable to the vagueness of the above-mentioned definition of discrimination that it 
borrowed from the other instruments.171 The General Comment No. 18 on non-discrimination, adopted 
in 1989, did not explicitly refer to indirect discrimination, though it did note, as mentioned above, that 
a distinction can violate Articles 2 and/or 26 even if it was not made for the purposes of discriminating 
against a particular group or individual but was discriminatory in its effects. In its decision in Bhinder 
v. Canada, which was adopted by the Committee at the same session as the General Comment, the 
HRC refused to directly address the question whether a general measure – in that case a hard hat 
requirement issued by a rail road company on its employees – could possibly constitute de facto 
discrimination against Sikh men who are required to wear a turban for religious reasons and who in 
consequence could not wear a hard hat.172 In Simunek et al v. The Czech Republic, adopted in 1995, 
the HRC expressed its view that intent “is not alone dispositive in determining a breach of Article 26” 
and that “an act which is not politically motivated may still contrive Article 26 if its effects are 
discriminatory”, a conceptualization that does not however indicate that it had fully embraced the 
concept of indirect discrimination yet.173 Finally, in 2003, in the case of Althammer v. Austria (no 2.), 
the HRC expressly recognized the concept of indirect discrimination by noting that indirect 
discrimination occurs when a rule or a measure that is neutral at face value or without the intent to 
discriminate has detrimental effects that exclusively or disproportionately affect persons having a 
particular ‘race’. It reiterated this position in the 2004 case Derksen v. the Netherlands in the 
following way: 
The Committee recalls that article 26 prohibits both direct and indirect discrimination, the latter 
notion being related to a rule or measure that may be neutral in its face without any intent to 
discriminate but which nevertheless results in discrimination because of its exclusive or 
disproportionate adverse effect on a certain category of persons. Yet, a distinction only constitutes 
prohibited discrimination in the meaning of article 26 of the Covenant if it is not based on objective 
and reasonable criteria.174 
 
The travaux préparatoires to Articles 2 and 26 clearly indicate that these articles were not meant to 
preclude positive or affirmative action.175 The HRC has pursued the same line of interpretation and 
 
grounds, in pursuit of an aim that is legitimate under the Covenant.” HRC, Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, 
Communication No 1306/2004. 
171 See Sarah Joseph – Jenny Schultz – Melissa Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: Cases, Materials and Commentary (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 533 ff. 
172 In para 6.2 the Committee said that “[i]f the requirement that a hard hat be worn is seen as a discrimination de 
facto against persons of the Sikh religion under article 26, then … the legislation requiring that workers in 
federal employment be protected from injury… is to be regarded as reasonable and directed towards objective 
purposes that are compatible with the Covenant”. HRC, Karnel Singh Bhinder v. Canada, Communication No. 
208/1986. 
173 HRC, Simunek, Hastings, Tuzilova and Prochazka v. The Czech Republic, Communication No. 516/1992. 
174 HRC, Derksen v. The Netherlands, Communication No 976/2001, para 9.3. 
175 Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, pp. 259-261.    
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has stated that the prohibition of discrimination in Article 26 does not rule out positive action 
measures, not even relatively far-reaching ones. In Jacobs v. Belgium the Committee considered that a 
domestic rule that required at least four of the eleven ‘non-justice members’ of the national High 
Council of Justice to be women and four men was in accordance with the ICCPR, as was the use of 
gender as a tie-breaker between equally qualified job applicants in a situation where equality between 
men and women was still lac
The Committee has actually not just acknowledged the legitimacy of positive action, but has 
opined that states are obliged to take such action in order to diminish or eliminate conditions which 
cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant: 
For example, in a state where the general conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or 
impair their enjoyment of human rights, the state should take specific action to correct those 
conditions. Such action may involve granting for a time to the part of the population concerned 
certain preferential treatment in specific matters as compared with the rest of the population. As 
long as such action is needed to correct discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate 
differentiation.177 
 
Furthermore, in General Comment No 4 on Article 3 (on gender equality), the HRC said that 
article 3, as articles 2(1) and 26 in so far as those articles primarily deal with the prevention of 
discrimination on a number of grounds, among which sex is one, requires not only measures of 
protection but also affirmative action designed to ensure the positive enjoyment of rights. This 
cannot be done simply by enacting laws. 
 
Despite its potential importance, this aspect of the HRC’s jurisprudence is surprisingly 
underdeveloped and unclear.178 One of the unresolved questions is whether any obligation to take 
‘specific action’ and ‘preferential treatment’ to correct discrimination in fact is of an immediate or 
progressive nature.179 The tactic of the HRC in this respect appears to be one of persuading state 
parties rather than condemning them for having failed to take the necessary action, implying a measure 
of flexibility.180 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
176 HRC, Jacobs v. Belgium, Communication No. 943/2000. 
177 HRC, General Comment No. 18 (1989), para 10. 
178 Similarly Martin Scheinin ‘Experiences of the application of article 26 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights’ in Council of Europe, Non-discrimination: A human right, Proceedings of the Seminar 
marking the entry into force of Protocol No 12 to the European Convention on Human rights, Strasbourg, 11 
October 2005 (Council of Europe, 2006). 
179 McGoldrick, cit. supra note 158, p. 275. 
180 Idem. 
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Personal scope and grounds 
 
The beneficiaries of the Convention rights and freedoms include all individuals within the territory of 
a state party and subject to its jurisdiction, and are thus not restricted to nationals of that state.181 The 
lists of prohibited grounds of discrimination in Articles 2 and 26 are identical, and include ‘race’, 
‘colour’, religion and ‘national or social origin‘. A motion made during the drafting that proposed to 
replace the words ‘race’ and ‘colour’ with the term ‘ethnic origin’, on the grounds that ‘race’ was 
considered to be imprecise and unscientific, was defeated on the grounds that ‘race’ and ‘colour’ were 
perceived to be more easily understood in their general usage.182 The lists are not exhaustive, as is 
indicated by the words ‘such as’ and ‘other status’. It is not entirely clear what other grounds should 
be taken to be covered in addition to those that are explicitly mentioned. Some authors have suggested 
that the ‘other’ grounds must logically be materially similar to those listed, that is, distinctions 
unrelated to an individual’s merit, abilities or efforts.183 Yet other authors suggest that every 
conceivable distinction that cannot be objectively justified is, in the final analysis, impermissible.184 
The Human Rights Committee has considered in its practice that sexual orientation, nationality, 
age, place of residence, and employment/unemployment and a number of other factors can count as 
‘other statuses’ protected by Articles 2 and 26.185 Determination of impermissibility has been made on 
a case-by-case basis. The HRC, in Kavanagh v. Ireland, actually adopted the view that the first 
sentence of Article 26 (“[a]ll persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any 
discrimination to the equal protection of the law”) can be evoked without any reference to a particular 
ground of discrimination – and without reference to any particular comparator.186 This suggests that 
the HRC is disposed to take a liberal attitude towards the issue of grounds, though at the same time it 
appears that differentiation on grounds not explicitly mentioned is likely to be tested less strictly than 
differentiation on grounds that are explicitly mentioned.187 While none of the individual 
communications examined by the HRC have so far dealt with ethnic discrimination, it is clear also 
from its comments on country reports that ethnicity is considered to be one of the grounds on which it 
 
181 This is without prejudice to the fact that several rights guaranteed in the Covenant are in themselves restricted 
in one way or the other. 
182 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 46. 
183 Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 281. 
184 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 45. Indeed, the Covenant does not speak of “other such status” or of “other 
similar status”, but only of “other status”, which is wider in scope and does not seem to require that the other 
protected grounds are materially similar to those explicitly mentioned. Therefore, and given also that the aim of 
the Article 2 is to ensure to “all individuals” fundamental human rights “without distinction of any kind”, the 
view that basically any ground of distinction can be considered under Articles 2 and 26 appears well-founded. 
185 HRC, Toonen v Australia, Communication No 488/1992; Gueye et al. v France, Communication No. 
196/1985; Love et al v. Australia, Communication No. 983/2001; Lindgren et al v. Sweden, Communication No 
298/1988; Calvancati Araujo-Jongens v. The Netherlands, Communication No 418/1990. See also Joseph et al, 
cit. supra note 171, p. 530. 
186 HRC, Kavanagh v. Ireland, Communication No 819/1998. 
187 Joseph et al, cit. supra note 171, p. 532. Irene P. Asscher-Vonk “Towards One Concept of Objective 
Justification”, in Loenen – Rodrigues (eds.), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 1999), p. 50. However, Scheinin advises that “great caution” must be exercised if one 
is tempted to draw any conclusions that some grounds of discrimination are more suspect than others, see Martin 
Scheinin “Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights” in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.) Economic, social and 
cultural rights: A textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001), p. 33. 
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is not permissible to discriminate, and that it indeed is a ground that the HRC takes a special interest 
in, although it is less clear whether in analytical terms ethnicity should be considered to form a ground 
of its own or whether it should be considered to be subsumed under the notion of ‘race’. 
The HRC has lately recognized intersectional discrimination and has called states to address it.188 
Its decision in Kavanagh that equal treatment cases do not always need to proceed by means of rigid 
comparisons – which has been perhaps the single most difficult, sometimes prohibitive, issue in 
intersectional discrimination cases – also shows one possible way of dealing with such discrimination.  
 
Material scope 
 
Article 2 provides for an accessory right, meaning that it can only be violated in conjunction with 
some other substantive provision of the Covenant.189 Under the case law of the Human Rights 
Committee, the accessory nature of Article 2 does not mean that a violation of it can only be 
established when another provision of the Covenant has been violated together with Article 2.190 If a 
state party to the Covenant provides, with respect to some right covered by the Covenant, for a higher 
level of protection than what is explicitly required, but does so in a discriminatory manner, then that is 
considered to violate Article 2.191 Article 2 therefore provides protection with respect to the rights and 
freedoms enshrined in the Convention, including right to life, freedom of movement, right to privacy, 
freedom of religion, freedom of association, political rights and minority rights. 
Article 26, on the other hand, is not similarly limited, which is one of the reasons why it is 
sometimes considered to be one of the most important international provisions on discrimination.192 
The scope of this article is mainly delimited by the notions of “equality before the law” and “equal 
protection of the law”.193 In its General Comment on Article 26 the HRC submitted that the Article   
prohibits discrimination in law or in fact in any field regulated and protected by public authorities. 
Article 26 is therefore concerned with the obligations imposed on States parties in regard to their 
legislation and the application thereof. Thus, when legislation is adopted by a State party, it must 
comply with the requirement of article 26 that its content should not be discriminatory. In other 
words, the application of the principle of non-discrimination contained in article 26 is not limited to 
those rights which are provided for in the Covenant.194 
 
 
188 HRC, General Comment 28 (2000), para 30. 
189 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 34. 
190 Ibid, p. 35. 
191 See HRC, Shirin Aumeeruddy-Cziffra and 19 other Mauritian women v. Mauritius, Communication No. 
35/1978, para 9.2 (b) 2(i)8. 
192 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 465. Nowak asserts that the broad interpretation of Article 26 follows 
unambiguously from a grammatical, systematic interpretation of Articles 2 and 26. See also HRC, General 
Comment No. 18 (1989); HRC, Broeks, Communication No 172/1984; HRC, Zwaan-de Vries, Communication 
No. 182/1984. 
193 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 469. 
194 Para 12 of the General Comment 18 (1989). 
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In Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland the HRC asserted that under Article 26, “States parties are 
bound, in their legislative, judicial and executive action, to ensure that everyone is treated equally and 
without discrimination”.195 
In 1987 the HRC came, in the consideration of Zwaan – De Vries, Broeks, and Danning v. the 
Netherlands cases, after long discussions, to the conclusion that Article 26 also applies in the sphere of 
social security. This move, which was not universally applauded at the time and which is of far-
reaching consequences,196 has now become a solid part of the Committee’s jurisprudence. 
The scope of Article 26, interpreted this way, is thus sweeping. First, the fields “regulated and 
protected by public authorities” have been on the increase, a development which has brought new 
areas within the purview of the Article. All countries in Europe regulate the field of employment, and 
at least some aspects of provision of goods and services, including banking and public housing, and 
these areas therefore also come within the purview of the prohibition of discrimination.197 Second, 
Article 26 contains a positive obligation on states to take steps to provide protection against 
discrimination, irrespective of whether it is perpetrated by public or private actors.198 This has been 
taken to follow from the second sentence, which provides that the law shall prohibit any 
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination in the 
areas covered by the first sentence, i.e. all matters dealt with by law. Indeed, in its General Comment 
31 the HRC confirmed that in its view Article 26 requires that individuals are to be protected from 
discrimination “in fields affecting basic aspects of ordinary life such as work or housing”.199 At the 
end of the day, any discrimination in the application of law, whether by courts, tribunals or the public 
administration, is therefore prohibited,200 as is any discrimination between private parties in the areas 
covered by law. Drafters and commentators, however, have been keen to emphasize that protection of 
privacy lays down the outer limits for the scope of application of the principle of non-
discrimination.201 
 
Domestic enforcement and remedies 
 
Article 2(3) of the Convention provides that  
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall have 
an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an 
official capacity; 
 
195 HRC, Haraldsson and Sveinsson v. Iceland, Communication 1306/2004, para 10.2. 
196 Martin Scheinin, “Women’s Economic and Social Issues of Practical Implementation” in Hannikainen & 
Nykänen, New Trends in Discrimination Law – International Perspectives (Turku: Grafia, 1999), p. 20.  
197 See also Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 478. 
198 This appears also to have been the intention of the drafters, although the matter was not considered self-
evident from the beginning, see Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, pp. 261–263. Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 478. 
199 HRC, General Comment No 31 (2004), para 8. 
200 See also Nowak, cit. supra note 19, pp. 466–469, and Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, p. 285. 
201 Nowak observes that ”[d]uring the drafting of Art. 26, it was repeatedly emphasised that discrimination in 
private relations was a matter of legitimate, personal decision-making, which is protected against State 
interference by the right to privacy.” Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 477. 
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(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto determined by 
competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent authority 
provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of judicial remedy; 
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted. 
 
This article provides for the overarching framework towards remedies under the ICCPR. It is 
complemented by other articles that require the provision of more specific remedies with respect to 
violations of certain rights and freedoms such as those laid down in Articles 9(5) and 14(6), the right 
to equal treatment not being among them. Read together, subsections (a)–(c) of Article 2(3) basically 
require the existence of an effective, accessible and enforceable remedy. Subsection (b), specifying 
that the right to a remedy can be determined by “any competent authority”, has been interpreted to 
bring into the scope of remedies for instance investigations by parliamentary committees and 
ombudsmen.202 The apparent open-endedness of the provision is qualified in view of the express 
emphasis laid on judicial remedies and in view of the requirement placed by subsection (a) that states 
must ensure that the remedy is effective, considering that the drafters expressed a strong sentiment in 
favour of judicial remedies as the most effective means of protection within a national system.203 
The HRC has, through the consideration of periodic reports, engaged in a wide-reaching 
examination of the available domestic remedies in the different countries. It has posed questions, inter 
alia, about the provision of legal aid, possible doctrinal limitations conditioning the exercise of 
remedies, types of evidence that are admissible under domestic laws and the independence and 
impartiality of the competent authorities.204 In its case law the HRC has drawn state parties’ attention 
particularly to the need to pay adequate compensation and to take measures, over and above any 
victim-specific remedy, to ensure that similar violations do not reoccur.205 In its jurisprudence under 
Article 5(2)(b) of the first optional protocol, which requires that individuals complaining to the HRC 
must have exhausted “all available domestic remedies” to have their communications considered, the 
HRC has indicated that it is judicial remedies that are most likely to be considered effective in that 
context as well.206  
The drafting and adoption by the HRC, in 2004, of General Comment No. 31, entitled Nature of 
the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, allowed the Committee to 
elaborate its views on Article 2(3) in a more systematic manner. In this comment the HRC put 
particular emphasis on three matters. First, it submitted that it “attaches importance to” – but did hence 
not go as far as to submit that it would make the ICCPR require – “States parties’ establishing 
appropriate judicial and administrative mechanisms for addressing claims of rights violations under 
 
202 See e.g. Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 59. 
203 Regarding the last point, Schachter, cit. supra note 15, p. 326; Nowak, cit. supra note 19, pp. 32, 58–59. 
204 See McGoldrick, cit. supra note 158, pp. 279–280. 
205 McGoldrick, cit. supra note 158, p. 285; HRC, Blaga v. Romania, Communication No 1158/2003.  
206 See R.T. v. France, Communication No 262/87, para 7.4, where the HRC observed that the reference “all 
available remedies” “clearly refers in the first place to judicial remedies.” See also HRC, Vicente et al v. 
Colombia Communication No 612/95, where the HRC considered that “purely administrative and disciplinary 
measures cannot be considered adequate and effective” where violations of basic human rights, such as the right 
to life, are at stake. 
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domestic law”.207 Second, it stated that “[a]dministrative mechanisms are particularly required to give 
effect to the general obligation to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and 
effectively through independent and impartial bodies”, notably with respect to acts that are recognized 
as criminal under domestic or international law, though it did not specify where exactly this “general 
obligation” stemmed from.208 Third, it submitted that Article 2(3) “requires that States parties make 
reparation to individuals whose Covenant rights have been violated” and said that it “considers that the 
Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation”.209 The Committee went on to observe that 
reparation can take the form of, inter alia, restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such 
as public apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and 
practices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations.210 The Committee 
also reiterated the obligation to take measures to prevent, where a violation of a right has been 
established, the reoccurrence of such violations.211  
Towards the end of General Comment No 31, the HRC interestingly and realistically observes that 
violations of the Covenant rights still take place even when a State party has provided for the remedies 
envisaged in Article 2(3), but proceeds to make the – perhaps less realistic – assumption that this is 
“presumably attributable to the failure of the remedies to function effectively in practice”.212 
 
Complementary equality provisions 
 
A number of other provisions of the ICCPR are also relevant from the equality point of view. These 
include in particular Article 27, which touches upon cultural equality. Article 27 guarantees 
individuals belonging to minorities a measure of protection by requiring that they “shall not be denied 
the right, in community with the other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess 
and practise their own religion, or to use their own language”.213 Article 27 is formulated in an 
extremely cautious way, one example of which is that it is couched in negative and indirect (“shall not 
be denied”) rather than positive and direct (“has the right to”) terms. This undoubtedly has to do with 
the fact that many differences of opinion emerged during the drafting of Article 27. In particular, it 
was not clear which minorities should be protected, whether it was a collective or an individual right 
that was at issue, and whether state obligations should go beyond mere toleration of the particular 
characteristics of minority groups.214 The contemporary interpretation of Article 27, both by academic 
commentators and the HRC, has settled for the view that it requires states to refrain from a policy of 
assimilation and from any action that threatens the very existence of minorities. It is also generally 
considered that Article 27 requires the state to take positive measures to protect the identity of a 
 
207 Para 15. 
208 Paras 15 and 18. 
209 Para 16. 
210 Para 16. 
211 Para 17. 
212 Para 20. 
213 Freedom of religion, also for immigrants and persons belonging to minorities, is bolstered in Article 18. 
214 Louis B. Sohn, ‘The Rights of Minorities’ in Louis Henkin (ed.) The International Bill Of Rights: The 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 273, 284–285; 
Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 484. 
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minority against infringements by non-state actors.215 Moreover, the HRC has opined that Article 27 
may require the state to take positive measures “to ensure the effective participation of members of 
minority communities in decisions which affect them”, thus calling for measures that provide for 
greater political equality.216 Yet, the legal opinion is undecided as to what extent Article 27 might be 
interpreted as having a programmatic effect, requiring the state to take active measures to create the 
kind of conditions in which minority cultures can thrive.217 The HRC has advocated the view that 
positive measures by states are necessary whenever the ability of a group to maintain its identity is in 
jeopardy.218 The existence of programmatic duties beyond that point is unclear, and it would seem a 
bit far-fetched to interpret Article 27 to require, for instance, the provision of cultural and religious 
accommodation in the workplace. 
The ICCPR also envisages the provision of a measure of preventive protection, particularly 
through Article 20(2), which provides that “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”. The HRC 
has interpreted the requirement to ‘prohibit’ to imply that the domestic law should provide for an 
appropriate sanction in case it is violated.219 
 
Nature of state obligations 
 
The principal article governing the scope of state obligations under the ICCPR is Article 2. As 
mentioned, state parties undertake in Article 2(1) “to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its 
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind”. Article 26 poses more specific obligations, and expressly requires that the law 
shall prohibit discrimination and that states shall provide “all persons equal and effective protection 
against discrimination.” The HRC has interpreted that this requires the adoption of non-discrimination 
legislation.220  
The obligation to ‘respect’ and to ‘ensure’ is generally taken to imply both a negative and a 
positive obligation.221 States are obliged both to refrain from violating the rights guaranteed in the 
Covenant, as well as to take positive steps to give effect to these rights. The latter aspect relates to 
 
215 HRC, General Comment No. 23 (1994), para 6.1. 
216 Idem, para 7; HRC, Länsman et al v. Finland, Communication No 671/95, para 10.4. 
217 For instance Nowak has argued that Article 27 cannot be interpreted as having any kind of a programmatic 
effect. Nowak, cit. supra note 19, pp. 502–505. In view of Nowak, Article 27 was deliberately formulated in a 
laissez faire spirit. On the other hand, Thornberry submits that Article 27 should be interpreted as requiring that 
states should “take such measures as are necessary in order to assist the minority to preserve its values”. See 
Thornberry, cit. supra note 7, pp. 178–186. 
218 The Committee opined in General Comment 23 (1994), para 6.2. as follows: “Although the rights protected 
under article 27 are individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to maintain its 
culture, language or religion. Accordingly, positive measures by States may also be necessary to protect the 
identity of a minority and the rights of its members to enjoy and develop their culture and language and to 
practise their religion, in community with the other members of the group.” 
219 HRC, General Comment No 11 (1983), para 2. 
220 HRC, Zwaan-de Vries v. The Netherlands, Communication No. 182/1984, para 12.4. 
221 See e.g. Nowak, cit. supra note 19, pp. 36-37; Thomas Buergenthal, ‘State obligations and permissible 
derogations’ in Louis Henkin (ed.) The International Bill Of Rights: The Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1981), pp. 77–78. 
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Article 2(2), which provides that “[w]here not already provided for by existing legislative or other 
measures, each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take the necessary steps, in 
accordance with its constitutional processes and with the provisions of the present Covenant, to adopt 
such legislative or other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the 
present Covenant”. The means by which a state gives effect to these rights has therefore been left up to 
the state to be decided in accordance with its constitutional processes. The HRC in its General 
Comment 31 interpreted subsection 2 and the requirement to take necessary measures to mean that it 
imposes on states parties an obligation to “adopt legislative, judicial, administrative, educative and 
other appropriate measures in order to fulfil their legal obligations”.222 
The obligation to ‘ensure’ also means that the state party must take effective measures to secure 
that the rights in question are protected in relation to all violations, including those that result from 
actions by private individuals or other private actors. In this respect the HRC has observed that, 
whereas the Covenant does not have direct horizontal effect as a matter of international law and is not 
a substitute for domestic criminal or civil law,  
the positive obligations on States parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if 
individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, 
but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of 
Covenant rights insofar as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities.223 
 
The interpretation that states parties are obliged by Article 26 to put a stop to discriminatory 
practices among private parties in quasi-public sectors such as employment, education, transportation, 
hotels, and theatres is also supported by the travaux.224 
6.7 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
 
Introduction 
 
The International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) was adopted in 
1966. As of January 2010 it had been ratified by 160 states.225 As already mentioned, a distinction is 
often made between civil and political rights on the one hand, and economic, social and cultural rights 
on the other, the distinction being that only the former are seen as readily justiciable rights, meaning 
rights that can be enforced through courts of law. While it is true that economic, social and cultural 
rights (ESC rights) are often framed as state obligations aiming at progressive realization and also 
acknowledging the constraints due to the limits of available financial resources, some ESC rights or 
aspects thereof are considered to impose obligations which are of immediate effect. The clearest 
 
222 General Comment 31 (2004), para 8. 
223 Idem. 
224 Nowak, cit. supra note 19, p. 478. 
225 Source: http://treaties.un.org (accessed 1.1.2010). 
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example of a justiciable right in this context is considered to be the right to enjoy ESC rights without 
any discrimination.226 
However, it is the case that there is very little legal guidance in the area of ESC rights, which 
places a great demand on the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the body 
that monitors implementation of the ICESCR, and the community of legal scholars, to elucidate on the 
Convention’s often vaguely-worded provisions. The CESCR has produced a volume of legal opinions 
through its General Comments and the observations that it has made in the course of the examination 
of periodic country reports. In particular, its General Comment No 20 on non-discrimination, adopted 
in 2009, answered a number of questions about how the Committee’s understands the principle of non-
discrimination. Moreover, an optional protocol to the ICESCR was adopted in 2008, by virtue of 
which states may recognise the competence of the Committee to receive and consider individual 
complaints, providing the Committee yet another avenue for developing and communicating its views. 
A source of legal opinions that has gained a position of some de facto authority with respect to the 
interpretation of ESC rights consists of two consensus documents, the Limburg Principles and the 
Maastricht Guidelines, drafted by two groups of experts to elaborate upon the Convention.227  
 
The concept of discrimination 
 
Article 2(2) of the Covenant reads: 
The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated in the 
present Covenant will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, 
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status. 
 
Unlike its counterpart Article 2(2) of the ICCPR, Article 2(2) of the ICESCR explicitly employs the 
term ‘discrimination’ instead of ‘distinction’. The travaux préparatoires to the two Covenants, 
prepared at the same time, clearly suggest that the two provisions and two concepts were meant to be 
understood in the same way, namely as excluding only arbitrary or unjust distinctions.228 The ICESCR 
itself does not define what it means by ‘discrimination’. The CESCR has on several occasions 
indicated that it conceives discrimination along the lines set out in other international human rights 
conventions, in particular the ICERD and CEDAW.229 The Limburg Principles, the Maastricht 
 
 
 
226 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (1990). See also Martin Scheinin, ‘Economic and Social Rights as Legal 
Rights’, in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2001). 
227 David L. Martin, in his survey of the relevant academic literature, concludes that Limburg Principles “have 
been largely accepted by the human rights community”. David L. Martin ‘The Limburg Principles Turn Ten: An 
Impact Assessment’ Sim special 20, p. 200. 
228 Ramcharan, cit. supra note 22, p. 259. 
229 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009), para 7; CESCR, General Comment No. 16 (2005), para 11 and 
General Comment No. 5 (1994), para 15. See also para 18 of the CESCR, General Comment No. 18 (2005), 
where the Committee implies that the prohibition set out in Article 2(2) of the Covenant corresponds to the 
prohibition of discrimination set out in Article 7 of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights 
of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. See also CESCR, General Comment 13 (1999), para 
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Guidelines and many individual experts support this interpretation.230 From this point of view 
discrimination is conceived as any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference, based on a 
prohibited ground, which has the intention or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of economic, social or cultural rights.231 
The Committee expressly distinguished between direct and indirect discrimination in its 2005 
General Comment No. 16 on gender equality, and further elaborated upon its approach in the 2009 
General Comment No. 20 on non-discrimination, where it provided the following definitions: 
Direct discrimination occurs when an individual is treated less favourably than another person in a 
similar situation for a reason related to a prohibited ground.  
Indirect discrimination refers to laws, policies or practices which appear neutral at face value, but 
have a disproportionate impact on the exercise of Covenant rights as distinguished by prohibited 
grounds of discrimination.232 
 
In view of the Committee, special measures that involve differentiations between persons or groups of 
persons are legitimate in so far as they are aimed at redressing de facto discrimination and are 
discontinued when de facto equality is achieved.233 This interpretation, which is in line with the 
above-mentioned instruments and their interpretation by the respective bodies, is supported, inter alia, 
by the Limburg Principles.234 In fact, the Committee has over time come to take the view that states 
are in some cases under an obligation to adopt special measures for the purposes of ensuring effective 
enjoyment of Covenant rights.235 It has also pointed out that some types of special measures, such as 
interpretation services for linguistic minorities, need to be of permanent nature.236 
 
 
 
 
 
31, where the Committee interprets Article 2(2) in light of the UNESCO Convention against Discrimination in 
Education. 
230 Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (UN Doc. E/CN.4/1987/17, annex; Human Rights Quarterly, Vol 9 (1987), pp. 122–135), para 41; 
Maastricht Guidelines on violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 20 
(1988), pp. 691–705), para 12; Katarina Frostell – Martin Scheinin, ‘Women’ in Asbjørn Eide, Catarina Krause 
and Allan Rosas (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A Textbook, 2nd revised Edition (The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2001). 
231 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009), para 7; CESCR, General Comment No. 5 (1994), para 15. 
232 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009), para 10. 
233 CESCR, General Comment No. 16 (2005), para 15. See also General Comment No. 13 (1999), para 32. 
234 Limburg Principles, para 39. 
235 CESCR, General Comment No 20 (2009), paras 8 and 9. For instance, in the context of disability 
discrimination the Committee has submitted that there is an obligation to take positive action to reduce structural 
disadvantages and to give appropriate preferential treatment to people with disabilities in order to achieve the 
objectives of full participation and equality within society, considering that people with disabilities constitute a 
vulnerable and disadvantaged group. CESCR, General Comment No. 5 (1994), paras 9 and 18. See also General 
Comment No. 3 (1990), para 12. 
236 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009), para 9. 
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Grounds and personal scope of application 
 
The list of prohibited grounds of discrimination in Article 2 of the ICESR is the same as in Articles 2 
and 26 of the ICCPR, and includes ‘race’, ‘colour’ and ‘national origin’. The list is not exhaustive, 
meaning that other grounds can qualify under the ‘other status’ category, and the Committee has 
submitted that for instance disability and age qualify as other statuses within the meaning of Article 
2(2).237 The Committee took the stance in its 2009 General Comment on non-discrimination that the 
ground of “race” includes “ethnic origin”, finally clarifying that issue after having before that been 
almost silent about ethnic discrimination in its comments.238 In the same instance the CESCR also 
opined that multiple discrimination “merits particular consideration and remedying”.239  
As regards the personal scope of application and discrimination on the basis of nationality, the 
Committee has taken the view that “[t]he Covenant rights apply to everyone including non-nationals, 
such as refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, migrant workers and victims of international 
trafficking, regardless of legal status and documentation.”240 One must however take note of Article 3, 
which provides that “[d]eveloping countries, with due regard to human rights and their national 
economy, may determine to what extent they would guarantee the economic rights recognized in the 
present Covenant to non-nationals”. The applicability of this provision is restricted in three respects: 
1) it applies only to such developing countries whose national economy could not adequately bear the 
fulfilment of these rights, 2) it applies only to economic and not social or cultural rights, and 3) it is 
without prejudice to rights guaranteed in other international human rights documents. Hence the 
possibilities to justify distinctions on the basis of nationality are limited indeed, in Europe in 
particular. 
 
Material scope of application 
 
The non-discrimination clause of Article 2(2) of the Covenant is not self-standing but is accessory to 
the other rights enunciated in the Covenant. Of the latter, especially the rights included in Articles 6, 7 
and 13 are particularly relevant in the present context. 
In Article 6 the states parties “recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to 
the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts”. To this end they 
assume the obligation to take “appropriate steps to safeguard” that right.241 In Article 7 the states 
parties recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of “just and favourable conditions of work” 
which ensure, in particular, equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any 
kind, as well as “equal opportunity for everyone to be promoted in his employment.”242 In its General 
 
237 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009), paras 28 and 29. We may note an interesting development with 
respect to the recognition of age discrimination, as in 1995 the Committee opined that “it may not yet be possible 
to conclude that discrimination on the grounds of age is comprehensively prohibited by the Covenant”, though it 
did soften that conclusion by adding that “the range of matters in relation to which such discrimination can be 
accepted is very limited.” CESCR, General Comment No. 6 (1995), paras 11–12.  
238 The Committee did however refer to ‘minorities’ in its General Comment No. 18 (2005), para 23. 
239 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009), para 17. 
240 Ibid, para 30. 
241 Article 6. 
242 Article 7(a)(i) and (c). 
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em
l any discriminatory legislation and “take measures” to address de facto educational 
disc
 ensure that individuals and entities in the private sphere do not engage in 
disc
iscrimination would thus be prohibited under Article 26 of the ICCPR but not the 
ESCR itself.248 
nforcement and remedies 
                                                       
Comment on Article 6 the CESCR opined that protection from discrimination is an essential part of 
the right to work. Accordingly, states should refrain from “denying or limiting equal access to work” 
and should “adopt legislation or to take other measures ensuring equal access to work and training”.243 
In the view of the Committee, the right to work has several components, notably the right of the 
worker to just and favourable conditions of work, in particular to safe working conditions, the right to 
form trade unions and the right not to be unfairly deprived of employment.244 It has underlined that the 
right to work should not be understood as an absolute and unconditional right to obtain 
ployment.245 
In Article 13 the states parties recognize the right of everyone to education. The article further 
provides that education shall be directed to the “full development of the human personality and the 
sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”, and 
that education shall enable all persons to participate effectively in a free society and promote 
“understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations and all racial, ethnic or religious groups”. 
Article 13(2) provides that primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all and that 
higher education be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity. By virtue of that right 
states should repea
rimination.246 
It is notable that the Committee has drawn attention to the fact that discrimination is frequently 
encountered in the private sphere, for instance in private housing, and that it has called the states to 
adopt measures to
rimination.247 
Given that Article 2 of the ICESCR is not self-standing but accessory to the other rights 
enunciated in the Covenant, situations might arise where discrimination in the social, economic and 
cultural sphere does not amount to discrimination in the enjoyment of any of the rights enshrined in 
the CESCR. Paradoxically, under the prevailing interpretations and practices of the respective 
committees, such d
IC
 
E
 
The ICESCR contains no direct counterpart to Article 2, paragraph 3 (b), of the ICCPR, which obliges 
States parties to, inter alia, “develop the possibilities of judicial remedy”. The CESCR has, however, 
 
243 Para 12 ff. 
244 Paras 6 and 12. 
245 Para 6. More generally on the right to work, see Krzysztof Drzewicki ‘The Right to Work and Rights in 
Work’ in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A textbook (Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2001). 
246 CESCR, General Comment 13 (1999), para 59. More specifically on the right to education, see Manfred 
Nowak ‘The Right to Education’, in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.) Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A textbook 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001). 
247 CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009), para 11. 
248 For more on how the ICCPR and other human rights instruments can be evoked for the protection of 
economic and social rights, see Martin Scheinin “Economic and Social Rights as Legal Rights”, in Asbjørn Eide 
et al (eds) Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook ( Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001). 
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 judicial remedy would “seem 
dispensable in order to satisfy the requirements of the Covenant”.251 
tate obligations 
Article 2(1) of the Covenant states that each state party to the Covenant  
sent covenant by all appropriate 
means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
                                                       
inferred a right to an effective remedy on the one hand from Article 2(1) of the Covenant, which 
requires the achievement of a full realization of the rights enunciated in the Covenant “by all 
appropriate means”, and from Article 8 of the UDHR, which requires the provision of “effective 
remedies”, on the other. This interpretation is shared by the Limburg Principles and the Maastricht 
guidelines.249 In the view of the CESCR the right to an effective remedy does not always require the 
existence of a judicial remedy; administrative remedies will in many cases be adequate.250 It has 
however been of the view that there are some obligations, such as those concerning non-
discrimination, in relation to which the provision of some form of
in
 
S
 
undertakes to take steps … to the maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving 
progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the pre
 
The interpretation of this broad and flexible provision, particularly as regards “progressive realization 
of rights”, has generated much legal commentary into which there is no need to go into here, as it goes 
beyond the scope of this study.252 The formulation of Article 2(2) on non-discrimination, cited above, 
has more absolute and practice-oriented overtones, as is implied by terms “guarantee” and “will be 
exercised”. Indeed, the CESCR and many authors have emphasised that Article 2 taken as a whole 
imposes on state parties some obligations that are of immediate effect, in particular the undertaking to 
guarantee that the relevant rights will be exercised without discrimination.253 In effect, a state is 
considered to be in breach of the Covenant if it has not taken all measures needed to effectively ensure 
that all ESC rights can be enjoyed in practice without any discrimination. The CESCR has noted that 
also non-public entities, such as private employers and private suppliers of goods and services, should 
be made subject to non-discrimination norms under the Covenant.254 In this context it is interesting to 
note that the preamble to the CESCR explicitly refers to the duties of individuals, as it proclaims that 
the contracting states realize “that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the 
community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance 
of the rights recognized in the present Covenant”; the nature of that responsibility or the legal 
significance of the statement are left unclear, but at the very least this observation is not at odds with 
 
249 Limburg Principles, paras 18 and 19 state that legislative measures alone are not sufficient to fulfil the 
obligations of the Covenant and that states parties should provide for effective remedies including, where 
appropriate, judicial remedies. Maastricht guidelines, para 22 states that victims should have access to effective 
judicial or other appropriate remedies at both national and international levels. 
250 CESCR, General Comment No 9 (1998), para 9. 
251 Idem; CESCR, General Comment 3 (1990), para 3. 
252 See e.g. the articles in Asbjørn Eide et al (eds.), Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A textbook 
(Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 2001). 
253 See e.g. CESCR, General Comment 3 (1990), para 1. 
254 CESCR, General Comment No. 5 (1994), para 11. 
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tions between private parties is 
sup
 in the absence of a sound legislative 
foundation for the necessary measures”.257 
6.8 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
troduction 
in 
high number of judgments delivered has allowed the court the opportunity to develop a fairly 
systematic approach to the interpretation of the Convention.261 At the same time, the interstate 
                                                       
the interpretation that the prohibition of discrimination should apply also in relations between private 
parties. The view that the CESCR has indirect horizontal effects in rela
ported by the Limburg Principles and the Maastricht Guidelines.255 
Article 2(1) foresees that the Covenant is to be given effect nationally by “all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures”. In this connection the CESR has opined 
that in some instances “legislation is desirable and even indispensable”.256 In particular, in its view it 
would be impossible to “combat discrimination effectively
In
 
The European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) was concluded in 
1950. As of January 2010, it had been ratified by 47 countries, including all EU member states.258 It 
has been observed that the Council of Europe was prompted to take up the cause of human rights 
primarily for the purposes of affirming and preserving the rule of law and the principles of democracy 
Europe, particularly in contrast to the totalitarianism exhibited both by the Nazis and 
communists.259  
It is widely considered that the European Convention has been something of a success story 
among the family of human rights instruments, particularly because of its relatively robust 
international enforcement system. An individual claiming to be a victim of a violation of the 
Convention may, after exhausting domestic remedies, directly lodge an application alleging a breach 
by a state of one of the Convention rights with the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 
Strasbourg. More than half a million applications have been lodged with the Court by now,260 and the 
 
255 Para 40 of the Limburg Principles state that de facto discrimination should be “brought to an end as speedily 
as possible” and that Article 2(2) demands from states parties that they prohibit private persons and bodies from 
practicing discrimination in any field of public life. Maastricht Guidelines, para 6, notes that the obligation to 
protect ESC rights means that for instance a failure to ensure that private employers comply with basic labour 
standards may amount to a violation of the right to work or the right to just and favourable conditions of work.  
256 CESCR, General Comment No. 3 (1990), para 3; CESCR, General Comment No. 20 (2009). 
257 Idem. 
258 Source: http://conventions.coe.int (accessed 1.1.2010). 
259 J.G. Merrills – A.H. Robertson, Human rights in Europe: A study of the European Convention on Human 
Rights, 4th ed (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2001), pp. 3–5. See also Steven Greer ‘What’s Wrong 
with the European Convention on Human Rights’ Human Rights Quarterly 30 (2008), pp. 680–702. 
260 By the end of the year 2007 more than 490 000 applications had been filed with the Court. European Court of 
Human Rights, Annual Report 2007 (Registry of the European Court of Human Rights, Strasbourg, 2008). This 
massive caseload has overburdened the Strasbourg Court, bringing it at the verge of an acute crisis. 
261 See however the excellent account of Merrils regarding how different judicial ideologies have come to play in 
the Strasbourg court. J.G. Merrills, The development of international law by the European Court of Human 
Rights (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). 
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complaint mechanism – originally envisaged to be the modus operandi of the Convention – has 
remained almost a dead letter.262 
 
The concept of discrimination 
 
The ECHR contains a non-discrimination provision in Article 14. The ECtHR has on several 
occasions underlined the fundamental importance of this article. In its 2004 decision Nachova and 
others v. Bulgaria, which was the first case ever in which it found discrimination on the grounds of 
‘race’ or ethnicity, it took the opportunity to proclaim that “the prohibition of discrimination in 
general, and of racial and ethnic discrimination in particular, under Article 14 reflect basic values of 
the democratic societies that make up the Council of Europe.”263 
 
Article 14 reads: 
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured without 
discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national and social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other 
status. 
 
As Article 14 or the other articles of the Convention do not define ‘discrimination’, the interpretation 
of the very meaning of the concept becomes crucial. The English text version of Article 14 explicitly 
uses the word ‘discrimination’, whereas the French text, which is equally authentic,264 uses the words 
‘sans distinction aucune’. The Court resolved the discrepancy between these two language versions in 
favour of the English version already in the 1968 Belgian Linguistics case, in which it submitted that: 
In spite of the very general wording of the French version (“sans distinction aucune”) Article 14 
does not forbid every difference in treatment in the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized. 
This version must be read in the light of the more restrictive text of the English version (“without 
discrimination”).265 
 
In the Belgian Linguistics case the Court went on give its interpretation of the notion of discrimination 
by noting that certain differences in treatment exist in many democratic countries, and that some legal 
inequalities (distinctions in law) tend only to correct factual inequalities. It continued by observing 
that 
 
262 Greer, cit. supra note 259, pp. 681–682. 
263 See ECtHR, Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, chamber judgment of February 2004, para 155. The case was 
referred to the Grand Chamber [GC], which delivered judgment in the case on 6 July 2005. The GC, for its part, 
declared that racial violence “is a particular affront to human dignity”, para 145 of the judgment.  
264 Article 59 of the Convention. 
265 ECtHR, Case ‘Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium’, 
judgement of 23 July 1968, p. 34. The Court’s reasoning was based on the argument that literal application of the 
French text would lead to “absurd results” (para B.10). 
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… the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the distinction has no objective and 
reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification must be assessed in relation to the aim 
and effects of the measure under consideration, regard being had to the principles which normally 
prevail in the democratic societies. A difference of treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in 
the Convention must not only pursue a legitimate aim: Article 14 is likewise violated when it is 
clearly established that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means 
employed and the aims sought to be realized.266 
 
The Court adopted this broad and flexible approach by “following the principles which may be 
extracted from the legal practice of a large number of democratic States”, without specifying what 
those countries were.267 This approach has proved to be durable and the ECtHR has, broadly speaking, 
followed it ever since. For instance in the 2009 judgement in the Andrejeva case, the Court [Grand 
Chamber, GC] reiterated that  
According to the Court’s settled case-law, discrimination means treating differently, without an 
objective and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations. “No objective and reasonable 
justification” means that the distinction in issue does not pursue a “legitimate aim” or that there is 
not a “reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought 
to be realized.”268 
 
The Court has in different cases focused upon the different components of this definition: In Gaygusuz 
the focus was on the examination of the justification; in the cases of Zarb, Willis and Okpisz the court 
concentrated on the comparative element of Article 14, by focusing on whether the difference in 
treatment took place between persons in relevantly similar or analogous situations;269 and in the cases 
of Andrejeva and Rainys and Gasparavicius it focused particularly upon the proportionality of the 
challenged measure.270 
The ECtHR appears to grant the contracting states a ‘margin of appreciation’ – essentially a 
conceptual device that allows states a measure of discretion in the way the Convention rights are 
implemented nationally271 – in assessing whether and to what extent differences in otherwise similar 
situations justify different treatment in law, the scope of this margin varying according to the 
circumstances, the subject matter and the background of the case.272 For instance in the Burden case, 
 
 
 
266 Idem. 
267 Idem. 
268 ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia, judgment of 18 February 2009, para 81. 
269 ECtHR, Zarb Adami v. Malta, judgment of 20 June 2006, para 71. In the Lithgow case the Court stated that 
the Article 14 “safeguards persons…who are placed in analogous situations against discriminatory differences of 
treatment”, see Lithgow and others v. United Kingdom, judgement of 8 July 1986. In the Fredin case the Court 
stated that for a claim to succeed, it has to be established, inter alia, that the situation of the alleged victim can be 
considered similar to that of persons who have been better treated. ECtHR, Fredin v. Sweden, judgment of 18 
February 1991. 
270 ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], judgment of 18 February 2009, paras 87–89; ECtHR, Rainys and 
Gasparavicius v. Lithuania, judgment of 7 April 2005, para 36. 
271 See e.g. Merrills – Robertson, cit. supra note 259, pp. 222-224. 
272 See ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], judgment of 18 February 2009, para 82, in which the Court opined 
that “[t]he Contracting States enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether and to what extent 
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the Court stated that the margin of appreciation is “usually wide when it comes to general measures of 
economic or social strategy”.273 Some commentators have criticized this and have opined that the 
doctrine of margin of appreciation should play a role only in the consideration of the other substantive 
article that is applied in conjunction with Article 14, not Article 14 itself.274 
The consideration of the justification of differential treatment leaves considerable room for the 
Court to develop its doctrines, in the development of which the ECtHR has shown a great interest in 
the trends prevalent in Europe, including individual countries, the European Union and the other 
organs of the Council of Europe.275 The Court has only rarely been called upon to elaborate on the 
legitimacy of positive/affirmative action,276 but on those occasions it has actually gone as far as to 
hold that in certain circumstances states have an obligation to engage in it.
The ECtHR has recently broadened its understanding of the concept of discrimination. In 
Thlimmenos v Greece, adopted in 2000, it famously held that it is not just differential treatment of 
similarly situated persons that may constitute discrimination, but also similar treatment of persons in 
dissimilar situations:  
The Court has so far considered that the right under Article 14 not to be discriminated against in the 
enjoyment of the rights guaranteed under the Convention is violated when States treat differently 
persons in analogous situations without providing an objective and reasonable justification. 
However, the Court considers that this is not the only facet of the prohibition of discrimination in 
Article 14. The right not to be discriminated against in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed 
under the Convention is also violated when States without an objective and reasonable justification 
fail to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different.278 
 
Thus failure on part of a state to treat differently persons whose situations are significantly different 
may constitute discrimination in the absence of an objective and reasonable justification.279 Despite 
the fact that the Court has used similar reasoning in subsequent cases, inter alia in the 2001 case of 
Chapman v. The United Kingdom [GC]280 and in the 2005 case Nachova and others v. Bulgaria 
 
differences in otherwise similar situations justify a different treatment.” See also ECtHR, Inze v. Austria, 28 
October 1987, para 41, and ECtHR, Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998. 
273 ECtHR, Burden v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2008, para 60. See also ECtHR, Andrejeva v. 
Latvia [GC], judgment of 18 February 2009, paras 81–92. 
274 Aart Willem Heringa, ‘Standards of review for discrimination: The scope of review by the Courts’ in Loenen 
– Rodriquez (eds.), Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), p. 31. 
275 See e.g. Merrills – Robertson, cit. supra note 259, p. 202. See the ECtHR cases Inze v. Austria, judgment of 
28 October 1987; Sheffield and Horsham v. United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998; and D.H. and others v. 
The Czech Republic, judgment of 7 February 2006.                                                                                                                               
276 Marc de Vos, ‘Beyond Formal Equality: Positive Action under Directives 2000/43/EC and 2000/78’ 
(Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007), p. 51. 
277 ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], judgment of 18 February 2009, para 82. 
278 ECtHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 March 2000, para 44. 
279 Also some other cases decided before Thlimmenos suggested that discrimination may be found where 
essentially different groups are treated in an identical way. See Geoff Gilbert, ‘The protection of minorities 
under the European convention on human rights’ in Janet Dine – Bob Watt (eds.), Discrimination Law: 
Concepts, Limitations, and Justifications (London: Longman, 1996); Nicholas Grief, “Non-Discrimination under 
the European Convention on Human Rights: a critique of the United Kingdom Government’s refusal to sign and 
ratify Protocol 12”, 27 E.L.Rev. Human Rights Survey, 2002, HR/5. 
280 ECtHR, Chapman v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001. 
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[GC],281 and despite its huge potential importance and radical ramifications, this aspect of the 
principle of non-discrimination has theoretically speaking remained rather underdeveloped and unclear 
in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence. The Court itself has been cautious in applying the principle, and for 
instance the outcome of the Chapman case seems to suggest that there is a certain threshold for the 
Court to condemn a state party for a failure to accommodate the characteristics and needs of minorities 
in their general polic
The Thlimmenos doctrine has given rise to theoretical controversies. Commentators disagree for 
instance upon the question whether the type of failure involved in Thlimmenos constitutes direct or 
indirect discrimination.283 It could also be understood as a third type of discrimination, failure on part 
of the state to take positive measures with a view to accommodating specific characteristics and needs 
linked to religion, ethnicity or other such grounds. International human rights documents and doctrines 
have until now conceptualized discrimination mainly in terms of prohibition of differential treatment, 
where it is assumed that instances where it is legitimate to treat people differently on grounds of ‘race’ 
or ethnicity are few and can be reviewed under the ‘legitimacy test’ and where the question of positive 
state obligations to differentiate on the basis of ‘ethnicity’ in particular falls within the ambit of an 
entirely different set of rights, namely minority rights.284 However, it does not appear that Article 14 
could, given its limited material scope, extend to a full recognition of minority rights.285 
The Court has broadened its understanding of the concept of discrimination also by coming, after a 
long development,286 and clearly influenced by the EU equal treatment directives,287 to explicitly 
embrace the concept of indirect discrimination. Thus in its 2001 judgement in the Hugh Jordan v. 
 
281 In paragraph 160 the Grand Chamber approvingly quotes the following passages from the Chamber judgment 
in the same case: “when investigating violent incidents and, in particular, deaths at the hands of State agents, 
State authorities have the additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to establish 
whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events. Failing to do so and treating 
racially induced violence and brutality on an equal footing with cases that have no racist overtones would be to 
turn a blind eye to the specific nature of acts that are particularly destructive of fundamental rights. A failure to 
make a distinction in the way in which situations that are essentially different are handled may constitute 
unjustified treatment irreconcilable with Article 14 of the Convention.” This position is reiterated also in ECtHR, 
Stoica v. Romania, judgment of 4 March 2008, para 119. 
282 ECtHR, Chapman v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, paras 126–130. 
283 See Mark Bell, ‘Direct discrimination’ in Dagmar Schiek – Lisa Waddington – Mark Bell, Non-
Discrimination Law: Cases, Materials and text on National, Supranational and International Non-
Discrimination Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007); Olivier de Schutter, Prohibition of discrimination under 
European Human Rights Law (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2005). 
284 See e.g. Kristin Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, 
Minority Rights, and Self-Determination (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000). 
285 This is because such differential treatment is warranted only when it is called for by the Convention, for 
instance in the interests of ensuring equal enjoyment of the Convention rights in practice. See for instance the 
Zarb case, where the Court submitted that “in other words, the notion of discrimination includes in general cases 
where a person or group is treated, without proper justification, less favourably than another, even though the 
more favourable treatment is not called for by the Convention.” ECtHR, Zarb Adami v. Malta, judgment of 20 
June 2006, para 73. 
286 Heringa, cit. supra note 274, p. 28. Already in the above mentioned Belgian Linguistics case the Court 
distinguished between the aims and effects of a measure and in the Building Societies case it recognized that 
allegations of discriminatory effect are covered by Article 14. ECtHR, Building Societies v. The United 
Kingdom, judgment of 23 October 1997. 
287 See e.g. ECtHR, D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic, judgment of 13 November 2007, para 184. 
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United Kingdom case,288 and later in the 2007 D.H. and others case, the Court accepted that a general 
policy or measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be 
considered discriminatory, notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that group.289 This 
corresponds to its understanding of indirect discrimination.290 In the D.H. case the Court held that a 
schooling system where Roma pupils in disproportionate numbers ended in special education of 
inferior quality constituted indirect discrimination. The decision of the Court in that case was anything 
but uncontroversial. In it, the Grand Chamber quashed, by a majority of thirteen votes to four, an 
earlier Chamber judgement that had not found any discrimination. The four dissenting Grand Chamber 
judges annexed exceptionally strongly worded opinions to the majority judgment.291  
The ECtHR has recognized that discrimination contrary to the Convention may result from a 
‘practice’ or a ‘de facto situation’, not just from a law, decision or the like.292 This, and the recognition 
of the concept of indirect discrimination, enables the Court to deal with many types of discrimination 
that occur in the context of everyday life. 
The Convention or the Court have not laid down rules regarding burden of proof or admissibility 
of evidence applicable in domestic contexts, other than the general requirement laid down in Article 
13 that the domestic remedies must be effective. Whereas these matters are therefore for the national 
authorities to determine, the ECtHR’s praxis with regard to its own procedures may influence the 
national practice, given that a mismatch detrimental to a contracting state arises where its procedural 
rules are less favourable to the complainants than those applied by the ECtHR, as this would lead to 
more complaints being submitted to the ECtHR and being resolved in favour of the applicants.293 In 
view of this it is useful to take a look at the ECtHR’s approach in this respect.  
Regarding the burden of proof, the basic rule applied by the ECtHR in cases involving alleged 
discrimination is that once the applicant has shown a difference in treatment, it is for the Government 
to show that it was justified.294 In the D.H. and others case the Court, after referring to this basic 
principle, went on to refer to the specifics of the case and to the EU equal treatment directives and 
their provisions on shifting of the burden of proof, and submitted that “where an applicant alleging 
indirect discrimination thus establishes a rebuttable presumption that the effect of a measure or 
 
288 ECtHR, Jordan v. United Kingdom, judgement of 4 April 2001, para 154. 
289 ECtHR, D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic, judgment of 13 November 2007, para 175. 
290 Ibid, para 184. 
291 For instance the dissenting opinion of Judge Zupani holds the majority opinion to ”border on the absurd” 
and adds that ”[n]o amount of politically charged argumentation can hide the obvious fact that the Court in this 
case has been brought into play for ulterior purposes, which have little to do with the special education of Roma 
children in the Czech Republic.” Judge Jungwiert, for his part, submits that the “abstract, theoretical reasoning” 
which he saw to underlie the majority decision “render the majority’s conclusions wholly unacceptable”. Judge 
Borrego Borrego submits that he is “somewhat saddened by the judgment in the present case” and suggests that 
the Court departed from its judicial role in the decision. 
292 ECtHR, Zarb Adami v. Malta, judgment of 20 June 2006, para 76; D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic, 
judgment of 13 November 2007. 
293 Whereas a mismatch would result also in the case where the national rules applied by a state party would be 
more favourable to the complainant than those applied by the ECHR, this is not likely to be experienced as a 
problem, as domestic cases would be less likely to make it to the ECtHR or be successful there. 
294 See e.g. ECtHR, D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic [GC], judgment of 13 November 2007, para 177; 
ECtHR, Andrejeva v. Latvia [GC], judgment of 18 February 2009, para 84. The burden of proof would 
obviously have to be different in cases that involve alleged discrimination by way of similar treatment of people 
that are in different situations, as in Thlimmenos. 
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practice is discriminatory, the burden then shifts to the respondent State, which must show that the 
difference in treatment is not discriminatory”.295 In Nachova it held that it can, in cases involving 
alleged discrimination, shift the burden of proof to the respondent Government, particularly where the 
events lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities.296 Whereas the 
Court’s approach to the burden of proof has not yet consolidated into a solid doctrine, these cases 
show that the court is willing to ease the applicant’s burden of proof particularly where indirect 
discrimination is at issue or where the evidence is wholly or in part in possession of the respondent. 
The – though possibly temporary – conceptualization of indirect discrimination in terms of a 
general policy or a measure that has “disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group” 
readily raises the question how such group effects can - or should - be demonstrated to the satisfaction 
of the Court. The Court has answered this question by clarifying that, in proceedings before it, there 
are “no procedural barriers to the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its 
assessment” and that it “adopts the conclusions that are, in its view, supported by the free evaluation 
of all evidence”.297 Whereas in Jordan it concluded that it “does not consider that statistics can in 
themselves disclose a practice which could be classified as discriminatory within the meaning of 
Article 14”,298 in Hoogendijk and Zarb Adami cases it came to declare that it was prepared to accept 
statistical evidence, clarifying finally in D.H. and others that it “considers that when it comes to 
assessing the impact of a measure or practice on an individual or group, statistics which appear on 
critical examination to be reliable and significant will be sufficient to constitute the prima facie 
evidence the applicant is required to produce.”299 Indeed, in D.H. and others the Court acknowledged 
that the evidence marshalled by the applicants, namely ethnic statistics compiled on the basis of a 
survey, while not necessarily “entirely reliable”, was capable of revealing “a dominant trend”, 
particularly as the statistics were corroborated by evidence obtained from independent supervisory 
bodies such as the CERD and ECRI. On these grounds the statistics were taken to be “sufficiently 
reliable and significant to give rise to a strong presumption of indirect discrimination” and in the end, 
a finding of a violation of Article 14.300 The Court was, however, careful to underline in its reasoning 
that indirect discrimination can also be proved by other means than statistics.301 What these other 
means are was left unclear, however. 
 
Grounds and personal scope 
 
Article 14 prohibits discrimination on “on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority, property, birth 
or other status”. The list of grounds is non-exhaustive, as is indicated by the words ‘such as’ and ‘other 
status’, and is not limited to in-born characteristics as is clear especially from the inclusion of the 
 
295 Ibid, para 189. Emphasis added. 
296 ECtHR, Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, GC judgment of 6 July 2005, para 157. 
297 Ibid, para 147. 
298 ECtHR, Hugh Jordan v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 4 May 2001, para 154. 
299 D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic [GC], judgment of 13 November 2007, para 188. 
300 Ibid, paras 190 and ff. 
301 Idem. 
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ground of ‘property’.302 The Court has in its practice considered alleged discrimination on the basis of 
for instance sexual orientation, marital status, transsexuality and even military rank.303 Some authors 
have suggested that any criterion of differentiation may be potentially examined under Article 14.304 
In Timishev the ECtHR confirmed that ethnic discrimination falls within the scope of Article 14, 
but, under the explicit influence of the definitions of racial discrimination in Article 1(1) of the ICERD 
and ECRI’s General Policy Recommendation No 7, it came not to treat it as an autonomous ground 
but as a form of racial discrimination.305 The Court did distinguish between the notions of ‘ethnicity’ 
and ‘race’ in the said case, however, proceeding even to outline what it takes these notions to mean: 
Ethnicity and race are related and overlapping concepts. Whereas the notion of race is rooted in the 
idea of biological classification of human beings into subspecies according to morphological 
features such as skin colour or facial characteristics, ethnicity has its origin in the idea of societal 
groups marked by common nationality, tribal affiliation, religious faith, shared language, or 
cultural and traditional origins and backgrounds.306 
 
Under the practice of the Court, it is for the applicant to show that there has been a difference of 
treatment, which quite readily calls for a comparison between individuals or groups that are placed in 
analogous or otherwise comparable situations but that differ in terms of a ground on which it is 
prohibited to discriminate under Article 14.307 Under cases involving indirect discrimination the 
applicant will presumably need to show – depending on the exact burden of proof – that the 
challenged measure or practice had, in fact, had a disproportionate impact upon a particular group, 
which again entails inter-group comparisons. Thus much turns on comparing, for instance, individuals 
or groups that differ in terms of ethnicity. 
In the non-discrimination jurisprudence of the ECtHR, some grounds are held to be intrinsically 
more suspect – to borrow a notion from the American equal protection jurisdiction – than others, 
requiring ‘very weighty reasons’ or even ‘compelling reasons’ to be forwarded to justify differential 
treatment on those grounds.308 It has been submitted that very weighty reasons are required to justify 
 
302 Again there is a difference between the French and English texts, as the French text reads “toute autre 
situation” where the English text reads “other status” and thereby the French text would seem to take an even 
more liberal position towards the “other” prohibited grounds of discrimination. 
303 ECtHR, Salgueiro Da Silva Mouta v Portugal, judgement of 21 December 1999; ECtHR, S.L. v. Austria, 
judgment of 9 January 2003 and ECtHR, L. and V. v. Austria, judgment of 9 January 2003. See also ECtHR, 
B.B. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 10 February 2004 and Sheffield and Horsham v. The United Kingdom, 
judgment of 30 July 1998. 
304 De Schutter, cit supra note 283, p. 13. 
305 ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia, judgment of 13 December 2005, para 56. The Court took a similar position in 
D.H. and others, judgment of 13 November 2007, para 176;  Stoica v. Romania, judgment of 4 March 2008, para 
117 ff, and ECtHR, Sejdi and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, GC judgment of 22 December 2009, para 43. 
306 Ibid (Timishev), para 55. This passage was with some modifications reiterated in ECtHR, Sejdi and Finci v. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, GC judgment of 22 December 2009, para 43. 
307 See Francis G. Jacobs – Robin C.A. White, The European Convention of Human Rights, third ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 2002), pp. 355-356. 
308 See e.g. ECtHR, Van Raalte v. The Netherlands, judgment of 21 February 1997; ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabalez 
and Balkandi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 May 1985, para 78. 
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differences based on, inter alia, nationality, race, religion and sex.309 In Timishev the Court confirmed 
that differential treatment on the basis of ethnicity warrants strict scrutiny, and went on record to say 
that “[r]acial discrimination is a particularly invidious kind of discrimination and, in view of its 
perilous consequences, requires from the authorities special vigilance and a vigorous reaction” and 
furthermore that the “Court considers that no difference in treatment which is based exclusively or to a 
decisive extent on a person’s ethnic origin is capable of being objectively justified in a contemporary 
democratic society built on the principles of pluralism and respect for different cultures.”310 In the 
D.H. and others case it adopted a slightly less absolute opinion, stating that “[w]here the difference in 
treatment is based on race, colour or ethnic origin, the notion of objective and reasonable justification 
must be interpreted as strictly as possible”.311 It is unclear whether such strict scrutiny applies also to 
the failure to treat people differently outlined in the Thlimmenos case. 
 
Material scope 
 
As the wording of Article 14 indicates, it is not an independent prohibition of all kinds of 
discrimination, but is limited to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention, 
including its protocols.312 The reason why the drafters chose not to frame the Article in broader terms, 
such as the principle of equal protection of the law, was apparently that they felt that the meaning of 
such broader terms would be too uncertain.313 
Article 14 is complementary to the other substantive provisions in the sense that it can be applied 
only where the facts at issue fall within the ambit of one or more of the substantive provisions of the 
Convention.314 Article 14 has independent meaning, though, in the sense that under ECtHR’s 
jurisprudence it is unnecessary to show that there has been a breach of another Convention 
provision.315 It suffices to demonstrate that another provision has been applied in a manner which is 
discriminatory, even in situations in which the national law implementing the right goes beyond the 
obligations expressly provided by the Convention. The Court summed up its practice in Okpisz: 
 
309 Jacobs – White, cit. supra note 307, pp. 355–356. Nicholas Grief, “Non-Discrimination under the European 
Convention on Human Rights: a critique of the United Kingdom Government’s refusal to sign and ratify 
Protocol 12”, 27 E.L.Rev. Human Rights Survey, 2002, HR/5. Heringa, cit. supra note 274, p. 30.  
310 ECtHR, Timishev v. Russia, judgment of 13 December 2005, paras 56 and 58. 
311 D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic [GC], judgment of 13 November 2007, para 196. 
312 Matti Pellonpää, Euroopan ihmisoikeussopimus (Helsinki: Lakimiesliiton kustannus, 1996), p. 435. See e.g. 
ECtHR, Krasnov and Skuratov v. Russia, judgment of 19 July 2007, para 69. 
313 Jeroen Schokkenbroek ‘A New European Standard Against Discrimination: Negotiating Protocol 12 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights’ in Stéphanie Lagoutte (ed.), Prohibition of discrimination in the Nordic 
Countries: The Complicated fate of Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights 
(Copenhagen: the Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2005), p. 20. 
314 See e.g. ECtHR, Abdulaziz, Cabalez and Balkandi v. United Kingdom, judgment of 18 May 1985; ECtHR, 
Burden v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 29 April 2008, para 58; ECtHR, Sejdi and Finci v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, GC judgment of 22 December 2009, para 39. 
315 That said, the Court usually first examines whether there has been a violation of the substantive provision.  If 
a violation is found, the Court does not always consider separately the allegation of a violation under Article 14 
in conjunction with the substantive provision. Francis G. Jacobs - Robin C.A. White, The European Convention 
of Human Rights, third edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002), p. 353. See e.g. ECtHR, Dudgeon v. United 
Kingdom, judgment of 22 October 1981. 
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As the Court has held on many occasions, Article 14 comes into play whenever “the subject-matter 
of the disadvantage ... constitutes one of the modalities of the exercise of a right guaranteed”, or the 
measures complained of are “linked to the exercise of a right guaranteed”.316 
 
This interpretative approach, which has developed over the years, somewhat expands the otherwise 
limited scope of application of Article 14. Yet the fact remains that the Convention provides only for a 
limited range of rights and freedoms. None of the provisions in the Convention address, as such, 
access to employment or occupation, or access to goods and services available to the public, including 
housing.317 Of the fields that are of particular interest to this study, only education is covered. Article 2 
of the first additional protocol provides: 
No person shall be denied the right to education. In the exercise of any functions which it assumes 
in relation to education and to teaching, the State shall respect the right of parents to ensure such 
education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions. 
 
Though drafted in negative terms, the Court’s interpretation of the first sentence is that there is a right 
to education, a right that applies to primary, secondary, and further or higher education.318 The second 
sentence has been interpreted as aiming at safeguarding a degree of pluralism in education, and to 
require states to ensure that the content of the education is free from any indoctrination and that 
information and knowledge included in the curriculum is conveyed in an “objective, critical and 
pluralistic manner”.319 The Court has opined that the rights enshrined in the Article involve a duty on 
the state to regulate the provision of education, although the state has a wide margin of appreciation as 
to its organization and as to the resources it devotes to the educational system.320 
Several important cases considered by the Court have dealt with discrimination in the field of 
education. In the Belgian Linguistics case the Court, though noting that Article 2 of Protocol 1 does 
not include a right to be taught in the language of parents’ choice, found the Belgian legislation to be 
discriminatory as it led, in fact, to a situation where certain linguistic communities, depending on their 
place of residence, had an unequal access to education in their own language. In Folgerø and Others v. 
Norway the Court held that the compulsory school subject ‘Christianity, Religion and Philosophy’, 
which laid a quantitative and qualitative emphasis on Christianity, coupled with an exemption system 
the use of which was considered to pose a heavy burden, violated Article 2 of Protocol No 1.321 In 
D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic, the applicants successfully challenged a schooling system 
 
316 ECtHR, Okpisz v. Germany, judgment of 15 February 2006, para 31. See also Case ‘Relating to Certain 
Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in Education in Belgium’, judgment of 23 July 1968, para 9. 
317 The Convention does, in Article 11, provide for the right to form and join trade unions, which must therefore 
be secured without any discrimination. 
318 Jacobs – White, cit. supra note 315, pp. 320–1. For instance in Folgerø the Court opined that by binding 
themselves not to deny the right to education, “the Contracting States guarantee to anyone within their 
jurisdiction a right of access to educational institutions existing at a given time and the possibility of drawing, by 
official recognition of the studies which he has completed, profit from the education received.” ECtHR, Folgerø 
and Others v. Norway, judgment of 29 June 2007. 
319 Idem. 
320 Jacobs – White, cit. supra note 315, pp. 321–4. 
321 ECtHR, Folgerø and Others v. Norway, judgment of 29 June 2007. 
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whereby a disproportionate amount of Roma children were placed in schools for children with mental 
disabilities.322 
A measure of protection against discrimination, for instance in the field of working life, may also 
result from the Court’s habit of broad interpretation of the Convention rights, the right to respect for 
private life in particular. In Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, the Court, while reiterating that the 
Convention does not as such guarantee access to a particular employment, stated that a ban to pursue 
professional activities may have effects on the enjoyment of the right to respect for private life within 
the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention, and be prohibited on those grounds.323 States may even 
have positive obligations to adopt measures designed to secure equal treatment between private 
parties, in so far as a failure to do so would amount to a failure to provide effective respect for private 
or family life sensu lato.324 Whereas cases may therefore arise in which the ECtHR requires states 
parties to take action to counteract discrimination in various fields of life, this requires that a link can 
be made between that field and one of the Convention rights or freedoms. However, it is impossible to 
outline the scope of each of the Convention rights, as the Court has on many occasions emphasised 
that for instance Article 8 obligations cannot be laid down in any abstract way and that the Court will 
decide cases on a one-by-one basis. 
Discrimination, also outside the field of education, may sometimes be so severe as to constitute 
degrading treatment that is prohibited in Article 3 of the Convention. In Cyprus v. Turkey the Court 
found that the Greek-Cypriots living in the Karpas area were compelled to live in a situation where 
they were “isolated, restricted in their movements, controlled and with no prospect of renewing or 
developing their community”. Restrictions of freedom of movement were of such nature that they 
were considered to weigh heavily on the group’s enjoyment of private and family life and their right to 
practice their religion. The Court concluded that the Karpas Greek Cypriots had been subjected to 
discrimination amounting to degrading treatment.325 That severe forms of discrimination may amount 
to degrading treatment has been recognized also in other cases.326 
The ECHR and the Court’s jurisprudence under it are not clear whether and to what extent there is 
a positive duty to act against discrimination committed by private parties.327 
At the end of the day the conclusion is warranted that the Convention as such, as interpreted by the 
Court, requires states to provide protection against discrimination in the areas of working life and 
provision of goods and services only in rather exceptional circumstances.328 
 
322 D.H. and others v. The Czech Republic [GC], judgment of 13 November 2007. 
323 ECtHR, Sidabras and Dziautas v. Lithuania, judgment of 27 July 2004, paras 42–50. 
324 See ECtHR, Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, judgment 20 December 2007, para 47. 
325 The Court reasoned as follows: “For the Court it is an inescapable conclusion that the interferences at issue 
were directed at the Karpas Greek-Cypriot community for the very reason that they belonged to this class of 
persons. The treatment to which they were subjected during the period under consideration can only be explained 
in terms of the features which distinguish them from the Turkish-Cypriot population, namely their ethnic origin, 
race and religion … The conditions under which that population is condemned to live are debasing and violate 
the very notion of respect for the human dignity of its members. In the Court’s opinion, and with reference to the 
period under consideration, the discriminatory treatment attained a level of severity which amounted to 
degrading treatment.” Cyprus v. Turkey, judgment of 10 May 2001, paras 302–311. 
326 See also e.g. European Commission of Human Rights, East African Asians v. United Kingdom, decision of 14 
December 1973, and ECtHR, Petropoulou – Tsakiris v. Greece, judgment of 6 December 2007. 
327 See also Henrard, cit supra note 94, p. 17. 
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Convention obligations” under Article 13.335 Remedies must, however, be understood both in the 
                                                                                                                                                                            
 
Enforcement and remedies 
 
Article 13, which deals with remedies, provides as follows: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed 
by persons acting in an official capacity. 
 
Whereas this is not fully clear from its wording, it is now generally accepted, by the ECtHR as well as 
legal scholars, that Article 13 must be understood as dealing with the domestic implementation and 
enforcement of the Convention rights; it is not about state responsibility or the remedies that should be 
available when the ECtHR has established that a state party has breached the Convention.329 The 
Court reiterated its position on this for instance in the 2007 case of Cobzaru v. Romania, where it said 
that “Article 13 of the Convention guarantees the availability, at the national level, of a remedy to 
enforce the substance of Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they might happen to be 
secured in the domestic legal order”.330 Insofar as the Convention requires state parties to provide 
protection from discrimination, also in relations between private parties, there must therefore be 
estic remedy.  
Yet this line of interpretation presents a further problem: if remedies – understood to include 
access to justice – come into play only after rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention have 
been found to be violated, which is what the article says, how is the remedy-triggering violation itself 
to be established, as that would require the availability of a procedural remedy?331 The Court has 
resolved this issue by holding in several cases that the right to a national remedy arises “where an 
individual has an arguable claim to be the victim of a violation”.332 This ‘arguable claim’ test, while 
generally accepted by legal scholars,333 is inherently imprecise and necessarily leaves a measure of 
discretion both to the national authorities and the Strasbourg Court. Whereas the early case law on 
Article 13 set only relatively low-level requirements upon states, mainly requiring the existence of 
some mechanism that might lead to a remedy, ECtHR’s jurisprudence has since evolved and has now 
remained rather static over the last years.334 The starting point is still that the Court acknowledges that 
contracting states are free to choose how to secure the Convention rights and freedoms in the domestic 
legal order and that they also have “some discretion as to the manner in which they confirm to their 
 
328 This is the conclusion also of Gerards, in Janneke Gerards, ‘Protocol No. 12 – the Dutch Debate’ in Stéphanie 
Lagoutte (ed.) Prohibition of Discrimination in the Nordic Countries: The Complicated Fate of Protocol No. 12 
to the European Convention on Human Rights (Copenhagen: The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2005), p. 
39. 
329 See e.g. Merrills, cit. supra note 259, p. 194; Jacobs – White, cit. supra note 315, pp. 386-387. 
330 ECtHR, Cobzaru v. Romania, judgment of 26 July 2007. 
331 Merrills, cit. supra note 259, pp. 194–195. 
332 See e.g. ECtHR, Silver v. United Kingdom, judgment of 25 March 1983. Emphasis added. 
333 Merrills, cit. supra note 259. 
334 Jacobs – White, cit. supra note 315, pp. 386 ff. 
335 See e.g. ECtHR, Keenan v. United Kingdom, judgement of 3 April 2001. 
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procedural and substantive sense, and must be effective.336 Article 13 indicates that procedural 
remedies need not always be judicial; ombudsman procedures and other non-judicial procedures may 
therefore qualify, depending on the nature of the complaint.337 The Court has also pointed out that “as 
a general rule, if a single remedy does not by itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the 
aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law may do so”.338  
These interpretations were summed up in the 2007 case of Cobzaru v. Romania:  
The effect of Article 13 is thus to require the provision of a domestic remedy to deal with the 
substance of an “arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief, 
although Contracting States are afforded some discretion as to the manner in which they conform 
to their Convention obligations under this provision. The scope of the obligation under Article 13 
varies depending on the nature of the applicant's complaint under the Convention. Nevertheless, the 
remedy required by Article 13 must be “effective” in practice as well as in law; in particular, its 
exercise must not be unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the 
respondent State.339 
 
As the Court pointed out in the above case, the scope of states’ obligations under Article 13 varies 
depending on the nature of the applicant's complaint, and the Court has expressed its view that in 
certain situations the Convention requires a particular remedy to be provided. Thus in cases that 
implicate Articles 2 (right to life) or 3 (prohibition of torture), the Court has interpreted Article 13 to 
require, “in addition to the payment of compensation where appropriate, a thorough and effective 
investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible for the acts 
of ill-treatment”.340 Where the suspicion arises that such acts were induced by racial attitudes, the 
authorities have “an additional duty to take all reasonable steps to unmask any racist motive and to 
establish whether or not ethnic hatred or prejudice may have played a role in the events” and to be 
particularly careful to pursue the official investigation with vigour and impartiality, as otherwise 
Article 14 may have been infringed as well.341 
In a number of cases the ECtHR has consistently held that Article 13 does not amount to a 
requirement of judicial review, meaning that it does not go so far as to guarantee a remedy allowing a 
contracting state’s primary legislation to be challenged before a national authority on grounds that it is 
contrary to the Convention.342  
 
 
 
336 See e.g. idem, where the Court said that the domestic remedy must be provided for the purposes of (i) dealing 
with the substance of an arguable complaint, and (ii) granting appropriate relief. 
337 Jacobs – White, cit. supra note 315, p. 390. 
338 ECtHR, Cobzaru v. Romania, judgment of 26 July 2007, para 81. 
339 Ibid, para 80, references omitted. See also ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, judgment of 27 July 2006, paras 160–
161; and ECtHR, Aydin v. Turkey, judgment of 25 September 1997, para 103. 
340 ECtHR, Cobzaru v. Romania, judgment of 26 July 2007, para 81; ECtHR, Bazorkina v. Russia, judgment of 
27 July 2006, para 161. 
341 See ECtHR Grand Chamber judgment in Nachova and others v. Bulgaria, judgment of 6 July 2005, para 160. 
With regard the obligation to ensure equal treatment in the administration of justice, see also ECtHR, Moldovan 
and Others v. Romania, judgment of 12 July 2005, paras 139 and 140. 
342 See e.g. ECtHR, Roche v. The United Kingdom, judgment of 19 October 2005, para 137. 
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Protocol No. 12 to the European Convention 
 
Protocol No. 12 was adopted in November 2000 and it entered into force in April 2005. By January 
2010 it had been ratified by 17 out of 47 Council of Europe member states, and by 5 of the 27 EU 
countries.343 Since there is little case law under Protocol No. 12 at the time of writing, the following 
analysis will rely strongly on the Explanatory Report that accompanied the Protocol.344 
Article 1 of the Protocol sets out a general prohibition of discrimination: 
1. The enjoyment of any right set forth by law shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social 
origin, association with a national minority, property, birth or other status. 
2. No one shall be discriminated against by any public authority on any ground such as those 
mentioned in paragraph 1. 
 
Article 1 explicitly uses the term ‘discrimination’, as does Article 14. This time the French text reads 
‘sans discrimination aucune’ instead of ‘sans distinction aucune’, aligning it with the English text and 
the ECtHR’s practice.345 In the 2009 case of Sejdi and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was 
the first case decided under Protocol No. 12, the ECtHR held that it interprets the concept of 
discrimination in the Protocol along the lines of its case law under Article 14.346 This follows the 
intention of the drafters.347  
The operative paragraphs of Protocol No. 12 do not expressly refer to special measures. However, 
the preamble to Protocol 12 reads that: 
the principle of non-discrimination does not prevent States Parties from taking measures in order to 
promote full and effective equality, provided that there is an objective and reasonable justification 
for those measures. 
 
The central notions at play here, ‘full and effective equality’ and ‘objective and reasonable 
justification’ are not defined in the Protocol or the Explanatory Report. Though the existing case law 
from the ECtHR provides some leads, particularly with respect to assessment of justifications, that 
case law is limited in scope and therefore the permitted scope of special measures is left open. What 
 
343 These were Finland, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Romania and Spain. The number of ratifications, 
particularly by the EU member states, is remarkably low. 
344 As is a usual practice for the Council of Europe, the Explanatory Report is not legally binding, but is intended 
to shed light on the intended meaning of the adopted instrument. 
345 See also para 18 of the Explanatory Report. 
346 ECtHR, Sejdi and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, GC judgment of 22 December 2009, para 55. 
347 See the Explanatory Report, para 18. See also Jeroen Schokkenbroek, ‘A New European Standard Against 
Discrimination: Negotiating Protocol 12 to the European Convention on Human Rights’ in Stéphanie Lagoutte 
(ed.), Prohibition of discrimination in the Nordic Countries: The Complicated fate of Protocol No. 12 to the 
European Convention on Human Rights (Copenhagen: The Danish Institute for Human Rights, 2005). 
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seems clear under a literal interpretation is that taking special measures is in any case allowed but not 
required.348 
The list of grounds is identical with Article 14. The inclusion of additional grounds was considered 
during the drafting process, but deemed unnecessary since the list is not exhaustive and the explicit 
inclusion of some new grounds was anticipated to give rise to e contrario -arguments that some other 
grounds were thus excluded.349 Given that the Court has already considered discrimination on the 
grounds of ethnicity under Article 14, it appears warranted to expect that it will be prepared to do the 
same under the Protocol as well. 
The ratio of Protocol 12 was to extend protection from discrimination to areas not covered by 
Article 14, the scope of which is limited to the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in the 
Convention.350 The scope of application of the Protocol is indeed defined in broader terms: Article 
1(1) requires state parties to secure the enjoyment of “any right set forth by law” without 
discrimination and Article 1(2) provides that “no one shall be discriminated against by any public 
authority”. While it is generally accepted that the Protocol indeed goes further than Article 14 in terms 
of material scope, scholars and representatives of states are puzzled about how far it actually goes.351 
One unresolved question is whether the term ‘law’ should be taken to cover not just national law but 
also international law; would the European Court have jurisdiction to examine whether a right 
emanating from another international instrument, say the UN Convention on Civil and Political 
Rights, is applied in a discriminatory manner by a state party to the Protocol?352 
The Explanatory Report goes to some lengths to explain the scope of application of Article 1, but 
fails to alleviate many of the uncertainties in this respect. According to the Report, the Protocol 
provides added protection, in comparison to Article 14, where a person is discriminated against: 
– in the enjoyment of any right specifically granted to an individual under national law; 
– in the enjoyment of a right which may be inferred from a public authority’s clear obligation under 
national law to behave in a particular manner; 
– by a public authority in the exercise of discretionary power (for example, granting subsidies);  
– or by any other act or omission of a public authority (for example, the behaviour of police officers 
when controlling a riot).353 
 
The principal objective of Article 1 is clearly to protect individuals from discrimination by public 
authorities, the latter notion including the courts, legislative bodies and the administrative bodies.354 
Authorities, particularly in light of the second subparagraph, must refrain from any discrimination in 
 
348 The preamble also has regard to the “fundamental principle according to which all persons are equal before 
the law and are entitled to the equal protection of the law”. The legal implications of this reference on Article 1 
are not wholly clear either – why were these principles not incorporated into the operative paragraphs? 
349 Para 20 of the Explanatory Report. 
350 See the Explanatory Report; Jeroen Schokkenbroek, cit. supra note 347. 
351 See the articles in Stéphanie Lagoutte (ed.), cit. supra note 347. 
352 The Explanatory Report indeed suggests that this might be the case, see para 29 of the Report. 
353 Explanatory Report, para 22. 
354 On the last point see ibid, para 30. 
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their role as employers and service-providers, which extends protection at least to some types of 
education, social services, medical care and public transportation. However, from the point of view of 
protecting individuals from discrimination, it does not matter much whether the employer or a service-
provider is a public authority or a private company. The question therefore arises whether the Article 
imposes a positive obligation on the states parties to take measures to prevent or remedy 
discrimination also in relations between private parties. 
The Explanatory Report is remarkably ambiguous in this respect. It states that the inclusion of a 
general obligation to take legislative or other action to prevent or remedy all instances of 
discrimination in relations between private persons “would not have been suitable” because the 
Convention contains justiciable individual rights, whereas such an obligation would have been of 
“programmatic character”, and the report concludes that “the extent of any positive obligations 
flowing from Article 1 is likely to be limited”.355 Yet it notes that in some instances the failure of a 
state to provide protection from discrimination in relations between private persons might be so “clear-
cut and grave” that it engages Article 1.356  This could occur where interpersonal relations concern 
“relations in the public sphere normally regulated by law, for which the State has a certain 
responsibility”.357 Access to work and access to services which private persons make available to the 
public are mentioned as areas implicated by Article 1, whereas “purely private matters” are taken to 
fall outside its scope in the interests of protecting “the individual’s right to respect for his private and 
family life.”358 Many countries, including Finland, have been of the view that the existence of positive 
obligations is not apparent under the Protocol.359 
In the Sejdi case the Court addressed this matter in passim. It noted that “Article 1 of Protocol 
No. 12 extends the scope of protection to any rights set forth by law”, and that it “thus introduces a 
general prohibition of discrimination.”360 This would seem to support the interpretation that states 
must provide protection from discrimination also in the private sphere, at least in areas that are 
regulated by law and where individuals therefore can have rights.361 Interestingly, in Sejdi the Court 
noted in obiter dictum that Article 1 of the Protocol is similar – although not identical – to Article 26 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.362 Keeping in mind the sweeping scope of 
the latter provision, it appears that the Court is indeed prepared to interpret the material scope of the 
Protocol broadly.     
The Protocol’s relationship with the Convention is governed by Article 3 of the Protocol, which 
provides: 
 
355 Ibid, paras 24–27. 
356 See ibid, paras 26–29. 
357 Ibid, para 28. 
358 Explanatory Report, para 28. 
359 As for Finland see the report of the Constitutional Law Committee of the Parliament of Finland, PeVL 4/2004 
vp. 
360 ECtHR, Sejdi and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, GC judgment of 22 December 2009, para 53. 
361 It must be noted that rights may derive not just from law but also from contractual relationships. Given the 
express reference in Article 1 to rights “set forth by law”, the Protocol probably does not apply to contractual 
relationships that are not governed by e.g. employment or tenancy laws. 
362 ECtHR, Sejdi and Finci v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, GC judgment of 22 December 2009, para 55. 
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As between the States Parties, the provisions of Articles 1 and 2 of this protocol shall be regarded 
as additional articles to the Convention, and all the provisions of the Convention shall apply 
accordingly. 
 
Thus, Protocol No 12 does not amend or abrogate Article 14, which will continue to apply with 
respect to states party to the Protocol. Any questions regarding the relationship between these two 
provisions will be within the Court’s jurisdiction.363 
6.9 The European Social Charter (revised) 
Introduction 
 
The European Social Charter was adopted in 1961. As of January 2010 the Charter had been ratified 
by 27 member states of the Council of Europe.364 Despite the official rhetoric within the Council of 
Europe stressing the indivisibility of civil and political rights on the one hand, and social, economic 
and cultural rights on the other, the conviction that the latter set of rights are not of justiciable 
character in the same way as the first set of rights played a key part in the process that led to the 
adoption of the Charter. One consequence of this was that whereas compliance with the ECHR is 
supervised by a Court handing out legally binding decisions, no complaints procedure was initially 
available under the Charter.365 This, the open-ended language of the Charter, and the politicized 
supervision of the Charter, together with other factors, led some commentators to characterize the 
Charter, particularly when contrasted with the ECHR, as little known, rarely referred to and often 
ignored in practice.366 Starting from the late 1980s a number of additional protocols, supplementing 
existing Charter rights and modifying the supervision machinery, were adopted with a view to 
reinvigorating the Charter. Finally, the revised European Social Charter was adopted in 1996. As of 
January 2010 the revised Charter had been ratified by 29 countries.367 The following analysis will 
focus upon the revised Charter. 
The implementation of the legal obligations contained in the Charter is subject to supervision by 
the European Committee of Social Rights (formerly known as the Committee of Independent Experts). 
The contracting states submit to a routine reporting mechanism whereby the Committee is to “assess 
from a legal standpoint the compliance of national law and practice with the obligations arising from 
 
363 Explanatory Report, para 33. 
364 Source: http://conventions.coe.int (accessed 1.1.2010). 
365 See generally on this Tonia Novitz, ‘Remedies for violation of Social Rights within the Council of Europe: 
The Significant Absence of a Court’ in Claire Kilpatrick, Tonia Novitz and Paul Skidmore (eds.) The Future of 
Remedies in Europe (Oxford: Hart, 2000). 
366 Ibid, p. 244 and the references cited therein.  
367 Source: http://conventions.coe.int (accessed 1.1.2010). 
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the Charter”.368 The Charter now also provides for a system of collective complaints, whereby trade 
unions, employers’ organisations and NGOs may lodge complaints with the Committee.369 
 
The concept of discrimination 
 
Whereas the original Charter did not feature an operative paragraph on non-discrimination but simply 
declared in its preamble that the rights provided therein should be secured without discrimination,370 
Article E of the revised Charter reads as follows: 
The enjoyment of the rights set forth in this Charter shall be secured without discrimination on any 
ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national extraction 
or social origin, health, association with a national minority, birth or other status. 
 
Article E draws its inspiration from Article 14 of the ECHR, as did the principle of non-discrimination 
enunciated in the preamble to the original Charter. The Committee has observed that the function of 
Article E is to help secure the equal effective enjoyment of all the rights concerned regardless of the 
specific characteristics of certain persons or groups of persons.371 The Appendix to the Charter 
specifies that differential treatment based on an objective and reasonable justification shall not be 
deemed discriminatory. 
The Committee has interpreted Article E as requiring the prohibition of both direct and indirect 
discrimination. It considers that discrimination may take the form of a rule, act or practice.372 Direct 
discrimination is understood by the Committee as “a difference in treatment between persons in 
comparable situations where it does not pursue a legitimate aim, is not based on objective and 
reasonable grounds or is not proportionate to the aim pursued.”373 Whether a difference in treatment 
pursues a legitimate aim and is proportionate is assessed in light of Article G of the Charter, which 
provides that the material provisions of the Charter shall not be subject to any restrictions or 
limitations not specified in those provisions, except where “prescribed by law” and “necessary in a 
democratic society for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others or for the protection of 
public interest, national security, public health, or morals.”374 
The Committee sees indirect discrimination as arising when a measure or practice without a 
legitimate aim disproportionately affects “persons having a particular ethnic origin” or “persons 
belonging to a particular race”.375 Influenced by the ECtHR’s decision in the Thlimmenos case, the 
 
368 Part IV, Article C of the revised Charter, Article 24 of the original Charter as modified by the 1991 
Amending Protocol (CETS No: 142). 
369 Part IV, Article D of the revised Charter, Article 8 of the 1995 Additional Protocol. 
370 The preamble states that contracting states considered “that the enjoyment of social rights should be secured 
without discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, political opinion, national extraction or social 
origin”. This principle, inspired by Article 14 of the ECHR, is accessory in nature in that its application is 
limited by the scope of the Charter. 
371 ESCR, Autisme-Europe v. France, decision of 4 November 2003, para 52. 
372 ECSR, Sud Travail et Affaires sociales v. France, decision of 16 November 2005, para 33. See also ECSR, 
Conclusions on France 2002, p. 24 
373 ECSR, Syndicat national des Professions du Tourisme v. France, decision of 10 October 2000, paras 24-25. 
374 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1, Greece, pp. 279–280. 
375 ECSR, European Roma Rights Centre v. Bulgaria, decision of 18 October 2006, para 57. 
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Committee has recognized that indirect discrimination may also arise where a state party fails, without 
an objective and reasonable justification, to treat differently persons whose situations are different: 
indirect discrimination may arise by failing to take due and positive account of all relevant differences 
or by failing to take adequate steps to ensure that the rights and collective advantages that are open to 
all are genuinely accessible by and to all.376 For instance, in the European Roma Rights Centre v. Italy 
case, the Committee was of the view that the state party had failed “to take into consideration the 
different situation of Roma or to introduce measures specifically aimed at improving their housing 
conditions, including the possibility for an effective access to social housing”, and on those grounds it 
found a violation of Article 31 together with Article E.377 
The Committee has recognized that exceptions to the general prohibition of discrimination may be 
made for the purposes of recognising genuine occupational requirements and for the sake of positive 
action measures.378 It has also submitted that to make the prohibition of discrimination effective, state 
parties should provide protection against retaliatory action by the employer against an employee who 
has lodged a complaint or taken legal action.379 
 
Grounds  
 
The list of expressly prohibited grounds of discrimination includes, among others, race, colour, and 
national extraction. The list is not exhaustive, and is comparable with the list in Article 14 of the 
ECHR, although for some reason the Charter mentions ‘national extraction’ where the Convention 
mentions ‘national origin’.380 The Committee has interpreted the Charter also to prohibit 
discrimination on the grounds of membership of an ethnic group.381 It has indicated that it regards 
membership of a ‘race ‘or ethnic group’ as particularly suspect grounds of discrimination.382 
 
Material scope 
 
Article E is accessory in nature in that its application is limited to the enjoyment of the rights set forth 
in the Charter. In terms of material substance, part I of the Charter lays down 31 broadly formulated 
“rights and principles” that range from the “opportunity to earn living in an occupation freely entered 
upon” to “right to housing”. Part I specifies that the state parties “accept as the aim of their policy, to 
be pursued by all appropriate means … the attainment of conditions” in which these rights and 
principles may be “effectively realised”. In Part II, states undertake a number of more specific 
obligations with a view to ensuring the effective exercise of each one of the rights laid down in Part I. 
However, pursuant to Part III, state parties do not need to consider to be bound by all of the rights and 
 
376 ECSR, ERRC v. Italy, decision of 7 December 2005, para 36. ECSR, Autisme-Europe v. France, decision of 
4 November 2003, para 52. 
377 Para 46. 
378 ECSR, Conclusions 2006, Bulgaria. 
379 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1, Iceland, p. 313. 
380 It is also noteworthy that the Charter does not mention ‘property’ as a prohibited ground of discrimination, 
unlike the Convention. 
381 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1, Austria, p.25. 
382 Idem. 
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principles set out in the Charter, but can choose, within the limits specified in Article A of Part III, 
which obligations to assume. Article E on non-discrimination is placed in Part V, and its observance is 
not optional. 
The Charter reaches into the areas of employment, education and housing. In Part II, under Article 
1 entitled ‘the right to work’, the parties undertake: 
(i) to accept as one of their primary aims and responsibilities the achievement and 
maintenance of as high and stable a level of employment as possible, with a view to 
the attainment of full employment;  
(ii) to protect effectively the right of the worker to earn his living in an occupation freely 
entered upon;  
(iii) to establish or maintain free employment services for all workers;  
(iv) to provide or promote appropriate vocational guidance, training and rehabilitation.  
 
The Committee has interpreted that paragraph 2, when read together with Article E, prohibits all 
discrimination which may occur in connection with recruitment and employment conditions in 
general, including remuneration, training, promotion, transfer and dismissal.383 In fact, it has 
interpreted the Charter to require adoption of legislation that prohibits discrimination in 
employment.384 It has further suggested that the domestic legal order should provide the means by 
which any discriminatory provision which appears in collective labour agreements, in employment 
contracts or in companies’ own regulations, may be declared null or be rescinded, abrogated or 
amended.385 Besides Article 2, also other provisions of the Charter seek to provide added protection 
from particular types of harm, including harassment, experienced in the working life. For instance 
Article 26 of Part II, entitled ‘the right to dignity at work’, requires states to promote awareness, 
information and prevention of “recurrent reprehensible or distinctly negative and offensive actions 
directed against individual workers” and to take all “appropriate measures to protect workers from 
such conduct”.   
In Article 17 of Part II, concerning “the right of children and young persons to social, legal and 
economic protection”, parties assume, inter alia, the obligation to “take all appropriate and necessary 
measures designed to ensure that children and young persons … have … the education and the training 
they need”. In Article 31, entitled “the right to housing”, the parties undertake to take measures 
designed, inter alia, to “promote access to housing of adequate standard”. These activities are to be 
pursued with regard to Article E on non-discrimination. 
 
 
 
 
 
383 Idem. 
384 Idem. 
385 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1, Iceland, p. 313. 
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Domestic enforcement and remedies 
 
The Committee has repeatedly emphasized the role of effective remedies, both in the procedural and 
substantive sense. It has called for “appropriate and effective remedies” in the event of an allegation of 
discrimination,386 specifying that the remedies must be adequate, proportionate and dissuasive.387 It 
has further opined that sufficiently deterring sanctions should be imposed for instance in cases of 
discriminatory dismissals, and that in such cases the victim should be entitled to adequate 
compensation that is proportionate to the damage suffered.388 
As regards procedural remedies, the Committee has opined that the domestic law should provide 
for the alleviation of the burden of proof in favour of the plaintiff in discrimination cases.389 It has also 
recommended that state parties should recognize the right of trade unions to take action in cases of 
employment discrimination, including action on behalf of individuals, and that they should establish 
special, independent bodies to promote equal treatment, particularly by providing victims with the 
support they need to take proceedings.390 
6.10 Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
 
Introduction 
 
Immediately after the adoption of the European Convention on Human Rights, which does not include 
a provision on minority rights, initiatives were made to remedy the situation.391 Yet it took more than 
40 years for these efforts to bear fruit, as the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (FCNM) was adopted in 1995. By January 2010 the Convention had been ratified by 39 out 
of the 47 Council of Europe member states, making it one of the most widely ratified treaties of the 
Council of Europe.392 
The Convention is the first ever legally binding multilateral instrument devoted to the protection of 
national minorities in general. The Convention states that its aim is to ensure “the effective protection 
of national minorities and of the rights and freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities”,393 and 
it sets out a number of provisions that deal with equal treatment, protection of identity and culture, and 
promotion of good inter-group relations. Implementation of the Convention by states parties is 
monitored by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe which is assisted by an Advisory 
 
386 Idem. 
387 ECSR, Conclusions 2006, Albania. It therefore considers that the imposition of predefined upper limits to 
compensation that may be awarded are not in conformity with the Charter, as in certain cases upper limits may 
preclude damages from being awarded which are commensurate with the loss and damage actually sustained. 
388 ECSR, Conclusions Albania, 2008. 
389 ECSR, Conclusions France, 2002, p. 24 
390 ECSR, Conclusions XVI-1, Iceland, p. 313. 
391 Explanatory Report to the Framework Convention. 
392 Source: http://conventions.coe.int (accessed 1.1.2010). 
393 Preamble to the Convention. 
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Committee.394 Monitoring principally takes place by means of consideration of periodic state 
reports.395 
 
Concept of discrimination 
 
Article 4(1) of the Convention provides: 
The Parties undertake to guarantee to persons belonging to national minorities the right of equality 
before the law and of equal protection of the law. In this respect, any discrimination based on 
belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited. 
 
Neither the Convention nor its Explanatory Report seek to explain what is meant by ‘right of equality 
before the law’ or by the ‘right of equal protection of the law’. The Explanatory Report simply states 
that Article 4(1) takes “the classic approach to these principles”, suggesting that these principles are 
self-explanatory or that at any rate their meaning is settled.396 The Advisory Committee has, in the 
context of the consideration of country reports, interpreted these principles to require “effective 
remedies against acts of discrimination by public authorities and private entities in a number of 
societal settings, such as education, job-advertisements and housing” and equal application of law by 
state authorities.397 
The Convention and the Explanatory Report are also silent as regards the meaning of the concept 
of ‘discrimination’. The Advisory Committee has, again in the course of consideration of country 
reports, taken the view that discrimination should be conceived as encompassing both direct and 
indirect discrimination.398 That said, it has been observed that the Committee has been cautious in 
concluding that indirect discrimination has actually taken place.399  
In its comments to country reports, the Advisory Committee has welcomed or recommended a 
series of measures in connection to the performance of their obligations under Article 4 by the state 
parties, including adoption of comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation in public law, criminal 
law and civil law with effective means of implementation; active roles for the courts, tribunals, and 
independent national institutions in combating discrimination; dissemination of information, 
education, and other efforts “to ensure that individuals are informed of their rights in this sphere and 
 
394 Hoffmann has observed that the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee of Ministers have in fact 
been guided by the Advisory Committee opinions, and that the country-specific resolutions adopted by the 
former have clearly reflected the findings of the Committee. Rainer Hoffmann ‘The Framework Convention For 
the Protection of National Minorities: An Introduction’ in Marc Weller (ed.) The Rights of Minorities: A 
Commentary on the European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2005), pp. 6–12. 
395 See section IV of the Convention. 
396 Explanatory Report, para 39. 
397 ACFC, Hungary, 22 September 2000. 
398 ACFC, Switzerland, 20 February 2003, paras 28 and 86; ACFC, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 27 
May 2004; See also Rainer Hoffman ‘The Impact of International Norms on the Protection of National 
Minorities in Europe: The Added Value and Essential Role of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities’ Strasbourg, 5 December 2006. 
399 See Henrard, cit supra note 94, p. 26. 
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that they have the confidence in the relevant authorities to seek remedy when they consider that these 
rights have been violated”.400 
Article 4(2) deals with special measures, by providing that “[t]he Parties undertake to adopt, where 
necessary, adequate measures in order to promote, in all areas of economic, social, political and 
cultural life, full and effective equality between persons belonging to a national minority and those 
belonging to the majority.” Two issues in particular merit attention. First, the Article is couched in 
terms of a positive recognition of the need to take measures to promote equality in fact. This makes it 
a not-so-distant relative of Article 2(2) of the ICERD. The Advisory Committee has opined that the 
Article, through its reference to full and effective equality, implies the need for the authorities to take 
specific measures in order to overcome past or structural inequalities.401 Second, this recognition is 
circumscribed in several ways. Measures are to be taken “where necessary”; the Convention nowhere 
defines when measures are to be considered necessary’ or who is to make the decision that certain 
measures are necessary. It is clear that subjective appreciation will necessarily be involved. The 
obligation does not consist of an obligation to take measures to bring about de facto equality; it 
consists of an obligation to take measures to promote such equality. Measures to be taken are to be 
“adequate”, an open term which does not indicate whether it should be understood in the sense of 
“fully sufficient” or in the sense of “barely sufficient”. The Explanatory Report sets out to interpret the 
meaning of the term “adequate”, and explains that it means that the measures in question must be in 
accordance with the “proportionality principle” and avoid “discrimination against others”.402 It further 
specifies that the principle requires, among other things, that such measures do not extend, in time or 
in scope, beyond what is necessary in order to achieve the aim of full and effective equality.403 
 
Grounds and personal scope 
 
The effect of the Convention is to a degree compromised by the fact that it does not define its intended 
beneficiaries, that is national minorities and their members, and no definition has been formulated by 
the monitoring bodies either. The accompanying report explains that the drafters “decided to adopt a 
pragmatic approach, based on the recognition that at this stage, it is impossible to arrive at a definition 
capable of mustering general support of all Council of Europe member States.”404 In response to the 
lack of definition several states have added declarations to their instruments of ratification by which 
they have usually sought to limit the breadth of their FCNM obligations to groups typically referred to 
as ‘historic’ or ‘traditional’ minorities405 – to the exclusion of ‘new’ minorities. The Advisory 
Committee, for its part, has adopted a pragmatic and flexible approach to the definitional issue and has 
opined that states have a ‘margin of appreciation’ in this respect but must avoid arbitrary or unjustified 
 
400 Gudmundur Alfredsson, ’Article 4’ in Marc Weller (ed.) The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary on the 
European Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2005), p. 150; ACFC, Russian federation, 11 May 2006, paras 48–49. 
401 ACFC, Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, 
social and economic life and in public affairs [ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, Strasbourg 5 May 2008], para 14. 
402 Explanatory Report, para 39. 
403 Idem. 
404 Ibid, para 12.  
405 Hoffmann, cit. supra note 394, p. 16; Tove H. Malloy ‘The Title and the Preamble’ in Weller (ed.), cit. supra 
note 394, p. 50. 
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distinctions.406 This approach goes well with the Committee’s general tendency to avoid unnecessary 
confrontation with governments.407  
 
Material scope 
 
The prohibition of discrimination in Article 4(1) relates to the obligation to guarantee ‘equality before 
the law’ and ‘equal protection of the law’, and therefore its scope of application is determined by the 
scope of application of the two principles. Insofar as the two principles are understood as relating to 
the substance of domestic legislation and its application, which is the standard reading of the two 
principles, then any discrimination on the grounds of membership in a national minority is prohibited 
in these respects. The scope of the prohibition of discrimination will therefore vary to some extent 
from one country to another, but will be limited to the exercise of public powers, specifically 
legislative, administrative and judicial powers. 
 
Complementary equality provisions 
 
The Convention, in separate provisions, addresses also the issues of cultural and political equality for 
national minorities. The most relevant articles in this respect are Articles 5 and 15 of the Convention.  
Article 5(1) touches on cultural equality, and provides as follows: 
The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national 
minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their 
identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage. 
 
The second paragraph of Article 5 furthermore specifies that states shall refrain from policies or 
practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to minorities, and shall protect them from any 
action aimed at such assimilation. 
The modalities by which states may fulfil their obligations under Article 5 are ostensibly diverse. 
The Advisory Committee has mainly drawn states’ attention to the need to involve minority groups in 
the process of determining what the state has to do to “promote the necessary conditions” for those 
groups to flourish, and has indicated that Article 5 may impose a financial obligation in certain 
circumstances.408 The Explanatory Report and commentators have by and large refrained from 
elaborating on how states should, or even could, go about fulfilling Article 5, and whether it for 
instance calls for cultural and religious accommodation at the workplace.409  
Article 15 deals with participation, and provides: 
 
406 Hoffmann, cit. supra note 394, p. 16; Hans-Joachim Heintze, ‘Article 1’ in Weller, (ed.) cit. supra note 394, 
p. 111. 
407 Gudmundur Alfredsson ‘A Frame with an Incomplete Painting: Comparison of the Framework Convention 
for the Protection of National Minorities with International Standards and Monitoring Procedures’ International 
Journal on Minority and Group Rights 7:291-304, 2000. Hoffmann, cit. supra note 394, p. 17. 
408 See Geoff Gilbert ’Article 5’ in Weller (ed.), cit supra note 394. 
409 See e.g. idem. There are, of course, theoretical explorations of how states may pursue multicultural policies, 
see e.g. Will Kymlicka, Multicultural citizenship: a liberal theory of minority rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1995). 
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The Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging 
to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those 
affecting them. 
 
Article 15 has been hailed as a provision of fundamental importance. The Explanatory Report 
describes that its aim is no less than to “encourage real equality”, and Marc Weller explains it in terms 
of “genuine integration” and “co-governance”.410  
Its theoretical importance notwithstanding, the Report and the Advisory Committee have refrained 
from laying down specific guidelines as to how states should “create the conditions necessary for 
effective participation”, choosing instead to highlight what measures can be considered as good 
practices.411 The Committee has opined that Article 15 calls for the setting up of effective channels of 
communication that facilitate “continuing and substantive dialogue” both between persons belonging 
to national minorities and the majority population, and between persons belonging to national 
minorities and the authorities.412 With respect to the latter aspect, it has emphasised that mere formal 
participation is not sufficient, but participation must have a substantial influence on decisions taken 
and that on these grounds mere consultation is, as such, not sufficient.413 There has also been an 
emphasis on equal participation in the electoral process and on adequate representation in parliament 
and other elected bodies.414 
 
State obligations, domestic enforcement and remedies 
 
The Convention deals with a subject area that is politically highly sensitive, a fact which led to great 
difficulties on the part of the drafters with agreeing upon acceptable language and, eventually, to many 
compromises in the text.415 The specific nature of the FCNM as a framework convention has also 
given rise to some confusion and much legal commentary.416 Indeed, as its title says, it is a framework 
treaty, which readily indicates that states are left discretion – within the confines of the framework set 
 
410 Explanatory Report, para 80; Marc Weller ‘Article 15’ in Weller (ed.), cit supra note 394. 
411 The report, for instance, mentions the following mechanisms: consultation with institutions representing 
minorities whenever states are contemplating legislation or administrative measures likely to affect them 
directly; involving persons belonging to minorities in the preparation, implementation and assessment of national 
and regional development plans and programmes likely to affect them directly; impact assessment studies; 
effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in the decision-making processes and elected 
bodies both at national and local levels; and decentralized or local forms of government. Explanatory Report, 
para 80. The Advisory Committee, in its Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to 
national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs [ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, 
Strasbourg 5 May 2008, para 10] lists and comments upon a number of possible initiatives, and explains its 
approach as follows: “Article 15, like other provisions contained in the Framework Convention, implies for the 
State Parties an obligation of result: they shall ensure that the conditions for effective participation are in place, 
but the most appropriate means to reach this aim are left to their margin of appreciation. This Commentary aims 
to provide the State Parties with an analysis of existing experiences so as to help them to identify the most 
effective options”. 
412 Ibid (Advisory Committee), paras 11–12. 
413 Ibid, paras 19 and 71. 
414 Weller, cit. supra note 410. 
415 Hoffmann, cit. supra note 394, p. 5. 
416 See the articles in Weller (ed.), cit. supra note 394; Weller ‘Conclusion’ in ibid, p. 633. 
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out – regarding how to give effect to its provisions. The text mentions in many places that it sets out 
‘principles’, not rights or freedoms as such, which is also reflected in that the provisions are framed in 
general and open terms.417 Most of the substantive provisions of the Convention are programmatic in 
nature, not meant to be invoked as such in courts of law. In a rather unceremonious and candid way, 
the Explanatory Report explains that the purpose of the last recital of the Preamble, which proclaims 
that the contracting states are “determined to implement the principles set out in this framework 
Convention through national legislation and appropriate governmental policies”, is to indicate that the 
provisions of the Convention are not directly applicable.418 All in all, the Explanatory Report and 
many commentators have concluded that the Convention does not create directly enforceable rights for 
individuals, that its implementation will be left to the states concerned in terms of their internal 
legislation and practice, and that it allows the contracting states an unusually wide measure of 
discretion in implementation.419 Yet, it has been observed that states have generally taken seriously the 
commitments made when ratifying the Convention, and that a growing respect for the achievements of 
the Convention has emerged.420 
6.11 Other relevant instruments 
The most essential international and European human rights instruments relating to non-
discrimination, for the purposes of this study, have been discussed above. Yet a number of other 
documents merit our attention as well, and will be briefly discussed below.  
 
Instruments by the United Nations and its Agencies 
 
International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
Their Families (ICRMW). This Convention was concluded in 1990. It had been ratified by 42 
countries, only four of which were Council of Europe member states and none of which was a member 
of the European Union, as of January 2010.421 The low number of ratifications by immigrant-receiving 
countries in particular is likely associated with the broad scope and very ambitious nature of the 
Convention: the number of articles that deal with substantive rights is as high as 64, which is 
compounded by the fact that many of these articles have up to nine paragraphs. The Convention 
 
417 See e.g. Article 19, where the contracting states agree to “undertake to respect and implement the principles 
enshrined in the present framework Convention…”. 
418 Paragraph 29 of the Report. Weller, cit. supra note 416, p. 634. 
419 Indeed, the Explanatory Report, paragraph 11, underlines that that “these provisions, which will not be 
directly applicable, leave the States concerned a measure of discretion in the implementation of the objectives 
which they have undertaken to achieve, thus enabling them to take particular circumstances into account.” See 
also Malloy, cit. supra note 405, pp. 49 ff; Hoffman, cit. supra note 394, p. 5; Alfredsson, cit. supra note 407. 
420 See e.g. Marc Weller ‘Preface’ in Weller (ed.), cit supra note 394, p. vii, and the contributions in Council of 
Europe, Filling the Frame: Five years of monitoring the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 2004). 
421 The four Council of Europe member states that are parties to the Convention are Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina and Turkey.  
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establishes a Committee for the purpose of reviewing the application of the Convention by the state 
parties. This review is to take place by means of the examination of periodic country reports and by 
means of the examination of individual complaints (called ‘communications’ in the Convention) with 
respect to those countries that have recognized the competence of the Committee to that effect.422  
 As already mentioned, the scope of the ICRMW is extraordinarily wide, which together 
with the low number of ratifications in Europe, means that it will only be necessary to review some of 
its most relevant paragraphs here. Article 25(1) of the Convention deals specifically with employment, 
and provides that migrant workers “shall enjoy treatment not less favourable than that which applies to 
nationals of the State of employment in respect of remuneration and: (a) Other conditions of work, that 
is to say … termination of the employment relationship and any other conditions of work which, 
according to national law and practice, are covered by these terms; (b) Other terms of employment”. 
Article 25(2) specifically underlines that it shall not be lawful to derogate from the principle of 
equality of treatment referred to in Article 25(1) in private contracts of employment. Article 7 provides 
that states parties undertake to “respect and ensure” the rights provided for in the Convention for all 
migrant workers and members of their families without distinction of any kind such as to race, colour 
or national, ethnic or social origin. States shall also ensure “respect for the cultural identity of migrant 
workers and members of their families”.423 Article 43 provides that migrants shall enjoy equality of 
treatment with nationals of the state of employment, inter alia, in relation to access to educational 
institutions and services; access to vocational guidance and vocational training; and access to housing, 
including housing schemes. Article 45 requires states to provide many of the same rights to members 
of the family of the migrant.424 
ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention (Convention No 169). Convention No 169 was 
concluded in 1989 and was, as of January 2010, ratified by 20 countries, including three EU 
countries.425 The Convention is of relevance in Europe, particularly in those parts of Northern Europe 
that are inhabited by the Sami people. In Article 2 of the Convention, the governments of states parties 
undertake to take measures to ensure that members of indigenous and tribal peoples benefit on an 
‘equal footing’ from the rights and opportunities which national laws and regulations grant to other 
members of the population. Furthermore, the Convention goes beyond this formal approach and 
emphasizes throughout the need to respect these groups’ identities and the need to take special 
measures for the purposes of alleviating de facto disadvantages and challenges faced by the peoples 
concerned. In Article 20 the governments undertake to “do everything possible to prevent any 
discrimination between workers belonging to the peoples concerned and other workers”, in particular 
as regards admission to employment and equal remuneration for work of equal value. Governments 
are to take positive measures to ensure that members of the peoples concerned have the opportunity to 
acquire education at all levels “on at least an equal footing” with the rest of the national community.426 
 
422 Articles 72–78 of the Convention. 
423 Article 31. 
424 This applies to migrants and members of their families who are ‘documented’ or in a ‘regular situation’. 
Article 30 applies to all migrants and the members of their families, and provides that each child of a migrant 
worker shall have the basic right of access to education on the basis of equality of treatment. 
425 Source: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/ (accessed 1.1.2010). The EU countries concerned were Denmark, the 
Netherlands and Spain. Of the remaining Council of Europe member states only Norway had ratified the treaty. 
426 Article 26. 
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They are also obliged, somewhat vaguely, to “assist” members of the peoples concerned to “eliminate 
socio-economic gaps that may exist between indigenous and other members of the national 
community”.427 
Convention against Torture or other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT).428 This Convention was concluded in 1984, and as of January 2010 it had been ratified by 146 
countries. Implementation of the Convention is supervised by the Committee against Torture, which 
carries out its duties through consideration of periodic country reports and individual communications 
submitted under an optional procedure laid down in Article 22 of the Convention. Though CAT does 
not directly deal with the kind of discrimination focussed upon in this study, it is a good example of a 
legal instrument which indirectly requires provision of a measure of protection to minorities and 
immigrants. Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia429 is a case in point, as an example of the way in 
which the Convention provides protection from acts that involve racist motives. In that case the 
Committee against Torture held that the burning down of Roma homes by a mob of non-Roma 
neighbours constituted acts of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The failure of the police 
authorities to take appropriate steps to protect the Roma amounted to acquiescence to these acts, since 
the police authorities were informed of the immediate risk facing the Roma and were even present at 
the scene of events. Accordingly the Committee found a violation of Article 16, paragraph 1 of the 
Convention by the state party.  
A number of other instruments – some of which are legally binding and some of which are not – 
similarly directly or indirectly require the provision of a measure of protection from discrimination 
within their specific fields of application. These include the Convention on the Rights of the Child; 
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities; UN Millennium Declaration; Declaration on 
Race and Prejudice; Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious 
and Linguistic Minorities; Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who are not Nationals of 
the Country in which They Live; and Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and 
of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief. 
 
Council of Europe instruments 
 
Council of Europe documents that are relevant in this context include the Convention on Cybercrime, 
in particular its Additional Protocol concerning the criminalization of acts of a racist and xenophobic 
nature committed through computer systems,430 and the European Charter for Regional or Minority 
Languages.431 A high number of documents dealing directly with racism and racial discrimination 
have been adopted by the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI). ECRI, 
 
427 Article 2(2)c. 
428 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 39/46 of 10 
December 1984. 
429 CAT, Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, case No. 161/1999. 
430 The Protocol provides that each Party to the Protocol shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to establish as criminal offence the distribution, when committed intentionally and without right, of 
any material that advocates, promotes or incites hatred, discrimination or violence against any individual or 
group of individuals based on ‘race’, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin (exceptions apply). Paras 1–3 of 
the Protocol. 
431 Adopted on 5.11.1992, CETS No.:148. 
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established in 1993, is the Council of Europe body entrusted with the task of combating racism and 
racial discrimination.432 ECRI has adopted a number of so-called General Policy Recommendations, 
including one on national legislation to combat racism and racial discrimination, and another on 
combating racism and racial discrimination in and through school education.433 By 2010, ECRI had 
started its fourth round of so-called country-by-country analyses, within the confines of which it visits 
each country under study and publishes country reports in which it presents its analyses and 
recommendations for improvements. 
 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) instruments 
 
The OSCE has adopted a significant number of so-called soft law instruments in the area of human 
rights that are relevant to the topic at hand.434 For instance in the Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Co-operation in Europe the participating states pledged to “respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms … for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion”.435 Similar 
pledges were made in the Concluding Document of Vienna.436 In the document of the Copenhagen 
meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension, the participating states “solemnly declared” that 
“all persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal 
protection of the law. In this respect, the law will prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all 
persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground”.437 
 
 
 
432 ECRI is charged with pursuing the following four objectives: (i) reviewing member states’ legislation, 
policies and other measures to combat racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and intolerance and their 
effectiveness; (ii) to propose further action at the local, national and European level; (iii) to formulate general 
policy recommendations for member states; and (iv) to study international legal instruments applicable in the 
matter with a view to their reinforcement where appropriate. Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers 
Resolution Res(2002)8 on the statute of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance, and its 
Appendix. 
433 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No 7 on national legislation to combat racism and racial 
discrimination, adopted by ECRI on 13 December 2002; ECRI General Policy Recommendation No 10 on 
combating racism and racial discrimination in and through school education, adopted by ECRI on 15 December 
2006. 
434 On the highly problematic concept of ‘soft law’, see e.g. Jan Klabbers, The Concept of Treaty in International 
Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1996). 
435 Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, adopted in Helsinki on 1 August 1975. 
436 In the Vienna document, the participating states pledged to “ensure human rights and fundamental freedoms 
to everyone within their territory and subject to their jurisdiction, without distinction of any kind such as race, 
colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, property, birth or other status”. The Third Follow-Up 
Meeting, Vienna 15.1.1989, para 13.7. 
437 Document of the Copenhagen meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension of the CSCE, 29 June 
1990, paras 5 and 5.9. 
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7 European Union law 
7.1 Background 
The track record of the European Union1 (EU) in the field of combating racial and ethnic 
discrimination was, for a long time, not very impressive. The 1957 Treaty of Rome prohibited 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality (banning discrimination of nationals of other member 
states, not nationals of third countries) and sex (albeit only in the area of equal pay), but it did not 
prohibit discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin.2 Indeed, the EU began to regulate 
discrimination on the grounds other than sex and nationality only recently, being for a long time 
satisfied with the adoption of ‘soft law’ instruments in these areas.3 This had to do with the fact that 
the basic imperatives behind the formation and operation of the Union were of an economic nature and 
had to do with the creation of the common market, not social policy.4 Combating racism and racial 
discrimination was, in many quarters and for a long time, held to be a matter for national, not EU 
action.5 There was also little pressure for action before the number of migrant workers from third 
countries started to increase in the 1960s and 1970s.  
The bottom line is that EU intervention in employment regulation used to be regarded as justified 
only where it was considered necessary in order to prevent unfair competition that could disrupt the 
smooth functioning of the internal market.6 For instance, the equal pay provision was originally 
inserted into the Treaty of Rome upon the insistence of those member states that already domestically 
observed that principle, in order to rule out the possibility that other member states could gain an 
unfair competitive advantage in intra-Community competition by relying heavily on cheap female 
 
1 The term ‘European Union” is used here also in reference to the organisational forms that preceded it, the 
European Communities in particular. 
2 See, in particular, Articles 7 and 119 of the original Treaty establishing the European Economic Community 
(EEC). 
3 For racial discrimination, the soft law instruments included Council Resolution on the fight against racism and 
xenophobia [1990] OJ C157/1, and Council Resolution on the Fight Against Racism and Xenophobia in the 
fields of Employment and Social Affairs [1995] OJ C296/13. Relevant instruments include also the following 
European Parliament documents, better known as the Evrigenis report and the Ford report: European 
Parliament, ‘Committee of Inquiry into the Rise of Fascism and Racism in Europe’ (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 
1985), European Parliament, ‘Report of the Committee of Inquiry into Racism and Xenophobia’ (Luxembourg: 
OOPEC, 1991). See generally e.g. Damian Chalmers ‘The Mistakes of the Good European’ in Sandra Fredman 
(ed.) Discrimination and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp 204 ff. 
4 Niessen notes that although some – including notably the Council of Ministers and the European Commission – 
were of the opinion that the European Treaties did not provide a legal basis for the European institutions to act 
on racial discrimination, such action could possibly have been taken on the basis of Article 235 (later 208), 
according to which actions could be taken, by unanimous vote, as long as they are necessary for the attainment 
of the objectives of the Community. Jan Niessen, ‘Making the Law Work. The Enforcement and Implementation 
of Anti-Discrimination Legislation’ European Journal of Migration and Law 5 (2003): 249–257. See also Erika 
Szyszczak, ‘Race Discrimination: The Limits of Market Equality?’ in Bob Hepple and Erika Szyszczak (eds.), 
Discrimination: The Limits of Law? (London: Mansell 1992). 
5 See e.g. Mark Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 61–63. 
6 Bell, cit. supra note 5, p. 2. 
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labour.7 Also the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of nationality was enacted primarily for 
economic reasons, as it served the purpose of facilitating free movement of workers between the 
member states. Racial and other forms of discrimination were addressed only in the form of non-
binding soft law instruments. This traditional approach of the EU was clearly intrinsically linked with 
its competition and employment agenda. 
During the 1990s, however, there were signs that the EU was developing a ‘social agenda’ that 
entailed an expanded role for the Union in guaranteeing a range of fundamental social rights, in the 
course of which the idea of European citizenship evolved from mere ‘market citizenship’ towards 
‘social citizenship’.8 These developments formed a background which was increasingly favourable to 
the anti-discrimination initiatives presented by a broad cross-country lobby consisting of a range of 
migrants’ rights groups, churches and human rights organisations.9 The growing pressure towards 
Community action led to an important opening in the form of the adoption of the Article 13 in the 
1997 Treaty of Amsterdam. Article 13, which was slightly revised by the Treaty of Lisbon and which 
is now Article 19, read originally as follows: 
Without prejudice to the provisions of this treaty and within the limits of the powers conferred by it 
upon the Community, the Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and 
after consulting the European Parliament, may take appropriate action to combat discrimination 
based on sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation. 
 
As is clear from its wording, this Article is an enabling provision, and cannot be applied directly. Its 
significance lies in providing the legal basis for the adoption of further EU law on discrimination, and 
indeed it provided the basis for the adoption of two directives on equal treatment in 2000. The Racial 
Equality Directive, which will be in focus here, dealt with discrimination on the grounds of racial or 
ethnic origin, whereas the Employment Equality Directive dealt with discrimination on the grounds of 
religion or belief, disability, age and sexual orientation. 
The adoption in 2000 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which also 
includes a non-discrimination provision, was yet another step towards the recognition of fundamental 
rights, despite the fact that the Charter did not have major legal effect before the coming into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. Importantly, the Treaty of Lisbon furthermore requires the Union to 
accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.10 
 
7 This of course means that Article 119 was not motivated primarily by fundamental rights considerations but by 
economic interests. Bell, cit. supra note 5, p. 8; Paul Craig – Gráinne de Búrca, EU law: text, cases, materials 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 879. See however ECJ, Defrenne v. Sabena [1976] ECR 455, where 
the ECJ states that article 119 pursued a double aim: First, the prevention of competitive disadvantage resulting 
for those countries that have actually implemented the principle of equal pay and second, ensuring of “social 
progress” and “the constant improvement of the living and working conditions” of the peoples of the 
Community, paras 8–10. 
8 Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, Constitutional Law of the European Union, (Harlow: Person, 2002), pp. 479–514; 
Bell, cit. supra note 5, p. 2 ff. 
9 This lobby was known as the Starting Line Group. See e.g. Ibid (Bell), p. 68; Bob Hepple, ‘Race and Law in 
Fortress Europe’ The Modern Law Review, Vol 67 January 2004, No 1, p. 3. 
10 New Article 6(2) of TEU. 
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The following subchapters focus on three sources of EC law in the area of equal treatment 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. These are the general principles of Community law, the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights and the Racial Equality Directive. As will be seen, the non-discrimination 
provisions in the EU instruments constitute a complex fabric of obligations that make them rather 
difficult tools to apply in the Member States. Moreover, case law from the ECJ regarding the 
interpretation of the Racial Equality Directive has only recently started to emerge, which is why many 
commentators have relied upon its case law in the area of gender equality for guidance also in the area 
of ethnic equality, given the many similarities between these two areas of law. That said, there are also 
significant differences between them, a fact which makes it difficult to predict reliably what approach 
the ECJ will adopt in its future case law. 
7.2 Non-discrimination as a general principle of EU law 
Fundamental rights, including the principle of non-discrimination, constitute part of the general 
principles of law which the Union has to respect in its activities, even in the absence of specific 
provisions to that effect. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) took this position in 1969 in response to 
concerns that arose in some member states regarding the Court’s case law, according to which EU law 
must be regarded as superior to conflicting national legal provisions.11 Some countries feared that as a 
consequence fundamental rights guaranteed by the national constitutions would become subordinated 
to the market interests embedded in the Community law.12 The ECJ sought to absolve these fears by 
incorporating fundamental rights considerations as an unwritten part of the primary law of the EU. 
This incorporation of fundamental rights by the Court as “part of general principles of law” is subject 
to two limitations, however: first, measures may be challenged only if they fall within the scope of EU 
law; second, the Court determines the nature and extent of fundamental rights on a case-by-case basis, 
meaning that there is a good degree of uncertainty with regard to the exact scope and content of those 
rights. 
This role of the fundamental rights finds an express legal basis in Article 6(3) of the revised 
TEU13: 
Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law. 
 
 
11 See Craig – de Búrca, cit. supra note 7, pp. 381–382. The primacy of Community law in relation to domestic 
law was established for the first time in the ECJ’s landmark case of Costa v. ENEL [1964] ECR 585. In that case 
the Court submitted that “… the law stemming from the treaty, an independent source of law, could not, because 
of its special and original nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without being 
deprived of its character as community law and without the legal basis of the community itself being called into 
question.” 
12 Craig – de Búrca, cit. supra note 7, p. 381; Tuomas Ojanen, Johdatus perus- ja ihmisoikeusjuridiikkaan 
(Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2009), pp. 95–97. 
13 Former Article 6(2). 
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The Court, for its part, has established that it draws inspiration not just from the constitutional 
traditions of member states, but also from “international treaties on which the Member States have 
collaborated or of which they are signatories.”14 It has noted that the European Convention on Human 
Rights has special significance in this respect, and has stated that for instance the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one of the international instruments which it “takes into 
account” in applying the principles of EU law.15 Article 7 of the TEU provides a mechanism for 
sanctioning those member states which in a “serious and persistent” manner breach the fundamental 
rights referred to in Article 6.16 
In its case law, the Court has consistently held that all the sources of fundamental rights support 
the existence of a strong principle of equality and non-discrimination.17 In Defrenne III, the Court 
drew on the provisions of the 1961 European Social Charter and ILO Convention No 111 in support of 
its view that 
respect for fundamental personal human rights is one of the general principles of Community law, 
the observance of which it [the Court] has a duty to ensure. There can be no doubt that the 
elimination of discrimination based on sex forms part of those fundamental rights.18 
 
It is generally held that also other grounds explicitly mentioned in the European Convention on 
Human Rights are protected as well, including ‘race’.19 The exact content of the non-discrimination 
principle is not clear, as the Court has generally confined itself to explaining the principle in very 
general and formalistic way, for instance as requiring “that comparable situations not be treated 
differently and different situations not be treated alike unless such treatment is objectively justified”.20  
 
14 See e.g. ECJ, European Parliament v. Council of the European Union, Case C-540/03, 27 June 2006, para 35. 
15 Ibid, paras 35–37. 
16 Article 7 was amended by the Nice treaty in 2000 to provide for the possibility to act before a breach has 
occurred, partly in response to the controversial Haider affair, which began when a series of diplomatic sanctions 
were adopted by fourteen of the then fifteen Member States against Austria after the far-right Freedom party 
entered into the coalition government in 2000. See Craig – de Búrca, cit. supra note 7, p. 403. 
17 This general principle remains in effect even after the adoption of the more specific equal treatment directives, 
as is implied e.g. in ECJ, Werner Mangold v. Rüdiger Helm, Case C-144/04, 22 November 2005, paras 74–75. 
18 ECJ, Defrenne v. SABENA (III), Case 149/77, 15 June 1978, paras 26–27. 
19 See e.g. Bell, cit. supra note 5, p. 21 and the references cited therein; Christopher McCrudden and Haris 
Kountouros submit that the principle of non-discrimination “presumably applies” to all statuses listed in Article 
13, including racial and ethnic origin. Christopher McCrudden – Haris Kountouros, ‘Human Rights and 
European Equality Law’ in Helen Meenan (ed.) Equality Law in an Enlarged European Union (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).  
20 ECJ, Spain v. Council, Case 203/86, 20 September 1988, paragraph 25, and EARL de Kerlast v. Union 
régionale de coopératives agricoles (Unicopa) and Coopérative du Trieux, Case C-15/95, 17 April 1997, para 
35. The Court has also opined that member states must observe the principle of proportionality whenever they 
impose restrictions on the exercise of fundamental rights. Therefore a restriction must not constitute, “having 
regard to the aim pursued, disproportionate and unreasonable interference undermining the very substance of 
[fundamental] rights”. ECJ, Wachauf v. Bundesamt für Ernährung und Forstwirtschaft, C5/88, 13 July 1989, 
para 18; Kjell Karlsson and Others, Case C-292/97, 13 April 2000. 
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7.3 The Charter of Fundamental Rights 
On 7 December 2000, the Council, Parliament and Commission solemnly proclaimed the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union. It came into effect, in a slightly amended form, upon the 
entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009. The Charter now has the same legal 
value as the European Union Treaties.21 The Charter sets out a wide range of rights, clarifying to an 
extent which fundamental rights are protected in the context of the EU. Article 51 of the Charter 
determines its scope of application: 
The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions and bodies of the Union with due 
regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the Member States only when they are implementing 
Union law. They shall therefore respect the rights, observe the principles and promote the 
application thereof in accordance with their respective powers.22 
 
Articles 20 and 21 of the Charter deal with equal treatment.23 Article 20, in its entirety, simply 
proclaims that “[e]veryone is equal before the law”. This is not explained or specified in any manner. 
Yet, the fact that this principle was given an article of its own, is often taken to underline not just its 
importance but also its ‘constitutive’ role in view of the prohibition of discrimination.24 
Article 21(1), for its turn, provides for a sweeping prohibition of all forms of discrimination: 
Any discrimination based on any ground such as sex, race, colour, ethnic or social origin, genetic 
features, language, religion or belief, political or other opinion, membership of a national minority, 
property, birth, disability, age or sexual orientation shall be prohibited. 
 
Article 21(1) contains innovative features. First of all, its scope of application has not been restricted 
in any apparent way. It is expected, for instance, to apply also in relations between private parties.25 
Second, its list of expressly prohibited grounds is not just extensive but unprecedented among 
international instruments, following a trend of proliferation of the expressly mentioned grounds of 
discrimination.26 In addition, the list is not exhaustive. Altogether seventeen grounds are explicitly 
mentioned, and these include many that are not mentioned in the European Convention on Human 
Rights or any other major human rights document. Discrimination based on race, colour, ethnic origin 
and membership of a national minority are each expressly and separately prohibited. There is nothing 
to suggest how colour might be different from ‘race’ and why membership of a national minority 
would not already be covered by ‘ethnic origin’. 
Discrimination on the basis of nationality is dealt with in a separate provision, namely paragraph 2 
of Article 21. The scope of application of the prohibition in Article 21(2), which is based on the EU 
Treaty, is considerably narrower than that of Article 21(1). Distinctions based on nationality laid down 
 
21 Article 6(1) of the Treaty of European Union as amended by the Treaty of Lisbon. 
22 The Charter also reads that it does not establish or modify the powers or tasks of the Union (Article 51). 
23 In addition, Article 23 deals with equality between women and men. 
24 EU Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Commentary of the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union, 20 June 2006, pp. 183–187. 
25 Ibid, p. 193. 
26 Ibid, p. 191. 
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in the EU Treaty are expressly excluded from coming within the scope of the prohibition of 
discrimination. As the EU Treaty confers special rights to citizens of the EU-countries, this means that 
third-country nationals are in practice put at a disadvantage in comparison with EU nationals in many 
respects without this being challengeable under the Charter. This situation, where all are equal but 
some are more equal than others, is one of the embodiments of the asymmetric development of 
Community non-discrimination law on the different grounds. 
Article 21(1) is expressly couched in terms of ‘discrimination’. The drafters made it 
extraordinarily clear that Article 21(1) “draws from” Article 14 of the ECHR and that insofar as the 
former corresponds to the latter it is to be interpreted in accordance with it.27 Yet the exact 
relationship between Article 21 of the Charter and Article 14 of the ECHR is ambiguous at best, as it 
is not at all clear whether Article 21 comes within the purview of Article 52(3) of the Charter, which 
provides that “[i]nsofar as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the 
[ECHR], the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the [ECHR]”. 
The Explanatory note produced by the drafters of the Charter provides a list of the Charter articles that 
are meant to be covered by Article 52(3), but Article 21 is not among them.28 This would seem to 
suggest that Article 14 of the ECHR was considered to be the reference point as regards the meaning 
of the concept of discrimination in Article 21 of the Charter, but that the scopes of the two articles 
were considered to differ from each other, particularly as concerns protection from discrimination on 
the grounds of nationality. This may be problematic and confusing from the point of view of 
protection of fundamental and human rights.29 
Of significance in the present context is also Article 47 of the Charter, which provides that 
everyone whose “rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the right to 
an effective remedy before a tribunal”. 
7.4 Directive 2000/43/EC 
Introduction 
 
The Council Directive 2000/43/EC, implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origin (generally known as the ‘Racial Equality Directive’), was 
adopted on 29 June 2000. EU member states were to adopt the laws, regulations and administrative 
provisions necessary to comply with the Directive by 19 July 2003. As of January 2008, almost all 27 
member states of the EU had taken legislative action to transpose the Directive into their national 
laws, although doubts remained with respect to some of them as to whether they had done so 
correctly.30 
 
 
 
27 Praesidium, Explanations for the Draft Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Brussels, 11 
October 2000 (18.10) (OR. fr) CHARTE 4473/00. 
28 Ibid, pp. 48–50. 
29 Tuomas Ojanen, Johdatus perus- ja ihmisoikeusjuridiikkaan (Helsinki: Yliopistopaino, 2009), p.104. 
30 Because member states have had some difficulties in transposing correctly the Racial Equality Directive into 
domestic legislation, one should keep in mind the principle of direct applicability of Directives as one possible 
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The speed with which the Directive was adopted was remarkable, as was in many respects the 
substantive content of the Directive.31 Whilst the Directive was built, to a great extent, on the concepts 
of EC legislation prohibiting discrimination on grounds of sex and nationality, the final text adopted 
by the Council was at times stronger than many expected.32 Paradoxically, it was the entry of Jorg 
Haider’s populist Freedom Party into the Austrian government that helped to create the momentum for 
the then draft directive, as the Directive was seen as one channel for expressing the condemnation of 
both racial discrimination and the Freedom Party’s agenda.33  
 
Concept of discrimination 
 
Article 2 of the Directive defines what it means by ‘equal treatment’ and ‘discrimination’. Equal 
treatment is defined in negative terms, as absence of direct or indirect discrimination based on racial or 
ethnic origin.34 The Directive expressly distinguishes between four types of discrimination: (i) direct 
discrimination, (ii) indirect discrimination, (iii) harassment and (iv) instruction to discriminate. Each 
of these will be analyzed separately below. 
Article 2(2) (a) defines direct discrimination in the following way: 
direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where one person is treated less favourably than 
another is, has been or would be treated in a comparable situation on grounds of racial or ethnic 
origin. 
 
This definition is based on a comparative rationale, and for instance the motives or intentions that led 
to the less favourable treatment play no role in it.35 Although the provision requires a comparison to be 
made in order to identify less favourable treatment, the standard is flexible in that the comparison can 
be made not just against an actual individual in a comparable situation (actual comparator), but also 
against an individual who has previously been in a comparable situation (past comparator) and also 
 
way for domestic courts to apply the directives in cases of nonadherence in domestic legislation. One should 
however also keep in mind that under the current ECJ doctrine there is no horizontal direct applicability of 
directives between individuals. In any case, it is the responsibility of the domestic courts to interpret domestic 
legislation in accordance with the Directives. If it is not possible to reach the result aimed at with the Directive 
through interpretation, the principle of supremacy of Community law overrides the conflicting national norm. 
31 See e.g. Adam Tyson, ‘The Negotiation of the European Community Directive on Racial Discrimination’ 
European Journal of Migration and Law 3, 2001, p. 201; Kevin Boyle–Anneliese Baldaccini, ‘A Critical 
Evaluation of International Human Rights Approaches to Racism’, in Sandra Fredman (ed.) Discrimination and 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). And indeed, as pointed out by Damian Chalmers, the 
Directives were adopted at a time when many member states were pressing for less EC legislation, not more. 
Damian Chalmers ‘The Mistakes of the Good European’ in Sandra Fredman (ed.) Discrimination and Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).  
32 See e.g. Tyson, cit. supra note 31. 
33 Ibid, p. 218. 
34 In this context it is interesting to note that the preamble to the Directive recognizes ‘equality before the law’ 
and ‘protection against discrimination’ as ‘universal rights’, but does not mention equal protection of the law. 
35 This notwithstanding, a showing of a prejudice or discriminatory intent on part of the respondent may be 
useful evidence in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination. 
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against a ‘hypothetical individual’ in a comparable situation (hypothetical comparator).36 The latter 
option allows those applying the law to engage in speculation about whether a person would have been 
treated more favourably had he or she been of a different ethnic origin. This definition of direct 
discrimination is essentially based on the concept of equality as consistency, and is as such primarily a 
relative one: as long as there is consistency, the outcome is irrelevant.37 
A distinct feature of this definition is its rigid nature: direct discrimination cannot be ‘justified’, 
except in lex specialis situations where positive action as envisaged in Article 5 of the Directive is at 
stake, or where a person’s racial or ethnic origin constitutes a “genuine and determining occupational 
requirement” within the meaning of Article 4. That said, the application of the definition is not always 
straightforward, as it does not prohibit the making of all distinctions but only distinctions that 
constitute less favourable treatment. The rule cannot therefore be comprised into a straightforward 
maxim “thou shalt not make distinctions on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin”, as a more 
qualitatively oriented assessment is called for. 
 Indirect discrimination is defined as follows: 
indirect discrimination shall be taken to occur where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or 
practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with 
other persons, unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a legitimate aim 
and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 
 
The definition of indirect discrimination is also based on a comparative logic. For a finding of indirect 
discrimination it first has to be demonstrated that a provision, criterion or practice would put persons 
of a racial or ethnic origin at a disadvantage, which means that it is sufficient to show that the 
provision, criterion or practice serves to produce a disadvantageous effect compared with other 
persons. The comparison is to be made at a group level, as is indicated by the use of the word 
‘persons’ in the plural. Discrimination must, broadly speaking, be attributable to a provision, criterion, 
or more flexibly, practice. Therefore the provision may be able to encompass some forms of 
institutional or even structural discrimination; for instance the kind of educational disadvantages 
complained of in the D.H. and others case may potentially come within the purview of the Directive. 
The definition of indirect discrimination incorporates an open justification defence. Instead of 
laying down a predefined list of allowed exceptions, the Directive allows the use of provisions, 
criterions and practices that, even though disadvantageous for the members of a group, are 
“objectively justified by a legitimate aim”, provided that the means used to achieve that aim are 
“appropriate and necessary”. The terms at hand are of course open, and therefore it remains unclear as 
to what exactly can constitute objective justification.38 The practical impact of the prohibition of 
 
36 This is apparent in light of the wording: discrimination occurs where one person is treated less favourably than 
another (i) is, (ii) has been or (iii) would be treated. 
37 Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 92 ff. 
38 This is so also under the Gender Equality Directives. See Craig – de Búrca, cit. supra note 7, p. 888, where the 
authors note that in equal pay claims the ECJ often leaves the matter for the national court to decide, only giving 
some guidance by declaring some grounds of justification to be too general and indicating that others may be 
sufficient. The authors observe more generally that under the ECJ’s case law the commercial objectives of the 
undertaking or an employer can ‘relatively easily’ defeat a claim of indirect discrimination, and that the ECJ 
gives member states a margin of appreciation where social policy objectives are at issue. Ibid, p. 894 ff. 
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indirect discrimination will therefore depend, to a very large degree, on the future case law of the 
European Court of Justice regarding the interpretation of said terms. It seems likely that the ECJ will 
leave the member states a measure of discretion in this regard, particularly where social policy is at 
issue. That said, the requirement that the means used be ‘necessary’ suggests that not just any measure 
that appears legitimate on its face will do, because if there are alternative measures that do not 
disadvantage members of a group, then it will not be ‘necessary’ to use a measure that does.  
Does proving indirect discrimination require the production of statistical evidence? To begin with 
it must be noted that some parts of the definition of indirect discrimination (‘would put’, 
‘disadvantage’) imply that to prove indirect discrimination one does not need to prove actual disparate 
impact, the proving of which intrinsically calls for statistical breakdowns.39 Instead, it appears that ‘a 
particular disadvantage’ can, where applicable, also be inferred from facts that are generally known.40 
This reading is supported by the Directive, where Recital 15 acknowledges that rules of evidence are a 
matter of national rules or practice, but reminds that such rules “may provide in particular indirect 
discrimination to be established by any means including on the basis of statistical evidence”.41 The use 
of the word ‘may’ clearly indicates that the drafters envisaged that indirect discrimination may be 
demonstrated also by means other than statistical evidence.42 In this way, the definition of indirect 
discrimination compares favourably with the older definition of indirect discrimination that prevailed 
in the field of EU gender equality law prior to the adoption of the Directive 2004/113/EC. That 
definition called, as a rule, for statistical evidence, as it required the showing of evidence that a neutral 
provision, criterion, or practice disadvantages a “substantially higher proportion of the members of 
one sex”.43 In practice, however, in most situations it will be difficult if not impossible to prove 
discrimination without statistics, as the disadvantageous effects of a provision, criterion or practice 
usually cannot simply be ‘known’. How can one for instance demonstrate that the apparently neutral 
recruitment practices of a company discriminate against immigrants, other than by showing how many 
immigrants have applied but not been selected, or by showing that there is a mismatch between the 
proportion of such persons employed by the company and the proportion of such persons living in the 
relevant catchment area? Or how will it be known, without statistical comparisons, that the pay 
scheme adopted by a company puts certain groups at a disadvantage? 
The third type of discrimination, harassment, is defined in the Directive as taking place “when an 
unwanted conduct related to racial or ethnic origin takes place with the purpose or effect of violating 
 
39 In the sphere of EU gender equality law, indirect discrimination used to be couched in terms of ‘unfavourable 
impact’, and the question has often arisen what kind of statistical evidence is needed to establish such 
discrimination. See e.g. ECJ, Regina v.  Secretary of State for Employment, C-167/97, 9 February 1999. 
40 One does not need to produce statistical evidence to show that an unconditional rule requiring all police 
officers to wear a particular type of headgear puts Sikh men at a particular disadvantage because it is common 
knowledge that they wear turbans for religious reasons and are on those grounds unable to comply with that rule. 
Perhaps also a company rule requiring cleaning personnel to speak the national language fluently, a requirement 
that is usually excessive and not based on the requirements of the work in question, can simply be assumed to 
constitute a prima facie case of discrimination against immigrant workers, as it is general knowledge that 
immigrants seldom speak the national language fluently.  
41 Recital 15 of the Preamble, emphasis added. Similarly, de Schutter, ‘European Union Legislation and the 
Norms of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities’ Strasbourg 23 October 2006, 
DH-MIN(2006)019. 
42 According to Tyson this was indeed the intention of the drafters. See Tyson, cit. supra note 31, pp. 202–204. 
43 Burden of Proof Directive. 
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the dignity of a person and of creating an intimidating, hostile, degrading, humiliating or offensive 
environment”.44 The references to ‘conduct’ – a way of acting – and to ‘environment’ were 
deliberately chosen in order to set the bar rather high and to exclude, as a rule, isolated incidents from 
being considered harassment.45 The Directive further stipulates that “in this context, the concept of 
harassment may be defined in accordance with the national laws and practice of the Member States”. 
As the formulation “in this context” indicates, the national latitude provided cannot undermine the 
substance of the right altogether, but the provision does seem to leave into national discretion matters 
such as whether employers should be made liable for harassment they did not directly initiate, for 
instance harassment against an employee by another worker or a customer.46  
Article 1(4) provides that an instruction to discriminate constitutes discrimination an sich. This 
means that employers who instruct employment agencies not to send them workers from certain ethnic 
groups are engaging in discrimination, irrespective of whether the instruction was acted upon. 
Article 4 provides for a limited exception to the prohibition of discrimination, and allows a 
difference of treatment where a characteristic related to racial or ethnic origin constitutes ‘a genuine 
and determining occupational requirement’, provided that the objective of the differential treatment is 
legitimate and the requirement is proportionate. The situations in which a particular ‘racial’ or ethnic 
origin would constitute such an occupational requirement are subject to some debate. It is likely that 
courts in most countries would accept reasons related to ‘authenticity’. A director of a historical play 
would therefore not have to hire a white actor to play the role of Martin Luther King Jr., even if that 
person would be considered to be the best actor overall, and the manager of a Chinese restaurant could 
prefer Chinese-origin applicants over others. Yet it can be asked whether this should be so.47 In any 
case, the Directive instructs that the exception written down into Article 4 shall apply only in very 
limited circumstances.48 
Article 5 deals with positive action and follows the established Community anti-discrimination 
doctrine in that it merely allows but does not require such action: member states are allowed, “with a 
view to ensuring full equality in practice”, to maintain or adopt “specific measures to prevent or 
compensate for disadvantages linked to racial or ethnic origin”. The justification for positive action 
can therefore lie either in past, present or future discrimination, and positive action measures can be 
taken as long as ‘full equality in practice’ has not been achieved. The fact that the European Court of 
Justice has interpreted the notion ‘positive action’ in the context of gender equality law in a way that 
 
44 Article 2(3) of the Directive. 
45 Tyson, cit. supra note 31, pp. 205–206. 
46 Cf. Bell, cit. supra note 5, pp. 75–76. 
47 Would it be legitimate to hire a person of Chinese origin, for reasons of ‘authenticity’, to work as the chef of a 
Chinese restaurant, even if the person concerned had never lived in China and even if he was hired instead of a 
person who is a known specialist in Chinese cuisine but of ‘wrong’ ethnic origin? Is it legitimate to hire a person 
of Chinese origin to work as a waiter in a Japanese restaurant over a better qualified person of German origin? It 
is clear that the application of the ‘genuine and determining occupational requirement’ exception raises difficult 
questions to which legal rules and principles provide little directly applicable guidance. See also the critique 
posed in Gwyneth Pitt, ‘Madame Butterfly and Miss Saigon: Reflections on Genuine Occupational 
Qualifications’, in Janet Dine & Bob Watt (eds.), Discrimination Law: Concepts, Limitations, and Justifications 
(London: Longman, 1996). 
48 Recital 18 of the Preamble specifies that a difference of treatment where a characteristic related to racial or 
ethnic origin constitutes a genuine and determining occupational requirement is justified only in very limited 
circumstances. 
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has been somewhat restrictive and unpredictable, casts a shadow of uncertainty also upon the practical 
impact of Article 5.49 
 
Grounds and the personal scope of application 
 
The Directive prohibits discrimination ‘on grounds of racial or ethnic origin’. The latter terms are used 
without further precision. The drafters however felt compelled to remind their audience, through 
recital 6 of the Directive, that the notion of ‘race’ should not be understood along the lines of 
biological objectivism: 
The European Union rejects theories which attempt to determine the existence of separate human 
races. The use of the term ‘racial origin’ in this Directive does not imply an acceptance of such 
theories. 
 
In Chacón Navas the ECJ held that the notions defining the grounds of discrimination – in that case 
the notion of disability under the Framework Directive – are to be given “an autonomous and uniform 
interpretation”.50 This means that national approaches to these matters will not be decisive. At the time 
of the writing the Court has not been called to interpret the notions of racial origin or ethnic origin. 
Should the issue arise, the Court may be influenced by Article 10 of the Council Directive 2004/83/EC 
which contains a rare definition of ‘race’ in the context of EU law, the said Article providing that “the 
concept of race shall in particular include considerations of colour, descent, or membership of a 
particular ethnic group”.51 Yet it is fully possible that the Court will take some other approach. 
It is notable that the Directive prohibits discrimination on the grounds of racial or ethnic origin, 
not ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’ as such. This shifts the focus from the present status of a person or a group of 
persons to their past. But how far back in time should one go? If one goes back 250 years in time, 
which makes approximately ten generations, everyone has up to 1024 ancestors. How many of them 
should have been from Africa for a modern-day European to be considered to be of African origin? 
And does the reference to ethnic origin instead of ethnicity, the latter term usually presuming the 
existence of a living community dimension with a distinct cultural identity, whereas ‘origin’ does not 
contain that idea as such, have an impact on the range or nature of protection provided for by 
Directive? In particular, does it mean that the Directive was not at all, or only to a small extent, meant 
to give protection against infringements of cultural identity? The legal opinion on these questions is 
only beginning to emerge. 
 
49 See chapter 11 below. 
50 ECJ, Chacón Navas, GC, C-13/05, 11 July 2006, para 42. In para 40 the Court explained its reasoning as 
follows: “It follows from the need for uniform application of Community law and the principle of equality that 
the terms of a provision of Community law which makes no express reference to the law of the Member States 
for the purpose of determining its meaning and scope must normally be given an autonomous and uniform 
interpretation throughout the Community, having regard to the context of the provision and the objective pursued 
by the legislation in question.” 
51 Article 10 also defines ‘nationality’ by noting that it “shall not be confined to citizenship or lack thereof but 
shall in particular include membership of a group determined by its cultural, ethnic, or linguistic identity, 
common geographical or political origins or its relationship with the population of another State.” 
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In Feryn, the ECJ held that the existence of direct discrimination is not dependent on the 
identification of a complainant who claims to have been the victim. In that case a Belgian association 
was able to bring actio popularis proceedings against an employer that had publicly stated that it 
would not recruit employees of immigrant origin.52 
In Coleman the ECJ addressed another key question and ruled that the equal treatment directives 
prohibit ‘discrimination by association’. In this case the claimant, who did not have a disability 
herself, had allegedly been treated unfavourably on the grounds that she was the primary carer of her 
son who did have a disability. The Court held that this unfavourable treatment, if substantiated in the 
national court, constitutes discrimination on the grounds of disability, irrespective of the fact that the 
person discriminated against did not have a disability herself. According to the Court, “the principle of 
equal treatment enshrined in the directive applies not to a particular category of person but by 
reference to the grounds mentioned” in the Directive. Insofar as the same rationale applies to racial 
and ethnic discrimination, and there are no apparent reasons to assume that it would not, then this 
means that for instance harassment and other types of discrimination that ethnic majority partners of 
immigrants and persons belonging to minorities are subjected to also come within the purview of the 
Directive and are therefore prohibited by it.53 
Article 3(2) of the Directive provides that it does not cover difference of treatment based on 
nationality and is without prejudice to the entry into and residence of third-country nationals and to 
any treatment which arises from the legal status of the third country nationals concerned.54 This 
exception is broad and the scope of its applicability unclear. Given that differential treatment by for 
instance service providers, allegedly taking place on the grounds of ‘nationality’, can constitute 
indirect or even direct discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin, the question arises whether 
Article 3(2) renders such discrimination untouchable.55  
The Directive doesn’t cover ‘pure’ religious discrimination, since that ground is addressed in the 
Framework Employment Directive. It has to be reiterated, though, that religion can constitute one of 
the most important elements of ethnicity, and thus the delimitation of the borderline between ethnic 
and religious discrimination can be a difficult one. The Directive does not address the problems 
inherent in intersectional and multiple forms of discrimination.56 Indeed, the EU’s chosen policy line 
has been to regulate the different grounds separately, with the result that legal protection against 
discrimination is different with respect to different grounds, a policy that is unfavourable for fighting 
multiple and intersectional discrimination. Given that the ECJ has in several cases ruled that for a 
treatment to be considered discrimination on a particular ground it is sufficient that the treatment was 
‘essentially’ based on a factor directly linked to that ground, it can however be expected that it would 
be ready to treat intersectional discrimination that has got an ethnic dimension as discrimination on the 
 
52 ECJ, Feryn, Case C-54/07, 10 July 2008. 
53 ECJ, Coleman, GC, C-303/06, 17 July 2008. The Court’s reasoning would however not seem to apply to 
indirect discrimination as defined by the EU directives. 
54 Article 3(2) of the Directive. 
55 This question has been posed by e.g. Bell, cit. supra note 5, p. 71. 
56 Recital 14 does, however, refer to multiple discrimination as follows: “In implementing the principle of equal 
treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, the Community should, in accordance with Article 3(2) of the 
EC Treaty, aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women, especially since 
women are often the victims of multiple discrimination.” 
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grounds of ethnic origin.57 That said, the fact that the definition is based on comparisons can 
complicate things, as ground-specific comparisons cannot always identify situations where 
discrimination is not based on a single ground. At the end of the day, the extent to which people are 
provided protection from intersectional discrimination depends on the content and structure of the 
domestic law. 
 
Material scope of application 
 
Article 3 defines the material scope of the Directive and hence the areas in which the prohibition of 
discrimination is to apply. The scope is wide and laid down in relatively detailed but not necessarily 
precise terms,58 and covers all aspects of employment, including selection criteria and employment 
and working conditions; access to self-employment and occupation; access to vocational guidance and 
training; membership of and involvement in an organisation of workers or employers; social 
protection including social security and health care; social advantages; education; as well as access to 
and supply of goods and services which are available to the public, including housing. The application 
of the provision is subject to a general limitation doctrine, however, which prescribes that the 
Directive may only deal with matters that fall within the powers conferred upon the Community, a 
doctrine that may diminish the applicability of the Directive in some specific but limited instances.59 
Article 3 further makes it explicitly clear that it shall apply to all persons, as regards both the 
public and private sectors, including public bodies. Its thrust is to put into effect the principle of equal 
treatment both in relations between private parties as well as in relations where the other party is a 
public authority, in so far as the matter falls within the material scope defined in Article 3. This 
extensive scope of the Directive has reportedly been difficult for some member states to accept due to 
traditional doctrines about the distinction between the public and private sphere, and because of the 
perception that the Directive interferes with the freedom or contract.60 
 
Enforcement and remedies 
 
The general EU law and ECJ case law have tended to emphasise, as a starting point, the principle of 
national procedural autonomy and the primary responsibility of the state in the field of remedies.61 
Yet, the ECJ has, in the interests of ensuring the effective implementation of the EU law, made some 
significant inroads into this area. It has, in its case law, developed several principles in the field of 
 
57 For instance in the case of P v. S and Cornwall County Council, C-13/94, 30 April 1996, the ECJ held that 
discrimination against transsexuals is in fact based, “essentially if not exclusively”, on the sex of the person 
concerned, i.e. is sex discrimination. See also ECJ, Mayr v. Bäckerei und Konditorei Gerhard Flöckner OHG, 
Case C-506/06, [GC] 26 February 2008. 
58 See e.g. the observations that Craig and de Burca make with respect to similar provisions in the gender 
equality directives, Craig – de Búrca, cit. supra note 7, pp. 919 ff. 
59 Article 3, which defines the material scope of application of the Directive, starts with the clause “[w]ithin the 
limits of the powers conferred upon the Community, this directive shall apply to…” See also Bell, cit. supra note 
5, pp. 76 and 131–136. 
60 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament, (Brussels, 30.10.2006) COM(2006) 643 final. 
61 For a fuller discussion, see Sionaidh Douglas-Scott, cit. supra note 8, pp. 312–339.  
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remedies, two of which are particularly relevant here: the effectiveness principle (the national remedy 
must provide a real deterrent against the unlawful act) and the equivalence principle (the national 
remedy must be comparable to the remedy available in national law for infringement of comparable 
national rights).62 Several sectoral pieces of law, including the Racial Equality Directive, have 
provisions which complement these principles. 
The Directive features a number of relatively specific and even innovative provisions that deal 
with enforcement and remedies. First, Article 7 requires the availability of “judicial and/or 
administrative procedures”.63 Such procedures must be available “to all persons who consider 
themselves wronged by the failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them”, a standard that 
appears to be more favourable to potential complainants than the ‘arguable claim’ standard applied 
with respect to many other instruments.  
Second, the Directive provides for a shifted burden of proof.64 Thus, when a complainant 
establishes “facts from which it may be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, 
it shall be for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle of equal 
treatment”.65 What is at issue is a shared, not reversed burden of proof, as the complainant still has to 
make a prima facie case of discrimination and to rebut the counter-claims made by the respondent to 
succeed. Shifting of the burden of proof does not apply to criminal procedures.66  
Third, member states are to ensure that organisations with a “legitimate interest … may engage, 
either on behalf or in support of the complainant, with his or her approval, in any judicial and/or 
administrative proceedings provided for the enforcement of obligations under [the] Directive”.67 
Taken at face value, the wording is ambiguous as to whether each member state is required to allow 
organisations to act on behalf of (potential) complainants, which would for instance include the right 
to initiate proceedings, or whether it is sufficient for the organisations in question to simply be allowed 
to act in support of the complainant. The preamble is not helpful in resolving this question, and the 
ECJ has not yet had the opportunity to rule on the matter, but the legal opinion seems to prefer the 
interpretation that it is sufficient for obstacles to be removed from the way of the organisations in 
question so that they can support victims.68 
 
62 The meaning of these principles is, of course, not fully clear. By way of an example, in ECJ, Edis v. Ministero 
della Finanze, C-231/96, 15 September 1998, the Court stated that the observance of the principle of equivalence 
implies that “the procedural rule at issue applies without distinction to actions alleging infringements of 
Community law and to those alleging infringements of national law, with respect to the same kind of charges or 
dues”, para 36. See also Craig – de Búrca, cit. supra note 7, p. 305 ff, and Barry Fitzpatrick, ‘The Effectiveness 
of Equality Law Remedies: A European Community Law Perspective’ in Bob Hepple – Erika Szyszczak (eds.), 
Discrimination: The Limits of Law? (London: Mansell, 1992). 
63 Recital 20 appears to prefer judicial remedies, as it declares that “[t]he effective implementation of the 
principle of equality requires adequate judicial protection against victimisation.” 
64 The partial reversal of burden of proof would seem to apply not just to claims that involve direct or indirect 
discrimination, but also to instructions to discriminate and harassment, but not victimization (cf. Articles 1, 8 and 
9). 
65 Article 8(1). 
66 Article 8(3). 
67 Article 7(2). 
68 Mark Bell et al, Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States compared 
(Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007). 
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Fourth, states are required to introduce into their legal systems such measures as are necessary to 
protect individuals from victimization, which is defined as “adverse treatment or adverse consequence 
as a reaction to a complaint” of discrimination.69 It is not just the victims themselves, but also their 
families, legal representatives and other individuals related to the issue who are protected from 
victimization.  
Fifth, Article 9 requires member states to lay down the rules on sanctions applicable to 
infringements of the national provisions adopted pursuant to the Directive and to “take all measures 
necessary” to ensure that they are applied.70 These sanctions must be effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive.71 It is for the domestic courts to determine, in accordance with the relevant rules of 
domestic law, which remedies are appropriate. However, purely token sanctions are not sufficiently 
dissuasive. It has been submitted that for instance a court order that simply prohibits particular type of 
discriminatory behaviour qualifies as an ‘appropriate remedy’, at least in some circumstances.72  
Last but not least, member states are to designate a body or bodies for the promotion of equal 
treatment of all persons irrespective of racial or ethnic origin. These bodies are to provide independent 
assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints, to conduct surveys concerning 
discrimination and make recommendations on any issue relating to discrimination.73 
In many respects the Directive leaves considerable room for interpretation. At the end of the day, 
the ECJ will have the last word in infusing the rules with greater specificity. Given the rather slow 
pace with which rulings in this area have emerged from the Court, it will take some time before 
substantial progress is made in the clarification of the legal obligations under the Directive. 
 
Complementary equality provisions 
 
The Directive focuses primarily on equality of treatment in the spheres of life specified in Article 2, 
thus providing for market equality in the spheres of employment, education and provision of goods 
and services, and for equality of rights in the sphere of social protection and social advantages. The 
focus on these forms of equality is however not exclusive, as the Directive also touches upon political 
equality and participation. Article 12 of the Directive requires member states to encourage, with a 
view to promoting the principle of equal treatment, dialogue with non-governmental organisations 
with an interest in fighting ethnic discrimination. They are, by virtue of Article 11, also to promote a 
dialogue between the two sides of the industry with a view to fostering equal treatment. There is, in 
other words, at the very least recognition of the desirability of having a broad debate about equality 
and of the ways in which it can be achieved. 
 
 
 
 
 
69 Article 9. 
70 Article 15. 
71 Idem. 
72 Opinion of Advocate General Poiares Maduro, delivered on 12 March 2008, Case 54/07, CGKR v. Firma 
Feryn, para 28. 
73 Article 13. 
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State obligations 
 
A directive shall, under Article 288 of the TFEU (ex Article 249 TEC), “be binding as to the result to 
be achieved, upon each Member State to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods”. Eventual implementation need not be uniform in every 
member state. Provisions of binding EU law which are clear, precise and unconditional enough to be 
considered justiciable can be invoked and relied on by individuals before national courts.74 Though 
directives cannot impose obligations on individuals of themselves and individuals can only claim the 
rights conferred by a directive against the state or emanations of the state (directives do not therefore 
have what is called ‘horizontal direct effect’), there is a broad obligation on national courts to interpret 
domestic law, as far as possible, in conformity with directives (‘indirect effect’, both in the vertical 
relationship between an individual and the state and in the horizontal relationship between individuals) 
after the time limit for their implementation has expired.75 Indeed, the ECJ has through its case law 
increasingly put pressure on national courts to play the lead role in the enforcement of the EU law, to 
the benefit of right-holders.76 
 
 
74 These criteria were formulated by the ECJ in Van Gend en Loos, Case 41/74. 
75 ECJ, Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordhein-Westfalen, Case 14/83, 10 April 1984. In Von Colson, para 
26, the ECJ submitted that the member states’ obligation arising from a directive to achieve the result envisaged 
by the directive and their duty to take all appropriate measures to ensure fulfilment of that obligation is binding 
on all authorities, including the courts, meaning that national courts are required to interpret their national law in 
light of the wording and the purpose of the directive. See also Andrew Clapham, Human rights and the 
European Community: A Critical Overview (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1991). 
76 See e.g. Damian Chalmers – Adam Tomkins, European Union Public Law: Text and Materials (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 2007), pp. 365 ff; ECJ, Defrenne v. Sabena, C-43-75, 8 April 1976. 
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8 Assessment 
8.1 Recapitulation 
The preceding chapters have analysed both the contemporary problem of discrimination and the legal 
response to it. The time has come to assess the contribution of international and European anti-
discrimination law and to examine its strengths and weaknesses from the point of view of combating 
discrimination. How does the legal response, explored in chapters 6–7, respond to the problems 
outlined in chapters 3–4? Are people protected from discrimination, in particular everyday forms of 
discrimination, and if they are, to what extent? In particular, are they protected from indirect 
discrimination and harassment, and is the law capable of dealing with structural and intersectional 
discrimination? Does the protection extend to spheres of everyday life such as employment, education 
and provision of goods and services? What is the effect of all these instruments and all the 
jurisprudence on the lives of victims of discrimination in practice? What are the overall strengths and 
weaknesses of the prevailing legal regime?  
Answering these questions is of course anything but straightforward and simple. International and 
European anti-discrimination law has developed into a complicated and technical labyrinth of 
instruments, doctrines and case law. All Council of Europe countries, EU countries in particular, are 
parties to a high number of substantively overlapping conventions and other instruments. On the one 
hand the high number of instruments and ratifications arguably indicates that the principle of non-
discrimination finds major support across the world, also in Europe. On the other hand, the fact that 
the relevant pieces of law overlap to a great extent, when combined with the fact that the relevant 
provisions are by no means identical, means that it has not been straightforward to operationalize this 
support into clear and unambiguous provisions. The following analysis focuses on the net effect of all 
the law. 
 
The concept of discrimination 
 
Most of the instruments examined, including the UDHR, ICCPR, ICESCR and the FCNM prohibit 
discrimination without defining it. Express definitions have only been laid down in the ICERD and the 
Racial Equality Directive. Interestingly, these two definitions are different in many respects. Whereas 
the Directive expressly defines discrimination in terms of direct and indirect discrimination, 
harassment and instructions to discriminate, these elements are not apparent in the case of the ICERD. 
In fact, the definition provided in the ICERD is inoperational to the extent that it has been imperative 
for the CERD to develop an entirely different approach to determining what constitutes discrimination 
for the purposes of the application of the ICERD in practice. 
There are areas where the approaches of the ICERD, the Directive and the interpretative practices 
of the ECtHR, HRC and the other bodies share common ground. First, it is clear in light of the relevant 
provisions, the preparatory works and the interpretative practices of the different bodies, that the 
purpose has never been to ban the making of any kinds of distinctions on the basis of ‘race’ or ethnic 
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origin (‘colour-blindness’). This is so even despite the fact that several human rights instruments 
rather peculiarly confuse ‘distinction’ and ‘discrimination’ and use them almost interchangeably.1 
Second, intention is not an essential part of any definition or conceptualization of discrimination. This 
means that it is not necessary, for instance, for a complainant to show that the respondent intended to 
discriminate, although demonstration of intent may help to build the case in a court. 
A degree of common ground can also be identified in the interpretative practices of the 
international human rights bodies. The ECtHR, HRC, CERD and ECSR all agree, by and large, that 
differentiation constitutes discrimination if the criterion used has no objective and reasonable 
justification or if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed 
and the aim sought to be realized.2 This formulation follows the logic of the Aristotelian maxim ‘treat 
equal cases equally’ and is ultimately about assessment of rationality: are there good and valid reasons 
for determining that the two cases at hand are equal or not? The Racial Equality Directive explicitly 
deals with one situation where it is deemed rational – and therefore legitimate – to treat people 
differently on the grounds of ethnic origin, by stipulating that  a distinction based on ‘racial’ or ethnic 
origin does not constitute discrimination where a characteristic related to origin constitutes a “genuine 
and determining occupational requirement”. As we have seen, the application of this exception is not 
straightforward. 
The ‘objective and reasonable justification’ test has its merits and demerits. On the one hand, it is 
flexible and allows the bodies concerned to develop their doctrines in response to changing 
circumstances and, in particular, changing social values. It allows judges and others charged with 
applying the law to respond to changes in the nature and forms of discrimination. On the other hand, it 
is almost void of fixed substance and provides little if any guidance for national authorities, judges, 
employers and service providers, victims of discrimination and other stakeholders. Moreover, reliance 
on this test does not contribute to legal certainty, as decisions as to what is discrimination and what is 
not are bound to evolve on a case-by-case basis and are bound to reflect subjective appreciation and 
the particular judicial ideologies and values of those who make the decisions.3 Moreover, there is 
always the immanent danger that the social or personal values are those held by the ethnic majority, 
which may well be very different from the values held by the minorities, particularly on an issue such 
as this which is of great importance to the minorities. In consequence the extent of the protection that 
the minorities enjoy from discrimination perpetrated by the majority may become determined by the 
latter.4 
 
 
 
1 A similar conclusion is drawn by Marc Bossuyt, The concept and practice of affirmative action, preliminary 
report by Mr. Marc Bossuyt, Special Rapporteur to the Commission on Human Rights, 19 June 2000, para 48. 
2 For the CERD, differentiation constitutes discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation, judged against 
the objectives and purposes of the Convention, are legitimate. For the HRC, differentiation constitutes 
discrimination if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the aim is to achieve a 
purpose which is legitimate under the ICCPR. For the ECtHR, differentiation constitutes discrimination if the 
criteria have no objective and reasonable justification or if there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized. 
3 With regard to the role played by the judicial ideologies of judges, see J.G. Merrills, The development of 
international law by the European Court of Human Rights (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993). 
4 This interpretation is not far-fetched when one examines the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ with respect to 
discrimination against transgender people and sexual minorities. See e.g. ECtHR, Sheffield and Horsham v. 
United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998, where one of the key motivations for the narrow interpretation of 
Convention rights was that transsexualism raises “complex moral and social issues”, an explicit 
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Particularly the ECtHR, and following it the ECSR, have moved on to recognize the second limb 
of the Aristotelian maxim, to require that ‘different cases be dealt with differently’. The second limb is 
more difficult to apply than the first, as its application requires the elaboration of a positive theory of 
equality and not just the application of the ‘harm principle’ that disallows measures that unfairly 
disadvantage particular groups or individuals. One obstacle for the implementation of the second limb 
has been the tradition of suspicion towards distinctions based on ethnicity, a tradition that was born 
because differential treatment has historically speaking almost always meant adverse treatment, and in 
retrospect manifestly so, as was the case in South Africa during the Apartheid regime, in Germany 
during the Nazi rule and in the United States under the so-called Jim Crow laws. There is also a more 
general distaste in Europe towards group rights, which an obligation to differentiate on the basis of 
group membership rather inevitably comes close to. All of this is compounded by the fact that the 
ECtHR’s jurisprudence in this respect is not extensive, and the standards that it will apply in future 
cases are respectively unclear. In effect, the legal opinion regarding the second limb is only starting to 
take its shape.  
All the bodies examined in this study, the CEACR, CERD, HRC, ECtHR, ECSR and the ACFC, 
have, starting from the 1990s, come to recognize the phenomenon of indirect discrimination. Yet they, 
and the EU Directive, have come to conceptualize indirect discrimination in different ways: whereas 
the Directive defines indirect discrimination in terms of putting persons of a particular ethnic origin at 
a “particular disadvantage”, the ECtHR speaks about “disproportionately prejudicial effects”, the 
CERD about “unjustifiable disparate impact”, the HRC about “disproportionate adverse effect not 
based on objective and reasonable criteria” and the ECSR about “disproportionate effect”. These 
differences are legally significant, because terms ‘disparate impact’ and ‘disproportionate impact’ 
readily call for statistical evidence showing the existence of such an impact on a particular group, 
whereas ‘particular disadvantage’ is a more relaxed standard in this respect. That said, on the one hand 
the relevant bodies have been careful to point out that a disparate/disproportionate impact can be 
shown also by other means than statistics, and on the other hand the Directive is clear on the fact that 
statistical evidence is also one of the methods by which the existence of a ‘particular disadvantage’ 
may be demonstrated. The fact remains that in practice it will be difficult to demonstrate indirect 
discrimination, however defined, without statistical evidence, unless the causal connection between 
the impugned ‘neutral’ measure and the harm inflicted is so self-evident and based on facts that are 
generally so well-known that it is unnecessary to have recourse to any other evidence. This, coupled 
with the fact that across Europe there is great reluctance to collect ethnic data – without which the 
statistics cannot be compiled in the first place – effectively means that protection against indirect 
discrimination is presently compromised to a great extent, and that instances of indirect discrimination 
are not detected except in the most extreme cases.5 
The definition of indirect discrimination, both under the Directive and practice of the different 
bodies, incorporates an ‘objective justification’ defence. Under the Directive, an apparently neutral 
 
acknowledgement of the fact that there is (was) no adequate support for rights for transsexuals among the 
general public. 
5 This seems to be the experience also outside Europe, see e.g. Meredith Wilkie, ‘Australia’s Human Rights and 
Equal Opportunity Commission’ in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement (Aldershot: 
Avebury, 1997), p. 85. 
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provision, criterion or practice which puts persons of a particular ethnic origin at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other persons does not constitute discrimination provided that it is 
“objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and 
necessary”. Again, the use of open terms such as these (‘legitimate aim’, ‘appropriate’, ‘necessary’) 
has both its pros and cons: on the one hand, it allows the bodies concerned to develop their doctrines 
in accordance with changing social circumstances and values; on the other hand, it introduces a great 
deal of legal uncertainty, as the addressees of the legislation have little guidance as to how the law will 
be applied in practice, particularly before the emergence of a solid amount of case law. It has been 
observed that the justification allowed for indirect discrimination has “proved fatal” in practice for 
some types of cases, and it has been suggested that the assessment of the ‘objective justification’ 
should be interpreted to incorporate a necessity test, so that a justification could be considered to be 
‘objective’ only where no other measure, that would be more favourable from the point of view of 
equal treatment, could have been used to achieve the same objectives.  
One welcome feature of the contemporary international and European anti-discrimination law is 
that the range of situations that can give rise to a finding of discrimination has broadened up. It is 
general practices, and not just rigid provisions or the use of certain criteria, that can constitute 
discrimination. In this way anti-discrimination law can, at least in theory, be used to challenge some 
forms of institutional and structural discrimination, as was done in the case of D.H. and others, 
decided by the ECtHR. 
The EU Directive is the only piece of law that expressly prohibits harassment and defines it as a 
form of discrimination. The Directive’s definition of harassment is not particularly clear or inclusive, 
as harassment is defined in terms of a violation of dignity and the creation of a hostile or degrading 
environment, considering that the first term is vague and the second elevates the bar rather high. In 
consequence, the effect of the prohibition of harassment remains not just uncertain but also limited, at 
least for the time being. 
It is important to note that the ICCPR, ICERD and the UDHR prohibit incitement to 
discrimination, and that the Directive prohibits instructions to discriminate. It is therefore not just 
actual instances of discrimination that are prohibited by the law. 
There is a good degree of conceptual and substantive diversity – or, less euphemistically, 
confusion – when it comes to measures aiming to promote the achievement of de facto equality. 
Essentially the same idea, though with different emphases and standards, is variously called ‘positive 
action’, ‘temporary special measures’ or ‘affirmative action’. These measures are crucial for the 
success of the fight against discrimination. The common ground across the different instruments is that 
taking such measures is allowed, either expressly or in light of the preparatory works and/or the 
interpretative practices of the different bodies. 
Beyond that common basic platform there are two major areas of uncertainty. First, Article 2(2) of 
the ICERD expressly requires states to take special measures “where the circumstances so warrant”. 
Article 4(2) of the FCNM requires states parties to adopt “where necessary, adequate measures” to 
promote full and effective equality for their national minorities, and Article 2(2)c of the ILO 
convention 169 requires states to “assist” indigenous peoples to achieve the same goal. The ECtHR, 
the HRC and the CESCR have interpreted that the non-discrimination provisions of the instruments 
whose implementation they supervise also require taking specific action and preferential treatment to 
correct discrimination in fact. Yet the legal opinion, under all these conventions, is remarkably 
ambiguous, underdeveloped, and unclear when it comes to the more exact nature and scope of this 
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obligation. This is very unfortunate from the point of view of fighting discrimination, and probably 
has something to do with the fact that the issue of special measures/positive action is a politically 
highly charged subject, as is demonstrated by the heated debates that have taken place in all countries 
that have policy programmes or legal provisions requiring such action.6 Second, there is presently not 
only uncertainty as regards the obligation to take positive action measures, but also as regards the 
lawful scope of such measures under the various pieces of law. Is the use of rigid quotas allowed, for 
instance in the field of employment? If not, what about aspirational targets, or policies that favour the 
selection of candidates belonging to under-represented groups in tie-break situations where two or 
more candidates have equal qualifications?7 The above-mentioned uncertainties notwithstanding, it is 
clear that the different documents do not go so far as to hold states responsible for ensuring the 
achievement of material equality between minorities and the majority. 
Minority rights (in sensu stricto) have by and large come to be separated from anti-discrimination 
law.8 The most relevant provisions that deal with the right of persons belonging to minorities to 
maintain and develop their cultural, religious and linguistic identities and to cherish their traditions are 
Article 27 of the ICCPR and Article 5 of the FCNM. That said, also non-discrimination instruments 
and provisions go some way in the direction of accommodating the particular needs and characteristics 
of minorities and immigrants. First, as already mentioned, the Thlimmenos doctrine developed by the 
ECtHR requires a measure of accommodation – but exactly how much, remains an open question. 
Second, the prohibition of indirect discrimination may also require the accommodation of some of the 
needs and characteristics of minorities and immigrants. This is so even though the relevant pieces of 
law do not expressly refer to a duty to accommodate cultural, linguistic and religious differences, 
unlike with respect to disability discrimination under the Framework Employment Directive, which 
expressly requires employers to provide “reasonable accommodation” in order to “guarantee 
compliance with the principle of equal treatment”.9 By virtue of the prohibition of indirect 
discrimination, rigid language requirements and dress codes imposed by employers may be challenged 
on the grounds that they put members of particular groups at a disadvantage or have a disparate impact 
upon them, in which case the legitimacy of such requirements depends on the assessment of the 
justification of the measure. Insofar as no acceptable justification can be presented, such requirements 
must effectively be abolished or modified in order to accommodate the groups in question. It would 
obviously have been a preferable and clearer solution to have a separate provision directly clarifying 
the extent of the obligation to provide accommodation rather than having to infer the existence of such 
a requirement indirectly through the prohibition of indirect discrimination, as the latter solution 
inevitably involves technical complexities and uncertainties.  
 
 
6 One only needs to think about the issue of affirmative action in the United States, and the high number of 
controversial court decisions, policies and legal and political commentaries that the subject area has given rise to. 
7 These questions are examined in greater detail in chapter 11. 
8 See Kristin Henrard, Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, Minority 
Rights and the Right to Self-determination (The Hague: Kluwer, 2000). 
9 Article 5 of the Directive provides as follows: “In order to guarantee compliance with the principle of equal 
treatment in relation to persons with disabilities, reasonable accommodation shall be provided. This means that 
employers shall take appropriate measures, where needed in a particular case, to enable a person with a disability 
to have access to, participate in, or advance in employment, or to undergo training, unless such measures would 
impose a disproportionate burden on the employer.” 
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Grounds and personal scope of application 
 
All instruments under study that prohibit discrimination on multiple grounds expressly mention ‘race’ 
as one of the prohibited grounds. Race is actually mentioned first in the list of grounds in all the 
documents concluded under the auspices of the UN or its specialized agencies, and is placed second in 
the list in the European documents right after sex, with the exception of the Social Charter (revised), 
which mentions ‘race’ first. This, as well as the fact that there are several instruments that deal 
exclusively with racial discrimination, together with the widespread tendency among judicial and 
quasi-judicial bodies to consider ‘race’ to be a particularly suspect ground for making distinctions, 
reflects the general agreement that racial discrimination is considered to constitute a particularly 
invidious form of discrimination. 
The approach to the issue of ‘grounds’ in international and European instruments raises several 
issues, three of which will be discussed here. First, the concepts used are not strictly distinct from each 
other. Peculiar ambiguity underlies all of this. On the one hand, international and European human 
rights documents expressly mention ‘race’, ‘colour’, ‘national origin’ and ‘religion’, notions that 
overlap to the extent that it appears that the only logical explanation for including all of them is that 
the preferred strategy has been to add as many concepts as possible in order to avoid any lacunae. On 
the other hand, ‘ethnicity’ or ‘ethnic origin’ is mentioned only in the EU Directive and the European 
Social Charter (revised). If the idea has been to be absolutely certain that all forms of discrimination 
based on origin are prohibited, why has ‘ethnicity’ been left out? There can be no doubt that ethnicity 
as a notion is farther removed from the notion of ‘race’ than the notion of ‘colour’. If colour is 
expressly mentioned, why is ethnicity not?  
Second, these core concepts are not defined anywhere. This is perhaps understandable in the case 
of instruments that prohibit discrimination on a number of grounds, but the same observation applies 
also with respect to the ICERD and the Racial Equality Directive. The only issue that is relatively 
settled is that under the ICERD and the practice of the ECtHR, ethnic discrimination is taken to be one 
form of racial discrimination. This approach is not without its problems.10 But what is more worrying 
is the fact that the terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are used in the legal instruments and in the practice of 
the different bodies in a straightforward and unqualified manner.11 The ICERD and its monitoring 
body in particular have no problems with speaking about ‘different races’ as if such things really 
existed.12 This all probably springs from, and contributes to the maintenance of, prevailing objectivist 
and essentialist understandings of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. That said, it would of course be even more 
problematic to expressly define these terms, given that there can be no single scientifically acceptable 
 
10 The notion of ‘race’, unless its meaning is significantly stretched from its current everyday usage, is generally 
understood to refer to biological, not cultural, religious and/or linguistic differences, unlike is the case with 
ethnicity. But if ‘ethnicity’ is stripped of cultural, religious and linguistic meanings and reduced simply to 
biological differences, then the question arises whether this by implication means that persons belonging to an 
ethnic group are not protected from discrimination that is based on (typical) cultural, religious and linguistic 
characteristics of the group. 
11 Occasional statements such as that made in recital 6 of the Racial Equality Directive, stating that the use of the 
term ‘racial origin’ in the Directive does not imply an acceptance of theories which attempt to determine the 
existence of separate human races, are far too rare and lacking in legal strength to offset the unqualified 
objectivist use of the terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ in these documents. 
12 See e.g. CERD, General Recommendation XXIV (1999). 
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definition of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’. The question of the exact definition of the terms at hand, and the 
question of whether a specific individual ‘really’ belongs to a particular group or not, have seldom 
been touched upon in the practice of the international and European bodies. It appears that the 
different bodies have by and large taken a pragmatic approach to the role played by the particular 
ground involved in an allegedly discriminatory event. Where an individual claims that she has been 
discriminated against on the grounds of her ethnic origin, the focus of the proceedings is usually 
primarily on whether she was put at a disadvantage in comparison to others, and the existence of a 
‘racial’ or ethnic difference is usually acknowledged without much ado or further examination, unless 
the claim is contested or manifestly unfounded. 
Third, the fact that the terms used are overlapping but undefined and therefore imprecise means 
that it will often not be a straightforward matter to determine on which ground(s) a person was 
discriminated against or whether a particular event or practice comes within the scope of a particular 
instrument.13 If the police’s stop-and-search practices disproportionately target young men with Mid-
Eastern looks, does that constitute discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity or discrimination on the 
grounds of (presumed) religion? If a shopkeeper refuses to let in Roma women, who in some countries 
typically wear distinctive and voluminous traditional velvet dresses, on the grounds that he believes 
that they might steal from the shop and hide goods under their dresses, is that discrimination on the 
grounds of ethnicity or is it discrimination on the grounds of sex, both or neither?  
The latter example brings us to a fourth issue, which is that the existence of the problem of 
intersectional and multiple discrimination is currently acknowledged but the legal problems involved 
have not by any means been resolved.14 None of the instruments at hand explicitly addresses this issue 
by providing for means by which to cope with such forms of discrimination, nor have any legal 
solutions in this regard been developed by the monitoring bodies. Indeed, the chosen – though not 
exclusive – policy line within the UN and the EU has been to develop ground-specific instruments, a 
policy which in itself is unfavourable for the purposes of fighting intersectional and multiple 
discrimination, as the applicable definitions of discrimination and scopes of application differ from 
one instrument to another, and therefore the outcome of a case may greatly depend on the ground on 
which the claim is based. Insofar as the international and European examples have led countries to 
adopt ground-specific anti-discrimination laws with strict comparison-based definitions of 
discrimination à la the EU Directive, victims of intersectional discrimination are likely to experience 
major difficulties in proving their cases. This is because complainants in such cases are in practice 
 
13 For instance the CERD has encountered situations where the Committee members have been uncertain 
whether a particular situation comes within the scope of the ICERD. In his letter of 18 August 1995 to the 
Secretary-General of the UN, the chairman of the CERD stated the following: “In many conflicts sentiments of 
ethnic belonging are mixed with sentiments of a religious or political character. The text of the Convention 
provides little guidance on the differentiation of ethnic from political motivation, while the position is further 
complicated by its definition of racial discrimination as covering distinctions which are racial either in their 
purpose or their effect. In several of the situations considered during 1995, Committee members were uncertain 
whether the ethnic elements in the apparent tensions were sufficient to bring the situation within the scope of the 
Convention.” Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Elimination of Racism and 
Racial Discrimination, A/50/18, 22 September 1995. 
14 For instance, recital 14 of the Racial Equality Directive provides that ”[i]n implementing the principle of equal 
treatment irrespective of racial or ethnic origin, the Community should, in accordance with Article 3(2) of the 
EC Treaty, aim to eliminate inequalities, and to promote equality between men and women, especially since 
women are often the victims of multiple discrimination.” 
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often forced to present their cases as if they are linked only with a single ground, a factor that 
privileges the respondents because they therefore have the opportunity to rebut the prima facie case by 
presenting ‘comparators’ that share the single identified ground but have not been put at a 
disadvantage. Indeed, protection against intersectional discrimination requires innovative legal 
solutions that are presently in great demand and short supply. This is unfortunate in view of the fact 
that intersectional discrimination, and particularly the proving thereof, presents particular challenges 
that must be tackled for the protection against discrimination to be effective in practice.15  
 
Material scope of application  
 
The primary focus of the international anti-discrimination law is on guaranteeing equality of rights, on 
prohibition of discrimination in the exercise of public powers, and on banning Apartheid and other 
manifest forms of discrimination. The EU law focuses on equality of treatment in the market place, 
and on equality with respect to some areas of social policy. Taken together, the international and 
European anti-discrimination law has come to cover many of those areas of life where discrimination, 
including everyday discrimination, typically takes place. These areas include employment, education 
and provision of services. That said, almost all of the human rights documents, whether international 
or European, are unclear about the reach of their non-discrimination provisions. This is particularly 
and manifestly so with the ICERD and Protocol No 12 to the ECHR. The material fields of application 
are not laid down in most of the instruments in any express terms, but have been left to be inferred by 
means of interpretation, a solution that brings with it a good measure of legal uncertainty. The only 
exception in this regard is the EU Directive, which expressly defines its scope of application, although 
it also has its grey areas and uncertainties. 
 
State obligations, domestic enforcement and remedies 
 
Countries are under a wide array of both negative and positive obligations under the international and 
European conventions and other instruments. A short list of the core obligations include the following: 
the obligation to amend, rescind or nullify any incompatible domestic legislation; the general 
obligation to pursue a policy of eliminating racial discrimination ‘by all appropriate means’ and 
‘without delay’; obligation to penalize dissemination of ideas based upon racial superiority or hatred, 
incitement to hatred, incitement to acts of violence and incitement to discrimination; and the 
obligation to promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and to combat 
prejudices, through the fields of education, culture and information. The EU Directive is the only 
document that expressly requires the enactment, nationally, of comprehensive anti-discrimination 
legislation where it does not already exist. That said, the different committees, the CERD in particular, 
have called for concrete, comprehensive and proactive measures to combat discrimination and have 
recommended the adoption of anti-discrimination legislation. 
ICCPR, ICERD and ECHR, as well as the UDHR, require states to provide for an ‘effective 
remedy’ in discrimination cases. There is wide agreement that the notion ‘remedy’ is to be understood 
 
15 Paola Ucellari, ‘Multiple Discrimination: How Law can Reflect Reality’ The Equal Rights Review, Vol One 
(2008). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
177
                                                       
both in the procedural and substantive sense. The ICERD goes further than the other documents and 
specifically requires, in Article 6, the provision of judicial mechanisms, without, however, specifying 
whether these should be of criminal, civil or administrative nature. That Article also requires that 
victims must be provided with the right to seek “just and adequate reparation or satisfaction for any 
damage suffered as result of discrimination” through those mechanisms. The EU Racial Equality 
Directive, for its part, requires member states to ensure that “judicial and/or administrative 
procedures” are in place for the defence of the rights of victims of discrimination. The bottom line 
appears to be that a victim of discrimination must have access to the general judicial system or at least 
to an administrative body such as an equality tribunal, ombudsman, a national commission for equality 
or some other comparable body with competence to deal with complaints about discrimination. The 
Directive expressly requires that the burden of proof be shared and that protection be provided from 
victimization. In addition, it goes a few steps beyond the traditional individual-rights based legal 
approach to remedies, and requires that specialized bodies be established for the purposes of 
promoting equal treatment, and that these bodies, and collective actors such as the social partners and 
NGOs, must be engaged in the endeavour to combat ethnic discrimination. 
8.2 Structural properties of anti-discrimination law 
On the basis of the above analysis, it is possible to analyse the structural properties of the 
contemporary international and European anti-discrimination law at a deeper level. These properties 
will be discussed in the following with an eye on how they either contribute to, or compromise, the 
cause of fighting discrimination and promoting equality in an effective manner. The different 
properties of the law will be subjected to a SWOT analysis, which highlights the strengths, 
weaknesses, opportunities and threats involved in the law. As will be apparent, it will oftentimes be 
the case that the different structural properties of anti-discrimination law have both their positive and 
negative implications. 
8.2.1 Theoretical undercurrents – doctrinal perplexity within a liberal political frame 
Anti-discrimination law, as it now stands, does not have a solid theoretical foundation, nor does it 
pursue any clear vision. Although we can observe certain developments in the substance of the law 
and discern analytical models which the different pieces of law correspond to,16 anti-discrimination 
law, taken as a whole, does not spring from or follow a single totalizing theory. There is no general 
agreement as to what exactly constitutes discrimination, why it should be prohibited, what the ultimate 
purposes of the law are and whether it should provide for – or at least promote – material and cultural 
equality. The different pieces of law and their interpretations have developed in an ad hoc manner 
without an overarching, guiding vision or set of first principles. 
 
16 See e.g. the typology presented by McCrudden in ‘The New Concept of Equality’ (2003) 3 ERA-Forum 9. 
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This should not be a matter of surprise or even concern, as the very search for ultimate theoretical 
foundations, in matters of social justice, is itself without a foundation.17 Classical principles such as 
‘equality’ do not have fixed contents awaiting discovery.18 Meanings are constructed rather than 
found, which is why conflicting convictions about social justice issues are part and parcel of legal 
provisions, theories, doctrines and interpretations. Whereas there is nothing abstract or theoretical 
about the hurt and disadvantage that victims of discrimination experience, the fact remains that – just 
like other concepts - equality and equal treatment are abstract and an sich empty or at the very least 
contested and open-ended concepts, which is why anti-discrimination law cannot self-evidently be 
founded on some particular theory that would explain what exactly should be prohibited and why. 
Numerous different theories have of course been formulated, but even their abundance only testifies to 
the lack of general agreement.19 Major parts of anti-discrimination law are intrinsically linked to 
general international human rights law, and therefore share some of its theoretical problems. Both are 
an offspring of conflicting and inherently imperfect philosophical theories and historical accidents of 
untheorizable suffering to which they constitute a response to, and as such they are both theoretically 
ambiguous and beyond apparent theoretization.20 
This said, the compatibility of the current regime of anti-discrimination law with the central tenets 
of political liberalism is remarkably clear, suggesting a close linkage between the two. To a great 
extent, anti-discrimination law reflects and, for its part, upholds – and even enforces – the core 
doctrines and values of liberalism. Akin to liberalism, anti-discrimination law is markedly 
individualist in its orientation. Discrimination is couched in terms of harm inflicted by individuals on 
one another and the law is mostly unconcerned with problems that cannot be conceptualized in that 
way. Protection from discrimination is – clearly for dogmatic, not empirical reasons - provided equally 
and ‘universally’ to all individuals, though people do not suffer from it equally, and therefore the law 
fails to recognize that it is some people rather than others that are affected. The law provides for 
individual justice, not group justice that would require attention to be paid to material, political and 
cultural equality. The whole idea of anti-discrimination law, as it stands, is to protect the enjoyment of 
individual rights and freedoms and equality of opportunity from unwarranted governmental or private 
intervention, and thereby to protect individual liberty and autonomy. It bolsters an apparent culture of 
rationalism by means of seeking to remove irrational elements from decision-making, one example of 
which is the deployment of the ‘principle of merit’ in the field of employment.21 Anti-discrimination 
law also reflects the so-called harm principle, according to which the state is entitled and even 
required to intervene in order to prevent one person from inflicting harm on another,22 as well as the 
doctrine that there are public affairs where public power may be exercised over individuals and private 
 
17 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Human Rights, Politics, and Love’ Mennesker & rettigheter 4/2001. 
18 Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The critical legal studies movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1986). 
19 See e.g. the theoretical approaches presented in Christopher McCrudden (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law 
(Aldershot: Dartmouth, 2004). 
20 Indeed, the law attempts the impossible when it tries to construe absolutes from conflicting ideological and 
political premises of the lawmakers and the accidents of experience that gives rise to its adoption. 
21 That the content of the principle of merit is controversial and that it can be deployed in order to mask irrational 
or morally repulsive actions is another matter, and will be considered below. 
22 The harm principle (or ‘doctrine’ as he himself described it) was formulated by J.S. Mill in his On Liberty 
(London: John W. Parker and Son, 1859), pp. 21–23.  
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affairs where it may not.23 Individualism, individual autonomy, individual liberty, rationalism, the 
harm principle and the distinction between public and private affairs are all central to the classical 
theory of political liberalism as formulated by J.S. Mill.24 
Yet it would be incorrect to conclude that anti-discrimination law is simply, necessarily or 
exclusively an embodiment of classic political liberalism. The law is flexible enough to accommodate 
different strands of liberalism, including welfare liberalism which advocates a greater role for the state 
in the reduction of de facto inequalities. This is reflected in that the law allows taking positive 
action/special measures, but does not require it or requires it only to a modest and unclear extent, 
leaving the decision whether to work towards material equality to states. The present focus of the law 
on formal equality and on processes, instead of substantive equality and outcomes, has a definite 
liberal twist to it. Major parts of the international law, which show restraint in imposing obligations 
upon states that go beyond elimination of openly discriminatory laws and policies, may even satisfy 
libertarians. The EU Directive, which staunchly requires state intervention in the fields of employment 
and provision of goods and services, is less accommodating of libertarian aspirations, but may find 
some appeal not just among classical and welfare liberals but also among communitarians, given that 
it takes some steps towards the recognition of the collective aspects of the fight against 
discrimination.25 The close linkage between liberalism and current regime of international and 
European anti-discrimination law is perhaps also showcased by the fact that traditionalist legal and 
political elites in post-socialist countries have had difficulties in accepting that anti-discrimination law, 
and with it individual rights, liberal values and genuine rule of law, could prevail over collective 
interests and political expediency.26 
Anti-discrimination law is not only wrought with tensions arising from the competing political 
orientations that it tries to accommodate, but also tensions and other problems that are internal to these 
orientations, including political liberalism, which it is closely associated with. Some of these tensions 
have to do with the liberal conception of individual rights. There are tensions between anti-
discrimination law on the one hand, and with the right to privacy, freedom of contract, freedom of 
speech and individual autonomy on the other.27 These tensions and even conflicts that occur at the 
level of principles (and rules laid down on the basis of them) have to a large extent not been resolved 
by the law (or at the very least the question how they have been resolved is in dispute), nor do they 
absolve by themselves. These unresolved tensions bring doctrinal indeterminacy to anti-discrimination 
law, pinpointing areas of controversy that are ultimately political in nature. Yet another structural 
property of the present regime of anti-discrimination law is that its excessive individualism hides from 
 
23 Ibid, p. 27 ff. 
24 Idem. 
25 The EU Directive arguably recognizes group aspects in several ways. To begin with, the concepts of indirect 
discrimination and positive action involve recognition of the group dimensions of discrimination. In addition, the 
Directive recognizes the important role played by the social partners and the collective bargaining system, as 
well as the NGOs representing the interests of the different groups victimized by discrimination. 
26 See e.g. Margarita Ilieva, The Bulgarian Draft Anti-Discrimination Law: An Opportunity to Make Good on the 
Constitutional Promise of Equality in a Post-Communist Society (European Roma Rights Centre, 2003), 
available at: http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=1444 (accessed 1.1.2010).  
27 Sometimes the anti-discrimination instruments themselves refer to these other principles as limiting the 
applicability of the principle of non-discrimination. See e.g. recital 4 of the Racial Equality Directive and its 
reference to protection of private and family life. 
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sight problems that are collective, social and/or cultural in nature. This individualism is undoubtedly 
related with the unwillingness of the theory of liberal democracy to recognize entities other than the 
individual and the state, and hampers the effectiveness of the law to reduce inequalities. 
The drafters’ and legislators’ apparent wish to make anti-discrimination law compatible with 
several types of political theories and orientations, while probably a precondition for its general 
acceptability, necessarily imbues the law with profound indeterminacy. The very objectives of the law 
are open, and therefore open to dispute, which also affects how the different elements of the law are 
interpreted, given that laws are often interpreted, or at least expected to be interpreted, in light of their 
(stated or presumed) objectives and purposes.28 If the objective of the law is taken to be the 
achievement of formal equal opportunity, then any exception to the principle of equal treatment should 
be read narrowly, including the taking of positive action/special measures. If the objective of the law is 
taken to be the achievement of substantive equal opportunity, then the law should be read expansively 
so as to maximize the role played by positive action/special measures. Reading the law from 
libertarian, socialist or collectivist positions would have other, but equally fundamental, implications. 
The thing, then, about doctrinal controversies over questions of substance in the field of anti-
discrimination law, is that they are at the end of the day political and moral controversies not a priori 
solved by the law itself. 
Indeterminacy of the law and its theoretical premises is not necessarily a weakness; once 
recognized, it can also be a strength, as it allows and even invites the development of a range of 
theoretical and doctrinal models, forcing us to think harder and deeper about the social justice matters 
involved.  
 
Equal treatment rather than treatment as equals 
 
As theorized in chapter 3, there are a number of possible dimensions to equality: we can speak of 
material, cultural, political, civil rights and market equality. As already noted, contemporary anti-
discrimination law focuses primarily on two types of equality: civil rights equality and market 
equality. Ipso facto, that law must be a disappointment for anyone who hopes that it would define and 
guarantee some other dimension of equality.  
As concerns material equality, it can be observed that the central thrust of the present legal regime 
is the defence of formal equal opportunities of individuals. Law comes into play for instance whenever 
a person is not hired because of the colour of his or her skin. The focus is on equal treatment and 
equality of opportunities, on the formal flawlessness of the process of distribution of jobs and social 
goods. It is not, or is only to a modest extent, on the actual distribution of jobs and social goods, or on 
the factors that brought it about. The extent to which any society should be concerned with material 
equality between groups is – under contemporary law – up to that society itself, any such concern 
being subject, however, to the requirement that the practical implications of such a policy must not 
violate the aforementioned requirement of procedural fairness. Accordingly, the present law poses 
limits on the extent to which a society may pursue a policy of equal outcomes in practice. 
As concerns cultural equality, international and European anti-discrimination law is markedly 
obscure with respect to the question whether, and if yes, to what extent, it recognizes, embraces or 
 
28 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31.  
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endorses cultural diversity and pluralism. As has been established in previous chapters, the present 
regime of anti-discrimination law does not directly address the question whether the non-
accommodation of cultural or religious characteristics may constitute direct or indirect discrimination 
on the grounds of origin. Case law in this regard is only starting to emerge.29 The deliberate use in law 
of the terms equal treatment and equal opportunity, instead of such terms as ‘identical treatment’ or 
‘similar treatment’, suggests that a measure of differentiation may at the very least be allowed insofar 
as it does not constitute unfavourable treatment. Given the openness of the formulation of the 
definition of indirect discrimination in particular, which gives courts and other competent bodies much 
leeway in this area, it is clear that the extent to which the anti-discrimination law protects expressions 
of other than the majority identity in various contexts of everyday life remains uncertain.30 Ultimately, 
the law’s ratio appears to be that people are alike, irrespective of origin, or that at the very least they 
should, irrespective of origin, be taken to be alike and by and large be treated alike. In this way, the 
law partakes in the social invention of the autonomous individual detached from any group 
affiliations. The legislator’s reluctance to confront and resolve the tension between what we might call 
the “assimilationist” and “pluralist” conceptions of anti-discrimination law is again probably due to its 
wish to accommodate different political views and conceptions of justice, as choices in this area 
necessarily have discernible political implications. It is also not far-fetched to assume that the 
ambiguity shown by the law towards recognition of cultural pluralism reflects the present identity 
crisis of European nation states – and quite likely contributes to it too. 
Material and cultural equality have come to be dealt with by other parts of the law, including other 
parts of the international human rights law. Indeed, social and economic rights set out a number of 
minimum living standards, and minority rights (and freedom of religion) set out minimum standards 
with respect to the protection of minority identities. The relationship between these areas of the law on 
the one hand, and anti-discrimination law on the other, is by no means clear or resolved.31 It is not too 
far-fetched to speak of a disjunction between the different areas of human rights law or of 
fragmentation of that law. Legally speaking it is not irrelevant which part of the law deals with these 
matters: economic and social rights as well as minority rights are mostly formulated as rights that are 
not directly enforceable, whereas this is not the case with anti-discrimination law. In consequence, the 
incorporation into anti-discrimination law of considerations relating to material and cultural equality 
would carry significant legal benefits.  
The bottom line is that the focus of the law is not on economic, social or cultural inequality. The 
crux of the contemporary anti-discrimination law is on equal treatment, not on treatment as equals, 
with all the attendant legal, political and social consequences. The threat in all of this is that focusing 
the law on particular dimensions of equality may serve to steer public and legal attention away from 
the other dimensions. Dubbing equal treatment law – essentially protecting market equality – as 
 
29 See e.g. ECtHR, Thlimmenos v. Greece, judgment of 6 April 2000. 
30 At present, protection of (minority) identity comes down to an assessment of whether a contested rule, 
criterion or practice reflecting majority standards is (with some generalisation) “objectively justified” and 
“proportionate in view of the ends”. 
31 See generally on this subject matter, Martin Scheinin – Reetta Toivanen (eds.), Rethinking non-discrimination 
and minority rights  (Turku: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University, 2004). See also Dimitrina 
Petrova, ‘A Right to Equality Integral to Universal Human Rights’ The Equal Rights Review, Vol. One (2008). 
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‘equality law’ is not therefore politically innocent.32 This conclusion is not as damning as it could be, 
because many minority groups themselves do give market equality a high priority.33 And again, the 
openness of the theoretical premises of anti-discrimination law mean that the market equality focus is 
not merely a weakness: had the states drafting international and European conventions tried to reach 
an agreement on each state’s obligations in the areas of material and cultural equality, they would 
most likely have settled for very low standards, given the exigencies of international negotiation, the 
diversity of national traditions and policies, and the consequent drive towards compromises. Indeed, 
prevailing theoretical openness provides an opportunity for international, European and national 
debate about how the law could be made more responsive to the different equality concerns. In effect, 
one of the challenges for the future is the uneasy task of formulating and debating contesting theories 
and legal doctrines about how our conflicting ideas about equality can be connected to our conflicting 
ideas about ethnic difference, in a manner that better promotes the achievement of the different 
dimensions of ethnic equality. 
 
Standards and their abundance: on legal evolution and legal uncertainty  
 
Anti-discrimination law has grown in importance and breadth, and has come to pose a major restraint 
on the actions of both public and private actors in a variety of domains of life.34 Yet the regulatory 
impact of that law in the actual behaviour of those actors is obscure at best, and not just because of the 
openness and diversity of its theoretical premises. 
Already the sheer volume of the law presents major challenges. Each EU country is party to at 
least a dozen human rights treaties, all of which prohibit discrimination either in their specific fields of 
application or more generally. Some of these treaties are remarkably complex and lengthy, such as the 
revised Social Charter, the substantive articles of which number 31, or the Migrant Convention, which 
has 93 articles. A conscientious interpreter of international human rights law would also take into 
account the numerous international declarations that deal with this subject area, as well as the 
jurisprudence and comments of the different supervisory and monitoring bodies, as well as the general 
recommendations and country-specific comments submitted by the latter bodies. This effectively 
creates an insuperable barrier for mastering the subject area in question. Many of the relevant 
declarations are considerably lengthy, such as the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action, which has 
no less than 341 articles. The general recommendations, which usually seek to explain only one article 
or just a single paragraph, tend to be several pages in length. The CERD alone had issued 31 general 
comments by January 2009, the latest of which was 13 pages long.35 Their length notwithstanding – 
 
32 See also Nico J. Beger, ‘Putting Gender and Sexuality on the Agenda: Queer Theory and Legal Politics’, in 
Reza Banakar – Max Travers (eds.), An Introduction to Law and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p. 175. 
33 For instance a survey conducted among Muslims living in Great Britain, France, Germany and Spain found 
out that Muslims were more worried about unemployment (46%–56% very worried per country) than decline of 
religion (18%–45% very worried) or Muslim women taking on modern roles in society (9%–22%). The Pew 
Global Attitudes Project, Muslims in Europe: Economic worries top concerns about religious and cultural 
identity, July 2006. Available at: http://pewglobal.org/reports/pdf/254.pdf (accessed 1.1.2010). 
34 At this point it should be reiterated that it is not just the judiciary that needs to be aware of the substance of the 
law; also the legislative and administrative branches of the state must know the law in order to comply with the 
negative and positive obligations set forth by that law. 
35 CERD, General Recommendation No. 31 (2005). 
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and without prejudice to the assessment of their overall quality – these documents tend to be couched 
in technical and open language, which means that these interpretative texts themselves need 
interpretation. Given these circumstances, is it rational, or reasonable, to expect even the well-
intending members of the judicial, legislative and administrative branches – not to mention the 
average employer or school principal, the ‘end users’ of the law – to master the entire field of 
international and European anti-discrimination law? That the answer must be in the negative is 
suggested by the fact that books, research reports and articles that deal with this body of law are, 
without exception, more than less selective, indicating that even the experts in this field are exhausted 
by the insurmountable amount of relevant materials. Even this study, though it covers much ground, 
has had to concentrate on the main legally binding international and European materials to the 
exclusion of non-binding materials, many of which provide valuable guidance and suggest best 
practices that may well work in practice.36 
At the same time, that law – particularly international law – is couched more in terms of general 
and flexible standards than rigid rules. Rules provide for precision and certainty, but their rigidity may 
in practice lead to results that the lawmaker did not intend.37 Standards, on the other hand, provide for 
less precision and certainty, but are flexible and allow evolution.38 Recourse to standards in the area of 
anti-discrimination law poses both threats and opportunities. On the one hand, addressees of the law 
are not always clear as to what their rights and obligations are, and there is always the danger that the 
arbitrary value judgments of those applying the law come into play, compromising the effectiveness of 
that law. The latter aspect is of high importance, given the spread of prejudices and stereotypes 
throughout society, including the judiciary, public administration and others who are obliged to 
comply with the law. On the other hand, the use of standards leaves room for creativity, teleological 
reasoning (which is highly prevalent in human rights reasoning) and the evolution of doctrines, 
making it possible that doctrines and case law are when necessary brought to bear on new forms of 
inequality. Indeed, all international monitoring bodies discussed in this study have shown a degree of 
willingness and ability to develop their doctrines, and this has had a positive effect in terms of 
securing greater legal protection from discrimination. 
The generality and openness of the law is apparent in the different aspects of the law, including the 
very definition of discrimination, the legitimate scope of positive action/special measures, and the 
precise material scope of the prohibition of discrimination. To take an example, discrimination is 
conceptualized by the ECtHR, CERD, HRC and ECSR, and indirect discrimination by the EU 
Directive, as (with some generalisation) differentiation or disadvantage that lacks ‘objective and 
reasonable justification’ or that violates the proportionality principle. These tests are highly general 
and their ability to guide the application of the law in practice is consequently weak. Consider for 
instance the merits and demerits of the ‘objective and reasonable justification’ test. On the one hand, 
 
36 This concerns e.g. the recommendations of ECRI. 
37 This is because of the under- or overinclusiveness of rules in view of the lawmakers’ purposes. See Frederick 
Shauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life 
(Clarendon Press, 1992). 
38 Yet, the certainty of rules is often illusory, given the subjectivity of legal interpretation, whereas standards 
may over time and with the accumulation of experience lead to the setting of a more precise rule either through 
sedimentation of case law or new legislation. Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law 
Adjudication’ Harvard Law Review Vol 89:1685, pp. 1701–1713 in particular. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
184
                                                       
this test is flexible and allows the interpreting bodies to develop their doctrines in response to 
changing circumstances, such as changes in the nature and forms of discrimination. It also allows them 
to take into account changes in social values. On the other hand, it is almost void of substance and 
provides little or no real guidance for national authorities, judges, employers and service providers, 
victims of discrimination and other stakeholders. Moreover, reliance on this test does not contribute to 
legal certainty, as decisions as to whether there has been discrimination or not are bound to depend 
highly on subjective appreciation and the particular judicial ideologies and values at play in decision-
making. In particular, there is always the immanent danger that the values that come into play are 
either those social values that are predominant in the particular society in question, which would mean 
that the extent of the protection that a minority enjoys from discrimination perpetrated by the majority 
would become determined by the latter,39 or personal values held by the decision-maker, which makes 
legal protection depend on whimsical factors. What this means is that the ‘objective justification test’ 
– as well as the proportionality test, for that matter – is so general that it can be used as an empty 
place-holder for other less presentable reasons for finding or not finding discrimination. Those charged 
with interpretation and enforcement of the law are therefore vested with considerable authority and 
responsibility. 
Indeed, the open and obscure language and complexity of international and European anti-
discrimination law underlines the role and importance of judicial interpretation of that law. The fact, 
however, is that the international courts and treaty bodies have hitherto dealt only with a handful of 
cases that concern racial or ethnic discrimination. Their jurisprudence, even if combined, does not help 
to resolve the many basic but hard questions, as the case law is not by any means comprehensive or 
even well-established in the sense that a solid legal tradition would emerge from it. The low number of 
cases brought before these bodies supports the conclusion drawn earlier that the international 
supervision and enforcement structures are, at the end of the day, only the second line of defence, and 
in practice national interpretative practices are foremost in importance. 
Of course the situation is not so grim that everything is up for grabs and that any interpretation, no 
matter how unprecedented or aberrant, is accepted as legally valid by higher courts, legal scholars or 
members of the society at large. Probably most of those who interpret and apply the law do so in good 
faith, do their best to consider all relevant factors and try to suppress their prejudices from influencing 
their judgment. Many judges and legal scholars in countries that do not have a well-established body 
of case law in these matters, which is the case with the majority of European countries today, will look 
to those jurisdictions (UK, USA, Canada) that do, which will serve to bring down the number of the 
most egregious interpretations, though at the same time borrowed interpretations replicate the 
weaknesses of the initial interpretations.40 But none of this does away with legal uncertainty, and the 
fact remains that potential or actual victims of discrimination, and potential or actual perpetrators of 
 
39 This interpretation is not far-fetched when one analyses the case law of the ECtHR and the ECJ with respect to 
discrimination against transgender people and sexual minorities. See e.g. ECtHR, Sheffield and Horsham v. 
United Kingdom, judgment of 30 July 1998. 
40 Borrowing from other jurisdictions, though an ordinary practice, may indeed have its problems. A solution 
arrived at in a single case in some other legal context is not necessarily the best one or transferable as such to 
another legal context. In fact, the search for legal precedents from other jurisdictions may give rise to a snowball 
effect, where suboptimal solutions spread from court to another and from country to another, causing much 
unnecessary damage. 
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discrimination, have legal questions that they will not have answers to without resorting to litigation, 
the outcome of which will oftentimes be unpredictable. Legal uncertainty also means that there are 
major risks associated with bringing legal action through litigation, a fact which may serve as a 
disincentive for legal resolution of problems. 
Unresolved problems in the theoretical undercurrents of anti-discrimination law, the fact that the 
law does not address many key questions in any direct manner, the open language of the law and the 
more general problems that relate to treaty interpretation in the field of international human rights law 
in particular, place formidable responsibilities upon bodies whose task is to apply, interpret and/or 
monitor the implementation of that law. It is of course a truism that courts and other competent bodies 
can never simply ‘apply’ the law and that interpretation is always called for, whatever the field of law 
in question. But it may be the case that the challenges are extraordinarily present in the field of 
international human rights law, a challenge which it is important to be aware of, because it calls for 
further theoretical and doctrinal elaboration and transparency of judicial reasoning that allows the 
evaluation of judicial decisions. 
 
Openness of standards: the merit principle as an example 
 
The open nature of legal standards is often not visible, let alone widely recognized. Take the merit 
principle, which has a central place in the liberal conception of equality of opportunity, and which in 
popular discourse harbours positive connotations about neutral, objective and rational assessment of 
the qualifications of individuals who are looking for work. It is generally accepted that differentiation 
on the grounds of ‘merit’, for instance in recruitment, is legitimate and does not constitute 
discrimination. The reality is, however, that whereas people mostly speak about ‘merit’ as if there was 
nothing controversial about it, there is no single ‘merit principle’ but a number of different 
conceptions, the application of which to any particular fact scenarios lead to different outcomes in 
practice.41 What constitutes merit and what weight merit, however conceived, should carry in 
decision-making are very much in dispute.42 The measuring and ‘weighting’ of the different elements 
of a chosen conception (say, “competence, capability and availability to perform the essential 
functions of the post concerned”43) and the comparison of the merits of two or more persons, cannot 
therefore be performed in any straightforward and objective manner. 
Take the concept of competence, for instance. Is it allowed under the law and the principle of merit 
to take into consideration the kind of social, cultural and linguistic competence that helps people to get 
along with fellow workers and customers – and those in charge of hiring and firing – but which 
immigrants and persons belonging to minorities are less likely to have because such competence is 
culture specific?44 The content of notions such as these is not self-evident nor is the choice between 
 
41 McCrudden has distinguished between five conceptions (or models) of merit: (i) Merit as absence of 
intentional discrimination, (ii) general common sense merit, (iii) strict job-relatedness conception of merit, (iv) 
merit as the capacity to produce particular job-related results, and (v) merit as the capacity to produce beneficial 
results for the organisation. Christopher McCrudden, ‘Merit Principles’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, Vol 18, 
Winter 1998.  
42 Idem. 
43 This is the formulation used in the EU Framework Employment Directive, recital 17. 
44 ‘Social competence’ refers here to the knowledge of social norms prevalent in a particular context. 
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the different conceptions and their elements value-free. The choice of a particular conception and its 
application in practice requires recourse to values, which makes the whole exercise a subjective if not 
political one, which is precisely what principles such as ‘merit’ claim not to be. The reality is that the 
‘merit principle’ leaves employers and other decision makers so much room for discretion and 
tinkering of the criteria for merit that courts will have a hard time reaching the conclusion that a 
particular decision, made nominally on the basis of considerations of merit, in fact involved 
discrimination. In fact, recourse to the merit principle may indeed help employers and other decision 
makers mask their real but less presentable motives, as they may easily decide to ‘weigh’ certain 
criteria more at the expense of others so as to achieve the desired outcome without getting into trouble, 
since differentiations on the basis of ‘merit’ are a priori considered to be legitimate. Moreover, 
employers sometimes hire ‘promising’ individuals irrespective of consideration of their merits in terms 
of prior experience, but this route to employment may not be accessible to persons belonging to 
minorities because of the status harms that they experience.45 The undesirable effect of all of this is 
that victims of prejudice are led to believe that the real reason for which they were denied 
employment, promotion or some other good were their inferior merits, and in consequence they will 
not only be denied the good in question but will be left with damaged self-esteem.46 We may well be 
justified in concluding that merit arguments are more trouble than they are worth.47 
8.2.2 New problems, old solutions: the capacity to tackle everyday discrimination 
One of the key features of the current state of play in the area of non-discrimination law is the number 
of high profile human rights treaties and other documents that address this issue. Indeed, racial 
discrimination has prompted more action within the UN and European organisations than any other 
‘human rights issue’,48 with the possible exception of gender equality.49 The high number of these 
legally binding documents, the most important of which are exceptionally widely ratified across the 
world and particularly Europe, testifies positively to the fact that racial discrimination has become an 
anathema in contemporary international relations.  
In substantive terms, despite its grey areas, international law condemns gross racial discrimination 
in no uncertain terms. At the core of the international law approach is the recognition of any 
discrimination in consequence of which individuals or groups are deprived of the full enjoyment of 
their rights on the grounds of ‘race’ or ‘ethnicity’. Genocide, segregation, and other forms of manifest 
exclusion or subjugation grounded in law and/or official policies come within the purview of the law 
without a question. The same applies to isolated incidents perpetrated by extremists motivated by 
 
45 See chapter 4.2 of this book. 
46 For instance Jennifer L. Pierce, in her study of law firms, observed that ‘unqualified’ had become the code 
word for racial and ethnic minority employees. Jennifer L. Pierce ‘A Raced and Gendered Organisational Logic 
in Law Firms’, in Reza Banakar – Max Travers (eds.), An Introduction to Law and Social Theory (Oxford: Hart, 
2002). 
47 McCrudden, cit. supra note 41, p. 546. 
48 Whether anti-discrimination law should be classified exclusively, necessarily or primarily as a matter of 
human rights is a question that is not addressed here in more detail. 
49 This is clear in a quantitative and qualitative assessment of the substance of international conventions, 
declarations, plan of actions, conferences and other actions. 
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racial hatred. The prohibition of systematic discrimination by way of an official policy may even 
amount to a jus cogens norm under international law, and must be observed also in times of public 
emergency. 
These achievements are somewhat compromised, however, in two respects. 
First, the apparent resoluteness of the international legal instruments does not necessarily mean 
that people would, everywhere and at all times, be protected even from gross breaches of the law. The 
international response to racial discrimination has undoubtedly helped to cut down manifestly 
discriminatory domestic laws and policies, and individuals have by virtue of it come to enjoy legal 
protection against the most egregious forms of discrimination. However, the impact of international 
obligations depends, in practice, primarily upon the level and sincerity of commitment of each 
government. The international system as such is not necessarily capable of preventing, stopping or 
constraining even gross forms of racial or ethnic discrimination. History teaches realism in this 
respect: the ICERD was adopted in 1966, but the Apartheid policy practiced in South Africa was not 
really dissolved before the first free elections held in 1994, which was also the year when a genocide 
took place in Rwanda despite it having acceded to the ICERD in 1975.  
Second, legal protection against the most egregious forms of discrimination appears to have had 
the effect of driving underground those overt expressions of racism that were current in the past. The 
vast majority of employers and shop-keepers know better than to engage in explicit racial and ethnic 
discrimination; signs indicating “No gypsies” are not as prevalent nowadays as they used to be. Yet, 
discrimination itself, particularly in the fields of employment and provision of services and goods, has 
not disappeared. Discrimination testing studies have shown beyond any doubt that employers and 
service providers keep on discriminating, albeit possibly at lower levels than before. Those who 
engage in discrimination just do not do it openly anymore, as the fear of legal and/or social sanction 
has led them to learn how to mask their actions so as to make them appear neutral. Indeed, as the 
forms of discrimination targeted by the international human rights instruments are primarily ones 
based on state policies or propelled by open ‘racial’ hatred, it is pertinent to ask whether the legal 
approaches that were deemed most desirable forty years ago are capable of addressing problems that 
are present today. This is what we shall turn to next. 
 
Capacity to tackle contemporary discrimination 
 
The previous chapters have suggested that to be able to deal with everyday discrimination effectively 
the law should possess the following qualities: it should be able to recognize indirect discrimination, 
harassment and other subtle forms of discrimination; it should address discrimination that arises not 
just from the application of rigid rules and criteria, but from more general practices, bringing at least 
some forms of institutional and structural discrimination within the scope of the law; it should 
recognize discrimination that takes place between private parties; it should recognize and redress 
harms inflicted not just on direct victims but also on indirect victims of discrimination, the other 
members of the victimized groups in particular; and it should address not just discrimination but its 
causes and effects as well. Anything less than that will not stop the vicious circle of discrimination, 
where discrimination and disadvantage reinforce each other. 
International law has, mainly through doctrinal developments, come to recognize the notion of 
indirect discrimination and the applicability of the law in relations between private parties. The focus 
of the law is now more on victims instead of perpetrators, and discrimination is increasingly 
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conceptualized in terms of the harm inflicted upon the (direct) victims, not in terms of racism or other 
motivations behind it.50 The law has also come to recognize that discrimination may arise not just 
from rules or criteria but also from more general practices, and the different monitoring bodies have 
been able to draw attention to structural problems through their dialogue with states under the 
reporting procedure.51 Accordingly, international law has, to some extent, been brought to bear on 
systemic, institutional and subtle forms of discrimination. Yet, its main weakness in terms of 
combating everyday discrimination is that its predominant focus is on equality of rights, and that it 
does not expressly and clearly enough require states to take effective action to combat all forms of 
discrimination in such fields as employment, and access to and provision of goods and services. At 
any rate it is clear that only a few countries, even in Europe, have adopted wide-ranging equality laws 
to give effect to their treaty obligations in this respect.  
Within the EU, most of the above-mentioned positive developments find a solid legal basis in the 
Racial Equality Directive. The Directive, moreover, does not focus on equality of rights but on 
securing equal treatment in the various fields of everyday life. 
Yet the reality is that both sets of law have major difficulties when it comes to tackling certain 
aspects of everyday discrimination, such as discrimination embedded in an organisational or 
occupational culture,52 or subtle harassment that manifests for instance as avoidance or unfriendly 
verbal and nonverbal communication.53 Discriminatory disadvantage that arises out of complex 
structural, systemic and institutional factors often also escapes legal attention because it cannot be 
attributed to the acts of one individual against another.54 Both sets of law also fail in that they address 
discrimination, not so much its causes or effects. There is little or no understanding of the broader 
harm inflicted by discrimination upon the society, the economy, individual businesses and the indirect 
victims. The law does not require structural remedies such as positive action, or do so in too obscure a 
way for states to get the message.55 The provisions in international human rights conventions that 
 
 
 
50 This shift in perspective is evident in the recognition of the concept of indirect discrimination, in the 
recognition of the concept of harassment (which is not based on a comparative rationale – even if an employer 
harasses everyone on a equal basis, that is harassment) and in the move away from an approach based in criminal 
law as the model for enforcing anti-discrimination law. 
51 Particularly the HRC, the CESCR, the CERD and ECRI have the possibility to draw attention to broader 
issues, including structural discrimination, even where no individual victim comes forward, through the 
consideration of state reports. This is one mechanism through which these bodies can address discrimination and 
act as catalysts in the process of development of domestic protection. That said, these bodies’ country analyses 
are bound to be somewhat superficial, as they seldom have the requisite evidence and time to address the 
pertinent problems in their full scope and depth. For instance Banton has made the observation that many states 
use the dialogue with the CERD as an opportunity to publicize the government’s activities, and the situation is 
the same for the other bodies as well. See Michael Banton, International action against racial discrimination 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), p. 114. 
52 This has been suggested by Bob Hepple in the context of the Macpherson report and institutional racism in the 
police forces. Bob Hepple, ‘Race and Law in Fortress Europe’ Modern Law Review, Vol 67, No 1, January 2004, 
p. 12. 
53 Indeed, subtle forms of discrimination are often not considered a ‘practice’ because such incidents are of a 
more abstract and general nature, subjectively experienced and not necessarily patterned. See e.g. Birgitta 
Lundström et al, Yhdenvertaisuuslain toimivuus, Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön julkaisuja 11/2008, pp. 114, 126. 
54 Ucellari, cit. supra note 15, p. 37. 
55 A few states do, however, provide for structural remedies. Such remedies may for instance require an 
employer found to have engaged in discrimination to pursue a policy of positive action in order to obtain a more 
balanced workforce, or call an educational establishment to pursue a policy of desegregation. See Mark Bell et 
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require awareness raising and other such preventive measures that are supposed to generate a positive 
change in attitudes are opaque, little enforced, and questionable in their practical impact. The 
conclusion is warranted that the law, as it stands, is not capable of stopping the vicious circle of 
discrimination, a conclusion which is clear also in view of the empirical findings that demonstrate the 
persistence of discrimination.  
There is still some room for further doctrinal development with regard to tackling some of the 
issues identified above; yet other aspects call for further legislation. The past doctrinal developments 
have been gradual, by no means easy or self-evident, and based on international and/or domestic 
experiences and influences. That international anti-discrimination law has taken the course towards 
recognising other than discrimination motivated by racism and other forms of intolerance is not self-
evident in view of the fact that it undoubtedly was the strong moral condemnation passed on racism 
and other forms of intentional discrimination that initially built the momentum for international 
cooperation in this area. That courts and other bodies applying the law develop their interpretations 
and doctrines is business as usual for them and there is nothing inherently extraordinary or suspect 
about that. Yet there may become a point at which these bodies are subjected to criticism for engaging 
in judicial activism, a charge which may negatively affect the persuasiveness and impact of their 
decisions as well as the public image of these bodies. The first warning signs, indicating that we may 
be approaching this stage, whether right or wrong, have already appeared.56 
8.2.3 The nexus between international and domestic anti-discrimination law 
International and European anti-discrimination law has played a major role in shaping domestic laws 
and policies across Europe. It is apparent that international co-operation has prompted states to take 
domestic action in this field that they would not have otherwise taken. It appears, perhaps somewhat 
non-intuitively, to be the case that foreign policy considerations have played a major, if not decisive 
part in bringing states to negotiate, adopt and ratify international conventions, declarations and plans 
of action with regard to non-discrimination, as a by-product of which they have had to make an effort 
to live up to the standards domestically. For instance the inclusion of reference to non-discrimination 
on the grounds of ‘race’ in the UN Charter and the UDHR had much to do with the aspiration to 
formally recognize the equality of nations in the ‘inter-national’ relations, as well as with the 
condemnation of Nazism and the aspiration to prevent similar ideologies from resurfacing.57 The 
adoption of the ICERD, for its part, was a reaction to a series of anti-Semitic incidents taking place in 
 
al, Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States compared (Luxembourg: 
OOPEC, 2007), pp. 60–63. 
56 See the dissenting opinions attached to ECtHR’s decision in D.H. and others [GC], judgment of 13 November 
2007. 
57 See e.g. Johannes Morsink, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999). The connection between racism and equality of states 
(and ‘civilizations’) is made for instance in the 1978 UNESCO Declaration on Race and Racial Prejudice, 
Article 3 of which condemns “[a]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, ethnic 
or national origin or religious intolerance motivated by racist considerations, which destroys or compromises the 
sovereign equality of States and the right of peoples to self-determination”. 
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certain parts of Europe and to Apartheid policy practiced by South Africa.58 Condemnation of far-right 
political parties, the Austrian Freedom Party in particular, figured strongly behind the EU Racial 
Equality Directive. In addition to these specific impulses, international and regional action against 
racial and ethnic discrimination has most likely also been motivated by a broader aspiration (conscious 
or not) to reduce interstate tensions that would occur if migrants, diplomats, tourists and other people 
with close ties to one country were systematically subjected to racism and discrimination in another 
country.59 There has also been a tendency in international relations to take some interest in how 
countries (or some of them) treat their minorities more generally, visible for instance in the Minority 
Treaties, and this has also underlined the need for international action in this area.60 In the EU in 
particular one of the underlying motives has undoubtedly been the need to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the common market, which would be disrupted if immigrant-receiving countries were 
allowed to take the opportunity to extract the labour resources of foreign workers for less by means of 
allowing unequal pay and unequal employment security. These transnational issues related to foreign, 
security and economic policies, although not an exhaustive explanation for international co-operation 
in this area, are indeed of such a nature that they could not satisfactorily have been left to national 
solutions, and hence international action in this field has come about.61 
Perhaps a bit paradoxically, the primary way by which states have been able to take action against 
racial and ethnic discrimination internationally has been by means of committing themselves, through 
adoption and implementation of international instruments, to take action domestically.62 The impetus 
given by international action to domestic efforts is clear in view of the fact that many states had to 
adopt new legislation to give effect to their obligations under the ICERD, and that domestic anti-
discrimination laws in the EU member states were brought to an entirely new level in the course of the 
transposition of the EU directives into national laws, as only a few EU countries had anything like 
comprehensive anti-discrimination laws prior to the adoption of the Directive. The conclusion that the 
focus of action has been on perceived problems in countries other than one’s own appears warranted 
also in view of the fact that many states have not been particularly forthcoming or progressive in 
taking domestic measures to combat discrimination even after becoming legally bound by 
international and European norms. This is clear from the country reports produced by the CERD and 
 
58 Kevin Boyle–Anneliese Baldaccini, ‘A Critical Evaluation of International Human Rights Approaches to 
Racism’ in Sandra Fredman (ed.), Discrimination and Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 
pp. 148–9. 
59 One of the preambular paragraphs of the ICERD stresses that the States Parties to the Convention reaffirm 
“that discrimination between human beings on the grounds of race, colour or ethnic origin is an obstacle to 
friendly and peaceful relations among nations and is capable of disturbing peace and security among peoples and 
the harmony of persons living side by side even within one and the same State.” 
60 At the Paris Peace Conference, US president Woodrow Wilson said that “nothing is more likely to disturb the 
peace of the world than the treatment which might in some circumstances be meted out to minorities.” Cited in 
Paul Gordon Lauren, The Evolution of International Human Rights: Visions Seen (Philadelphia: University of 
Pennsylvania Press, 1998), p. 95 
61 Cf. Henkin, who argues that much, particularly of the early, standard-setting in the field of international 
humanitarian law had political-economic rather than humanitarian motivations. Louis Henkin, International 
Law: Politics and Values (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995), p. 168. 
62 In a sense this partially follows also from Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which excludes UN intervention into 
“matters which are within the domestic jurisdiction of any state”, except in specific situations envisaged in 
chapter VII of the Charter. 
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ECRI, which without exception criticise states for insufficient and/or inappropriate domestic action, as 
well as from the number of infringement proceedings initiated by the European Commission for the 
failure of some EU member states to take the requisite action to transpose the EU Racial Equality 
Directive.  
That there has been this international interest in co-operation can be considered a strength for the 
fight against discrimination, in view of the fact that a domestic political system based on majoritarian 
decision-making is not necessarily a great defence for the interests of a minority. In a democracy 
based on majoritarian decision-making, a self-interested majority can easily walk over the interests of 
a minority unless effective constraints are in place.63 Moreover, in most countries of the world only 
citizens are entitled to vote and to stand for election at national elections, which means that 
immigrants are automatically excluded from participation in the construction of the body politic to 
begin with. In consequence, protection against racial and ethnic discrimination is seldom high on the 
political agenda, as the majority does not need such protection. These considerations suggest that 
without international action and pressure, the level of protection against ethnic discrimination would 
quite likely be considerably weaker across the world today. 
On the other hand, the fact that international and European law has in many countries driven the 
development of domestic law means that the domestic laws replicate its shortcomings too. Whereas 
the international and European anti-discrimination law is clear in that it defines only the minimum 
standards of achievement that states have to comply with, the reality is that instead of being the floor, 
it may have become the ceiling.64 The number of infringement proceedings initiated by the European 
Commission for the failure to implement the EU Directive properly or at all, and the recurrent 
criticism directed by the CERD, HRC, ACFC, ECRI and other bodies at the state parties for failure to 
live up to their obligations, indicates that states have not been particularly eager to implement even the 
minimum standards. This is not the whole picture though, as many states have also gone beyond their 
minimum obligations in some respects.65 But more important than that is that the established but in 
many respects obscure and insufficient standards laid down in international and European law may 
have inadvertently steered attention away from new, creative solutions or from other forms of 
inequalities than those now addressed. 
8.2.4 Indirect effects: Reinforced essentialism and statism 
Legal remedies often have their undesired side-effects.66 In fact, just like in the field of medicine, 
there may even be cases where the cure is worse than the disease. There are two types of negative 
side-effects related to anti-discrimination law that in particular merit our attent
First, the anti-discrimination law and related discourse may inadvertently have come to reinforce 
prevailing essentialist conceptions of ‘race’ and ethnicity. The different instruments and the practice of 
 
63 Such constraints could provide for, inter alia, effective participation of the target groups in all decision making 
that is of concern to them, or a secured Constitutional status. 
64 That this may often be the case with human rights has been suggested by David Kennedy in Dark Sides of 
Virtue: Reassessing International Humanitarianism (Princeton University Press, 2004). 
65 Bell et al, cit. supra note 55. 
66 See generally on this Kennedy, cit. supra note 64. 
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their monitoring bodies reflect common-sense understandings of ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’. As the 
preceding analysis has revealed, these notions are used in a straightforward, unqualified and 
essentialist manner, meaning that these notions are by and large treated as if in reality there really were 
distinct ‘races’ and monolithic ethnic groups. This is most pronounced in the case of the ICERD and 
the work of its monitoring committee. The Convention itself refers in many places to the existence of 
separate races, and the Committee – instead of challenging this – ‘confirms’, inter alia, in its General 
Recommendation No 24 that “the Convention relates to all persons who belong to different races”.67 
The unqualified and straightforward use of such language in official contexts and in the legal 
vocabulary in particular undoubtedly contributes to, reinforces and legitimizes racial thinking 
(racialism), which as theorized in chapter 4, is a critical component of racism itself. The timid 
disclaimers found in some instruments,68 stating that the use of these notions should not be taken as an 
acceptance of theories that attempt to determine the existence of separate races, are of little avail in 
offsetting the negative side-effects, as these disclaimers remain hidden underneath a pile of racial 
language and are seldom if ever brought to public attention. In effect, a peculiar tension results 
between the universalist language and universalist aspirations of international human rights law and 
movement, and the overt use of inherently divisive racial language in the ICERD and other 
instruments. At the very least a distinction should be made between the existence of racial 
discrimination, and the existence of ‘races’; whereas there are no ‘races’ as such, there is 
discrimination based on the assumed existence of ‘races’. The two issues should be kept clearly 
separate. 
Second, the fact that international and European conventions, declarations and action plans are 
designed, adopted and implemented by states or intergovernmental bodies reinforces and almost 
reifies the role of the state in combating discrimination. It creates a statist culture which emphasises 
the role of legislation, policy programmes and other centrally coordinated action, and sustains the 
utopia that governments can effectively prevent people from engaging in discrimination and thereby 
eliminate all forms of discrimination. Such statism may inadvertently or even openly discourage non-
state action and broader mobilization and campaigning against discrimination – unless of course such 
action is backed up by the government of the day. This need not be the case, and indeed the range of 
instruments available to a government (legislation, policy programmes, and awareness raising 
campaigns) cannot and should not replace the more grass-roots oriented work best carried out by 
NGOs and independent equality bodies. Judging by the numbers, the anti-racist movement is strong in 
Europe: the European Network Against Racism, an EU-wide network of NGOs, has no less than 600 
active member organisations.69 Yet the reality appears to be that NGOs are an under-resourced, 
 
67 CERD, General Recommendation No 24, para 1. 
68 Cf. recital 6 of the Racial Equality Directive. Also one of the 38 preambular paragraphs of the Durban 
Declaration states that the participating states strongly reject “any doctrine of racial superiority, along with 
theories which attempt to determine the existence of so-called distinct human races”. 
69 http://www.enar-eu.org/ (accessed on 1.10.2009). There are also organisations other than NGOs that are active 
in this field. One particularly active organisation is the European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), which is an 
international public interest law organisation that engages in a range of activities aimed at combating anti-
Romani racism and the human rights abuse of Roma. The approach of the ERRC involves, in particular, strategic 
litigation, international advocacy, research and policy development, and training of Romani activists. 
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undervalued and underused resource in the fight against discrimination, and therefore their capacity to 
complement state action is presently somewhat compromised. 
8.2.5 The chief mischief: Individual litigation as the chosen model of enforcement 
International and European law, including anti-discrimination law, poses few requirements when it 
comes to enforcement and remedies. This deliberate choice to “respect national procedural autonomy” 
effectively defeats the promise that states have made to eliminate discrimination in all its forms. Most 
international and European instruments are content with the abstract requirement that there must exist 
an ‘effective remedy’, which is usually interpreted as requiring the existence of some kind of a 
procedural (and substantive) remedy, but not necessarily a judicial one. The ICERD and the EU Racial 
Equality Directive go a bit further, and explicitly require that victims of discrimination have access to 
a judicial or administrative mechanism.  
One of the core characteristics of international and European anti-discrimination law is that it is 
conceptualized in terms of individual rights.70 For there to be ‘discrimination’ there generally has to be 
an identifiable complainant who has suffered some legally provable disadvantage. That there may be 
more than one person who has been discriminated against in one and the same instance does not 
detract from this conclusion; the individual rights of all of them have been violated. The right to a 
remedy is an individual right as well: the law requires that mechanisms be available by which 
individuals can vindicate their rights when these have been violated. And it is indeed individuals who 
stand as respondents in courts and tribunals, although on occasion also employers and other legal 
persons may be held responsible as well. 
Is individual litigation an effective mechanism for the enforcement of anti-discrimination law? 
Does it help to prevent discrimination from taking place? Does it bring people and the society where 
they would be if there was no discrimination – or anywhere near there? The effectiveness of the 
individual litigation system has in recent years been improved in many ways. The EU Directive, and 
also the other pieces of law as interpreted by the monitoring bodies, requires states to remove many of 
the obstacles formerly associated with bringing legal action in cases of discrimination. Key aspects in 
this respect include lowering the burden of proof in other than criminal cases; the prohibition of 
victimization; the requirement of effective and proportionate sanctions; and the requirement that there 
must exist, nationally, a body for the promotion of equal treatment with a competence to provide 
independent assistance to victims of discrimination. Surely at least these advances have rendered the 
system effective? 
These improvements notwithstanding, the answer to the questions posed above must be a 
resounding “no”. Whatever the possible merits of the individual rights-based model in ‘empowering 
the victims’ (it might also be a source of stress) and in releasing pressures by at least providing for an 
opportunity to take legal action, the fact is that only a few individuals who consider themselves 
discriminated against ever take legal action. An EU-wide survey conducted among immigrant and 
minority groups found that, on average, only 18% of those who considered that they have been 
 
70 The discussion here is without prejudice to any domestic arrangements, such as class actions, which go beyond 
the minimum requirements of international and European law. 
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discriminated against had reported the matter to the competent authorities or at the place where it 
happened.71 In some countries virtually no-one had done so.72 The real numbers are likely to be even 
lower than that, because people are not necessarily aware of the fact that they have been discriminated 
against, given the oftentimes subtle or structural nature of contemporary discrimination. 
All of this has a number of consequences. Discriminating employers and shopkeepers are basically 
assured that the likelihood of being brought to court are minimal, and the likelihood of being 
convicted is smaller still, as the complainant or the public prosecutor will seldom have evidence that 
will satisfy the courts. Let us assume, on the basis of the –  grantedly limited – research evidence that 
we have, that 25% of the cases of suspected discrimination that are reported to the police lead to a 
‘guilty’ verdict in the court.73 From a European perspective, the chance of being convicted for 
discrimination that one has engaged in would therefore appear to be less than 4.5%, considering that 
only 18% of the victims report their cases to begin with.74 The figure is only indicative, but certainly 
suggests that employers and service providers are in practice free to discriminate without much fear of 
legal sanction. For the same reasons the law is not just ineffective in preventing discrimination, it is 
also ineffective in redressing discrimination that has already taken place: no legal action, no redress. 
More fundamentally, even where a victim pursues a case and is successful, the redress is (usually) 
limited in scope in that it will be aimed at making good the harm suffered by the individual 
complainant, not at remedying the harm inflicted on other direct or indirect victims. Individual 
litigation as a model of enforcement therefore has its inherent limits that will not do much to overcome 
the broader detrimental effects of discrimination and break the cycle of disadvantage. 
There are a number of reasons that explain the paucity of legal action, some of which are general 
and some of which are specific to the subject area at hand. Litigation is slow, expensive and stressful 
for the complainant. People who have experienced subtle types of everyday discrimination are often 
unlikely to be aware of that or feel confident enough about that, and have the requisite evidence, to go 
to the court. They might also feel insecure because they do not know the content of the law and the 
vagaries of judicial processes (particularly relevant in the case of immigrants75), they may lack 
 
 
 
71 European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights, EU-MIDIS: European Union Minorities and Discrimination 
Survey: Main Results Report (Vienna: FRA, 2009). 
72 Idem. 
73 A study that examined all cases of suspected crimes with racist characteristics that were reported to the police 
in Helsinki in 2006, found the following: in less than half of the cases the investigation was completed 
successfully and the case was sent to the prosecutor; the prosecutor took two out of three suspects to the court; 
and the court reached a ‘guilty’ verdict in less than half of the cases brought before it. The foremost reason why 
cases were not successful at the different stages of the judicial process was lack of evidence. See Laura Peutere, 
Rasistisia piirteitä sisältävät rikosepäilyt rikosprosessissa (Tampere: Poliisiammattikorkeakoulu, 2008). 
74 It is presupposed here, on the grounds of research evidence that suggests this, that people who report in 
surveys that they have been discriminated against do indeed have legitimate grounds for believing so.  
75 Indeed, it may well be the case that immigrants are, on the average, and because of linguistic and other 
barriers, less likely to file a claim on experienced discrimination than members of ethnic minorities. Consider the 
case of Finland, for example, where the number of Roma (a traditional minority) is thought to be around 10 000 
and where the number of foreigners (foreign citizens) is around 132 600 (situation as of 1.1.2008). A 
comprehensive impact assessment study that reviewed the domestic anti-discrimination case law concluded that 
the majority of crime reports about discrimination in access to and provision of goods and services were 
submitted by persons of Roma origin, a fact that is in stark contrast with the relatively small size of the 
community. Whereas persons of Roma origin may be more likely than immigrants, on the average, to be 
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institutional support (both legal and psychological), and there may be insufficient safeguards against 
retaliation.76 There are also groups, such as sans papiers and trafficked persons, for whom legal 
remedies remain theoretical because coming forward would put them at the risk of deportation. 
One must also take note of the fact that people are generally not very eager to go to the court. For 
example, figures from the 2008/2009 British Crime Survey (BCS) show than more than half (59%) of 
crimes were never reported to the police.77 The likelihood of reporting crime varied considerably by 
the type of offence: thefts of vehicles were most likely to be reported (89%), whereas reporting rates 
were lower for crimes such as assault without injury, theft from the person and vandalism (30%–
35%).78 The results of the BCS also indicate that victims were not inclined to report crimes that they 
considered to be a private matter, too trivial, or of such a nature that they believed that the police 
would do nothing about them.79 All of the above factors may indeed explain the low volumes of legal 
action in the subject field at hand. This reinforces the conclusion that individual litigation is not a 
particularly effective mechanism for the enforcement of anti-discrimination law. 
The emphasis on individual litigation as the model of enforcement of anti-discrimination law may 
well spring from the prevalent episodic understanding of discrimination. Enforcement through 
individual litigation might suffice if equality really was the rule and discrimination the exception, if 
racial discrimination was a curable anomaly within the otherwise healthy society, if it only were a few 
very unfortunate individuals who were discriminated against. But in a society permeated by everyday 
discrimination it cannot plausibly be expected that every time someone is harmed she or he will bring 
legal action. As mentioned, litigation takes time, energy and money, thus being a major burden. All 
this leads to the following question: is there not something fundamentally unfair about a system that 
puts the burden on the aggrieved individuals to take action to correct the wrongs done unto them? 
Should not the burden rest on the side that engages in discrimination? 
Chapters 9-13 of this study present and analyze the strengths and weaknesses of a variety of 
approaches that go beyond the individual rights and individual litigation based approach to anti-
discrimination law. 
8.3 Conclusions: Of camouflage and loose cannons in the fight against 
discrimination 
Activities in the subject area at hand are frequently referred to as “fight against discrimination”, 
“combating discrimination” or “mobilization against discrimination”.80 The use of military metaphors 
gives the impression that decisive action and large-scale interventions and campaigns are underway 
and that these operations are based on carefully planned strategies and clear objectives. It appears to 
 
discriminated against, this factor cannot plausibly explain the discrepancy in its entirety. Lundström et al, cit. 
supra note 53, p. 128. 
76 See e.g. Mark Bell, Anti-Discrimination Law and the European Union (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), pp. 49–50. 
77Alison Walker et al (eds.), Crime in England and Wales 2008/09, Home Office, July 2009, p. 25. 
78 Idem. 
79 Idem; Sian Nicholas et al (eds.), Crime in England and Wales 2006/2007, Home Office, July 2007, p. 26. 
80 See e.g. the Durban declaration. 
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be only a matter of time when discrimination is defeated once and for all, and indeed promises to that 
end are made. 
Prima facie, there indeed appears to be much action. There have been numerous dedicated 
decades, well-known and well-ratified conventions, detailed declarations and ambitious action plans. 
Important bodies have been set up for the purposes of monitoring the conduct and activities of states in 
this area. Different bodies and most of their individual members have undoubtedly done what they 
could to advance the good cause. A high number of individuals have fought the good fight in the roles 
of activists, lobbyists, legal counsellors, judges, prosecutors, scholars, advisers, campaigners, policy 
officers, teachers, artists and so on, and deserve our praise for that. Significant advances have been 
made, a high number of cases have been won, and the egalitarian agenda is more widely accepted 
today than probably ever before. There is no reason to belittle the impact or importance of any of that. 
Yet the strides made cannot overshadow the impression that something is still seriously wrong. Seen 
from the perspective of victims of discrimination, the protection offered by the law amounts to not 
much more than a camouflage or a smokescreen. There are several reasons for this state of affairs. 
The demands posed by international and European anti-discrimination law are intense. The law 
sets out structures which not so much dictate that one should not oppress strangers, but that one should 
treat strangers as brothers and sisters.81 In view of the prevalence of discrimination in contemporary 
Europe and the wide variety of factors that explains it (racism, prejudices, stereotypes, unconscious 
motives) this is, frankly speaking, a demand of great intensity. The obligation to eliminate 
discrimination, imposed by states parties on themselves, is a demand of even greater intensity; as a 
matter of fact, it demands too much, as no state can possibly live up to it. In effect, progress towards 
the meeting of these demands does not come without a real fight and it is clear that any progress in 
tackling these challenges is bound to be incremental and slow to emerge. 
There is little evidence that governments have really grasped, or perhaps even wanted to grasp, 
how drastic measures they would have to take to keep the promise to eliminate discrimination. This is 
evident for instance in that they have been slow to adopt comprehensive and effective anti-
discrimination laws. This state of affairs is at least partly the result of a mindset according to which 
racism and racial discrimination are exceptional phenomena that bedevil only a few unfortunate 
societies. The ICERD itself is greatly influenced by this mindset, stating as it does in its preamble that 
the states parties to the Convention are “[a]larmed by manifestations of racial discrimination still in 
evidence in some areas of the world”.82 This mindset has by no means disappeared. Thus, the majority 
of governments, sixteen out of thirty, that were invited to respond to an inquiry by a UN Special 
Rapporteur in 1994 – almost thirty years after the adoption of the ICERD – replied that racism, racial 
discrimination, xenophobia or related intolerance does not exist in their country.83 No progress in 
 
81 Damian Chalmers, ‘The Mistakes of the Good European’ in Sandra Fredman (ed.) Discrimination and Human 
Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 194. 
82 Emphasis added. The UN Declaration on Elimination of All forms of Racial Discrimination contains a similar 
paragraph, in addition to which it proclaims that “although international action and efforts in a number of 
countries have made it possible to achieve progress in that field, discrimination based on race, colour or ethnic 
origin in certain areas of the world continues none the less to give cause for serious concern.” 
83 Report on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination xenophobia and related intolerance prepared by 
the Special Rapporteur of the Commission on Human Rights, 23 November 1994, UN doc. A/49/677, paras. 40–
45.  
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elimination of any problem can be made if there is widespread denial about the existence of that 
problem. 
There has also been a more general reluctance to confront some of the difficult but basic questions 
involved. Drafters of international and European documents have either been unwilling, or unable 
because of lack of general agreement, to really address what equality should be taken to mean and how 
it could be achieved. The existing legal regime is less the result of the gradual unfolding of some great 
vision, theory or a set of first principles, than a reaction to particular human catastrophes and a non-
monolithic bundle of a number of theoretical, philosophical and political influences, economic 
interests, interstate compromises, legal models adopted from particular countries, and lately also 
interest group lobbying. Yet between the lines, the different documents set formal equality of 
opportunity, national unity and political liberalism as ‘default positions’. There is, in a sense, a bias 
towards social order rather than social justice.  
One of the key characteristics of the law is its open language and wide use of terms and principles 
such as ‘objective justification’ and ‘proportionality’. Open language does not necessarily have to be 
suspect or a weakness; it does also provide opportunities. Yet the reality is that terms such as these 
leave those charged with interpreting and applying the law much room for manoeuvre, meaning also 
that various subjective – individual or social – values, beliefs and prejudices can come into play. 
Given the pervasive nature of prejudices and stereotypes, which are often not consciously held, this 
can be highly problematic. Open terms are loose cannons – sometimes hitting the mark, often missing 
it – in that they can be used to justify almost any subjective moral assessment: sometimes nothing is 
more subjective than what a person considers to be objective. International bodies and legal scholars 
aspire to contribute to the formation of a more systematic and coherent legal opinion, but the impact of 
these efforts is always limited. The reality is that judges and other persons and bodies charged with 
applying the law tend to prefer rigid rules instead of provisions couched in open language, because 
they do not have the time to read through the relevant analyses and materials, which moreover may not 
be applicable in the specific circumstances of the case and can be obscure, equivocal or inconsistent 
with some other part of the law. There is no doubt that an empirical inquiry into judicial practice, 
particularly the practice of courts of first instance, would in any jurisdiction reveal a stunning diversity 
of approaches and interpretations in questions of law (and also of interpretations of fact in comparable 
circumstances).84 In consequence there is always the danger that the open terms used in law may 
backfire in practice and lead to disappointing results from the point of view of victims of 
discrimination.  
The greatest single obstacle for making major advances in the fight against discrimination is the 
individualist orientation of the law and the consequent individualization of the fight. The battle is 
fought in single, usually relatively minor episodes that will not have broader impact. It is fought by a 
few isolated and aggrieved individuals who face major legal and de facto hurdles (building up a case, 
gathering evidence, general personal deprivation) and who mostly lack sufficient institutional support. 
 
84 To take the example of Finland again, specialized training courses and text books on anti-discrimination law 
are available for judges, prosecutors, legal counsels and other legal professionals. Yet, decisions rendered by 
courts and tribunals in these fields often surprise scholars and create controversy. The existence of the same 
phenomenon can be observed at the international level, as is clear for instance from the great number of 
scholarly critiques of the decisions of the ECJ in the field of gender equality and positive action in particular. 
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The massive mobilization suggested by the use of military language is simply not there. The fight is 
passive, reactive, backward-looking and defensive, not proactive or future or results oriented. The 
general preventive effect of the law is poor, and the law ignores the collateral damage inflicted on 
indirect victims of discrimination, the society at large and those direct victims who lack the means, 
will or awareness to pursue legal action.  
The individualist orientation of the law comes with a high price, but is no surprise, as that law is 
embedded in a broader legal and social culture that takes individuals and individual rights as its 
exclusive rallying point. The individualist orientation may come at the expense of social action, 
collective remedies, and duties to promote equality. The language of individual rights possesses 
rhetorical force, but the danger is that the fundamentally important interests ‘protected’ by means of 
rights remain nothing but rhetorical for the individuals concerned. Rights, if actively relied upon, can 
be powerful weapons in one-to-one legal fights, but they will not help to win the broader war against 
contemporary forms of racism and discrimination. The existence of rights creates the impression, if 
not illusion, that all is well and problems are tackled, when in fact problems are rampant and little 
progress is made. This, it is suggested, might also more generally be a problem with human rights.85  
Anti-discrimination law is caught in a Catch-22 situation. On the one hand, the blindness of the 
liberal paradigm to collective or group level problems prevents it from identifying the real problems 
and consequently, better responses to discrimination. On the other hand, group-based remedies and 
other measures are highly problematic, given that there are no uncontroversial answers to questions 
such as “which groups are entitled to particular remedies such as positive action?” and “on the basis of 
which criteria can we determine whether a person belongs to such a group?”86 Racism and racial 
discrimination operate in an arbitrary manner and are based on a variety of unscientific and mutually 
contradictory racial beliefs and ways of categorization. Whereas the law should ideally remedy the 
harms inflicted, no conceivable law can replicate the unscientific and contradictory beliefs and ways 
of categorization that brought the harm in the first place. This fact alone results in a kind of imbalance 
which makes redress difficult. Moreover, also other kinds of categorization systems – even those that 
appear scientific - are problematic, as they can never be fully objective, and therefore risk increasing 
the levels of racial awareness and essentialism that in turn can reinforce discrimination and levels of 
racism. The solution, then, lies in strategies that take the collective aspects involved fully in account 
without falling victim to an essentialist approach to ‘race’ and ethnicity in hope that one could render 
these subjects ‘governable’: it is for the law to fit to the facts, not for the facts to fit to the law. 
Any final verdict about the effectiveness of present anti-discrimination law in bringing about the 
desired social change must necessarily be mixed and cautious. On the one hand the law poses some 
intense demands; on the other hand, it is weak in enforcing those demands. These two viewpoints are, 
naturally, connected: one could not, up until now, have had anti-discrimination law that was both 
 
85 The observation that rights are actually put to use only when they are evoked is not new. This state of affairs 
is, however, not always seen as problematic. See e.g. Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and 
Practice, (2nd ed., Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2003). 
86 See Timo Makkonen, Identity, Difference and Otherness: The Concepts of ‘People’, ‘Indigenous People’ and 
‘Minority’ in International Law. Eric Castrén Institute Research Reports 7/2000 (Helsinki: University Press, 
2000); Dwora Yanow, Constructing “Race” and “Ethnicity” in America: Category-Making in Public Policy and 
Administration (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). 
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ambitious in its content and enforcement. Feminism and other social movements have shown that 
positive social development is painstakingly slow to take place, especially where a change of attitudes 
and socially prevalent and culturally transmitted beliefs is called for. Any progress is therefore likely 
to be gradual, and the imposition of staunch enforcement measures at an early stage of the process 
could even have been counterproductive. Yet, the level of ambition should rise with the progress that 
is made, and the time has come to take the fight against discrimination to the next level. 
It is difficult and perhaps unnecessary to assess whether the failure on part of the states to keep the 
promise to eliminate all forms of racial discrimination is due to ignorance, indifference or unfounded 
optimism. Quite likely all of these factor in. The ineffectiveness of the present legal response has in 
any case not escaped the attention of the main actors in the international human rights arenas. For 
instance one of the first preambular paragraphs of the 2001 Durban Declaration laments the fact that 
“despite the efforts of the international community, the principal objectives of the three Decades to 
Combat Racism and Racial Discrimination have not been attained and … countless human beings 
continue to the present day to be victims of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related 
intolerance.” But the response of the ‘international community’, socialized into international rights 
talk, has been to dedicate more decades and declarations for the individual rights based fight against 
discrimination, as the Durban Declaration and Programme of Action with its 341 articles so amply 
testifies to. But this course of action is flawed in that the problem is not so much quantitative as it is 
qualitative, and in that measures need to be taken nationally, not just internationally; there is a need to 
fundamentally rethink the response to discrimination. Within the EU area the adoption and national 
implementation of the Racial Equality Directive represents new openings, in that there are elements in 
the Directive that go some way in rendering the national legal protection against discrimination more 
effective. But it does not go long enough, because the problem is not just that of effectiveness. There 
is not just a gap between theory and practice; the theory itself is flawed in that it cannot achieve its 
stated purposes. In consequence, as things stand, any country that wishes to make further headway in 
combating racial and ethnic discrimination must necessarily go beyond the existing international and 
European requirements.  
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9 Rethinking the response 
The previous chapters have identified and analyzed the problems with discrimination, the present 
international and European responses thereto, and the problem with these responses. The present legal 
response was found to be severely limited, and in consequence there is a need to rethink the response. 
The following chapters examine key legal and policy tools that can help to narrow down the gap 
between the promises and the practice.  
Envisioning strategies for dealing with social problems is a tricky business. It is difficult to assess 
the scope and nature of complex social problems to the full, and to devise effective remedies. There is 
always also the risk of just bypassing these key stages of problem-solving by resorting simply or 
primarily to personal preferences, the influence of which can of course never be fully avoided anyway. 
Idealists think that everything should – and therefore can – be changed; conservatives think that 
nothing can – and therefore should – be changed. The kind of critical pragmatism advocated in this 
study would, on the other hand, suggest that we should be as clear as possible about what should be 
changed and what can be changed (as these are not always the same), and concentrate our efforts on 
the areas where these two overlap. Bearing this in mind, we can usefully rethink the response by 
engaging in a holistic analysis and by distinguishing – as in military and business parlance – between 
the objectives, strategies and tactics of the fight against discrimination. Objectives are fundamental 
and set out the desired outcomes, strategies are broad means for achieving the objectives, and tactics 
are more specific means for implementing and supporting the strategies. The following subchapters 
develop a framework of principles that provide guidance in the setting out of these aspects in the 
subsequent chapters, and perhaps also in the broader societal debate about the means and objectives of 
the law, this study being but one contribution to that debate. 
9.1 Objectives 
Equality through rights or politics – or both? 
 
There is a tendency in mainstream legal and political discourse not to put to question the objectives 
and means of law, particularly insofar as that law deals with matters that are perceived to belong to the 
realm of human rights. This is of course linked to the fact that disrespect of law and particularly of 
human rights has brought about intolerable suffering in the past. But even this should not overshadow 
the fact that these rights and the associated pieces of law are the result of political processes, inter-state 
compromises reached by what after all is a small number of state representatives, and particular 
political, philosophical and religious projects. The meaning of the concept of ‘equality’ is contested, 
and the way the law defines it, privileges some conceptions of it to the detriment of others. 
The previous chapters have examined the nature and objectives of the present anti-discrimination 
law. The main thrust of international and European anti-discrimination law was found to be on 
equality of rights and on market equality. That law does touch upon other possible dimensions of 
equality, such as material, political and cultural equality, but only somewhat lightly and vaguely. It 
would certainly not be unfair – at least from some vantage points - to conclude that the present 
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cluded.3 What is needed is a more inclusive, reflective and transparent 
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ve 
are
international anti-discrimination law has not realised its full potential, as it allows injustices of 
recognition, distribution, and representation by not really engaging those themes as it could.  
Not only is the content – to the extent that we can speak of it in such essentialist terms – of the law 
socially and politically constructed, but so is its judicial and scholarly interpretation, including the 
terms in which those interpretations are framed, in our case ‘race’, ‘disadvantage, ‘merit’ and so on. 
What this means is that the law is formulated and interpreted in this way although it could also be 
formulated and interpreted in that way, and that there is a structural bias in that only some people and 
thereby some interests have been and are engaged in these processes.1 It should be acknowledged that 
laws, institutions and other major social arrangements are the end result of a competition of different 
socio-political interests and usually reflect the prevailing distribution of power, and that the 
competition continues after this in the struggles about the interpretations of law and the operations of 
institutions.2 In particular and most importantly, it appears that the people most directly affected by 
the different forms of exclusion, that is immigrants and persons belonging to minorities, are by and 
large excluded also from the legislative and judicial processes in which their very exclusion 
ressed.  
If it is accepted that the practical implications of equality cannot be deduced from some universal 
principles, then that concept must be opened up for a society-wide and -deep dialogue. That dialogue 
should, as a matter of principle, be open, inclusive and permitting maximum contestation. That said, it 
should be recognized that – again with a necessary degree of generalization – states, and the powerful 
economic, political and other elites behind them, have until now dominated the discussions. It is now 
time for the ‘international community’ and each state to pay attention to those whose voices and 
interests have hitherto been ex
ion of equality and justice. 
It is not to be expected that the previously silenced will speak with one voice, and even less that 
their points of view would not often clash with those of ‘the establishment’. But conflict is desirable, 
because it forces us to deliberate more deeply about the moral and political choices involved, and their 
effects. Some may find it difficult or undesirable to criticize the present arrangements, the present 
legal instruments and institutions upholding them, for they are – often with good justification – 
perceived to do good, to be on the right side. Yet, these instruments and institutions cannot be elevated 
above criticism, for they might well be made to do a better job. Indeed, there is a need to keep the 
existing arrangements under review at all times, because all progress stops the very second people are 
satisfied with the existing achievements. The lack of constructive criticism also leaves the deliberati
nas to those who criticise the existing arrangements for all the wrong, say purely racist, reasons. 
Acknowledging the social and political constructedness of law, also that dealing with fundamental 
rights, and of the de facto diversity and pluralism of values, again also in matters of fundamental 
rights, emphasizes the fundamental role of the political sphere (in sensu lato) as the arena for settling 
                                                        
1 On the concept of structural bias, see Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: the structure of 
 Justice, Development and Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2002). 
international legal argument (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, reissue with new epilogue). 
2 Idem. 
3 See e.g. Anne Phillips, ‘Multiculturalism, Universalism and the Claims of Democracy’, in M. Molyneux and S. 
Razavi (eds.) Gender
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ies and 
n opportunity to adjust those guarantees through inclusive democratic deliberative processes.6 
bjectives of equality law for the purposes of the present discussion 
e 
done to achieve the kind of social change anticipated by the contemporary anti-discrimination law?”  
9.2 Strategies 
ethodological notes 
these issues.4 Yet, the matter is not that straightforward. To begin with, we should not naively assume 
that the controversies will be resolved through open confrontation in the context of political 
deliberation, and that the process somewhat miraculously leads to a rationally motivated consensus 
either through the prevailing of ‘the best argument’ or through a negotiated compromise that can be 
generally accepted. The criterion of consensus is unrealistically demanding; people do not rely only 
upon reason but also their biases, and there are power differentials in consequence of which bargaining 
positions are not by any means equal. It is simple mathematics that majorities enjoy a privileged 
position in a representative democracy, whereas minorities can be out-numbered and out-voted. And 
inasmuch as majorities are not free from biases, prejudices and negative stereotypes, as we have 
reason to believe, then the outcomes of democratic processes cannot be presumed to be without bias 
either. The many examples of ethnic persecution in – at least nominally – democratic societies is all 
the reason that is needed for putting in place strict, enforceable and ultimately ‘non-negotiable’ legal 
safeguards for persons belonging to minorities. There are perhaps no fully satisfactory solutions for 
resolving the dilemma between democratic policymaking and rights that protect minorities by 
‘trumping’ the possible damaging outcomes of such policymaking,5 but these considerations would 
seem to support constitutional democratic systems where there are legal guarantees for minorit
a
 
O
 
Whereas there is thus a need for a deeper and broader debate about the meaning of ‘equality’, it is not 
desirable or even possible to try to pre-empt that discussion by anticipating the outcomes of that 
debate for the purposes of the present study. In consequence, the rest of the chapters focus upon how 
the objectives outlined in the now prevailing international and European anti-discrimination law can 
best be met. In effect, the rest of the study examines possible answers to the question “what should b
M
 
The following chapters present four broad categories of measures that are geared towards helping to 
close the gap between the rhetoric of the law and the reality on the ground. These measures are 
subjected to a strict scrutiny so as to assess their potential effectiveness and the circumstances in 
which they can be presumed to work. Too often these or some other measures are optimistically and 
                                                        
4 See also Andrea Baumeister, Liberalism and the ‘Politics of Difference’ (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University 
Press, 2000). 
5 For the theory of rights as trumps, see Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1978). 
6 At the time of the writing many European countries, including United Kingdom, are reviewing their equality 
policies and laws, and particularly the objectives thereof, through broad consultative processes. See e.g. 
Equalities review, Fairness and Freedom: The Final Report of the Equalities Review (Crown, 2007).  
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Equally often these solutions are 
dism
ions rest in part on hunch and guesswork.7 Yet, our advice and 
ecisions can only be as good as is the information that they are based on, meaning that it is necessary 
 research, and in the future to review existing policies 
henever new evidence comes up. 
 better than them. Furthermore, for many individuals and groups living in Europe, ‘equality’ is 
not
tal institutions. Minorities and immigrants, with their 
ow
                                                       
even naively presented as off-the-shelf panacea sure to deliver, without any consideration of the 
challenges that they bring or the negative side-effects that they have. The presentation of this or that 
solution as a cure-all to discrimination creates high but false expectations, and may bar the further 
development of more effective tools to fight discrimination. 
issed on the grounds of (supposed or real) incompatibility with some political vision, or as too 
costly, without any real consideration of the viability or benefits of the action in practice. There is 
therefore a need to steer clear of any such abstracted approaches.  
Methodically, the following analysis combines theoretical considerations with empirical research 
and experiences from different countries where available. The approach is multidisciplinary, as 
singular approaches are inherently insufficient for capturing and analysing the subject areas at hand. 
This study does not claim to present conclusions that are certain to work everywhere and every time. 
Societies are not the same, and no society is a machine, the problems of which can be identified and 
fixed by means of some socio-technical engineering. Often it will be true that even with the best 
application of tools of multidisciplinary analysis and research, it is not possible to project all the 
foreseeable consequences of a far-reaching and complex policy or legal tool, and at the end of the day 
any policy advice and policy decis
d
to make full use of all relevant experience and
w
 
No mechanical legal or policy transplantation 
 
The roots of the European legal and policy response to racial and ethnic discrimination can to a large 
extent be traced to the United States. But Europe, as heterogeneous as it is, is demographically, 
politically and historically different from the US. For Europe – with a highly necessary degree of 
generalization – the problem is not a binary Black and White problem of major socio-economic 
differences that are to a significant extent due to history of slavery and other forms of ‘white 
supremacy’ and economic exploitation, but a more theoretically complex situation of high number of 
heterogeneous ‘old’ minorities and ‘new’ immigrant groups living within what are still perceived as 
nation states, with many of these groups doing worse economically than the ethnic majorities but some 
doing
 just about equal opportunities and inclusion but also about appreciation and respect for the 
diversity of cultures, languages and religions, in contrast to the ‘melting pot’ ideology prevailing in the 
US.  
The latter aspect is relevant, because the nationalist idea-forces operating in Europe, building on 
Europe’s nation-statist traditions, oppose the recognition of ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. As 
an empirical fact, nation states are largely a thing of the past, but they still exist as political ideals that 
have a hold of public imagination and many socie
n traditions and cultures, fit badly into that picture. The upholding of strong social identity-based 
 
7 See e.g. Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1981), p. 19. 
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 In consequence, whatever measures are taken to combat discrimination, they should be 
bas
nsequence that strategies that require a high level of 
cial awareness to be operational, in particular those that involve the collection of personal racial 
e. Europe should therefore rethink anti-discrimination law 
nd policy with fresh, unprejudiced eyes, and perhaps decide what the best course of action is by 
boundaries between ‘us’ and ‘them’, is one of the barriers that inhibit ‘them’ from being fully included 
in the society supposedly consisting just of ‘us’. 
Insofar as social identities are part of the problem, they must also be part of the answer. A 
consistent theme in much social-psychological writing on prejudices, for instance in the seminal works 
of John Duckitt and Rupert Brown, is that our policies should attempt to minimize the destructive 
potential of category divisions by decreasing the salience of those divisions.8 This does not mean that, 
for instance, national identities should be rendered empty of meaning or somehow culturally neutral. 
Rather, it could for instance mean updating that identity by means of discarding the myths of a single, 
overriding and essential ethno-national identity, narrative and future. A national identity, a kind of 
‘super-identity’, may be formed around common citizenship, inclusive civic participation, common 
economic interests, and the recognition of a range of ethnically or otherwise more specific 
‘supraidentities’. Indeed, both Brown and Duckitt hold that it is not just possible but also necessary 
both to recognize cultural and ethnic diversity and the associated group dynamics, and to work 
towards decreasing the salience of group boundaries by means of fostering an overarching, common 
civic identity.9 Also the fact that we all have multiple identities (based on gender, age, religion, 
profession, hobbies and so on) should be recognized: research evidence suggests that the recognition 
of multiple group memberships and of crisscrossing loyalties is a key factor in having good intergroup 
relations.10
ed on, or at least be compatible with, the recognition of deep cultural and social diversity, but steer 
clear of divisive identity politics. The American ‘melting pot’ cultural policy, which is also reflected 
in the theoretical premises of its anti-discrimination law tradition, should not as such be imported to 
Europe.  
A certain necessary break with the Anglo-American model of anti-discrimination law and policy 
arises also from the fact that most of the Europe is not as ‘racially aware’ as is the US or the UK. For 
many in Europe, their ‘racial identity’ is not their primary social identity, and even talk of ‘races’ is 
found repulsive in some societies. This has the co
ra
data, may not be viable for most of Europ
a
learning from others and then forgetting about it. 
 
The proper role of anti-discrimination law 
 
Any legal-political strategic planning should involve the consideration of the proper role of the law in 
                                                        
8 John Duckitt, The Social Psychology of Prejudice (London: Greenwood, 1994), p. 260; Rupert Brown, 
ichael Harris Bond, Social Psychology Across Cultures (Essex: 
pp. 269–270. 
Prejudice – Its Social Psychology (Oxford: Blackwell, 1995), p. 269. 
9 Idem. This also calls for facilitation of cross-cultural adaptation, which in this context refers to encounters with 
different people, different norms, different standards, and different customs. What sustains individuals in this 
process is a willingness to open oneself up to new cultural influences, a willingness to face obstacles head-on by 
the use of instrumental strategies, and a resolve not to run away. These motivations require time and peer support 
for their sustained deployment. Peter B. Smith–M
Pearson Education Limited, 1998), 
10 Brown, cit. supra note 8, p. 78.  
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oaches will 
be 
 social protection laws and/or laws providing for cultural and religious rights. And at all 
mes one should keep in mind that the law can be used not just to prohibit and punish, but to allow, 
e. This is an all the more relevant consideration in the field of combating 
iscrimination, given that much of discrimination does not arise from a ‘guilty mind’ but from 
achieving policy ends. One starting point is that laws are often imperfect means for achieving social 
policy goals such as equality in its different dimensions.11 Ample evidence comes from the field of 
gender discrimination: the principle of equal pay has been part of the international and EU law since 
the 1950s, but there still isn’t a single country in the EU where women’s wages are equal to those of 
men.12 It has also been observed that anti-discrimination law has grown in complexity to such a degree 
that the enforcement of legal obligations has become somewhat impractical.13 Disappointment with 
the capacity of the law to induce social change has led policy makers, particularly at the EU level, to 
look for new forms of governance, based not on command and control but on facilitating and 
encouraging change through less hierarchical and coercive mechanisms. Some characteristics of this 
approach include guidance by information – that is by means of identification and spreading of ‘best 
practices’ through research, benchmarking, validation and peer learning – and inclusive participation 
by all the stakeholders concerned in the formulation of the ends and means of a policy.14 Some 
mechanisms, including data collection and mainstreaming, that are linked with these appr
discussed in the following chapters. Yet, as that discussion shows, also these mechanisms are of 
limited efficiency in affecting social change. This means, among other things, that the role of ‘hard’, 
enforceable law should not be forgotten.15 Indeed, it appears that the pursuance of a dual-track 
approach, based on the utilization of both legal and policy tools, is the most viable way to combat 
discrimination.  
When considering the role of law, one should keep in mind that some of the objectives that anti-
discrimination law is hoped to achieve, say material equality and cultural equality, may perhaps better 
be met by
ti
encourage and/or to facilitat
d
unconsciously activated stereotypes and unreflective application of established organisational 
practices. 
 
Problem-centred approach 
 
Discrimination is not, as the preceding chapters have hopefully made clear, a problem; it is a whole 
bunch of problems. Any response to it that purports to be effective must acknowledge the full range of 
inequalities and their causes and effects. The response must therefore address subtle and unsubtle 
forms of discrimination, and individual, structural and institutional discrimination. It must recognize 
                                                        
11 See e.g. Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992), p. 44 ff. 
12 Commission of the European Communities, Report from the Commission to the Council, the European 
Parliament, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on equality 
between women and men 2006. Brussels 22.2.2006, COM(2006) 71 final. 
13 Dagmar Schiek, ’From European Union non-discrimination law towards multidimensional equality law for 
Europe’ in Dagmar Schiek – Victoria Chege (eds.), European Union Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative 
perspectives on multidimensional equality law (Oxon: Routledge-Cavendish, 2009), p. 11. 
14 See e.g. Tanja A. Börzel et al, Conceptualizing New Modes of Governance in EU Enlargement (Free 
University of Berlin, 7 February 2005). 
15 See also Kevät Nousiainen, ‘Utility based equality and disparate diversities – from a Finnish perspective’ in 
Schiek - Chege (eds.), cit supra note 13. 
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 victims of discrimination suddenly start to take their cases to the courts in high numbers. 
must start to think about how to redistribute the costs arising from 
also be based upon the recognition that discrimination is highly 
ervasive in contemporary societies and is part of the daily social reality and the mainstream society, 
A fo
 today in Europe than there were twenty-thirty years ago – we do not have the statistical 
dat
individual people’s attitudes. Quite vice versa, top-to-bottom awareness raising and sensitising 
the collateral damage inflicted by discrimination on its indirect targets, including the victims’ families, 
individuals with same origins, businesses, and the society at large. It must recognize that it is not just 
racism and prejudices that explains discrimination, but unconscious stereotypes, opportunistic 
cost/benefit calculations, (often discreetly) biased organisational cultures, and unequal social 
structures and realities. It must also be based upon the recognition that there is nothing on the basis of 
which we can expect prejudices, stereotypes, racism and discrimination to disappear all of a sudden, or 
to expect that
In part this means that we 
discrimination. The response must 
p
not a matter of seldom-occurring episodes taking place at the fringes of the society or in some distant 
unfortunate countries. In short, action against discrimination must be brought from the fringes to the 
mainstream. 
  
cus on behaviour and attitudes 
 
Anti-discrimination policy is currently almost exclusively oriented on the idea that it is possible to 
affect a change in people’s behaviour but that it is not possible to affect a change in people’s 
attitudes.16 This idea, which fits squarely into the framework of mainstream liberal political 
philosophy and therefore resonates well among large audiences, is unsatisfactory in two respects.  
First, as we have seen time and again, the means – primarily legal means – that European countries 
have used for affecting a sea change in behaviour have not worked. There may be fewer acts of 
discrimination
a to know this for a fact – but what we do know is that discrimination is a widespread and serious 
problem today.17 While there is both room and reason for increasing the efficiency of anti-
discrimination legislation and its enforcement, it would quite likely take extraordinary enforcement 
mechanisms coupled with unduly harsh sanctions for the individual litigation –based law to really 
affect a profound change in discriminatory behaviour. This is not at the radar at the moment, nor 
should it be. 
Second, the idea that it is not possible, or at any rate desirable, to try to affect a change in people’s 
attitudes is too cautious, to say the least. To say this is not to suggest any kind of direct influencing of 
campaigns using leaflets, advertisements and diversity training schemes may be counter-productive, 
                                                        
16 That law cannot, partly for reasons of burden of proof, attempt to control attitudes and beliefs but only 
observable behaviour, was influentially argued by Roscoe Pound in his seminal article ‘The limits of effective 
legal action’ 27 Int’l J. Ethics 150 (1917). 
17 The evidence that there is about progress made in combating racial and ethnic discrimination is neither 
ework for a Fairer Future – The Equality Bill (The Stationary 
ffice, June 2008). 
comprehensive nor particularly reassuring. With regard to the latter aspect, evidence from the UK, a country that 
has been rather active in fighting discrimination, shows that ethnic minorities were 17.9% less likely to find 
work than those belonging to the ethnic majority in 1997, whereas some ten years later the gap was still 15.5%. 
British Government Equalities Office, Fram
O
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other factors that play a central part in the creation and maintenance of those biases. 
The two most important means in this respect, as discussed in this study, are the reduction of 
intergroup distance and the reduction of intergroup differences in material wellbeing. Not to realise 
iss an opportunity to work towards equality but to be complicit in the maintenance 
t their voice is 
rea
ating ethnic discrimination is just one of the infinite number (or so 
it s
for instance because many people may find such direct attempts at changing attitudes repulsive.18 
Information-based campaigns risk only reinforcing the faith of the already converted, as people are 
selective in that they tend not to be receptive to information that does not fit into their existing world 
view. Instead, we should recognize that the way the society and social relations are organized affects 
people’s perceptions, values and behaviour, inevitably, in good and bad, irrespective of whether we 
want it or not or are even aware of it. Negative stereotypes and prejudices are socially constructed and 
culturally transmitted, and an enormous amount of social psychological literature and research has 
shown how to reduce intergroup biases and tensions through affecting a change in those social 
structures and 
this is not just to m
of inequality.  
9.3 Tactics 
By far the most important, though not exclusive, tactical move that those promoting equality can make 
is to engage, head-on, in all debates that have a bearing on equality, whether of a political, judicial, 
scholarly or popular nature. Conversely, the worst mistake one can make is to remain passive, 
particularly considering that the hundreds of European human rights groups and associations 
representing minorities seldom enjoy the kind of powerful position that ensures tha
lly heard by the right audiences unless these groups use every opportunity to speak out loud. In 
contrast, there are other stakeholders, such as the social partners, that do wield considerable political 
power and that can ensure that their intended audience is listening whenever they speak, but who have 
interests that do not always coincide with those of the immigrant and minority groups. 
The proactive equality measures discussed in the rest of the book are resource-intensive. It cannot 
be presumed that states are willing to invest in them to the extent that it would take to achieve major 
social change towards a more equal society, unless policy makers begin to demonstrate real leadership. 
For them to do that, it is up to those who are discriminated against to demand such leadership.19 At 
any rate it is highly likely that the different stakeholders with an interest in promoting equality – 
ranging from NGOs to equality bodies to government departments in charge of equality issues – will 
have to continue to struggle with limited resources. There is constant pressure for minimizing public 
expenditure, and the cause of comb
eems) of ‘good causes’ that compete for public funding. Accordingly, the stakeholders concerned 
                                                        
18 There is, indeed, empirical evidence that suggests that for instance diversity training schemes may have, if 
anything, counterproductive effects. Alexandra Kalev – Frank Dobbin – Erin Kelly, ‘Best Practices or Best 
Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies’ American Sociological 
Review, August 2006, Vol. 71, pp. 589–617. 
 
19 Paul Lappalainen, ’Stimulating leadership to promote positive action’ in European Commission, Putting 
Equality to Practice: What role for positive action? (Luxemburg: OOPEC, 2007). 
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 then what follows is that the 
fight against discrimination cannot be reduced into something that its victims have sole responsibility 
for. As our analyses have revealed time and again, discrimination is not the kind of an interpersonal 
mination law would have us to believe. Rather, it is a matter for the 
ublic resources should be devoted for. Any other approach to this issue 
base on discrimination. 
The
h a long time-span, and to mobilize a comprehensive range of strategies: the 
ma
must think hard about how to deploy the resources they have, and must be clever in assessing what is 
possible in given political and social circumstances so as not to waste scarce resources available on 
endeavours that will not pay off.20 
Yet it should not be hard to make the case for substantial increases of funding. If there is a 
consensus that discrimination is a social problem, a matter of justice,
dispute that the present anti-discri
society, something that p
simply aggravates the injustice of the perverse economics of discrimination, where the costs of 
adverse treatment are borne by its direct and indirect victims, not by the perpetrators. In short, the 
principle should be ‘the discriminator pays’, not ‘discrimination pays’. 
9.4 Conclusions 
There is a need to affect a paradigm shift from static non-discrimination policies to more proactively 
attuned anti-discrimination policies, and beyond that, to positively attuned policies for the promotion 
of equality. Presently dominating strategies, such as providing the direct victims the opportunity to 
bring legal action does not prevent discrimination from taking place, and cannot remedy it, given the 
low rates of legal action. Proactive deployment of a broad spectrum of preventive and remedial 
measures is therefore called for. 
Whatever policies are adopted and whatever measures are taken, they must respond to the real 
problems on the ground. On this basis it is necessary to build to a knowledge 
 response itself must be as multifaceted as is the problem, and must be directly targeted at the 
particular problems: for instance, negative stereotypes and collateral damage should be addressed by 
means of positive action and redistributive measures; subtle, structural and institutional forms of 
discrimination should be made visible by means of research and investigations, and remedied by 
means of placing proactive duties on organisations to identify these problems and to make the 
necessary adjustments; and opportunism based on cost/benefit calculations should be discouraged by 
increasing the likelihood and intensity of costs of discrimination.  
Taken together, these viewpoints support the conclusion that it will be necessary to incite action on 
a broad front and wit
ny dimensions of inequality have built up over a long period of time, and will take a long time to 
bring down. As Christopher McCrudden has put it, a “wise policy maker, therefore, will not want to 
put all her eggs in one basket, and will want instead to keep a range of tools available with which to 
attempt to achieve the desired changes in behaviour.”21 It is also crucial to recognize that the forms of 
inequality and discrimination will not stay the same permanently but will change, which means that 
                                                        
20 Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The Racial Equality Directive as a Basis for Strategic Enforcement’ in Janet Cormack 
(ed.) Strategic Enforcement and EC Equal Treatment Directives (Migration Policy Group, 2004), p. 52. 
21 Christopher McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal Change 
(Oxford: OUP, 2007), p. 128. 
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re, at this time and age, already rather widely shared. The 2008 Declaration of 
Prin
 this field as it is possible to get, as it was developed and signed by 128 prominent 
human rights experts and advocates from 44 countries. Similarly with the conclusions of this study, 
the Declaration calls for action on a broad front and underlines that “the right to equality requires 
positive action”, that states should “[p]romote equality in all relevant policies and programmes”, and 
that “States must collect and publicise information, including relevant statistical data” to uncover and 
remedy inequalities.22  
There is therefore a need to examine in more detail the modalities by which the proactive 
initiatives identified above can be implemented, and the related challenges. This is done in the 
following chapters. 
                                                       
also measures that are aimed at countering them must change accordingly: our policies must be 
reflexive at all times. 
These conclusions a
ciples on Equality, which was developed for the purposes of “modernising and integrating legal 
standards related to the protection against discrimination”, comes as close to achieving a consensus 
among the experts in
 
22 Declaration of Principles of Equality, principles 3, 11 and 24 in particular. The Declaration is available at the 
website of the Equal Rights Trust, www.equalrightstrust.org (visited 1.1.2010). 
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10 Collection of equality data 
Evidence suggests that each year millions, quite possibly tens of millions people living in Europe 
experience discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origin.1 Yet most of this discrimination 
remains invisible, under the radar. In consequence of this we have difficulties with assessing the 
nature, prevalence, causes and consequences of discrimination and designing countermeasures. At the 
same time, anti-discrimination law has widened its focus from an emphasis on individual prejudice to 
one which addresses organizational and societal patterns and practices. Group outcomes are 
emphasised, both in order to diagnose discrimination, and to discover whether remedial measures have 
been effective. This in turn makes it important to have access to statistical data and to be in a position 
to utilize such data in a way that is relevant for fighting discrimination and promoting equal treatment. 
In short, there is a need to collect and utilize so-called ‘equality data’. 
The notion of equality data is used in this study in reference to any piece of information that is 
useful for the purposes of analyzing the state of equality. The information may be quantitative or 
qualitative in nature. The main focus is on equality statistics, by which are meant aggregate data that 
reflect inequalities, their causes or effects in the society. All EU countries have taken some measures
in order to produce equality data in relation to ethnicity, but only a few countries have developed 
anything like a systematic or institutionalized framework for doing this.2 The existing data tends to be 
good as far as it goes, but it just does not go very far.3 This state of affairs can be contrasted with the 
widespread collection and use of equality data in the field of gender equality, where it is already 
widely accepted that commitment to equality requires measuring of progress made towards achieving 
it.  
Some methods of producing equality data involve the collection and other processing of ethnic 
data. The idea of collecting such sensitive data raises many concerns and fears. This is because the 
data are, by themselves, capable of being used for both legitimate and illegitimate purposes, as also 
experiences with past misuses show.  Because of this some people are of the view that ethnic data 
should not be collected, not even for the purposes of combating discrimination. It is also widely 
believed that collection of sensitive data is prohibited by international, EU and/or national laws 
relating to the protection of personal data. The following discussion will therefore discuss these 
matters and make a distinction between those data collection methods that involve the collection of 
ethnic data, and those that do not. 
 
1 This conclusion appears warranted, considering that immigrants and members of national minorities number 
possibly around 140 million in Europe and that in the MIDIS-survey conducted by the FRA some 30% of the 
respondents reported that they had been discriminated against on the grounds of their ethnic origin in the course 
of the last 12 months. 
2 Lack of data collection on ethnic discrimination was clearly demonstrated in the course of the work carried out 
by the now defunct European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC). See e.g. EUMC, Racism 
and Xenophobia in the EU Member States – trends, developments and good practice. Annual Report 2005 – Part 
2 (EUMC, 2005). 
3 Timo Makkonen, European Handbook on Equality Data (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007). 
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10.1 The policy case  
A survey conducted by the European Commission in 2004 found that 93 % of the respondents, most of 
whom were experts in the field of anti-discrimination, were of the view that data collection was 
‘important’ or ‘very important’ to the development of effective policies to promote equality and tackle 
discrimination.4 Also governments have on several occasions recognised the need to compile equality 
statistics.5 This widespread recognition of the need for data collection reflects the many and absolutely 
vital roles that statistical data can play in this context, as outlined below. 
 
Evidence-based policy development and implementation 
 
Data can be highly useful for the purposes of policy development and implementation both at the 
national and European levels. Decisions can only be as good as the information on which they are 
based, which means that decision-makers need as much information as they can get in order to arrive 
at the right decisions. It will be hard to arrive at the right decisions if they have to be made in the dark 
or be arrived at through trial and error. Making the right analyses and decisions right at the start helps 
to better secure equal opportunities of the individuals and groups concerned, being cost-effective in 
addition. Equality considerations are relevant for all policy areas, including employment, education, 
health care and provision of services and goods. Data is indispensable for identifying and overcoming 
inequalities in these fields of life, and can help to identify the best course of action to take, although 
they cannot an sich guarantee the quality of actions. In any case, research and statistics on the extent 
and nature of discrimination are the key to overcoming the common ‘no problem here’ attitude, and to 
provide an explanation for the public for the need to take more effective anti-discrimination 
measures.6 The integral role played by research in the formation of European and national anti-
discrimination laws and policies in different countries is well 
Ideally, in a knowledge-based society, information emanating from statistical and other research 
feeds into every stage of the decision-making process:  
 
 
 
 
4 European Commission, Response statistics for Green paper on anti-discrimination and equal treatment. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu.  
5 See for instance the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of 
Action of 12 July 1993, A/CONF.157/23. 
6 The ‘no problem here’ attitude has been documented e.g. by Wrench, see John Wrench, ‘Combating 
Employment Discrimination in Europe: National Variation and the Dawn of ‘Good Practice’’ in Erna Appelt –
Monica Jarosch (eds.) Combating Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe (Oxford: 
Berg, 2000), p. 275. 
7 Existence of more evidence of racial discrimination in the different spheres of life was cited by the European 
Commission as one of the reasons why the Racial Equality Directive went further than the Framework 
Employment Directive in terms of material scope of application. See Communication COM [19999] 564 of 25 
November 1999, and Jan Niessen, ‘The Starting Line and the promotion of EU anti-discrimination legislation: 
The role of policy-oriented research’ Journal of International Migration and Integration Vol. 1, No 4, December 
2000.  
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Figure 2. The role of data in evidence-based decision-making. 
 
Judicial decision-making 
 
Statistical data is sometimes a conditio qua sine non for the judicial assessment of whether 
discrimination has taken place. To the extent that modern forms of discrimination are subtle and 
covert, they are also less easy to prove. Direct evidence of discrimination is rare, and where such 
evidence exists, corroboration is even rarer.8 Problems of evidence are present in both criminal and 
civil proceedings, and although shifting the burden of proof in civil cases, brought about by the EU 
Directive, eases that burden somewhat, complainants still have to establish “facts from which it may 
be presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination” in order to make a prima facie case 
resulting in the shift the burden of proof to the respondent.9 Empirical evidence can help to build such 
 
8 Fitsum Alemu, Testing to prove racial discrimination: methodology and application in Hungary. An internet 
article available at: http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=1016 (accessed 1.10.2009). 
9 Article 8 of the Racial Equality Directive. 
STATISTICAL AND OTHER RESEARCH 
1 Background research can support policy making by assessing the state of the nation and by 
identifying and analyzing present and future challenges; 
2 Applied research, such as prospective impact assessments, can provide guidance on the best 
available means to tackle the identified problems; 
3 Other types of applied research, such as retrospective impact assessments based on indicator 
data, can tell if the adopted policies and measures have been effective in practice or if adjustments 
need to be made. 
Setting goals to be reached; Setting 
priorities; 
IMPLEMENTATION  
Choosing the means by which the 
goals are to be reached 
EVALUATION 
Assessment of the effectiveness of the 
measures taken 
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a case, either by demonstrating the adverse nature of some treatment or by forming the broader 
background against which a particular decision or practice can be assessed. In any event, statistics 
constitute circumstantial, as opposed to documentary, evidence.10 
It is usually not necessary to provide statistical data to make a prima facie case of direct 
discrimination. This is because it should suffice to show that only one individual has been treated 
unfairly in comparison to another, whereas statistics deal with the aggregate level of analysis and do 
not as such conclusively prove that a particular individual has, or has not, been discriminated against. 
In particular, statistics produced by the respondent, showing e.g. a balanced workforce, should not 
suffice – at least not alone – to rebut a case made by the complainant. The fact that an employer does 
not discriminate as a matter of regular practice does not prove that he or she did not do so in a 
particular instance. 
There is a very important exception to the above-stated main rule, however. Judicial bodies know 
that it may be difficult for a complainant to bring even prima facie evidence of discrimination, and 
may allow the use of statistical evidence to infer direct discrimination. In particular, statistical 
evidence may be used to establish a regular pattern of treatment of a particular group: regular failures 
by the members of a group to obtain appointment or promotion, or clear evidence of under-
representation in particular grades, may give rise to an inference of discrimination. In such situations, 
statistical evidence may in practice be a conditio qua sine non for successful pursuance of a case, 
especially if no other evidence is available or if it is too weak.11 For instance, in the British case 
Marshall v F Woolworth & Co. Ltd., the complainant considered that she had not been offered a job 
because she was Black, i.e. that direct racial discrimination was involved. An employment tribunal 
inferred the existence of direct discrimination from the fact that there was no Black person working at 
the store in question, even though there is a sizeable Black community living in the local area and half 
of the job applicants were black.12 In Britain a court may use the monitoring records of an employer, 
showing an imbalance in e.g. the ethnic profile of the workforce, to draw an inference of 
discrimination.13 Statistics may also play an important role in showing that the justification proffered 
by the respondent is merely a pretext.14 The respondent can in turn introduce statistical evidence that 
challenges the relevancy, accurateness or completeness of the statistics relied on by the complainant. 
 
10 See e.g. Joseph L. Gastwirth, ‘Statistical Evidence in Discrimination Cases’ J. R. Statist. Soc. A (1997). 
11 The situation prevailing under the EU law can be contrasted with the situation prevailing under the US federal 
law. In the US, statistics are often admissible in individual disparate treatment cases, but they are rarely 
determinative without additional anecdotal evidence, because of the need to show the intent to discriminate. See 
Jay W. Waks. et al, ‘The Use of Statistics in Employment Discrimination Cases’ The Trial Lawyer, Vol. 24 
(2001), p. 261. 
12 Marshall v F Woolworth & Co. Ltd , COIT 1404/80, ET. 
13 For instance in West Midland Passenger Transport Executive v Singh, Balcombe LJ in the Court of Appeal 
stated that “statistics obtained through monitoring are not conclusive in themselves, but if they show racial or 
ethnic imbalance or disparities, then they may indicate areas of racial discrimination…. In the absence of a 
satisfactory explanation in a particular case, it is reasonable to infer that the complainant as a member of the 
group has been treated less favourably on grounds of race. Indeed, evidence of discriminatory conduct against 
the group in relation to promotion may be more persuasive of discrimination in the particular case than previous 
treatment of the applicant which may be indicative of personal factors peculiar to the applicant and not 
necessarily racially motivated.” West Midland Passenger Transport Executive v Singh [1988] ICR 614 at 619. 
14 Waks, cit. supra note 11. 
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The concept of indirect discrimination, as it has been conceived in the EU law and in the case law 
of the various monitoring bodies, rests, as discussed, on a comparative approach. Indirect 
discrimination is concerned more with substantive outcomes than with any formal consistency of 
treatment.15 Indeed, it recognizes that sometimes formally consistent application of seemingly neutral 
criteria may in fact have discriminatory effects. All of this quite readily calls for identification and 
measurement of possible gaps in achievement that may emerge between two groups of people. 
In the employment context comparisons can be drawn in a number of ways. Comparisons can be 
drawn for instance between those who have applied and those who have been selected, between those 
who are in employment and those who live in the relevant catchment area and so on. 
Consider the following case from Britain: 
In Aina v Employment Service, a Black African employee applied for the post of equal 
opportunities manager in his organisation. He was assessed as having the skills and ability for the 
job. However, his application was rejected because, unknown to him, the post was open only to 
permanent staff at higher grades than his. Monitoring data showed that the organisation had no 
permanent Black African employees at the grades in question. The employment tribunal held that 
there was no justification for the requirement, and that it amounted to indirect discrimination on 
racial grounds.16 
 
As in direct discrimination cases, respondents are allowed also in these cases to submit data of their 
own that challenges the relevancy, accurateness or completeness of the statistics relied on by the 
complainant. 
While the comparative rationale of the concept of indirect discrimination invites the use of 
statistical evidence, such evidence is in practice not required in all, or perhaps even in most cases.17 In 
some circumstances the competent bodies may take ‘generally known facts’ into account, and make 
assumptions about ordinary behaviour without requiring statistical evidence. For example in the 
British case of Panesar v Nestlé Co Ltd it was accepted that those with Pakistani ethnic origins were 
more likely than others to have beards, and therefore a claim for indirect discrimination could be made 
out against a rule that prohibited employees from having beards.18 In two other British cases, Mandla 
v Lee19 and Singh v British Rail Engineering,20 bans on the wearing of turbans were treated as making 
out a claim for indirect race discrimination against Sikhs. Importantly, the European Court of Justice 
has confirmed in its case law in the field of gender discrimination that there are circumstances where it 
is not necessary to analyze the specific consequences of the application of a criteria or practice in 
order to find indirect discrimination.21 
 
 
 
15 For a general discussion of this, see Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2002), p. 106 ff. 
16 Aina v Employment Service [2002] DCLD 103D. 
17 Cf. the European Parliament, which has submitted that it considers that indirect discrimination becomes 
impossible to prove in the absence of statistical data. European Parliament Resolution on non-discrimination and 
equal opportunities for all - a framework strategy /2005/2191(INI)), adopted on 14 June 2006, para 18. 
18 Panesar v Nestlé Co Ltd, [1980] IRLR 482. 
19 Mandla v Lee, [1983] IRLR 209. 
20 Singh v British Rail Engineering, [1986] ICR 22. 
21 See e.g. the case of Schnorbus, where the selection procedure regarding access to practical legal training 
discriminated against women because of the preference accorded to applicants who had completed compulsory 
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Despite the potential usefulness of statistical evidence in deciding discrimination cases, the 
overwhelming majority of the EU countries so far has none, or only very limited experience of it. This 
situation can be contrasted with the widespread use of statistics in the field of sex discrimination cases 
in Europe,22 and with the equally widespread use of statistics in the field of racial discrimination cases 
in the USA. The lack of experience in this regard appears to be directly linked to the present lack of 
ethnic data in Europe. It must also be noted that the compilation and use of statistical evidence 
involves many difficult and technical obstacles, particularly with respect to the identification of the 
correct pools of comparison. In effect, even if ethnic monitoring was introduced across Europe, it may 
take some time before the legal cultures of the EU member states become accustomed to the use of 
statistical data in the present context.23 
 
Monitoring by specialized bodies 
 
One of the reasons why equality data is needed is because the national specialized bodies and 
international monitoring bodies need it in order to perform their monitoring and supervisory functions. 
As appears from the examples below, the international bodies have frequently asked the states parties 
to furnish them with the necessary equality data. It should be recalled that all EU member states are 
parties to the main human rights conventions, and are thus under a direct legal obligation to report 
periodically on the human rights situation in their countries and to include in these reports quantitative 
and qualitative information, also in relation to discrimination.24  
– The UN Human Rights Committee, in its guidelines for state reports, reminds the contracting 
states that their reports should include “sufficient data and statistics” in order to enable the 
Committee to assess progress in the implementation of human rights by states parties.25 
– The UN Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, in its guidelines for state 
reports, calls states to provide “[s]tatistical data on the enjoyment of each Covenant right, 
 
military or civilian service, which could be done only by men. The court said: “…it is not necessary in this case 
to analyse the specific consequences of the application of the [selection criteria]. It is sufficient to note that, by 
giving priority to applicants who have completed compulsory military or civilian service, the provisions at issue 
themselves are evidence of indirect discrimination since, under the relevant national legislation, women are not 
required to do military or civilian service and therefore cannot benefit from the priority accorded by the 
abovementioned provisions of the JAO to applications in circumstances regarded as cases of hardship.” ECJ, 
Schnorbus v. Land Hessen, case C-79/99, 7 December 2000, paragraph 38. 
22 ERRC – Interights – MPG, Strategic Litigation in Europe: From Principles to Practice (Nottingham: Russell 
Press ltd, 2004), p. 82. 
23 Timo Makkonen, Measuring Discrimination: Data collection and EU Equality Law (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 
2007). 
24 The reporting system is being reformed at the time of the writing with a view to rationalizing it. The new 
instructions for state reports included in the Harmonized guidelines on reporting under the international human 
rights treaties, including guidelines on a core document and treaty-specific documents (see HRI/GEN/2/Rev.5, 
29 May 2008) underlines the importance of data collection, and provides that states should develop an efficient 
system for the collection of all statistical and other data relevant to the implementation of human rights (para 15). 
The Indicators for assessing the implementation of human rights, listed in Appendix 3 to the Guidelines, further 
requires that all social, economic, cultural, demographic, political, and justice system statistics be disaggregated 
by “main population groups”. 
25 HRC, Consolidated guidelines for state reports. CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev.2 (26.02.2001), paragraph C.6. 
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disaggregated by … ethnic origin” on an annual comparative basis. In relation to Article 2 on non-
discrimination, the Committee asks states to “provide disaggregated and comparative statistical 
data on the effectiveness of specific anti-discrimination measures and the progress achieved 
towards ensuring equal enjoyment of each of the Covenant rights by all.”26 
– The UN Committee on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, in its guidelines 
for state reports, calls states to collect information on the ethnic characteristics of the population. In 
view of the Committee, “[i]f progress in eliminating discrimination based on race, colour, descent, 
or national or ethnic origin is to be monitored, some indication is needed … of the number of 
persons who might be treated less favourably on the basis of these characteristics.” The Committee 
also calls states to monitor all trends that can give rise to racial segregation; to provide statistics on 
complaints filed, prosecutions launched and sentences passed in relation to discrimination; to 
provide information on whether persons of minority origin are proportionately represented in all 
State public service and governance institutions; to indicate whether persons belonging to protected 
groups are over- or underrepresented in certain professions or activities, and in unemployment; to 
indicate any variations in the level of education and training between the different population 
groups; to indicate whether the protected groups are concentrated in particular localities; and to 
describe different needs for health and social services. The Committee also requests state parties to 
describe, “as far as possible in quantitative and qualitative terms, factors affecting and difficulties 
experienced in ensuring the equal enjoyment by women of rights under the Convention”, and 
specifies that they “should provide data by race, colour, descent and national or ethnic origin, 
which are then disaggregated by gender within those groups”.27 
– The Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities, in its outline for country reports, also calls for the collection of necessary data. 
According to the outline, states should provide “factual information … such as statistics and the 
results of surveys.” The document also points out that “where complete statistics are not available, 
governments may supply data or estimates based on ad hoc studies, specialized or sample surveys, 
or other scientifically valid methods, whenever they consider the information so collected to be 
useful.”28 
 
An express treaty obligation to monitor the realization of human rights through data collection 
mechanisms has been a long time coming. That idea was, in the context of ethnic equality, introduced 
in the Durban Declaration, which urges states to 
 
26 CESCR, Guidelines on treaty-specific documents to be submitted by states parties under articles 16 and 17 of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (E/C.12/2008/2, 24 March 2009), paras 3 
and 10 in particular. 
27 CERD, Guidelines for the CERD-specific document to be submitted by states parties under article 9, 
paragraph 1, of the Convention (13 June 2008), CERD/C/2007/1, paras 11 and 19 in particular. 
28 ACFC, Outline for reports to be submitted pursuant to Article 25 paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention 
for the protection of national minorities. Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 30.09.1998. ACFC, 
Commentary on the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and 
economic life and in public affairs [ACFC/31DOC(2008)001, Strasbourg 5 May 2008], paras 30–31. 
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collect, compile, analyse, disseminate and publish reliable statistical data at the national and local 
levels and undertake all other related measures which are necessary to assess regularly the situation 
of individuals and groups of individuals who are victims of … racial discrimination.29 
 
The Declaration also invites states to “improve concepts and methods of data collection and analysis” 
and to “develop indicators of progress and participation of individuals and groups of individuals in 
society”, and endorses quantitative and qualitative research.30 There are also other instruments calling 
for the collection of data in relation to discrimination.31  
It should also be kept in mind that the national bodies for the promotion of equality, which all EU 
Member States are required under Article 13 of the Racial Equality Directive to have, are under the 
Directive to “conduct independent surveys concerning discrimination” for the purposes of analysing 
the problems involved and studying possible solutions.32 Whereas the term used (“surveys”) is generic 
to the extent that member states seem to have a wide discretion as to how to go about fulfilling this 
requirement, Article 13 underlines in general the need to build to a national knowledge-base on 
discrimination. 
 
Workplace monitoring 
 
Data can be an indispensable tool for organizations, such as business enterprises and government 
agencies, which want to make sure that their firing, hiring and other policies and practices comply 
with the equal treatment laws. They can do this by monitoring the composition of their workforce and 
applicants by ethnic origin. The resulting aggregate internal data can be used to track down how 
people with different origins are treated for instance with respect to promotion and retention, to ensure 
that there are no biases in this respect. The data may also be compared with external benchmark data 
showing the composition of the general population for the purposes of detecting possible under-
representation in the organization as a whole. In a similar vein, an organization that provides services 
to the public may want to monitor its service delivery. For instance, a housing agency may want to 
monitor its service delivery to ensure that it provides equal housing on equal terms for everyone. For 
all this to be possible, the organizations in question need to collect the necessary internal data, in 
addition to which they would benefit from the availability of suitable external benchmark data, such as 
census data, against which it can compare its internal data. Ethnic monitoring is currently practiced in 
Britain, Canada and the United States. Monitoring is practiced also on other grounds: for instance, in 
Northern Ireland designated authorities and all employers with ten or more employees are required to 
monitor the composition of their workforce in terms of (religious) community background and sex.  
 
 
 
 
29 Paragraph 92. 
30 Paragraphs 93 and 94. 
31 Article 31 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, entitled “Statistics and data 
collection”, provides that “States Parties undertake to collect appropriate information, including statistical and 
research data, to enable them to formulate and implement policies to give effect to the present Convention”. 
32 Article 13 and recital 24 of the Racial Equality Directive. 
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Awareness raising 
 
Qualitative and quantitative data can be a major asset for sensitizing and awareness-raising activities. 
Reliable evidence on the extent and nature of discrimination can serve as a compelling, factual 
baseline for national discussion on discrimination, benefiting governments and NGOs alike, as they 
use this information for the purposes of advocacy, awareness-raising and education. Indeed, there is 
evidence suggesting that that this kind of information is frequently used for these purposes and is 
perceived to be an effective tool in this respect.33 
 
Resource for researchers 
 
In many ways, researchers and statisticians are the eyes and the ears of the society. Equality data is an 
indispensable resource for researchers seeking to improve our understanding of discrimination as a 
phenomenon. Research, again, is a prerequisite for developing and implementing more effective 
policies to fight discrimination. Given that discrimination is a complex and often subtle social 
phenomenon, it can often be rendered visible only by means of rigorous research efforts.  
 
Other uses 
 
In addition to these rather practical functions, the compilation of equality statistics can be seen to have 
more symbolical functions. Already the mere existence of a data collection system sends a message to 
the actual and potential perpetrators, actual and potential victims, and the general society, signalling 
that the society disapproves of discrimination, takes it seriously, and is willing to take the steps 
necessary to fight it. This can have a general preventive effect.  
It should also be noted that the fight against discrimination requires broad-based mobilization and 
action, and this is facilitated by data collection, as data renders discrimination visible and helps to 
make inequality a societal concern instead of being a concern just to its victims. 
10.2 Methods 
The data needs, identified above, are substantial. No single data source alone can meet all these needs. 
Discrimination is a complex social phenomenon, which makes it is a tricky subject to study and 
analyze. A single data source usually throws light into one aspect of discrimination (typically either its 
causes, nature, extent or effects) from a single point of view (the victim’s, society’s, or perpetrator’s), 
in addition to which the different data sources vary, as will be discussed, in terms of their validity and 
reliability. These challenges mean that it is essential to adopt a multi-source and a multi-method
approach to the investigation of discrimination.34 It is only when a mutually consistent pattern of 
 
33 Niklas Reuter – Timo Makkonen – Olli Oosi, Study on Data Collection to measure the extent and impact of 
discrimination in Europe. Final Report 7.12.2004. Available at http://ec.europa.eu/social (accessed 1.10.2009). 
34 Makkonen, cit. supra note 3. 
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results across different analyses emerges that we can achieve a reasonably valid picture of 
discrimination as a social problem. It is therefore necessary to set up and support several mechanisms 
by which equality data is compiled.35 The different mechanisms, their uses, and their advantages and 
disadvantages, are discussed below. 
 
Official statistics 
 
Official statistics are, by definition, produced by government agencies, and form an integral part of 
society’s infrastructure. All countries in Europe produce population-wide statistics on employment, 
level of education, income, health and wealth. Such statistics provide all-important information of the 
socio-economic status of the population, and if broken down by racial or ethnic origin, they provide a 
relatively solid point of entry for the analysis of the situation of the different population groups. There 
are three possible primary sources of social, economic and demographic data: population censuses, 
household surveys and administrative records. Different countries have adopted different approaches 
in this respect. 
The compilation of equality data through official statistics has two major advantages. First, the 
necessary data is often produced by the state on a regular basis, which allows for the steady 
development of longitudinal data, enabling trend analysis. Second, socio-economic data provides an 
important insight into the effects of direct, indirect and structural discrimination as well as all other 
causes of disadvantage. This is important, as it is patently difficult to measure indirect and structural 
discrimination in particular.  
While this source of information has its benefits, it has its limitations as well. First, not all 
discrimination leads to observable differences in outcomes, which means that some forms of 
discrimination are not visible in socio-economic statistics.36 Second, it is challenging to establish 
clearly the portion to which the disadvantaged position of a group, as shown by outcome statistics, is 
the result of discrimination. While it may safely be assumed that members of groups that are 
discriminated against are worse off than they would be if they were treated equally, it is extremely 
difficult to establish the extent to which their socio-economic disadvantage results specifically from 
discrimination. Some researchers have used multivariate analyses37 in an attempt to control the other 
relevant variables, such as average level of education, in order to estimate the extent to which 
disparities in, for instance, income and employment level result from discrimination. The ability to 
effectively carry out regression analysis poses further demands on data collection, as it requires the 
availability of a wide range of ethnic data, for instance with regard to educational achievements. Such 
data is currently not often available. In addition, the method itself has also been subject to some 
 
35 National Research Council, Measuring Racial Discrimination. Panel on Methods for Assessing Discrimination 
(Washington DC: National Academies Press, 2004). 
36 This would categorically be the case with some types of discrimination, such as denial of access to a restaurant 
on the basis of ethnic origin, which is unlikely to lead to differences in socio-economic status. A person may also 
be repeatedly discriminated against in access to employment, except for once, and thus be able to obtain a 
position that matches her qualifications. Therefore even repeated events of discrimination may not always lead to 
observable differences in outcomes. 
37 Under a multivariate analysis, discrimination is found through the unexplainable residual gap that remains 
between two groups even after all the variables that can be reasonably assumed to have factored in have been 
taken into account and controlled for. 
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criticism.38 In consequence, statistics based on official data sources perhaps best function as 
indicators: they pinpoint differences in outcomes but do not exp
At any rate, however, it is highly valuable also from the point of view of other policy goals to 
establish if there are differences in socio-economic situations of different groups, even if it cannot be 
positively established to what extent the disparities result from discrimination. The existence of 
disparities calls for closer investigation of the matter and possibly also the adoption of appropriate 
remedial measures. This is especially the case where the statistics disclose disparities in outcomes 
across multiple areas of life, such as employment, housing and health.39  
 
Complaints data 
 
Another type of baseline data on discrimination is provided for by so-called ‘complaints data’. 
Complaints data is generated as a by-product of the work carried out by those bodies that, in one way 
or another, handle discrimination complaints. Complaints data typically includes information on the 
numbers and types of complaints filed with a particular body within a particular timeframe, typically a 
year. Also other data may be available, such as aggregate profiles of offenders/respondents and 
complainants, broken down by variables such as age and gender. The primary source of complaints 
data is the justice system. Such sources of data include tribunals, regular and specialized courts, and 
specialized bodies such as equality commissions and ombudsmen. In those countries where 
discrimination is a criminal offence, complaints data can also be compiled on the basis of police crime 
report registers and prosecution registers. Complaints data, in the broad sense of the notion, may also 
be available through non-governmental organizations that provide direct services (for instance advice 
and assistance) to victims of discrimination.  
As useful as statistics on complaints are for some purposes, particularly for highlighting the nature 
of reported discrimination, they constitute poor indicators of any actual levels of discrimination. Cases 
that are reported to the police or taken to the courts represent but the proverbial tip of the iceberg – 
exactly how small the tip is, is difficult to estimate unless some other data is available, such as victim 
survey data. 
 
Research 
 
Several types of research methods are available for the purposes of studying inequalities. These 
include the following. 
Victim surveys. Victim surveys refer to studies whose purpose is, as the name suggests, the 
gathering of information about the experiences of people at a particular risk of discrimination. Victim 
surveys provide a good overview of the extent, nature and effects of discrimination as experienced by 
the people concerned. Surveys can provide detailed information, such as information relating to the 
 
38 See P.A. Riach – J.  Rich, ‘Field Experiments of Discrimination in the Market Place’ The Economic Journal 
112, November 2002, p. F481. From a theoretical perspective, one limitation of the method is that it does not 
take into account the extent to which the variables that are controlled for reflect discrimination in themselves. 
39 Here it needs to be reiterated that for instance the EU Directives link the adoption of positive action measures 
to the existence of disadvantages, not just discrimination. 
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experienced obstacles in access to justice, and the effects, psychological and other, of discrimination. 
While victim surveys can be instrumental in assessing the dark figure of discrimination, it should be 
underlined that victim surveys can measure only the subjective experiences of the respondents: the 
actual prevalence of discrimination may be higher than indicated by the responses, as the respondents 
may not always be aware that they have been discriminated against; on the other hand, the prevalence 
of discrimination may be lower than indicated by the responses, as individuals may sometimes 
erroneously attribute a negative event to discrimination even if discrimination played no part in it. In 
any case, results from victim surveys can provide highly important insights into the operation of 
discrimination and how people cope with it. 
Self-report surveys. Self-report surveys focus on the attitudes, opinions and/or behaviour of 
respondents. These surveys are usually directed at the general public, or a specific target group, such 
as employers. Attitude surveys in the context of anti-discrimination work are usually used to map out 
the prevalence and type of prejudices and stereotypes within a specific population. Attitude surveys, 
when conducted at regular intervals, give information on changes in attitudes, and can thus function as 
an early warning system: while there is no straightforward correspondence between negative attitudes 
and discriminatory behaviour at an individual level, increased social acceptability of prejudices signals 
a danger of increasing levels of discrimination in the society in general. Surveys can also set out to 
inquire about behaviour and practices that are questionable from the point of view of equal treatment. 
While people may be reluctant to report such behaviours (the same applies to negative attitudes), they 
are more likely to do so if their responses remain fully confidential. 
Discrimination testing. Testing is a form of social experiment in a real-life situation. In 
discrimination testing, two or more individuals are matched for all relevant characteristics other than 
the one that is expected to lead to discrimination, in our case ethnic origin.40 The testers apply, for 
instance, for a job or an apartment, usually on numerous different occasions, and the outcomes and the 
treatment they receive are closely monitored.41 The method was originally developed as a tool for 
checking compliance with the law, and may be used as a means of evaluating the effectiveness of anti-
discrimination legislation.42 The discrimination testing method has been applied in many different 
contexts, such as access to employment, housing and other kinds of services and goods. Despite its 
robust nature in exposing discrimination, it does have its limitations: it has some inherent limitations 
such as that it cannot be used to study discrimination beyond a certain stage – for example, it can be 
used to study the first stages in access to employment but not necessarily the subsequent stages, and it 
cannot be used to study differences in wages, progression or redundancy at all. There has also been 
some debate over the ethical acceptability of the method, but the conclusion appears warranted that 
there are no major problems in that respect, especially insofar as minimal inconvenience is caused to 
those involved in the study.43 
 
40 Michael Fix – Margery Turner ‘Testing for Discrimination: The Case for a National Report Card’ Civil Rights 
Journal, Fall 1999. 
41 Idem. 
42 Colectivo IOE, Labour market discrimination against migrant workers in Spain, International Migration 
Papers 9 (Geneva: International Labour Office, 1995). 
43 P.A. Riach – J. Rich ‘Deceptive Field Experiments of Discrimination: Are they Ethical?’ Kyklos, Vol. 57, 
2004, pp. 457-470. 
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Other types of research. A considerable number of other research methods are available for the 
purposes of studying inequalities. These include qualitative research strategies, such as in-depth 
interviews, theme interviews and case studies. Qualitative analyses can provide important insights and 
unique perspectives on the victims, perpetrators and circumstances of discriminatory events, the 
historical and social contexts of these events and more particularly on the motives and other reasons 
behind the events. Qualitative research is an essential companion to quantitative research; it brings the 
analysis from the macro-level to the micro-level and helps to see the people behind the numbers. 
Qualitative research methods are an essential part of any research programme that aims to study 
discrimination, but they are even more important in studying such types and forms of discrimination 
that are difficult to study by means of more quantitatively oriented research. 
Overall, the different forms of research constitute indispensable tools for examining the causes, 
extent and effects of discrimination with any precision. They have all been used for several decades, 
meaning that the related methodologies are already well-developed and refined, and have been used to 
study discrimination in many areas of life. Victim surveys and discrimination testing in particular have 
been found to constitute effective means for measuring the prevalence of discrimination, whereas 
qualitative research methods have proved to provide important insights about the causes, nature and 
effects of discrimination. However, research projects are all too often ‘one-off’ exercises, meaning that 
the use of these methods needs to be systematized in order to obtain information that is up-to-date and 
capable of showing trends. 
 
Ethnic monitoring 
 
Ethnic monitoring refers to situations where an organization collects data on the ethnic make-up of its 
workforce and/or its clientele in order to track down any imbalances. The purpose of monitoring is to 
allow an organization to obtain an overall, statistically valid picture of the way in which its policies 
and practices affect persons belonging to different groups. 
Monitoring is perhaps the most robust measure an organization can take to ensure it is in 
compliance with the equality laws. It can help organizations to highlight possible inequalities, 
investigate their underlying causes, remove any unfairness or disadvantage, and send a clear message 
to employees, job applicants, customers and shareholders that the employer takes equal opportunities 
seriously.44 Moreover, monitoring is indispensable for tracking down the effects of any positive action 
schemes. Experiences from countries where monitoring is practiced have often been positive.45 In 
particular, it is evident that in Northern Ireland, monitoring and other duties imposed on employers by 
the Fair Employment and Treatment (NI) Order 1998, have together with other public policy 
interventions resulted in substantial remedying of the earlier imbalances in participation in 
 
44 Commission for Racial Equality, Ethnic Monitoring: A Guide for public authorities (CRE, 2002), p. 3. 
Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, ‘Sexual Orientation Discrimination in Northern Ireland. The Law 
and Good Practice’ (Belfast: Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2004), p. 32 ff.  
45 B. Hepple – M. Coussey and T. Choudhury, Equality: A new framework. Report of the Independent Review of 
the Enforcement of UK Anti-Discrimination Legislation (Cambridge: University of Cambridge, 2000). 
Commission for Racial Equality, cit. supra note 44. Shirley Dex and Kingsley Purdam, Equal Opportunities and 
Recruitment. How Census data can help employers to assess their practices (York: York Publishing Services, 
2005), p. 10.  
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employment for members of the different community groups.46 This development can be contrasted 
with the modest effects of the earlier, standard non-discrimination law.47   
In employment, monitoring lets employers examine the make-up of their workforce in terms of 
ethnic origin, and compare this with benchmark data where such exist. It also lets them to analyze how 
their personnel practices and procedures affect different groups.48 In service delivery, monitoring can 
tell which groups are using the services, and how satisfied they are with them. Organizations can then 
consider ways of reaching underrepresented groups and make sure that the services meet the specific 
needs of each group, and that the services are provided fairly.49 
Obtaining information with regard to the representation of the different equality groups within the 
workforce can be useful in and of itself, especially when monitoring is carried out on an on-going 
basis or repeated at regular intervals, as the development of longitudinal data allows the assessment of 
trends. However, when the internal data of an organization can be compared with some external 
benchmark data – that is, data on the expected participation rates of these groups as disclosed by for 
instance official statistical data or data gathered by other organisations operating under similar 
circumstances – the internal data becomes even more useful. 
Monitoring can be carried out in two ways, either through the collection of personal data (data 
related to identifiable individuals) coupled with associated record-keeping, or through the collection of 
anonymous data. The data can be collected directly from the persons concerned, by means of using 
self classification, or indirectly through third-party observation, by means of using other-classification.  
 
Conclusions 
 
The following table illustrates and summarises the purposes for which data is needed, by whom, what 
kind of data is needed, and how it can be obtained: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2008 Monitoring Report - Monitoring Report No 19: A Profile of 
the Monitored Northern Ireland Workforce (Belfast: Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2009).  
47 Christopher McCrudden has observed that the earlier anti-discrimination legislation had “little effect on 
employers’ practices”. See McCrudden, Buying Social Justice: Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal 
Change (Oxford: OUP, 2007), pp. 72–73. 
48 Commission for Racial Equality, cit. supra note 44. 
49 Idem. 
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Type of action Body What data is needed Methods/mechanisms 
Policy-making Political and 
administrative bodies at 
the national, European 
and international levels 
– Baseline data, such as 
demographic data and 
socio-economic data  
– Data on nature, extent, 
causes and 
consequences of 
discrimination 
– Official statistics, 
broken down by origin or 
a proxy variable such as 
language or place of birth 
– Research data 
Monitoring (external) International monitoring 
bodies (e.g. CERD, 
ECRI, FRA); national 
monitoring bodies (e.g. 
ombudsmen) 
Same as above Same as above 
Monitoring (internal) Public and private 
organisations 
– Monitoring data on the 
composition of 
workforce and/or 
recipients of services 
(ethnic data/qualitative 
data) 
– Benchmark data 
– Ethnic monitoring 
(anonymous or non-
anonymous) 
– Benchmark data 
(census or register data, 
data from major surveys 
or from comparable 
organisations) 
Judicial proceedings Complainants, 
respondents, courts 
– Context-specific data, 
such as data on hiring 
and firing practices of 
the organisation 
– Baseline data 
– Ethnic monitoring 
– Ad hoc investigations  
– Census or register data, 
data from major surveys) 
Awareness raising and 
sensitizing activities 
National and 
international public and 
private bodies, NGOs 
– Accessible, 
compelling information 
– Victim surveys, 
discrimination testing, 
self-report surveys and 
other research  
Research The scientific 
community 
– Baseline data  
– Data on nature, extent, 
causes and 
consequences of 
discrimination 
– Official statistics 
– All kinds of research 
– Monitoring data 
 
An all-important distinction must at this point be made between those data collection mechanisms that 
involve the processing of ethnic data, and those that do not. The more robust mechanisms involve the 
collection and other processing of personal ethnic data. Here it is important to be aware of the fact that 
data can be used not just to secure and promote rights, but to breach them. Examples of past misuse of 
sensitive data have shown that there are real and significant dangers involved in collection of sensitive 
data, ethnic data in particular. On this basis, many feel that ethnic data should not be collected. Many 
also believe that collection of ethnic data runs against privacy laws and data protection laws. These 
two issues merit closer consideration and will be discussed in the following subchapters. 
As the data protection laws apply only where processing of personal data is involved, an 
elementary distinction must be made between those operations that involve processing of personal 
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data and those that do not. Typically, the latter group includes most forms of discrimination testing, 
anonymous surveys and anonymous workplace monitoring. 
Many other forms of data collection however require the processing of personal data and therefore 
also engage data protection laws. These include the collection of ethnic data through censuses or non-
anonymous workplace or service delivery monitoring, and the collection of data for the purposes of 
various kinds of administrative records maintained by central or local authorities or for instance 
schools. 
10.3 Challenges 
Information is power, and power can be abused 
 
That the concept of collecting ethnic data, often perceived as ‘sensitive data’, raises many concerns 
and fears is understandable in light of the many historical and some contemporary examples related to 
misuse of data in the context of human rights abuses. There have been several well-known situations 
where population data systems have been used, or attempted or planned to be used, to target 
vulnerable groups within the population. Selzer and Anderson have identified 17 cases where 
population data systems have either been used to target individuals or population subgroups, or where 
such efforts were initiated, or where such targeting has been seriously contemplated.50 Examples 
include the extermination and forced migration of Jews, Roma and other groups during the Second 
World War in altogether six European countries, the internment and forced migration of Japanese 
Americans during 1941–1945, the Apartheid in South Africa, the Cultural Revolution in China and the 
1994 Rwandan genocide.51 
The research shows that the misuse or attempted misuse of population data have occurred in both 
totalitarian and democratic countries, although in democratic societies such misuses tend to occur 
primarily in times of national stress.52 The targeted groups have included ‘racial’ and ethnic 
minorities, linguistic minorities, indigenous populations and subjected populations such as the African, 
‘Indian’ and ‘Coloured’ populations in South Africa. In terms of geographical scope, all regions of the 
world are represented, except Latin America and Western Asia, though the latter factor may be 
attributable to the lack of information concerning these areas. While almost all of the examples of 
misuse or suspected misuse of population data systems are historical, the use or contemplated use of 
surveys and administrative data to investigate and prosecute suspected terrorists after 9/11 in the 
United States is also included in the list of the 17 cases.53  
 
50 William Selzer, ‘On the use of Population Data Systems to Target Vulnerable Population Subgroups for 
Human Rights Abuses’ Coyuntura Social No. 30, 2005. 
51 Idem. See also William Selzer – Margo Anderson ‘After Pearl Harbor: The Proper Role of Population Data 
Systems in Time of War (2000).’ A research paper available at: 
http://www.uwm.edu/~margo/govstat/newpaa.pdf (accessed 1.1.2010). 
52 Idem. 
53 Idem. Processing of ethnic data may also be highly problematic in the context of ethnic profiling, see EU 
Network of Independent Experts on Fundamental Rights, Ethnic Profiling. CFR–CDF, Opinion No 4/2006, 
December 2006. 
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These historical experiences advise extreme caution in relation to those forms of data collection 
that lead to the maintenance of large datasets that contain data on nationality, ethnicity, religion and 
their possible proxies such as language and place of birth. The existence of such datasets poses a threat 
in a situation where things go seriously wrong and some group that wishes to target some other groups 
for abusive purposes has been able to wield power, and where the ordinary legislative and institutional 
safeguards for the protection of fundamental rights are no longer capable of precluding or stopping the 
abuse.  
But a number of other viewpoints also merit our consideration. First of all, it should be recognized 
that the collection of ethnic data (in sensu lato) is already widespread in the context of census-taking. 
Many countries in the world, including USA, Canada, UK and many Central and Eastern European 
countries, already gather data on racial or ethnic origin through their censuses.54 And even those 
countries that do not collect ethnic data do have extensive datasets containing such personal 
information as that pertaining to nationality, mother tongue and place of birth, factors that can work as 
proxy indicators for ethnicity. And at any rate, in the context of everyday life, people know or assume 
they know the ethnic origin of the people they meet, meaning that lack of ethnic data is no guarantee 
against abusive targeting. 
It should also be noted that many institutions, including the European Parliament, are of the view 
that data collection is just so critical for combating discrimination, that it should be undertaken 
notwithstanding historical and cultural considerations.55 
These viewpoints suggest that priority should perhaps be given to securing the confidentiality of 
the existing and future data. Modern data protection technology provides useful means by which any 
data set can be protected from unauthorized access and by which the data can be rendered useless (by 
way of obscuring or masking individual data) even if accessed by unauthorized third parties.56 But 
even these mechanisms cannot render each system entirely watertight, and the question remains 
whether the risk involved in introducing the collection of ethnic data, however remote it may feel, is 
worth taking. That is a question that cannot be answered in the abstract, and at the end of the day that 
question should primarily be answered by the representatives of minorities and immigrants due to the 
fact that they are the groups that would on the one hand stand to benefit from the introduction of 
ethnic monitoring, and on the other they would have to stand the risk of possible misuse. 
 
Protection of individuals with regard to privacy and the processing of personal data 
 
International and European instruments relating to the right to privacy and protection of personal data 
regulate the manner in which ethnic data may be collected, registered, used or disseminated. Whereas 
the protection of personal data was initially treated as a dimension of the right to respect for private 
 
54 Makkonen, cit. supra note 23. 
55 European Parliament resolution on non-discrimination and equal opportunities for all – a framework strategy 
(2005/2191(INI)), para 14. 
56 It must equally be kept in mind, however, that also the techniques used to gain unauthorized access to such 
data and to link anonymized data to specific identifiable individuals (re-identification of data) are constantly 
developing as well. 
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life, it is nowadays increasingly conceived of as a fundamental right in and of itself.57 Yet, instruments 
protecting both sets of rights are relevant in the present context. 
These instruments are engaged whenever personal information, that is information relating to 
identified or identifiable natural persons, is collected or otherwise processed.58 Whereas statistics, 
when released, regularly do not disclose information with regard to any particular individual,59 this 
does not mean that the carrying out of statistical operations would not engage the rules that relate to 
the protection of personal data. This is because statistics are based, on the whole, on the processing of 
microdata, in our case personal ethnic data.60 
A particular challenge for any attempt to analyze the concrete implications of the international and 
national instruments relating to data protection and the right to privacy arises from the fact that they 
often take the form of framework instruments. Instead of directly addressing for instance the 
permissibility of ethnic monitoring, they set down rather diffusely formulated, general rules whose 
application to particular circumstances is quite challenging, given also the almost complete absence of 
legal analyses or case law.61  
 
Right to privacy 
 
All EU member states have ratified the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Article 8 of 
the ECHR provides for the protection of privacy. Article 8(1) provides that “[e]veryone has the right 
to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence”. It is a well established 
interpretation of the ECtHR that the right to respect for private life encompasses the right to respect 
for information relating to private life.62 Therefore the processing of personal data, including ethnic 
data, falls within the ambit of Article 8. The collection or other processing of personal data without the 
knowledge or consent of the data subject, especially if the data is capable of being used in ways that 
are harmful to the data subject, may amount to an interference with the rights provided in Article 8. 
Also the subsequent use or disclosure of voluntarily submitted personal data may engage Article 8 if 
the data is used for purposes other that those that the data subject was informed of, or if the data is 
disclosed to unauthorized third parties, or stored in a way that fails to guarantee security of the data.  
The right to respect for private life is not absolute: interference thereof may be justified under 
Article 8(2) of the ECHR. If it is not to contravene Article 8, an interference must (i) have been in 
accordance with the law, (ii) pursue a legitimate aim, and (iii) be necessary in a democratic society in 
 
57 The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was the first international document that had 
separate provisions with regard to respect for private and family life (Article 7) and protection of personal data 
(Article 8). See Makkonen, cit. supra note 23, pp. 52–72; Maria Tzanou – Tuomas Ojanen, Thematic 
EU/International Legal Study on assessment of data protection measures and relevant institutions (EU 
Fundamental Rights Agency, forthcoming). 
58 David Bainbridge, EC Data Protection Directive (London:  Butterworths, 1996), p. 2. 
59 A key element of data protection laws and laws regulating statistical activities are the rules and principles that 
prohibit and prevent the connecting of a particular – in itself ‘anonymous’ – data to any particular individual 
through direct or indirect means (‘re-identification’). 
60 See e.g. Explanatory memorandum to the Council of Europe Recommendation No. R(97) 18 on the protection 
of personal data collected and processed for statistical purposes (30 September 1997). 
61 See ibid, p. 3. 
62 European Commission on Human Rights, X v. UK 30 DR 239 1982; ECtHR, Amann v. Switzerland, judgment 
of 16 February 2000; ECtHR, MS v. Sweden, judgment of 27 August 1997. 
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order to achieve that aim. These requirements are to be interpreted narrowly.63 While the first two 
requirements should not be difficult to meet in the context of collecting ethnic data, the third 
requirement, that is whether the activity can be considered ‘necessary in a democratic society’, is 
critical. Under the case law of the ECtHR, for the answer to be in the affirmative, there should be a 
pressing social need justifying the interference, in addition to which the interference must be 
proportionate to the aim pursued.64 Article 8 therefore requires strict evaluation of which data 
collection operations are ‘necessary’, one element of which is the principle of proportionality that 
requires that one should always employ those data collection methods that pose the least threat to 
privacy. 
Also other international treaties are relevant here, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) in particular. Article 17 of the ICCPR prohibits “arbitrary and unlawful interferences” 
of privacy. In that context the UN Human Rights Committee has opined that “the competent public 
authorities should only be able to call for such information relating to an individual’s private life the 
knowledge of which is essential in the interests of society as understood under the Covenant.”65 While 
it should be uncontroversial that collection of personal data for the purposes of guaranteeing equal 
treatment is “in the interests of the society as understood under the Covenant” – given, for instance, 
the fact that the very same Committee has encouraged the collection of this kind of data – it is clear 
that each data collection operation must also meet the test of being essential for those interests. 
The guidance provided by the ECHR and the ICCPR is of a very general nature, leaving many 
questions unanswered. It can, however, be safely submitted that they do prohibit, for instance, the use 
of voluntarily submitted ethnic data for such purposes as ethnic profiling, for instance by the police, 
unless the data subject has given her consent thereto. To that extent, they do require the provision of 
some protection against the misuse of ethnic data.  
 
Protection of individuals with regard to processing of personal data 
 
More specific guidelines on the permissibility of collecting ethnic data are provided by data protection 
instruments such as the EU Data Protection Directive. The importance of the latter is underlined by the 
fact that the ECJ has tended to interpret the Directive in a generous manner with a view to ensuring a 
high level of protection of personal data.66 
Processing sensitive data is prohibited by Article 8(1) of the Directive, which provides that 
“Member States shall prohibit the processing of personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin”.67 This 
prohibition implies the legislator’s general distaste towards the collection of ethnic data.  
 
63 See e.g. ECtHR, Rotaru v Romania, judgment of 4 May 2000, paragraph 47. 
64 ECtHR, Smith and Grady v. United Kingdom, judgment of 27 September 1999; Chassagnou v. France, 
judgment of 29 April 1999. 
65 HRC, General Comment 16 (1994). 
66 Maria Tzanou – Tuomas Ojanen, Thematic EU/International Legal Study on assessment of data protection 
measures and relevant institutions (EU Agency for Fundamental Rights, forthcoming). See also ECJ, 
Tietosuojavaltuutettu v. Satakunnan Markkinapörssi OY, Satamedia, C-73/07, 16 December 2008. 
67 Note however that the Directive does not actually use the concept ‘sensitive data’, but uses the term ‘special 
categories of data’ instead. 
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Exceptions to Article 8(1) are laid down in Article 8(2), however. The exceptions provide, first of 
all, that the processing of ethnic data is allowed where the data subject – the person to whom the data 
relates to – has explicitly and freely expressed his or her informed consent thereto.68 The requirement 
that the consent has to be freely given means that the data subjects must be given a real choice and no 
penalty may be imposed in case one decides not to co-operate: individuals from whom information is 
requested must not be subject to any kind of duress, influence or pressure, whether direct or indirect.69 
There is some disagreement as to whether an employee can ever be considered to be acting out 
entirely freely when an employer asks her to disclose some personal information, even if the employee 
is told that disclosure is voluntary.70 The condition that the consent given must be ‘informed’ means 
that it must be clear to the person whose consent is being sought what exactly she is consenting to. The 
party requesting the sensitive data must make it clear that disclosing sensitive information is not 
obligatory, and must inform the data subject of the purposes for which the information is being 
requested, and to what kind of use the information will be put, and if it will be disclosed to third 
parties. Moreover, the paragraph leaves it to the each member state to decide whether it considers that 
the giving of consent constitutes a sufficient condition for justifying the processing of sensitive data.71 
This is an important restriction, as opinions in the EU countries are mixed in this respect.72  
Article 8(2) allows processing of ethnic data also where it is “necessary for the purposes of 
carrying our the obligations and specific rights of the controller in the field of employment law in so 
far as it is authorized by national law providing for adequate safeguards”.73 Whereas it is clear that 
ethnic monitoring can be useful, even highly useful, for employers for the purposes of complying with 
employment law, it is doubtful whether it can be considered ‘necessary’.74 
Article 8(2) allows the processing of ethnic data also where the processing relates to data that is 
necessary for the “establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims”. Where a court or other 
competent body has the power to require an organization to produce documents or other information 
for the purposes of finding out whether equal treatment laws have been breached, the necessary 
processing of data can be justified under this subparagraph. Employers are also allowed to carry out 
the necessary data collection activities in order to defend their legal rights. It is doubtful, or at any rate 
 
68 See also Article 2(h) of the Directive. 
69 See also Council of Europe Recommendation No. R(97) 18 on the protection of personal data collected and 
processed for statistical purposes, and it’s Explanatory Memorandum, p. 69. 
70 In Belgium, an Executive Decree issued by the government (Executive Decree of 13 February 2001 
implementing the Federal Law of 8 December 1998 on the protection of the right to private life with respect to 
the processing of personal data) provides that consent cannot constitute a justification for the processing of 
sensitive data where the consent cannot be considered to have been given ‘freely’. This is taken to be the case in 
the context of the employment relationship, as it is considered that a power imbalance exists between the 
employer and the employee. The Belgian government took this position despite two prior contrary opinions 
issued by the Belgian Commission for the protection of private life (Commission for the protection of private 
life, Opinion Nos 8/99 and 25/99). 
71 Article 8(2) of the Directive. 
72 See Douwe Korff, EC Study on Implementation of Data Protection Directive. Comparative Summary of 
National Laws (Cambridge: Human Rights Centre, September 2002). 
73 Article 8(2)b. 
74 Rosemary Jay – Angus Hamilton, Data Protection Law and Practice (2nd ed, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 
2003), p. 192; Makkonen, cit. supra note 23, pp. 59–60. 
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not clear, whether organisations are allowed to keep records for monitoring purposes even before a 
claim has been filed, as a sort of precautionary measure.75 
Processing of ethnic data may also be allowed under Article 8(4), which provides that  
Subject to the provision of suitable safeguards, Member States may, for reasons of substantial 
public interest, lay down exemptions in addition to those laid down in paragraph 2 either by 
national law or by decision of the supervisory authority. 
 
Article 8(4) provides yet another avenue for ethnic monitoring. Processing of ethnic data is allowed 
under this subparagraph provided that three conditions are met. First, there has to be a ‘substantial 
public interest’. It should go without further argument that the guaranteeing and promotion of equal 
treatment meets this requirement. Second, the processing of the data must be provided for in national 
law, or be authorized by the national supervisory organ where it has been given the necessary powers. 
Third, suitable safeguards must be in place to protect the rights and freedoms of individuals. This may 
require the taking of appropriate technical and organizational measures, particularly in order to 
maintain the security of the data and thereby to prevent any unauthorized transmission or access to the 
data.76 One of the objectives of Article 8(4) is to facilitate scientific research and government 
statistics, making it legitimate to process and store sensitive data in central population registers, tax 
registers, census registers and the like. Ethnic monitoring in the UK has been justified unde
cle.77  
Any collection of sensitive data must not just be allowed under Article 8, but must also meet a set 
of qualitative principles laid down in Article 6. The first requirement put forth by Article 6 is that 
personal data must be processed ‘fairly and lawfully’. The conditions under which sensitive data can 
‘lawfully’ be processed are laid down in Article 8, as discussed before. Secondly, all personal data 
must be processed ‘fairly’. Fairness is somewhat less obvious in meaning, but is potentially a broader 
notion. At a very general level, the notion of fairness means that, in striving to achieve their data-
processing goals, data controllers must take account of the interests and reasonable expectations of 
data subjects.78 The notion of fairness brings with it requirements of balance and proportionality: the 
collection and further processing of data must be carried out in a manner that does not, in the 
circumstances, intrude unreasonably upon the data subject’s privacy nor interfere unreasonably with 
their autonomy and integrity.79 The requirement of fairness is also seen to imply that a person must not 
be unduly pressured into supplying her personal data or to accept that the data are used for particular 
purposes.80 It has also been interpreted to favour, as a point of departure, an approach where personal 
 
 
 
75 See Makkonen, cit. supra note 23, p. 61. 
76 See recitals 34 and 46 of the Directive. 
77 Jay – Hamilton, cit. supra note 74, p. 190 ff. 
78 Lee A. Bygrave, Data Protection Law: Approaching its Rationale, Logic and Limits (The Hague: Kluwer, 
2002), p. 58. 
79 Idem. 
80 Idem. 
81 Ibid, p. 59. This principle is also supported by Article 9.2 of the Council of Europe Recommendation No. 
R(97) 18 on the protection of personal data collected and processed for statistical purposes. The 
Recommendation, as interpreted in its Explanatory Memorandum, actually goes as far as to require that sensitive 
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right to be informed of a particular data processing activity, they are to be informed in such a language 
and in such a manner that is intelligible for them, a condition that is important especially for 
foreigners.  
Article 6 further provides that data must be “collected for specified, explicit and legitimate 
purposes and not further processed in a way incompatible with those purposes”. This requirement is 
really a cluster of four principles: 1) the purposes for which data are collected shall be specified; 2) 
these purposes must be explicit, i.e. fully and clearly expressed; 3) the purposes must be legitimate; 
and 4) the purposes for which data are further processed shall not be incompatible with the purposes 
for which the data were first collected. Importantly, the subsection expressly recognizes that the 
further processing of data for statistical or scientific purposes is not considered incompatible, on the 
condition that ‘appropriate safeguards’ are in place.82 It should be pointed out that some EU Member 
States have been found to provide too weak safeguards or none at all in this respect.83 
Article 6 furthermore requires that the data must be “adequate, relevant and not excessive in 
relation to the purposes for which they are collected and/or further processed.” This lays down the 
principle of proportionality, which specifies that only those personal data may be collected that are 
necessary to achieve the purposes of the data collection operation. Insofar as doing so does not put the 
objectives of a particular operation in jeopardy, the controller should opt for secondary rather than 
primary data collection,84 anonymous rather than nominal surveys, sampling rather than full-scale 
surveys, and for voluntary rather than compulsory surveys.85 The requirement of adequacy may be 
seen to favour, as a point of departure, data collection methods that proceed from the basis of self-
classification; however, if the utilization of the self-classification method leads in a particular instance 
to a situation where a high number of people choose not to classify themselves, or categorize 
themselves along lines that clearly do not match the ‘objective reality’, methods employing third-party 
identification may be applied as they may in fact better meet the adequacy requirement.86 
The data must also be ‘accurate’.87 All reasonable steps should be taken to ensure that the data is 
not factually misleading. This speaks in favour of obtaining the data directly from the data subjects, as 
in general it can be assumed that data obtained in this way is accurate.88 Personal data is to be erased 
or rendered anonymous once it is no longer required for the purposes for which it has been kept.89 
Where the design of a scientific or statistical project so requires, the necessary identification data may 
 
data may not be collected by any other means than by collecting it directly from the data subjects. See p. 58 of 
the Explanatory Memorandum. 
82 Such safeguards may consist of for instance the following measures: the legal requirement that the data must 
not be used to take decisions on data subjects; the obligation to notify the national data protection authority or an 
ethics committee of the planned operations; obligation to obtain prior authorization from the national data 
protection authority; the requirement that a particular balance test be met; the requirement that the data should be 
pseudonymized or anonymized whenever possible. Korff, cit. supra note 72.  
83 Ibid, p. 66 ff. 
84 Primary data collection refers to ‘original’ collection of data, while secondary data collection refers to the 
usage of some dataset consisting of data that has already been collected. 
85 See Council of Europe Recommendation No. R(97) 18 on the protection of personal data collected and 
processed for statistical purposes and the Explanatory Memorandum, p. 62.  
86 CRE, cit. supra note 44, p. 69. 
87 Subparagraph d. 
88 Idem. 
89 Subparagraph (e); Bygrave, cit. supra note 78, p. 60. 
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be retained, provided that specific, ‘appropriate’ domestic safeguards are in place. Privacy-enhancing 
technologies should be used where possible.90 
Processing of personal data is also regulated by the Council of Europe Convention for the 
Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data. The Convention, 
which was adopted in 1981, is the only international treaty dealing specifically with data protection, 
and has been ratified by all EU member states. The Convention corresponds in many respects with the 
EU Directive, being however somewhat more generally formulated. A key requirement of the 
Convention is that “appropriate safeguards” must be in place for any processing of ethnic data to be 
legitimate.91 
 
Other fundamental rights considerations 
 
The principle that no-one can, as a rule, be obliged to disclose his or her ethnic origin, is rather well-
established in the field of international human rights law. The Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities recognizes in Article 3(1) that “[e]very person belonging to a 
national minority shall have the right to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such”.92 This 
provision leaves it to every such person to decide whether or not she wishes to come under the 
protection flowing from the principles of the Convention. This has been interpreted as implying that 
each person shall be entitled to require not to be treated as belonging to a minority, and that no-one 
may be obliged to disclose his or her possible affiliation with a minority.93 The Advisory Committee 
on the Framework Convention has taken the view that consequently answering census questions on 
ethnicity cannot be made compulsory.94 The Human Rights Committee has for its part opined that no-
one can be compelled to reveal his or her adherence to a religion or belief, and it is likely that it would 
rule similarly with respect to ethnic origin, given the close connection between the two.95 
The CERD Committee has also emphasized the right of an individual to be in control of 
information that relates to her person. This is clear in view of the Committee’s General 
Recommendation VIII, which reads as follows: 
 
 
90 On the concept of Privacy-Enhancing Technologies, see e.g. John Borking ‘Privacy-Enhancing Technologies 
(PET) - Darf es ein Bitchen weniger sein?’ Datenschutz und Datensicherheit, Volume 25, Number 10, October 
2001. 
91 Makkonen, cit. supra note 23, pp. 62–64. 
92 The OSCE Copenhagen document of 1990 provides for a related right in Article 32: “To belong to a national 
minority is a matter of a person’s individual choice and no disadvantage may arise from the exercise of such 
choice”. 
93 See Opinion of the ACFC on Cyprus, 6 April 2001, ACFEC/OP/I(2002)004, para 18, Opinion on Azerbaijan, 
22 May 2003, ACFC/OP/I(2004)001, para. 21 and Opinion on Ukraine, 1 March 2002, ACFC/OP/I(2002)010, 
para 22. 
94 See e.g. the opinion of the ACFC on Poland, where it noted that “[w]hile recognising the need for quality data 
in this area, the Advisory Committee considers that the right not to be treated as a person belonging to a minority 
also extends to a census and that a compulsory answer to a question on ethnic origin or a question on language 
used is not compatible with that principle”. ACFC, Opinion on Poland, 27 November 2003, 
ACFC/INF/OP/I(2004)005, para 24. 
95 HRC, General Comment No. 22 (1993), para 3. 
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The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
Having considered reports from States parties concerning information about the ways in which 
individuals are identified as being members of a particular racial or ethnic group or groups,  
Is of the opinion that such identification shall, if no justification exists to the contrary, be based 
upon self-identification by the individual concerned.  
 
The Committee has not further elaborated upon its opinion, for instance with regard to its underlying 
rationale, nor has it explained in what situations it would consider it ‘justified’ to use other methods 
than self-identification for the purposes of identification. 
It should be noted that the principle of self-identification has also been endorsed by the CESCR, 
the ECRI and the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action, and is explicitly laid down in some national 
laws.96 
 
Domestic data protection laws 
 
All EU countries have adopted domestic legislation on data protection. Their laws closely follow the 
substance of the international and European instruments.97 This is of significance, because the latter 
instruments allow states parties to provide for a higher level of protection of personal data than what is 
provided for by the international instruments, meaning that they can forbid the collection of ethnic 
data altogether if they so wish. Yet, state parties have not used this opportunity beyond the 
introduction of some rather technical requirements by some of them.98 
 
Socio-political considerations 
 
Given that it is legally possible - provided that a number of quite specific criteria are met - to collect 
ethnic data, the next stage in the assessment of whether ethnic data collection should be introduced for 
the purposes of fighting discrimination is to consider the social and political questions involved. Is 
there popular support for monitoring, considering that for ethnic monitoring to work, people would 
need to co-operate in it on a voluntary basis? What do the persons most directly concerned, 
immigrants and persons belonging to minorities, think about ethnic monitoring? Would the 
 
96 CESCR, General Comment No 20 (2009); Isil Gachet ‘The Issue of Ethnic Data Collection From the 
Perspective of Some Council of Europe Activities’ in Andrea Krizsan (ed.), Ethnic Monitoring and Data 
Protection: The European Context (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2001), p. 54; Article 92(a) of 
the Durban Declaration and Plan of Action; Article 7 of the Hungarian Minority Act. 
97 Makkonen, cit. supra note 23. 
98 See Idem (Makkonen). However, in Belgium, an Executive Decree issued by the government (Executive 
Decree of 13 February 2001 implementing the Federal Law of 8 December 1998 on the protection of the right to 
private life with respect to the processing of personal data) provides that consent cannot constitute a justification 
for the processing of sensitive data where the consent cannot be considered to have been given ‘freely’. This is 
taken to be the case in the context of the employment relationship, as it is considered that a power imbalance 
exists between the employer and the employee. The Belgian government took this position despite two prior 
contrary opinions issued by the Belgian Commission for the protection of private life (Commission for the 
protection of private life, Opinion Nos 8/99 and 25/99). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
235
                                                       
introduction of ethnic monitoring be counterproductive in some way? If so, would the benefits still 
outweigh the disadvantages? 
To find answers to the first two questions, the European Commission commissioned two Special 
Eurobarometer surveys, the results of which were published in 2007 and 2008. To begin with, 75 % of 
the respondents to the 2007 Eurobarometer said that they are in favour of providing information about 
one’s ethnic origin as part of a census, on the condition of anonymity, with 19% opposing disclosure 
of such data.99 On average, there is therefore a broad degree of acceptance among the European public 
to provide ethnic information as part of a census, for the purposes of fighting discrimination. 
Respondents to the 2008 survey were asked to indicate whether they support or oppose ethnic 
monitoring in the field of employment, either in the context of monitoring the composition of the 
work-force in order to evaluate the representation of people from ethnic minorities, or to monitor 
recruitment procedures to ensure that candidates from ethnic minorities have the same chance of being 
selected for an interview or hired as other candidates with similar skills and qualifications. According 
to the results, 57% of the respondents supported monitoring the composition of the workforce, 
whereas 33% opposed it, the rest being undecided. Major differences in opinion between the EU 
member states appeared, as more than 70% of the respondents in Ireland, Denmark, Greece and 
Cyprus were in favour of workplace monitoring, whereas only a minority of respondents supported 
monitoring in Germany, Latvia, Slovakia, and Austria. There was considerably greater support for 
monitoring applicants than monitoring the actual workforce, as 71% of all European respondents were 
in favour of the first type of action. There was also less variation between countries with respect to this 
question, as a clear majority in all countries was in favour of monitoring in this context.  
Significantly, those who self-identified themselves as part of an ethnic minority were more 
favourable towards both kinds of monitoring, as 67% of these respondents supported workplace 
monitoring and 77% supported monitoring recruitment procedures. This suggests that the 
overwhelming majority of persons belonging to minorities and immigrants do not perceive that any 
risk of misuse would arise from the introduction of monitoring, or that at any rate they are not held 
back by it. Yet, it must be kept in mind that many still do have reservations. 
For the majority of the countries there would appear to be substantial, perhaps even adequate, 
popular support for the introduction of mechanisms for collecting ethnic data. Moreover, experience 
from those countries that have already introduced ethnic monitoring regimes indicate that the residual 
public resistance often turns into acceptance once monitoring is introduced and people get first-hand 
experience of how the system works. For instance in Northern Ireland, the concept of monitoring on a 
religious basis was an anathema to both public and private sector employers, but after the introduction 
of the regime of monitoring in the civil service, it was generally asked why it should not also be 
applied in the private sector and, after pressure was exerted to strengthen the domestic fair 
employment legislation, the legislation was amended to require monitoring from all employers with 
more than 10 employees.100  
 
99 The condition of anonymity is probably to be understood, in this context, as referring to an arrangement where 
the ethnic data is not permanently associated with any identifiable individual. European Commission, 
Discrimination in the European Union. Special Eurobarometer 263 (European Commission, January 2007), p. 
28.  
100 Bob Cooper ‘The Fair Employment Commission in Northern Ireland’, in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-
Discrimination Law Enforcement (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997), pp. 203–204.  
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Yet things are not at all this simple and straightforward. To be operational, data collection schemes 
- and particularly workplace monitoring - require the co-operation of basically every individual whose 
data is requested. Less than close to perfect co-operation leads to skewed results that are not of much 
use. For instance in the context of recruitment, in small to medium size businesses there may only be 
few minority-origin persons within the pool of applicants, even on a yearly account, and the resulting 
statistics will not be of much use if one or more of these persons choose not to disclose their ethnic 
origin. Keeping in mind that no-one may be obliged to reveal his or her ethnic origin, and that there is 
opposition to disclosure of ethnic data, this is a difficult equation to solve, particularly in countries 
where opposition to monitoring is high. 
There is always also the problem with the construction of categories for the purposes of 
monitoring. Given that social construction is strongly and inevitably involved in all ‘racial’ and ethnic 
distinctions and classifications, and that there is no scientifically valid basis for these practices, there 
can be no objective way of constructing ethnic classifications and assigning people into the available 
categories. The choices made will be subjective, and countries that practice ethnic data collection use 
classifications that are specific to their history, perceptions prevalent in the popular culture, 
bureaucratic practices, their current demographic structure and prevailing legal system. The year 2001 
British census questionnaire, to give an example, asked “What is your ethnic group?” and gave five 
broad, quite interestingly essentially ‘race’-based, categories to choose from: “White”, “Mixed”, 
“Asian or Asian British”, “Black or Black British” and “Chinese or other ethnic group”.101 To give a 
somewhat contrasting example, the Hungarian 2001 census form asked the respondent the question 
“Which of these nationalities do you think you belong to”, and gave 14 different choices such as 
‘Bulgarian’, ‘Roma’ and ‘Hungarian’.102 These contrasting approaches aptly demonstrate the lack of 
universally applicable principles and the influence of socio-historical factors. The difficulties that 
people have in placing themselves in ‘racial’ or ‘ethnic’ boxes such as these is often exacerbated by 
the fact that classification schemes tend to provide only for a few broad categories to choose from, and 
do not necessarily accommodate persons with ‘mixed backgrounds’. Moreover, the reporting of the 
census results – “Whites live like this, Blacks like that” – contributes to ethnogenesis, the social 
construction of essentialized ethnic and ‘racial’ divisions and identities.103 The simplicities of data 
collection, in short, do not do justice to the diversity and complexity of the social reality.  
There is always also the problem that self-identification procedures may lead to over- or 
underestimation of the numbers of individuals who belong to ethnic minorities, as some persons 
belonging to majorities may falsely identify as members of minorities, for instance for the purposes of 
benefiting from some social programme aimed at the minorities; this phenomenon is known as the 
problem of ‘false positives’. On the other hand, some persons belonging to the minorities may choose 
to identify as members of the ethnic majority for instance in order to avoid stigmatization; this 
 
101 Much in the same vein, the year 2000 US census questionnaire posed the question “What is your race?” and 
asked the respondent to indicate if she was of, inter alia, ‘White’, ‘Black, African American or Negro’, 
‘American Indian or Alaska Native’, ‘Asian Indian’ or of ‘Some other race’. An entirely different question asked 
whether the respondent is “Spanish/Hispanic/Latino”, which aptly shows the ambiguity of designing taxonomies. 
102 Census questionnaires from the different countries are available at the website of the United Nations Statistics 
Division, http://unstats.un.org (visited 1.1.2010). 
103 Dvora Yanow, Constructing “Race” and “Ethnicity” in America: Category-Making in Public Policy and 
Administration (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2003). 
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phenomenon is known as the problem of ‘false negatives’.104 For example, in some censuses 
conducted in Central and Eastern Europe, it appears that even fewer than one in ten Roma persons 
identified themselves as such.105 In consequence of these two phenomena, census-taking and 
monitoring exercises may lead to distorted results even if there nominally is full co-operation on part 
of all the persons concerned. 
 It must be realized that the collection of ethnic data may have the counter-productive 
effect of increasing the salience of ethnic identities. When people answer ethnic questions they are 
obviously reminded of their ethnic identity, its implications and its importance. As argued in chapters 
2–4 above, a strong case can be made that even mere acts of distinction-making on the basis of group 
affiliations produce ingroup favouritism and outgroup bias.106 Increasing racial awareness is liable to 
increase ‘racial’ and ethnic divisions, unless it is counterbalanced by effective measures that underline 
the existence of a broader, overarching ‘intergroup identity’.107 As the meeting of the latter condition 
is far from straightforward, the introduction of ethnic data collection always carries the risk of 
increasing group divisions, and therefore even risk breaching Article 2(1) of the CERD Convention, in 
which each contracting state “undertakes … to discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial 
division”.108 It must, however, be considered that ethnic data collection will not have the same effect 
in all societies, because there are major cultural differences in the prevalent levels of ‘racial’ and 
ethnic awareness. In those countries where levels of that awareness are already high, such as the USA 
and the UK, the introduction or further extension of data collection mechanisms cannot therefore be 
presumed to pose the kind of a problem as it would in many other countries. 
Many of the apparent problems with ethnic data collection could be circumvented if the data were 
collected by means of third-party observation instead of self-identification. This would involve the 
employer or a census interviewer filling in the ethnic data for the data subjects without consulting 
them about it, on the basis of visual observations or some other cue such as the surname or mother 
tongue of the person concerned. There are three major problems with this approach, however: First, it 
is in tension with the legal instruments on privacy, data protection and human rights, which are 
strongly in favour of the self-identification method. Second, the idea of third-party observation rests 
on the highly problematic thought, reflecting scientific positivism, that ethnicity and ‘race’ are fixed, 
objective and therefore observable facts.109 Third, census questionnaires are nowadays filled in by the 
data subjects themselves in almost all countries, and it is not likely that countries will – simply for the 
 
104 For instance in Hungary, the application of the self-identification rule in determining who are eligible to 
participate in minority self-government elections as voters and as candidates has reportedly led to an abuse of the 
system by non-minority people. On the other hand, in many countries, including Canada, there is clear evidence 
of ethnic minority people reporting as belonging to the majority. See Makkonen, cit. supra note 23, p. 77 and the 
references cited therein.  
105 For an example, in the 1991 Czechoslovak census only some 33 000 people declared themselves as Roma, 
whereas most unofficial estimates show a Roma population of between 250 000 – 300 000. Barbora Bukovska, 
‘Ethnic Statistics and Data Protection: The Czech Case’ in Krizsán, Andrea (ed.), Ethnic Monitoring and Data 
Protection (Budapest: CPS Books, 2001). See also European Commission, The Social Situation in the European 
Union 2007 – Social Cohesion through Equal Opportunities (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2008), p. 92. 
106 See e.g. Henri Tajfel, Human Groups and Social Categories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). 
107 See e.g. Richard J. Crisp – Sarah R. Beck ‘Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Moderating Role of Ingroup 
identification’, Group Processes & Intergroup Relations, 2005 Vol 8 (2), p. 182. 
108 Emphasis added. 
109 Yanow, cit. supra note 103, p. 106. 
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sake of introducing an ethnic question that can be filled in a particular way – switch back to the older 
method where census returns were filled in by the interviewer. In effect, even if monitoring based on 
third-party observation would be introduced at workplaces, a mismatch would rather inevitably result 
between the monitoring data and the census data, because the two sets of data would be collected in 
different ways.   
10.4 Conclusions 
European countries should step up their activities when it comes to collecting equality data. This is 
clear in view of the number of benefits that an evidence-based approach can bring, and in view of the 
presently meagre performance of EU countries in this area. Currently discrimination mostly remains in 
the dark, and authorities and other stakeholders do not have a clear picture of the realities of everyday 
life for immigrants and persons belonging to minorities. One consequence of this is that they also put 
inadequate effort to solving these, for them invisible, problems. 
The question remains what is the best way to collect data about discrimination, its causes and 
effects. A distinction may be made between a ‘sociological approach’, which involves the conducting 
of quantitative and qualitative surveys and other types of research, and which can reveal inequalities 
and their causes and consequences in the society, and ‘ethnic monitoring’, which involves the 
collection of ethnic data, and which can expose specific discriminatory practices in workplaces. These 
two approaches are not mutually exclusive, but can be used in conjunction. The choice whether to 
pursue the sociological approach does not so much involve matters of principle, it involves more 
matters of finance, as a fully fledged and continuing research programme can be costly to run. The 
pursuance of this line of action depends therefore primarily on political will.  
The pursuance of ethnic monitoring, on the contrary, raises several issues of principle. It is a 
fascinating and much-promising tool in that it can at least in theory render particular instances of 
discrimination visible and help to achieve fairer outcomes. The international, European and national 
rules on protection of privacy and data do not categorically prohibit the collection of ethnic data, 
though they are suspicious towards it and lay down conditions that must be strictly observed whenever 
such data is collected. States that are interested in the introduction of ethnic monitoring must above all 
provide ‘suitable safeguards’ for the protection of the data subjects. Yet it is not clear whether the 
provision of such ‘suitable safeguards’ is enough, as the available safeguards can never be entirely 
watertight. The risk of abuse cannot be assessed in the abstract, as it is only immigrants and persons 
belonging to minorities, that is those individuals whose interests data collection might put at (however 
distant) risk and in whose interests such data would be collected, who should be entitled to answer the 
question of whether the existence of that risk is sufficiently great so as to preclude any data collection. 
Policy-makers, on the other hand, must consider whether the introduction of ethnic data collection is 
counterproductive, as it may increase the levels of divisive ethno-racial awareness and identification. 
At any rate, a monitoring regime that would guarantee the necessary degree of accuracy and reliability 
would take years to develop, as it would take some time before people would grow used to it and show 
confidence in it. At the end of the day, the decision about ethnic data collection must therefore depend 
on the particular socio-political circumstances and particularly on the views of the groups directly 
concerned. What is good for one society may not be good for another. 
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11 Positive action 
Anti-discrimination law does not, as pointed out, prohibit measures that are aimed at improving the 
social and economic status of groups that are socially at a disadvantage. This general principle, 
manifested in the different instruments and pieces of case law, hides significant disagreement. To 
begin with, the different pieces of anti-discrimination law use different terms, sometimes referring to 
this type of measure as ‘positive action’, ‘affirmative action’ or ‘special measures’. In this chapter the 
term ‘positive action’ is used as an umbrella term for the sake of convenience, not, for instance, 
because of any assumed superiority of the concept. Secondly, the substantive content of the principle 
is couched in several different ways. Perhaps most importantly, it is sometimes suggested that states 
have an obligation to take positive action, whereas most pieces of anti-discrimination law are 
generally interpreted only to allow, not require, such action. There are also manifest differences in 
terms of the legitimate scope of positive action, as will be shown a bit later on. In short, the applicable 
legal standards exhibit conceptual and substantive diversity. 
For the purposes of the present discussion, positive action is broadly speaking used to refer to a 
policy or a specific operation that directly or indirectly helps to diminish or eliminate particular 
disadvantages suffered by a group or the members thereof in terms of opportunities or resources, over 
and above those measures that need to be undertaken to identify and eliminate discriminatory practices 
and criteria.1 Positive action can, at least in theory, be distinguished from positive, active measures 
taken in order to track down and eliminate discrimination, in that positive action goes beyond such 
measures.2 What is characteristic of positive action is that it is oriented towards accelerating and even 
ensuring the achievement of a more equal distribution of opportunities or other social goods, seen 
from a group perspective. It is about taking into account the very characteristic – ethnic origin – that 
puts people at a disadvantage in our societies. There is, however, not necessarily even a fine line 
between positive action on the one hand, and policies of equal opportunity and general welfare 
policies on the other.3 For an example, an employer may train the staff on equal treatment law, and 
 
1 For other conceptualizations, see Marc de Vos, ‘Beyond Formal Equality: Positive Action under Directives 
2000/43/EC and 2000/78’ (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007), p. 11; Anita Allen ‘Can Affirmative Action Combat 
Racial Discrimination? Moral Success and Political Failure in the United States’ in Appelt, Erna – Monica 
Jarosch (eds.) Combating Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe (Oxford: Berg, 
2000), p. 25; Olivier de Schutter ‘Chapter Seven: Positive Action’ in Dagmar Schiek – Lisa Waddington – Mark 
Bell, Non-Discrimination Law: Cases, Materials and text on National, Supranational and International Non-
Discrimination Law (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 759. De Schutter, for instance, considers that positive 
action is about differences in treatment on the basis of otherwise suspect grounds. This study, however, proceeds 
from the understanding that already equal treatment sometimes requires that “suspect grounds” are taken into 
account, and that on the other hand, positive action is not about using “suspect” criteria but about the impact of 
such measures on the target groups. 
2 See e.g. Nathan Glazer, ‘Affirmative Action and “Race” Relations: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe’ 
in Erna Appelt–Monica Jarosch (eds.), Combating Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for 
Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), p. 140. International and European anti-discrimination law emphatically point out, 
that the prohibition of discrimination does not preclude positive action measures. Such a clarification would not 
be necessary if positive action was simply about measures taken to eliminate discriminatory practices. 
3 See e.g. Melissa S. Williams ‘In Defence of Affirmative Action: North American Discourses for the European 
Context?’ in Erna Appelt – Monica Jarosch (eds.) Combating Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a 
Model for Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), p. 70. 
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may review selection, recruitment and other employment criteria and practices to track down factors 
that slow down the hiring of minority persons. These measures may well lead to an increase in the 
number of minority employees, and one could well argue both that they constitute plain anti-
discrimination work and that they constitute positive action.4 General welfare programmes and 
policies are by definition aimed at the least well-off, which means that in an ethnically stratified 
society many immigrant and minority groups do benefit from them in a particular way. Again, it is 
largely a matter of opinion whether this is seen as positive action or not. The above examples suggest 
that positive action should perhaps not be conceptualized as a deviation from general equal 
opportunity policies or general welfare policies. In fact, there may be significant overlap between 
these approaches. 
The diversity of legal standards and the fact that they mostly stop short of requiring positive action 
express the plurality of political views on this subject matter. Positive action goes into the heart of 
theories and sentiments about social justice, as it deals with the distribution of goods such as 
opportunities and resources. It forces the society to take a stand on tough and ultimate questions such 
as “what is equality” and “how can and should equality be achieved”. In consequence it is not at all 
surprising that positive action is an issue that engenders controversy, and that legislative and judicial 
caution is exercised in this area, particularly with respect to international and European law.  
Yet the lack of overall agreement over positive action should not become prohibitive for taking 
such action. As the next subchapter will show, positive action is the key to unlocking a positive 
development and must necessarily form a part of an effective anti-discrimination policy where there 
are major intergroup differences in wellbeing, as in modern-day Europe. This basic point of departure 
is fairly widely acknowledged.5 In addition, Europe has not seen anything like the controversies that 
have vexed the US, where affirmative action policies have in recent decades been both fiercely 
opposed and defended. One must also note that the opposition to affirmative action in the US appears 
to stem to a large extent from a belief that such action is primarily about preferential treatment that 
leads to less-qualified African Americans and other persons belonging to minorities being hired over 
better-qualified whites.6 Such a belief is, particularly in the present European context, entirely 
misplaced. In consequence, positive action need not be the divisive and political issue it has become or 
is perceived to have become.7 
 
4 This is the case particularly if one operates within the conceptual framework of substantive equality of 
opportunity. 
5 For instance the European Commission, in its 2008 Communication on Non-discrimination and equal 
opportunities, declares that it ”will use the permanent dialogue with Member States to promote the full 
utilisation of the possibilities for positive action, in particular in access to education, employment, housing and 
health care.” See Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission to the 
European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the 
Regions, Non-Discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment, 2.7.2008 COM(2008) 420 final, 
pp. 7–8. 
6 See e.g. Allen, cit. supra note 1, pp. 26–27. 
7 Vos, cit. supra note 1, p. 5. 
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11.1 The policy case  
This subchapter aspires to make a general argument for the adoption of positive action measures, 
without prejudice to the kinds of positive action that should be pursued. 
Positive action is, broadly speaking, aimed at eradicating or reducing group-wide socio-economic 
disadvantages. This is a laudable aim, also and particularly from the point of view of promoting 
market equality and material equality. People’s socio-economic status, and even their assumed socio-
economic status, affects how others perceive them and behave towards them. Intergroup differences 
seem to generate or reinforce intergroup prejudice, they appear to influence the salience of group 
identities and intergroup distinctions, and they structure interpersonal contacts and stimulate the 
attribution of negative traits and inferiority to the less advantaged group.8 This simple dynamic 
between status and the treatment one receives conditions relationships and plays into the construction 
of inequality in a variety of ways, as discussed in this study. Perhaps most importantly, major 
intergroup disparities feed and sustain negative stereotypes, because people tend to explain these 
disparities in ways that confirm their prejudices. People are sensitive not just to group divisions, but 
also to the status patterns that appear to go with them, and draw inferences from that.9 In effect, there 
is a short step from a particular group being visibly overrepresented in second-class jobs to that group 
being labelled second-class workforce and its members second-class citizens. Seen from the point of 
view of minorities and immigrants, the vicious circle of discrimination and deprivation may foster the 
kind of dissatisfaction and social unrest that many in Europe so much fear. One key lesson that 
decision-makers in Europe and elsewhere should learn is that if a group of people have nothing, they 
have nothing to lose, and vice versa: the more they have, the more they have to lose too. There appears 
to be, indeed, a link between general wellbeing and security. 
It is also possible to set in motion an upward spiral, and this is where positive action measures step 
in. Upward social mobility helps to dismantle negative stereotypes, and the increased integration and 
visibility of immigrants and minorities helps the general public to reconsider and reshape its identity in 
a manner that acknowledges the society’s full ethnic and cultural diversity. This will have major 
positive social-psychological effects and can foster the emergence of a more inclusive and accepting 
public culture that is more appealing also to the persons belonging to minorities. The ‘give and take’ 
role of mutual assistance and dependence that equal participation (for instance as tax payers) in the 
society promotes, helps to create a sense of common endeavour, a ‘we-ness’ not based on origin but 
common interest.10 
 
8 John Duckitt, The Social Psychology of Prejudice (London: Greenwood, 1994), p. 125. 
9 A theory known as illusory correlation explains how this takes place. This theory holds that people tend to see a 
stronger (and possibly more natural) relationship between two relatively unusual but attention-capturing 
phenomena that to certain extent appear to go together (such as being an immigrant and being deprived), even if 
the correlation is in reality slight or even entirely illusory. In consequence, people can come to overestimate the 
link between being an immigrant and being deprived.  
10 John Duckitt, in his seminal work on prejudices, concludes that positive action is needed to break entrenched 
cycles of exclusion and to redress the often severe social and economic inequities that result from the histories of 
injustice and discrimination, and holds that positive action ultimately lessens negative stereotyping. Duckitt, cit. 
supra note 8, p. 253. 
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Positive action will also bring about minority role models and is likely to reinforce target 
communities’ trust in the society at large and its fairness.11 We may also presume that increased 
participation in the labour life, on equal terms, promotes integration and active commitment to the 
society in general. Fostering such commitment is of the outmost importance, since particularly 
newcomers lack the kind of deep roots and social networks in the host society that help them feel like 
integral parts of that society. Participation in the labour market, the political life and other public 
domains fosters a sense of control over one’s life and boosts one’s self-respect.  
The benefits to the society at large and the target groups aside, what about businesses and other 
organizations the efforts of which the successfulness of positive action to a great extent depends on? 
Why would they undertake such measures, unless of course they were legally obliged to do it? The 
answer is that businesses can be expected to benefit in a range of ways from engaging in positive 
action. To the extent that positive action helps to prevent discrimination, it helps to save financial and 
public image costs linked with discrimination litigation and other enforcement measures. Businesses 
may also experience an improvement in their public image, making them more appealing to minority 
jobseekers and customers, which would help them to tap into a broader pool of talent and customer 
base. On the cost side, positive action requires some advance planning and therefore the use of human 
resources, entailing costs. Yet, its implementation does not necessarily have to be costly, as the 
typology of positive action measures set out in the next subchapter demonstrates. Whatever costs there 
are may well be offset by the benefits. 
So far the policy case has been developed on fairly practical and broad social utility terms. Indeed, 
the impact of upward social mobility of disadvantaged ethnic groups on both the attitudes and 
wellbeing of those groups themselves and the attitudes – and indirectly also the wellbeing and sense of 
security – of the ethnic majority is so strong that the case for positive action may be considered 
compelling on those grounds alone. However, the case for positive action can be made, and is usually 
made, not on the grounds of social utility but on the grounds of justice. In the United States a major, if 
not the main, rationale for affirmative action policies has been the desire to redress negative effects of 
past discrimination, including segregation, slavery and other forms of ‘white supremacy’.12  
In Europe, the case for using positive action to redress the present effects of past gross injustices is 
perhaps not as strong as in the US, although one must keep in mind that colonialism, racism and other 
forms of subordination and exclusion constitute an undeniable part of the history of Europe as well. 
This means that also in Europe there is a legacy of disadvantage that is attributable to past 
discrimination. The kind of systematic, institutional, widespread and often subtle discrimination that 
operates in Europe today, with all its repercussions, is, however, all the reason that is needed to 
support positive action. The moral duty to compensate for undue disadvantages imposed upon persons 
and groups victimized by discrimination is strong. Even if anti-discrimination law (as presently 
conceived) was enforced to the full extent, which it surely is not, the disadvantages would not be 
 
11 Erna Appelt ‘Affirmative Action: a Cross-National Debate’ in Erna Appelt–Monica Jarosch (eds.) Combating 
Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), p. 9; Allen, cit. supra 
note 1, p. 30. 
12 See e.g. Robert K. Fullinwider, The Reverse Discrimination Controversy (New Jersey: Rowman and 
Littlefield, 1981), p. 26. 
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eliminated, as that law cannot cope with the broad effects of past and present discrimination. The 
existing group-structured inequalities respond only to group-based remedies, such as positive action.13 
Material inequalities and disparities may, however, also arise from factors other than 
discrimination, and it is difficult if not impossible to tell to which extent existing disadvantages can be 
attributed to discrimination. In this respect it is important to remember that international and European 
law allows the use of positive action to ameliorate disadvantages in general, irrespective of their 
source. This is reflected in the language of the relevant provisions, which are couched in terms of 
“ensuring adequate development and protection of certain groups and individuals belonging to them” 
and “prevention and compensation of disadvantages linked to ethnic origin”.14              
The reality is that no matter how convincing a theoretical case for positive action is made in terms 
of social utility or in terms of justice, the decision to engage in such action often hinges, in practice, on 
popular support – or the lack of it, as political decision-makers may be unwilling to support positive 
action out of fear of losing voters. The example of the United States has demonstrated how positive 
action can become an overly politicized and controversial issue, with attendant cautiousness to engage 
with it. The attitude climate in Europe is presently much more hospitable towards positive action than 
is the attitude climate in the US. In a 2008 survey conducted in the EU, 72% of the respondents – 
almost three out of four – said that they were in favour of positive action, defined as “specific 
measures … adopted to provide equal opportunities for everyone in the field of employment”15 This is 
a remarkably high figure, because one cannot automatically expect the dismantling of privileges to be 
popular among the privileged. The fact that such an overwhelming majority supports positive action 
would indeed seem to suggest that the case for positive measures is compelling in Europe. As people 
may sometimes support some general idea but oppose its practical implications,16 a distinct feature of 
the survey was that it specified that positive action encompasses, for instance, “special training 
schemes” and “adapted selection and recruitment processes”, two relatively strong and practical lines 
of action. Importantly, opposition towards positive action was found to be rather low, ranging from 
9% (Spain) to 36% (Austria) and averaging 22% in the EU. In light of these findings, lack of popular 
support cannot be used as an excuse for not taking positive action measures in Europe. 
11.2 Methods  
Positive action can be accomplished and implemented in a variety of ways. It can be engaged in by 
both public and private organizations, including businesses, schools and public bodies.17 
 
 
 
13 Similarly, Williams cit. supra note 3, p. 66. 
14 ICERD and the Racial Equality Directive, respectively (emphasis added). 
15 European Commission, Discrimination in the European Union: Perceptions, Experiences and Attitudes. 
Special Eurobarometer 296 (July 2008), p. 28. 
16 For instance the very same Eurobarometer survey found that whereas “only” 6% of the EU respondents said 
that they would feel uncomfortable with having a neighbour of a “different ethnic origin” (a general statement), 
altogether 24% said they would feel uncomfortable with having a Roma neighbour (a more specific statement). 
Ibid, pp. 120–127. 
17 There can also be third-party positive action, for instance by public employment services that are not 
themselves the final employers, and that provide for instance subsidized learning opportunities for a fixed period 
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As previously noted, in an ethnically stratified society, ‘general’ social policy measures tend to 
have an ethnic impact. For instance, measures such as increases in the human and material resources 
of schools in areas inhabited predominantly or disproportionately by immigrants and persons 
belonging to minorities have a positive action dimension to them. Employment policies and tax 
policies may also be geared towards helping the least well off groups, which often disproportionately 
consist of immigrants and persons belonging to minorities. Measures such as these cannot go all the 
way in eliminating group-wide disadvantages, as they usually benefit only the least well-off without 
helping the majority of these population groups. Targeted policy measures such as language courses, 
socio-cultural competence courses and further education courses for immigrants have got a more 
direct positive action quality to them and can be expected to have a broader effect. 
Positive action is most often associated with policies and measures undertaken by public or private 
organizations in the context of employment. Different measures can be helpful at different stages of 
the recruitment and selection process, and engagement in positive action at one stage does not exclude 
engagement in it at others. A typology of positive action measures is developed below. At this point, 
this typology is presented without prejudice to the assessment of their legal acceptability or socio-
political feasibility, as both issues will be discussed at a later stage.  
The different individual measures vary in intensity, starting with measures that harbour on general 
anti-discrimination measures. 
Commitment to an explicit equal opportunities policy. This kind of a policy should first of all aim 
at elimination of discrimination from all the operations of the organization. This would involve 
consciously and comprehensively examining, identifying and eradicating any discriminatory or 
distorting practices. Secondly, the policy could have a more proactive component, such as training 
personnel in equality law.18 
Outreach. This category consists of encouragement measures to attract minority applicants and 
increase their proportion in the pool of applicants. Possible outreach measures include advertising 
open vacancies in minority or local media and placing advertisements in community and intercultural 
centres; using minority languages and images in advertisements and in other company communication, 
including on the internet; promoting better intercultural relations through sponsoring events that are of 
interest to the target groups; and appointing or designating a diversity recruitment officer in charge of 
outreach measures. 
Pre-employment support. This category includes measures designed to help the target groups to 
better compete for jobs or other opportunities, and can come close to outreach measures. Potential 
support measures include training and specialist advice on issues such as CV writing, interview 
techniques and presentation skills. Labour agencies can also appoint counsellors to support migrants 
 
of time. This kind of third-party action may be the only way to bring positive action to small and medium size 
enterprises that would not individually have the capacity or know-how to engage in it. Elisabeth Strasser – 
August Gächter – Mariya Dzhengozova, The Benefits of Positive Action: Thematic Discussion Paper. Discussion 
paper prepared by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development for the FRA (Vienna, March 
2008), p. 22. 
18 Paul Taylor ‘Positive Action in the United Kingdom’ in Erna Appelt – Monica Jarosch (eds.) Combating 
Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000). 
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and members of minorities during the interview.19 Special preparatory classes for new employees may 
also be helpful. Courses aimed at improving employability may be targeted particularly at immigrants 
and persons belonging to minorities. 
Adaptation of merit, skill and selection criteria. This category includes measures by which one 
reviews and redefines the criteria that are relevant for recruitment and selection. Once we realize and 
accept that there are no inherently neutral or self-evident employment criteria and that any criteria will 
be advantageous for some and disadvantageous for others, then a review of these criteria appears not 
just possible but necessary.20 For instance, skills and experience more likely to be found among 
persons belonging to minorities may be considered an asset or a requirement for a job. Language 
skills, or social skills such as familiarity with a particular culture or an intercultural environment, can 
be considered a merit and made relevant and favourable selection criteria for many types of positions. 
In several countries ethnic origin does, for instance, constitute a legitimate criterion for employment in 
the hiring of police officers to work with youth from minority communities.21 A further type of 
measure is the adjustment of standardized employment tests or their results in order to take into 
account their cultural biases, considering that these tests do not always reflect the knowledge, skills 
and competence of minorities.  
Positive recruitment measures. This category includes recruitment measures that may be 
considered a form of indirect positive action. An employer may, for instance, reach the target 
population by focusing on those geographical areas with substantial concentration of immigrant 
families or by focusing on the long-term unemployed if the target groups are overrepresented in that 
category.  
Preferential treatment in recruitment. A particularly useful measure would be a decision to invite 
at least one immigrant or minority origin person, who meets the minimum requirements, to be 
interviewed whenever there is a job opening. This policy has been used in Norway, with notable 
success.22 
Preferential treatment in selection. This category of measures gives members of underrepresented 
groups some kind of preference in the actual selection decision. The purpose of preferential 
 
19 During one campaign carried out in the Netherlands, 250 counsellors were hired to support migrants during 
job interviews. This tactic proved effective in overcoming ethnic stereotyping. See Ravinder Singh Dhami – 
Judith Squires – Tariq Modood, Developing positive action policies: learning from the experiences of Europe 
and North America. Department for Work and Pensions, Research Report No 406 (Corporate Document 
Services, 2006), p. 45 and the references cited therein. 
20 Frank Cunningham, ‘Positive Action and Democracy’ in Erna Appelt – Monica Jarosch (eds.) Combating 
Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), p. 56 
21 There is experience in this respect at least in Great Britain, the U.S. and Germany. See e.g. Allen, cit supra 
note 1, p. 26. An academically and legally interesting question is whether – or more precisely: when - these types 
of measures should be considered as falling under the category of positive action and when under ‘genuine 
occupational requirements’. See Fullinwider, cit supra note 12, p. 17, who holds that ”[i]f a black is hired 
because he is black but being black is a job-related qualification, then this is not a case of preferential hiring as I 
have defined it.” See also Schutter, cit. supra note 1, p. 771. One possible answer to this question is to pose 
another question: is tweaking employment-related criteria made in the interests of the social policy aim of 
promoting more equal representation in the workforce, or is it made in the interests of selecting the best person 
for a particular job? See Vos, cit. supra note 1, pp. 34–35. 
22 See Timo Makkonen ‘Good as far as it goes, but does it go far enough? A report on Norway’s Anti-
discrimination laws and policies’ (Migration Policy Group, 2008). 
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employment is to achieve an ethnically balanced workforce. This purpose makes it necessary to assess, 
in some way, what the present composition of the workforce is and what a balanced workforce would 
look like, using the distribution of groups in the national or local population as a point of comparison. 
Such assessments are often used in connection with soft targets, the attainment of which need not 
necessarily lead to actual preferential treatment, or with more rigid quotas, the attainment of which 
may more readily call for robust use of preferential treatment. 
Preferential treatment may vary in intensity, depending on the threshold rule that is used to trigger 
the treatment:  
– ‘the other things being equal rule’, that is, under-representation is used as a decisive criterion in 
tie-break situations where there are two or more equally qualified candidates; 
– ‘the high threshold of qualification rule’, that is, under-representation is used as the decisive 
criterion where the nominally best candidate is only marginally more qualified;  
– ‘the minimum threshold of qualification rule’, that is, under-representation is used as the decisive 
criterion where the person belonging to the underrepresented group meets the minimum level of 
competence, irrespective of whether there are candidates who are better qualified.23 
 
In-service positive action. This group of measures is aimed at those who are already in employment, 
and include training to increase the potential for career advancement; early intervention to ensure 
retention; mentoring;  and cultural and religious accommodation, where not already required by the 
law.  
11.3 Challenges 
The policy case for positive action was argued above at a general level, without prejudice to the 
assessment of the socio-political desirability and legal acceptability of any individual types of 
measures. The latter perspectives call for our attention, however, as they set the parameters within 
which positive action can be carried out in practice. For the purpose of the following discussion, a 
general distinction is made here between ‘hard measures’, which involve outright preferential 
treatment on the basis of origin, and ‘soft measures’, which promote inclusion without engagement in 
direct preferential treatment. 
 
Legal perspectives 
 
There is remarkably little international or European judicial or even quasi-judicial guidance on 
positive action in the area of combating ethnic discrimination, considering the outstanding practical 
and legal importance of the subject area at hand.24 The most basic principle is rather clear, though: 
 
23 Williams, cit. supra note 3, p. 73. 
24 There is a wealth of case law in the US, but it is not applicable as such to international or European law. 
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anti-discrimination law does not preclude positive action, and appears even to require it in order to 
guarantee the effective and equal enjoyment of human rights. But major legal questions remain 
unresolved, such as “what exactly constitutes positive action”, “what is the legitimate scope of positive 
action” and “when exactly is the taking of positive action required and not just allowed”? For instance 
the ECtHR has yet to rule on these issues. By far the most authoritative and detailed case law in 
relation to positive action has been developed by the European Court of Justice in the context of 
gender equality law. Scholars are divided on the issue of whether we can expect the acquis developed 
in the field of gender equality law to apply mutatis mutandis also in the field of racial equality.25 
Therefore that case law will be reviewed here only briefly, as a general illustration of the Court’s 
approach in this area. 
The ECJ’s approach with regard to positive action in the field of gender equality has developed 
incrementally, and we can note changes in its approach over time.26 But the red thread for the Court, 
as seen from today’s perspective and in the perspective of cases such as Kalanke, Marschall, Badeck 
and Abrahamsson, is that selection rules and processes, that give automatic and unconditional 
preferences to those belonging to the underrepresented sex, and that do not include an objective 
assessment of specific personal situations of all the candidates, are inconsistent with the EC law and 
its provisions on positive action in particular.27 Automatic and unconditional preferences are precluded 
even between candidates having equivalent or substantially equivalent merits.28 The ultima ratio of the 
Court appears to be that the goal of “ensuring full equality in practice”, referred to both in Article 
157(4) (ex Article 141(4)) of TFEU and the Racial Equality Directive, is about ensuring the full equal 
opportunities of individuals, that is, about compensating for the negative baggage (effects of past or 
present discrimination in particular) that a particular social background may bring to the competition 
for opportunities, but not about ensuring any particular outcomes.29 The Court put this emphatically in 
Lommers, in which it stated that a “group of measures designed to eliminate the causes of women’s 
reduced opportunities in access to employment and careers and intended to improve the ability of 
women to compete on the labour market and pursue a career on an equal footing with men” are not 
precluded by EU law.30 It appears that in view of the Court, the purpose of positive action is ‘merely’ 
to correct irregularities that obstruct the optimal operation of the market and the principle of equal 
opportunities. Indeed, the Court has said that in its view a procedure for the selection of candidates for 
a post involves, as a rule, simply the assessment of their qualifications by reference to the 
requirements of the vacant post or of the duties to be performed, and nothing else.31 From this it 
 
25 For two contrasting opinions, see Vos, cit. supra note 1, pp. 31 and 68 and the references cited therein, and de 
Schutter, cit. supra note 1, pp. 821–825. 
26 See Vos, cit. supra note 1; de Schutter, cit. supra note 1. 
27 ECJ, Kalanke v. Freie Hansestadt Bremen, C-450/93, 17 October 1995; ECJ, Hellmut Marschall v. Land 
Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-409/95, 11 November 1997; ECJ, Badeck, C-158/97, 28 March 2000; ECJ, 
Abrahamsson and Anderson v. Elisabet Fogelqvist, C-407/98, 6 July 2000. The Court summarised its conception 
in Abrahamsson, para 43. 
28 Idem (Abrahamsson). 
29 The Court explains in Abrahamsson that the legitimate positive action criteria ”aim … to achieve substantive, 
rather than formal, equality by reducing de facto inequalities which may arise in society and, thus … to prevent 
or compensate for disadvantages in the professional career of persons belonging to the under-represented sex.”. 
See also ECJ, H. Lommers v. Minister van Landbouw, Natuurbeheer en Visserij, 19 March 2002, para 33. 
30 ECJ, Lommers, cit. supra note 29, para 33. 
31 ECJ, Abrahamsson, cit. supra note 27, para 46. 
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follows that positive action is conceptualized more as an exception to the principle of equal treatment, 
than an integral element of it. In line with this approach, the ECJ has emphasised that any positive 
action measure has to have due regard for the principle of proportionality, and that any such measure 
must remain within the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to achieve the aim in 
view.32 On that account, the Court is of the view that a measure that gives priority to a person 
belonging to an underrepresented group, who meets the minimum qualifications but who does not 
have qualifications equivalent to those of the person who would otherwise be selected, is 
disproportionate and thus precluded by EU law on that ground alone.33  
In light of this analysis it appears likely that the ECJ would allow, as a rule, measures that simply 
facilitate and improve the ability of underrepresented groups to pursue, and to progress in, their 
careers.34 It is, however, questionable whether the ECJ would be ready to accept outright preferential 
treatment measures. Perhaps only a rule or a scheme that favours a person belonging to an 
underrepresented group (how ever that under-representation would have to be demonstrated), in 
situations where that person and some other candidate have got the best and substantially equivalent 
qualifications, would survive the Court’s scrutiny, provided that this rule is not applied 
unconditionally or automatically, and that the situations of both candidates are fully and equally taken 
into account. 
At the end of the day, ECJ’s current conceptualization of positive action favours formal equality 
and equality of opportunities over substantive equality and equality of outcome.35 This point of view 
can be contrasted with the point of view adopted in the sphere of international human rights law, 
particularly the ICERD, where positive action to ensure the effective enjoyment of rights is 
considered, albeit vaguely, an integral part of anti-discrimination law. This is, however, not an 
instance of inconsistency, as with some simplification, international anti-discrimination law is 
primarily about equal and effective enjoyment of rights, whereas EU law is about equal opportunities 
in the market place. The two share common ground in that neither set of laws guarantees any kind of 
equality of outcome in terms of material equality. Yet, the presumption that equality of opportunities 
can be achieved without any concern whatsoever to outcomes appears flawed in the analysis of this 
study. Major socio-economic differences generate and sustain negative stereotypes and prejudices and 
generate further disadvantage through fertilizing the roots of discrimination. To achieve equality of 
opportunity we must therefore pay attention to any socio-economic gulfs that persist between groups.  
 
Socio-political perspectives 
 
Would positive action schemes, if widely adopted and implemented, have the kind of counter-
productive effects that substantially compromise, or even surpass, their benefits? The literature on 
positive action, which is substantial, has brought up several kinds of concerns about the potential 
negative impact that such policies may have. Yet, what must be made clear from the start is that these 
debates have focused almost exclusively on preferential treatment, not the other types of positive 
 
32 ECJ, Lommers, cit. supra note 29, para 39; ECJ, Abrahamsson, cit. supra note 27, para 55.  
33 Idem (Abrahamsson). 
34 See also ECJ, Lommers, cit. supra note 29, para 38. 
35 de Schutter, cit. supra note 1, p. 824. 
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action. Preferential treatment rests on ethnic distinctions and therefore increases the salience of group 
membership, and is to that extent a legitimate concern for the efforts to reduce intergroup divisions. 
The following discussion will therefore pay attention to these concerns particularly in the context of 
preferential treatment.  
Would positive action schemes, if more widely deployed, promote racial stereotypes, by means of 
sending the message that immigrants and members of minorities need special attention to make it in 
the modern competition-based society?36 The scenario that positive action schemes could indeed foster 
negative stereotyping does not seem entirely implausible, insofar as positive action relies on 
preferential treatment and the adoption of such measures arouse major public attention.37 As things 
stand, positive action has not aroused any major public interest in Europe and any reliance on outright 
preferential treatment seems to be without political, popular and legal support. The softer methods, 
while calling for employers to pay attention to ethnic diversity and the ‘ethnic impact’ of the measures 
they take, do not involve the making of rigid distinctions on the basis of origin, and are unlikely to 
increase the salience of group divisions in the society in any substantial manner. Moreover, the softer 
positive action measures do enjoy general support according to opinion polls, meaning that the general 
public appears convinced that such measures are not just legitimate but necessary. In these 
circumstances there is no reason to be concerned about soft positive action measures having the 
unintended effect of reinforcing negative stereotypes. Quite vice versa, to the extent that such action 
contributes to the upward social mobility of the target groups, it will help to dismantle the existing 
negative stereotypes. 
Would the adoption and implementation of preferential treatment schemes, if such were found 
necessary and legally acceptable, then have counterproductive effects?  In other words, would 
preferential treatment schemes be taken by the public as an indication that the beneficiary groups are 
in some way inferior, thus reinforcing and reinvigorating vulgar beliefs about ‘racial’ superiority and 
inferiority?38 Would preferential treatment promote group divisions? Asking these questions may 
appear theoretical, given that preferential treatment on the grounds of ethnic origin does not currently 
appear to be practiced in Europe. Asking these questions may also appear somewhat premature, given 
that it would be fully possible to capitalize on the current popular support for positive action, to pursue 
preferential treatment, and to reconsider the continuance of this line of action if preferential treatment 
would start to show the kind of undesirable effects that outweigh its benefits. And answering these 
questions involves an inevitable, active and uncomfortable engagement in speculation. Yet, the issue 
will continue to be debated, and therefore the matter cannot be ignored here either. 
Preferential treatment could indeed trigger further negative stereotyping if there was major public 
debate about it, and if sizable portions of the general public would be persuaded that the reason for the 
need for preferential treatment is some fault or failure on the beneficiaries’ part, not the unfair 
disadvantages imposed upon them. As preferential treatment involves the making of ethnic 
distinctions and distributes advantages and burdens on the grounds of these distinctions, it is prone to 
generate intergroup rivalry insofar as the public becomes aware of it and is not of the opinion that such 
policies promote ‘the common good’. It would certainly not be a surprise if populist and far-right 
 
36 See e.g. Fullinwider, cit. supra note 12, p. 20. 
37 Dhami et al, cit. supra note 19. 
38 On this debate, see Allen, cit. supra note 1, p. 33. 
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argumentation would draw attention to preferential treatment policies and reinterpret them in terms of 
‘unjust benefits’ and ‘discrimination against the majority’, in an effort to turn the public opinion 
against such treatment and the target groups in general. But the possible reinforcement of the beliefs of 
the already prejudiced is no argument against redressing the damage that these same individuals have 
inflicted and continue to inflict upon the victims; perhaps vice versa. What matters are popular 
perceptions, and these could turn either way, given the pre-existing general propensity both to support 
egalitarian values and to hold negative stereotypes. In effect, if public discussion over preferential 
treatment and its rationale would arise, politicians and interest groups and individuals would need to 
be ready not just to support and pursue such action but to actively engage in the public discussions, 
equipped with the data that show why that action needs to be taken.39 Indeed, much of the early 
success of affirmative action in the US can be credited to a strong black protest movement and the 
case it made for preferential treatment.40  
That said, no stereotype-forming public discussion will necessarily even arise, nor will the general 
public necessarily take preferences to indicate inferiority instead of discrimination and disadvantage, 
in which case the upward social mobility of immigrants and persons belonging to minorities would 
simply serve to dismantle existing negative stereotypes and prejudices. Be that as it may, the impact of 
preferential treatment on the public opinion is hard to predict, and much will depend on how well the 
case for preferential treatment is made in the public. 
A second thing to consider in this context is whether preferential treatment compromises the self-
esteem or self-respect of members of beneficiary groups.41 It should be underlined that this risk is 
feared to materialize in the context of preferential treatment only. It hurts one’s self-esteem to be 
selected for employment over a more competent person simply for the sake of one’s ethnic origin, so 
the argument goes. The merits of this argument look questionable on three counts at least. First, those 
supporting it have not come up with any empirical evidence.42 Second, the argument supposes that the 
preferred persons would be convinced (a) that some other candidate really was more qualified, and (b) 
that it is morally wrong to compensate for disadvantages in this way. Usually people will not know 
about the qualifications of the other candidates, let alone be fully aware of all selection criteria, so the 
merits of that argument look at least dubious. Alternatively, one could of course expect damage to the 
minorities’ self-esteem to result not from their own assessment of the situation but from other people’s 
assessment of it. But if that argument was correct, if the members of the beneficiary groups would be 
generally harassed with claims that they have been hired not on the basis of merits but group 
privileges, then one could expect them to feel at the very least ambivalent about preferential treatment. 
This brings us to the third point: if it were true that positive action, preferential treatment in particular, 
hurts its beneficiaries’ self-esteem or self-respect, then it would be logical to expect them to oppose 
 
39 Indeed, the experiences from the US and Canada suggest that government, when promoting positive action, 
should do so robustly and should communicate with the public effectively regarding the rationale and nature of 
the policies. See Dhami – Squires – Modood, cit. supra note 19, pp. 114–116. 
40 Melinda Chateauvert ‘Using Historical and Sociological Evidence to Defend Anti-Discrimination Policies’ in 
Appelt, Erna – Monica Jarosch (eds.), Combating Racial Discrimination: Affirmative Action as a Model for 
Europe (Oxford: Berg, 2000), p. 114. 
41 This has been suggested e.g. by Thomas Sowell, in Affirmative Action Reconsidered: Was it Necessary in 
Academia (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy, 1975). 
42 Williams, cit. supra note 3, p. 78; Harry Holzer – David Neumark ‘Assessing Affirmative Action’ Journal of 
Economic Literature, Vol 38, No 3 (Sep. 2000). 
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such measures or at any rate be ambivalent about them. But the evidence that there is does not support 
this, as surveys from the US show that beneficiaries support these measures substantially more often 
than other people.43 This means, at the very least, that the beneficiaries tend to think that the benefits 
of positive action outweigh the costs. In effect, if the beneficiaries are not concerned about positive 
action damaging their self-esteem, why should other people be? 
A third, and most serious, issue to consider in this context is whether preferential treatment raises 
levels of group division. Preferential treatment policies - the connection of tangible benefits to the 
possession of particular characteristics – advantage some and disadvantage others on the grounds of 
their ‘racial’ or ethnic origin, and therefore run against prevailing liberal ideas about neutrality and 
equal treatment. It would, in other words, be felt to violate the basic sense of formal justice, making 
people to feel strongly about it. Indeed, there are elements in the public perceptions in the US about 
preferential treatment that suggest that resistance to it is not just about pragmatic, ‘rational’ assessment 
of its pros and cons.44 Preferential treatment would be bound to increase both the number of groups 
seeking the status of a disadvantaged group and the number of individuals seeking recognition as a 
member of such a group. This kind of signification of origin and the associated competition for 
benefits can indeed be expected to raise the levels of ‘racial’ and/or ethnic consciousness and thereby 
increase group divisions, unless the levels of such consciousness are already at a high level in the 
society concerned. The potential impact of preferential treatment therefore depends on the values and 
perceptions prevalent in each society. In most parts of contemporary Europe the impact would quite 
likely be negative at this time. 
At this point one has ample reasons for asking why the public debate – conducted mainly in the 
US, not Europe – has been so overly concerned with the possible counterproductive effects of positive 
action. For most forms of positive action, the softer measures, these concerns appear to be entirely 
unfounded, and for preferential treatment they appear to be speculative and context-dependent at the 
least. Why is it that ‘no-one’ is concerned about the effects of positive action on women in context of 
gender equality? Why is it that ‘no-one’ is worried about the negative impact that the existing 
preferences and privileges enjoyed by individuals belonging to the majority have on their self-esteem, 
for it should be manifestly evident that discrimination inflicted upon members of minorities – a 
phenomenon which the members of the majority are well aware of in light of surveys45 – must by 
definition unjustly privilege members of the majority? Why is it that any plans to confer limited 
preferences to immigrants and minorities raise so many concerns? 
Research conducted in the US has demonstrated that there exists a major discrepancy between the 
experienced threat of ‘reverse discrimination’ and its actual incidence: a vast majority of the 
respondents in the US believe that it is likely that an African American will get a job instead of an 
equally or more qualified ‘White American’ whereas only a small fraction of ‘Whites’ say that they 
have actually been in a situation where an ‘African American’ was preferred over them because of 
 
43 Charlotte Steeh – Maria Krysan ‘The Polls – Trends: Affirmative Action and the Public, 1970-1995’ Public 
Opinion Quarterly Vol 60 (1996), pp. 135–137. 
44 Ibid, pp. 139–140. 
45 Again, one might keep in mind that 62% of Europeans – almost two out of three – say that they think that 
ethnic discrimination is ‘very widespread’ or ‘fairly widespread’ in their country. See European Commission, cit. 
supra note 15, p. 35.  
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preferential treatment.46 Evidence from the US also suggests that people may attribute minorities’ 
advances in the field of employment to positive action rather than their own merits.47 Why so? The 
answer may lie in the self-interest of the majority; for it, ‘racial preferences’ are a problem as soon as 
it is no longer in the receiving end, irrespective of whether social justice or utility considerations 
would demand support for preferential treatment in favour of the presently disadvantaged. Research 
has also found that old-fashioned racial thinking and racial divisions explain much of ‘White’ 
opposition to affirmative action.48 Given the social prevalence of negative stereotypes and prejudices, 
it would indeed be unexpected if they would not influence what the public thinks about the matters at 
hand. Indeed, the contemporary calls for colour-blindness, neutrality and formal equality of 
opportunity, and not for positive action and preferential treatment, may cover hidden forms of racism 
and exclusion.49 In effect, whereas it is fully legitimate – and indeed necessary – to consider the socio-
psychological consequences of particular courses of action, the excessive concern for the prejudicial 
effects of positive action appears not just unwarranted but morally suspect.50 
 
Effectiveness 
 
Whereas the case for positive action can rather confidently be made at a theoretical level, this does not 
mean that we should expect all kinds of positive action programmes to be successful everywhere and 
every time. Indeed, there is evidence to the effect that positive action programmes have not always 
delivered or been as effective as has been expected.51 It is therefore crucial to delve into the 
assessment of the effectiveness of the different positive action measures and the conditions that affect 
their successfulness. This is a tricky business, however, as the assessment of the impact of particular 
measures in the highly complex settings of the real world is really demanding, which is the reason why 
there are so few comprehensive studies in this area.  
Under these circumstances, the uniquely comprehensive research report by Dhami, Squires and 
Modood, in which they review the research conducted on positive action in Canada, the Netherlands, 
Northern Ireland and the United States, is highly welcome. In their report the authors posed the 
obvious question about the effectiveness of positive action policies in general, and reached the overall 
conclusion that there can be “clear benefits” from a programme of positive action, a finding which led 
the authors to recommend stronger positive action policies.52 Perhaps the main merit of the report, 
however, was the study of the experiences from different countries of conditions under which positive 
action appears to be effective. In their conclusions, the authors point out that positive action schemes 
are effective where these measures are supported by adequate levels of political will; are applied in a 
 
46 Steeh – Krysan, cit. supra note 43, pp. 139–140. 
47 Allen, cit. supra note 1, p. 32. 
48 R. Michael Alvarez – Lisa García Bedolla ’The Revolution against Affirmative Action in California: Racism, 
Economics, and Proposition 209, State Politics and Policy Quarterly, Vol 4, No 1 (Spring 2004), pp. 1–17. 
49 David Theo Goldberg–Philomena Essed, ‘Introduction: From Racial Demarcations to Multiple Identifications’ 
in Philomena Essed – David Theo Goldberg (eds.) Race Critical Theories (Oxford: Blackwell, 2001). 
50 This conclusion should not be surprising, considering the evidence on the prevalence and intensity of 
prejudices. 
51 See e.g. Dhami et al, cit. supra note 19, p. 97; Frank Cunningham, cit. supra note 20, p. 42. 
52 Dhami et al, cit. supra note 19, pp. 6-8. Their study, including the recommendations, is made with the UK in 
mind in particular. 
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flexible manner; are subject to periodic review; are accompanied by a more general cultural shift that 
results in broader support for such programmes also among employers; are vigorously enforced and 
adequately resourced; do not involve too much red tape and bureaucracy; and where supply-side issues 
of education and skills training (for the immigrants and persons belonging to minorities) are 
addressed.53 Their conclusions clearly demonstrate that it is not enough simply to adopt positive action 
measures and then sit still and wait for positive results; rather, a well-considered, long-term and 
reflexive engagement is called for. 
What kinds of positive action measures or programmes appear effective? The evidence is 
incomplete at best, but suggests that both soft and hard measures may lead to positive results. For 
instance the policy of inviting at least one qualified immigrant origin person to interview whenever 
there is a job opening, implemented in Norway in the public sector, has led to an increase in the 
representation of immigrant-origin persons.54 There is also evidence of the effectiveness of many other 
types of ‘soft positive action’ measures, including pre-employment counselling.55 The evidence also 
suggests that affirmative action, particularly preferential treatment, has increased the opportunities of 
African Americans in the United States and has decreased their wage inequalities.56 This has come 
with little or no cost in terms of business efficiency.57 Indeed, because of its robustness, one could 
expect the ‘hard’ positive action measures to be a particularly effective means of promoting equal 
opportunities. 
The efficiency of preferential treatment is however circumscribed in two ways. First, it appears 
that preferential treatment only helps individual better-off members of minorities, not the other 
members of that minority, effectively forming a majority of it.58 Second, preferential treatment 
schemes appear to fail if they are poorly defined and do not involve ethnic monitoring and numerical 
goals or possibly even quotas.59 In effect, preferential treatment can best be pursued in those countries 
where the general attitude climate and the vulnerable groups in particular are favourable to 
monitoring.60  
 
53 Idem. 
54 See the evaluation report regarding the National Action Plan to Combat Racism and Discrimination 2002–
2006, Arbeids- og inkluderingsdepartementet, Handlingsplan mot rasisme og diskriminering (Arbeids- og 
inkluderingsdepartementet, November 2006). 
55 Dhami et al, cit. supra note 19. 
56 Idem. 
57 Holzer and Neumark, in their extensive economic investigation of the issue, conclude that “all in all, the 
evidence suggests to us that it may be possible to generate affirmative action programs that entail little sacrifice 
of efficiency” and add that there may even be overall efficiency gains, cit. supra note 42, p. 559.  
58 See e.g. the arguments and statistics presented in Thomas Sowell ‘From Equal Opportunity to “Affirmative 
Action” in Francis J. Beckwith – Todd. E. Jones (eds.) Affirmative Action: Social Justice or Reverse 
Discrimination (New York: Amherst, 1997). See also Allen cit. supra note 1, p. 33. 
59 Strasser et al, cit. supra note 17, p. 23; Dhami et al, cit. supra note 19. 
60 Indeed, if preferential treatment cannot be systematically applied, then the question whether the pros still 
outweigh the cons becomes increasingly legitimate. 
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11.4 Conclusions 
Entrenched inequalities, in terms of opportunities and outcomes, call for positive action to redress 
current discrimination and the legacy of past discrimination. The power of positive action lies in that it 
appears to be the only, or at the very least main, method for breaking down the vicious cycle of 
disadvantage and discrimination. Yet positive action is no miracle cure; it does not come without 
sustained and well-planned efforts and its positive impact is by no means automatic, immediate or 
strong enough to always affect tangible social change. Much depends on the extent to which the 
proponents of positive action are able to mobilize themselves, on the extent of political will, on the 
extent to which employers and other stakeholders are willing to put their time, energy and resources 
into implementing it. And even then, not all methods of positive action suit all societies at all times. 
A general challenge in the incorporation of positive action as a key element of equal treatment 
policies involves a change in the mindset with regard to what it means to treat people equally. A break 
in the practice of the prevailing non-discrimination approaches that are inherently unable to affect a 
positive change is called for. This means that now that the general public has by and large learned – 
some the hard way – that ‘racial’ or ethnic origin are not relevant criteria in today’s societies, the 
public is asked to re-acknowledge these criteria and to accept that inequalities cannot be addressed 
unless these factors are taken into account. Also legal professionals, the judiciary in particular, will 
need to re-examine their doctrines about equal treatment and the permissible scope of positive action. 
These changes in the mindset may not be impossible to achieve, as they fit rather well into the recent 
broad cultural change in values in Europe.61  
It is perhaps somewhat ironic that preferential treatment, arguably the most effective means of 
positive action, bears the greatest risk of being counterproductive. Due to its intrinsic quality of 
signifying group membership and the necessity to engage in ethnic monitoring to implement it in a 
satisfactory way, it can perhaps only be successfully implemented in countries where the levels of 
‘racial’ and ethnic consciousness are high to begin with and where the general public and the 
vulnerable groups in particular are favourably disposed towards collection of ethnic data. This 
perspective renders preferential treatment policies inapplicable in practice for many parts of 
contemporary Europe, if not most. 
The need to engage in preferential treatment is perhaps to some extent diminished by the fact that 
basic welfare guarantees, often also for immigrants, are fairly substantial in Europe, particularly in 
comparison to the rest of the world. Moreover, the case for preferential treatment for the needy 
immigrant and minority groups is diminished also in view of the fact that there are other groups, such 
as people with disabilities, women, sexual minorities, religious minorities and senior people that 
currently suffer from discrimination and that would also ‘deserve’ preferential treatment and benefit 
from it. But if preferential treatment schemes would encompass these groups as well, then these 
schemes risk becoming too burdensome to manage. In effect, class- or income-based welfare policies 
that are applied universally across the society and irrespective of membership in any group have much 
to speak for them. That said, we should not be under the illusion that class- or income based policies 
 
61 Ronald Inglehart, ‘Globalization and Postmodern Values’ The Washington Quarterly, 23:1 Winter 2000. 
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would lead to the same outcome as ethnically-based preferential treatment; they are simply not as 
effective in promoting inclusion.62 
 
 
62 Holzer–Neumark, cit. supra note 42, p. 561. 
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12 Positive duties 
Dissatisfaction with the individual rights based approach to combating racial and ethnic discrimination 
has led to theoretical and legislative innovations, particularly after the turn of the 21st century. A 
particularly influential idea has been that of introducing positive equality duties as a means of 
accelerating the achievement of equality. There is no generally agreed definition for positive duties, 
but for the purposes of the present context, it can be defined as an overarching obligation, placed by 
law upon an organisation, to take active measures to promote the achievement of equality.1  
At its broadest, the duty means that its bearers are required to take account of equality 
considerations in everything they do. This kind of a duty encompasses the role of the organization 
concerned in its dual capacity of an employer and provider of goods and/or services. In its employer 
role, the organization is required to mainstream equality considerations into its decisions and practices 
that deal with, inter alia, recruitment and selection, training, promotion and retention. In its role as a 
provider of goods and services, the organization is required to ensure that it provides services of equal 
quality at equal value and on equal terms for all groups. A broad duty would also require an 
organization to take equality into account in its decisions and practices that concern its public image, 
external and internal communication, procurement, and relations with other stakeholders, including the 
different communities.2 
Positive duties can in principle be placed both upon public and private bodies, but up until now 
there is mainly experience of public sector duties. Authorities are indeed uniquely placed to affect a 
change in the society, given their role as providers of public services in areas such as education, 
employment, housing, the justice system, and health and social care. The private sector plays however 
a much greater role in the field of employment, as private sector jobs account for some 70 percent of 
all jobs in Europe.3 
12.1 The policy case  
The idea of positive duties has got much to speak for itself, particularly against the backdrop of the 
failures of the individual rights based approach to equality. Firstly, and perhaps most importantly, it 
promises to affect a broader and more lasting change, whereas the changes brought about by the latter 
are patchy and concern only a few individuals at best.4 The reality is that often equality concerns are 
 
1 See also Discrimination Law Review, ‘A Framework for Fairness: Proposals for a Single Equality Bill for 
Great Britain’, June 2007, p. 79. Available at: http://www.communities.gov.uk (accessed 1.1.2010). 
2 See e.g. CRE, Towards Racial Equality: An evaluation of the public duty to promote race equality and good 
race relations in England and Wales (2002), p. 13.  
3 Situation for the EU-27 for 2007. Source: Eurostat, European Union Labour Force Survey – Annual Results 
2007, Eurostat Data in Focus 27/2008. The private sector is here defined broadly as consisting of agriculture, 
industry and market services and excluding non-market services provided by the public and non-profit 
institutions. 
4 See also Alexandra Kalev–Frank Dobbin, ‘Enforcement of Civil Rights Law in Private Workplaces: The 
Effects of Compliance Reviews and Lawsuits Over Time’, Law & Social Inquiry, Volume 31, Issue 4, 855–903, 
Fall 2006. 
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experienced as significant only if one is in some way responsible for tackling them. Under the 
individual rights model, this happens when one is sued to the court, which means infrequently, if ever. 
In contrast, the duty to promote equality is a lasting, on-going duty. It is proactive, not reactive in 
nature. Moreover, and again in contrast to the individual rights based approach, duties require a more 
systematic and broad approach to guaranteeing and promoting equality. In effect, it stands a better 
chance of identifying and removing indirect, institutional and structural discrimination in particular.5 
Secondly, the former approach places obligations and burdens on the side which is creating the 
problems, not on the side upon which problems are inflicted. To that extent, it is certainly more in line 
with predominant understandings of fairness, and is practical in that it is organizations that are better 
able than the disadvantaged individuals to shoulder the burdens involved in ensuring that equality laws 
are complied with. The above said, the approach based on duties is not about blaming anyone, it 
bypasses the need to find fault and to identify individual complainants and respondents, as well as the 
problems of proof and the need to take potentially lengthy and costly legal action.  
Thirdly, duties are anticipatory in nature, in that they aim at preventing harm from being inflicted, 
whereas individual rights aim at remedying the harm already done, being retrospective in nature. In 
other words, whereas the predominant anti-discrimination framework primarily aims at putting things 
right after they have gone wrong, positive duties aim at getting things right in the first place. Instead of 
being about sitting down and waiting for the complaints to arrive, it is about the active compensation 
of past wrongs and prevention of new ones. 
The fourth benefit of positive duties is that it is a goal-oriented approach. The action taken can be 
given a clear direction, the precise formulation of the goal of course depending on the domestic 
legislator. Indeed, it need not just to be about market equality, it can also be about the other 
dimensions of equality. 
Overall, positive equality duties promise to set in motion a kind of domino effect whereby a 
change in the legal parameters brings about an institutional and cultural change that on its turn 
contributes to a social change.6 This is some promise, and warrants a closer look at the methods by 
which the positive duties can be implemented, as well as a closer examination of the conditions under 
which positive duties can be presumed to be effective. 
12.2 Methods 
The idea of positive equality duties is a relatively recent innovation and is still in its infancy, 
particularly in terms of theoretical development and even more so in terms of practical 
implementation. Finland, Sweden and United Kingdom offer three, rare at the time of writing, 
examples of imposition of positive equality duties in law, and will be reviewed in the following. 
 
 
5 See also Fredman – Spencer, “Beyond Discrimination: It’s Time for Enforceable Duties on Public Bodies to 
Promote Equality Outcomes” E.H.R.L.R. Issue 6 (2006), p. 600. 
6 For instance the British Discrimination Law Review report notes that positive duties are intended to help to 
bring about a culture change so that promoting equality becomes part and parcel of public authorities’ core 
business. Discrimination Law Review, cit supra note 1, p. 79. 
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United Kingdom 
 
The general statutory equality duty was introduced in Great Britain by the Race Relations 
(Amendment) Act 2000. This equality duty imposes the duty on an extensive list of public bodies, 
requiring them to have “due regard” to the need (i) to eliminate unlawful racial discrimination, and (ii) 
to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between people of different racial groups.7 
Specific duties were introduced in secondary legislation on some, mainly larger, public authorities, 
with a view to helping them to meet the general duty.8 A specialized agency, the Commission for 
Racial Equality – now replaced by the Commission for Equality and Human Rights – has also 
published several statutory and non-statutory Codes of Practice that elaborate upon these duties with a 
view to providing guidance on how to meet them.  
There are three specific duties that are designed to help public authorities to meet the general duty: 
(i) the duty to publish a ‘race equality scheme’; (ii) the employment duty; and (iii) the duty for schools 
and higher education institutions.9  The first specific duty requires a wide range of public authorities to 
prepare and publish a race equality scheme, in which they are to set out their arrangements for 
assessing, and consulting on, the likely impact of their proposed policies on ‘race equality’; and to set 
out their arrangements for monitoring their policies for any adverse impact on ‘race equality’. Public 
authorities bound by the first specific duty are required to monitor all their functions and policies that 
are relevant to the general duty. 
Most public authorities bound by the general duty are, under the second specific duty, required to 
promote ‘race equality’ as employers. This means that they have to monitor, by “racial group”: 
(i) The numbers of 
a) staff in post; 
b) applicants for employment, training and promotion, from each racial group; and 
(ii) Where an authority employs 150 or more full-time staff, the numbers of staff from each racial 
group who 
c) receive training; 
d) benefit or suffer detriment as a result of its performance assessment procedures; 
e) are involved in grievance procedures; 
f) are the subject of disciplinary procedures; or 
g) cease employment with that authority.10 
 
 
7 Section 71(1). 
8 Race Relations Act 1976 (Statutory Duties) Order 2001. 
9 Not every authority that is subject to the general duty is also subject to any or all of the specific duties. 
10 Each authority bound by this duty is required to publish the results of its monitoring annually. 
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Educational bodies are, under the third specific duty, to monitor the ethnic composition and 
performance of their staff and pupils. Schools must prepare and publish a ‘race equality policy’, as 
well as to monitor and assess how their policies affect ethnic minority pupils, staff and parents. 
The Commission for Equality and Human Rights is chiefly responsible for ensuring compliance 
with the duty. Authorities not meeting the duty may be given a ‘compliance notice’ by the 
Commission, requiring them (i) to comply with the duty and (ii) to provide the Commission 
information about the steps that will be taken to comply with the duty. Those failing to comply with a 
requirement of the notice may be taken by the Commission to a High Court under a judicial review 
procedure.11 
A specific set of duties exist in Northern Ireland under Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 
1998. The Act places duties upon designated authorities, which include for instance government 
departments, universities and local councils. These authorities are required, in carrying out of their 
functions, to “have due regard to the need to promote equality of opportunity” and to have “regard to 
the desirability of promoting good relations” across a number of equality grounds, including “racial 
group”. The Equality Commission for Northern Ireland is charged with a number of responsibilities in 
respect of ensuring the fulfilment of these duties. 
 Each designated authority is required to produce an ‘equality scheme’ setting out how it proposes 
to fulfil the duties. The scheme must be submitted to the Equality Commission for approval. The 
schemes must conform to any guidelines, as to form and content, issued by the Commission with the 
approval of the Secretary of State. Each authority must furthermore conduct a review of the scheme 
within five years of submission of the scheme to the Commission, and the Commission must be 
informed of the outcome of that review. Furthermore, the legislation requires authorities to conduct 
equality impact assessments. The results of equality impact assessments must be published and the 
equality scheme must state the authority’s arrangements for this. The legislation also requires that 
persons likely to affected are consulted in the course of the policy-making process. The duty to ensure 
equality of opportunity is also to be taken into account in public procurement.12 
 
Finland 
 
In Finland, Section 4(1) of the Equal Treatment Act (21/2004) places a general obligation on all public 
authorities  
to promote equality, in all their functions, in a goal-oriented and planned manner, and to 
consolidate such administrative and operational practices that will ensure promotion of equality in 
the making and preparation of decisions. In particular, authorities shall address the circumstances 
that prevent the realization of equality.13 
 
This duty is basically about mainstreaming equality considerations into all public decision-making, 
whether governmental, municipal or local. This general equality duty, applicable with respect to all 
 
11 Equality Act 2006, Sections 30–32.  
12 See e.g. Equality Commission for Northern Ireland and the Central Procurement Directorate, Equality of 
Opportunity and Sustainable Development in Public Sector Procurement (May 2008). 
13 Unofficial translation by the author. 
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grounds of equality, is supplemented by a specific duty to promote equality on the grounds of ethnic 
origin. This specific duty requires each authority to adopt an ‘equality plan’, in which they are to set 
out the measures regarding how they will go about fulfilling the general duty with respect to ethnic 
equality.14 The nature of the functions of the authority in question determines the required 
extensiveness of the plan, introducing an element of proportionality into the equation. The plan may 
involve positive action measures, which is why Section 7(1) of the Act specifically provides that 
action taken in pursuance of an equality plan does not constitute discrimination. 
The law charges the Ministry of the Interior to issue General recommendations in relation to the 
content of the plan. The prevailing General recommendations specify, inter alia, that each plan shall 
cover the authority’s role both as an employer and as a provider of public services. It also urges each 
authority to draw up the plan in cooperation with the representatives of the groups concerned. While 
both the general and specific duties are legally binding, the law does not attach any hard and fast 
sanctions or mechanisms of enforcement to these duties. 
 
Sweden 
 
In Sweden, Chapter 3 of the Act on Discrimination (567/2008) places detailed duties on employers in 
particular. A general obligation is placed on each employer to promote, in a goal-oriented manner and 
in the framework of its activities, the achievement of equal opportunities and equal rights. This general 
duty is complemented by a range of specific duties including the following: an employer must take 
reasonable accommodation measures to ensure that the working methods and the work environment 
are fit for everyone irrespective of origin; it must take measures to prevent harassment and 
victimization; it must take measures with a view to promoting the opportunity of each individual, 
irrespective of origin, to apply for work opportunities; and once in every three years it shall prepare an 
equality plan that sets out the measures that the employer intends to undertake in order to comply with 
the specific duties. The subsequent plan must include a report on the measures actually taken to 
implement the previous plan. The reporting duty concerns only employers with 25 or more employees. 
Education providers are under a different set of duties, including a duty to adopt an equality plan on a 
yearly basis.15 
Compliance with these duties is overseen by the Discrimination Ombudsman and the 
Discrimination Tribunal. The Ombudsman has effective investigative powers, and can take an 
employer to the Tribunal in case of suspected non-compliance. The Tribunal is empowered to order 
the employer to comply with its duties under the threat of a fine.16 
 
Instruments of implementation 
 
A general equality duty, as also the examples of the three states show, typically requires the duty-
bound organizations to pay attention to both the contents of decision-making and the processes that 
lead to it. In effect, positive equality duties generally have three partly overlapping characteristic 
 
14 Section 4(2) of the Equal Treatment Act. 
15 Disrimineringslag, Sections 3–16. 
16 Chapter 4, Sections 1–5 of the Act. 
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components: they involve the equality mainstreaming ethos, consultative policy-making processes, 
and impact assessment of the effects of policy decisions.17 An obligation to set them out in an equality 
plan supports the sustained, coherent and effective design and implementation of each of these 
elements. 
There is a considerable amount of experience of mainstreaming in the context of gender equality, 
where the idea of placing equality considerations at the heart of all decision-making has by and large 
become accepted throughout Europe, with the Nordic countries leading the way.18 Mainstreaming can 
be conceptualized in a variety of ways,19 but many definitions reflect the idea of systematic inclusion 
of equality considerations into all organizational processes and the examination of the equality impact 
of the various parts of those processes, as reflected in the following definition adopted by the 
European Commission: 
Gender mainstreaming involves not restricting efforts to promote equality to the implementation of 
specific measures to help women, but mobilising all general policies and measures specifically for 
the purpose of achieving equality by actively and openly taking into account at the planning stage 
their possible effects on the respective situation of men and women (gender perspective). This 
means systematically examining measures and policies and taking into account such possible 
effects when defining and implementing them. 
 
Mainstreaming strategies respond to the common experience that questions of equality and non-
discrimination may easily become sidelined.20 Substantive mainstreaming of equality issues should 
not be achieved simply through the technical introduction of pertinent discussion items into decision-
making; rather, and perhaps more importantly, it calls for the consultation of the groups concerned 
about what equality requires in each specific context at hand.21 As such, it suggests building a new 
relationship between the citizens and the government, a relationship where responsibility for making 
decisions and tackling problems is not just on government officers and other ‘experts’ but also on the 
affected groups.22 In effect, inclusive mainstreaming may be defined as systematic incorporation of 
non-discrimination and equality considerations into all decision-making in co-operation with the 
groups concerned. Reviews suggest that equality concerns should be taken into account throughout the 
 
17 Etienne Mclaughlin, ‘From Negative to Positive Equality Duties: The Development and Constitutionalisation 
of Equality Provisions in the UK’ Social Policy & Society 6:1, p. 115.  
18 European Commission, Gender mainstreaming of employment policies. A comparative review of thirty 
European countries (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the EC, 2007). For a look at the historical 
development of the concept, see Panu Artemjeff, ‘Mainstreaming Equality: Conceptual Development and 
Mainstreaming Model of the Join In Project’ in Panu Artemjeff – Kirsi Henriksson (eds.), Mainstreaming 
Equality and Non-discrimination in Theory and Practice (Helsinki: Cosmoprint, 2006), p. 19 ff. 
19 Idem (Artemjeff), pp. 20–22. 
20 Christopher McCrudden, ‘Regulating Discrimination: Advice to a Legislator on Problems Regarding the 
Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Law and Strategies to Overcome Them’ in Titia Loenen – Peter Rodrigues 
(eds.) Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), p. 311. 
21 See also Artemjeff, cit. supra note 18, pp. 20–22. 
22 See generally on shared governance, Matt Leighninger, The Next Form of Democracy: How Expert Rule is 
Giving Way to Shared Governance… and Why Politics Will Never Be the Same (Nashville, Vanderbilt 
University Press, 2006). 
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evaluation.23 For public bodies, mainstreaming entails the incorporation of non-discrimination 
objectives into all policies, legislation and programmes, and is also linked to principles of good 
governance. The idea of shared and systematic responsibility across a wide range of governmental and 
non-governmental organizations contrasts positively, because of reasons of scale, with the previously 
dominant idea of charging one government department or agency with equality issues. 
Mainstreaming also has got its more indirect benefits. The objecti
ntrinsically connected to other major social objectives, such as the promotion and guaranteeing of 
human rights and democratic decision-making. Non-discrimination is also linked to such all-important 
societal goals as high level of employment and of social protection, the raising of the standard of 
living and quality of life, economic and social cohesion, and solidarity. The more efficiently anti-
discrimination efforts are embedded in policies aimed at achieving these other goals and objectives, 
and the more efficiently they are seen to be essential for these policy goals, the higher the chance that 
the efforts are effective and embraced by the population at large.24 
How exactly can the mainstreaming of equality concerns th
text of review of a policy? At the level of an ‘ideal model for mainstreaming’ we can distinguish 
four main stages.25 The first step of the process is ‘a preparatory phase’, which involves preparatory 
work such as the identification and involvement of the different stakeholders and definition of their 
responsibilities, the formulation of objectives and targets, and drawing up a budget if necessary. The 
next step is ‘baseline review’, conducted on the basis of all available data for the purposes of 
identifying present inequalities relevant to the policy. Use should be made of existing evaluation 
procedures and data, such as different indicators, customer surveys, consultation with affected 
communities, research, and where such exists, ethnic monitoring data.26 This review also forms the 
starting point for later evaluation. The third step is ‘impact assessment’, which is often taken to be at 
the very heart of effective mainstreaming of equality.27 The idea is to use prospective impact 
assessments, a special type of social analysis, to predict potential equality impacts of policies and 
laws. Consultation of the groups affected by the policy can be highly useful at this point, particularly 
in order to identify potential indirect adverse effects. Impact assessments can be demanding in terms 
of time and resources, which is why it would be a sensible strategy to use screening techniques to 
determine if a full assessment is warranted and what its scope should be.28 The fourth step is ‘redesign 
of policy’, which involves adjustment of the policy in light of the materials gathered and views 
presented. Again, involvement of the representatives of the groups in question is called for. The 
policy-making cycle should be concluded by a retrospective assessment of the equality impact of the 
 
23 Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services, Non-discrimination mainstreaming – instruments, case studies and 
way forwards (April 2007). Available at http://ec.europa.eu. 
24 Jan Niessen, ‘Making the Law Work: The Enforcement and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation’ European Journal of Migration and Law 5: 249-257, 2003, p. 2. 
25 European Commission, cit. supra note 18; Artemjeff, cit. supra note 18. 
26 Artemjeff, cit supra note 18, p. 25. 
27 CRE, cit supra note 2, p. 10. 
28 The High Court of England and Wales commented in the Elias case on the British equality duty, set out in 
section 71 of the Race Relations Act, as follows: “No doubt in some cases it will be plain even after a cursory 
consideration that section 71 is not engaged, or at least is not relevant. There is no need to enter into time 
consuming and potentially expensive consultation exercises or monitoring when discrimination issues are plainly 
not in point”. [2005] EWHC 1435 (Admin), para 96.  
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adopted policy. Consultation can be an important source of feedback in assessing the impact of 
policies, but where available, the real test of progress will be the extent to which key outcomes are 
delivered on the ground, as measured by indicators such as satisfaction levels of ethnic minority users 
of public services, educational attainment levels of ethnic minority youths at school or college, and the 
representation of ethnic minorities at all levels in the public sector.29 For the mainstreaming strategy to 
be comprehensive, this process must be repeated with respect to all relevant policies and processes.  
Mainstreaming may or may not lead into the adoption of positive action measures. Mainstreamin
 also be seen to be about reviewing and challenging the status quo, as a way of recognizing that all 
policies, institutional structures and laws, as neutral as they may appear, may in fact reinforce 
disadvantages. It can bring under discussion how particular decisions and arrangements may serve the 
needs and aspirations of some groups rather than others; that decisions about who participate in 
decision-making, or how resources are distributed, can and do have an impact on equality. For 
instance, a public housing programme reflecting the dominant demand for small starter homes, 
accommodating the needs of typical priority groups such as single parent families, may respond poorly 
to the needs of immigrants, many of whom have larger families. In the area of city planning, a 
decision to build a sports arena instead of an intercultural contact point similarly reflects and responds 
to particular preferences and interests to the detriment of others. In all policy-making, some social 
interests and some groups win, others lose, and the end result conveys a message to the public as to 
what is held important in that society. Mainstreaming is, in effect, ultimately about bringing the 
situation and needs of minorities from the margins of organizational culture to its centre. This does not 
mean that the interests of these groups will prevail at all times; rather it means that their interests will 
prevail at least at some times.   
A comprehensive equality d
 account in public procurement. This is a potentially powerful instrument, given that public 
authorities do business with private companies on a large scale: in the EU, public procurement 
represents some 16 percent of EU gross domestic product.30 Procurement contracting represents a 
unique opportunity for the public authorities to use the power of the public purse in the interest of 
promoting the implementation of social justice in the private sector.31 This can take place, roughly 
speaking, in two ways.32 Firstly, and presumably more effectively, this would involve a contract 
compliance programme, in which public authorities specify certain social criteria that a contractor who 
wants to obtain government contracts must meet. By means of integrating equality considerations into 
public procurement, public authorities can gently pressure businesses into embracing equality and 
diversity policies. In practice, the integration of equality considerations into public procurement entails 
that companies that provide goods and services to the public are required to take action to promote the 
achievement of de facto equality. This may involve, for instance, drawing up equality plans, signing 
otherwise voluntary Diversity Charters, setting up goals to achieve a representative workforce, and/or 
 
29 CRE, cit supra note 2, p. 10. 
30 Fabienne Ilzkovitz, Adriaan Dierx, Viktoria Kovacs and Nuno Sousa, Steps towards a deeper economic 
integration: the Internal Market in the 21st century: A contribution to the Single Market Review, European 
Commission Economic Papers No 271, January 2007, p. 62. 
31 Christopher McCrudden, Bying Social Justice:  Equality, Government Procurement, & Legal Change (Oxford: 
OUP, 2007). 
32 For more elaborate distinctions, see idem. 
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conducting workplace monitoring.33 This kind of public procurement is used as an instrument to 
promote equality inter alia in the UK and the USA, and it has been suggested that it should be more 
widely applied across Europe.34 The second approach would be to have a programme under which 
public authorities are required to disqualify a contractor from tendering for a contract if he or she has 
seriously breached anti-discrimination laws in the course of his or her business or profession. 
The existing empirical research shows that under right conditions, taking equality into ac
lic procurement can have considerable beneficial effects.35 Effects have however been reduced 
where enforcement, monitoring and compliance efforts have been inadequately funded or resourced, 
or where previous support for such a policy has been withdrawn, or where those administering the 
policy have seen that function as secondary or peripheral to their work.36 
gained in Sweden yet – of the introduction of positive duties are mixed but encouraging. On the one 
hand, it is widely agreed that this approach has been useful, but on the other hand, it is also widely 
agreed to have been less useful than had been hoped. 
In Britain, there is “encouraging evidence that, to
uence on public authorities’ practices”, particularly in relation to compelling them to pay greater 
attention to ensuring fair treatment of all their employees.37 The duty to produce a ‘race equality 
scheme’ has been well complied with, at least at face value.38 But the success has been more limited 
than had been hoped for. The general duty has come under criticism for being too weak in the extent to 
which it requires action to be taken. It has been pointed out that the duty only requires the authorities 
concerned to “have due regard to the need” to act, rather than really requiring them to act.39 Indeed, it 
appears that for many duty-bound public bodies, the focus has excessively been on processes, 
bureaucracy, and too little on achieving tangible equality outcomes.40 For some public bodies it 
appears that the making of the equality scheme has been seen as the main component of the equality 
 
33 A number of EU member states have promoted (France, Belgium and Germany) voluntary Diversity Charters, 
through which companies commit themselves to non-discrimination and diversity. 
34 For further information on public procurement, see McCrudden, cit. supra note 31; PLS Ramboll 
Management, Study of the Use of Equality and Diversity Considerations in Public Procurement: Final Report. 
Available at: http://ec.europa.eu (visited 1.1.2009). 
35 The empirical research is reviewed by McCrudden in ibid, pp. 594–617. 
36 Ibid, p. 595. 
37 Discrimination Law Review, cit. supra note 1, p. 83. Moreover, in a survey conducted in 2002, 69% of the 
responding authorities felt that their work on the public duty had produced positive benefits.  
38 Indeed, already six months after the duty to produce a scheme came into effect, between 83% and 99% of 
relevant authorities (depending on the sector) had already produced a scheme and the rest were preparing one. 
Commission for Racial Equality, cit. supra note 2.  
39 This is perhaps the mainstream reading, see e.g. Fredman – Spencer, cit. supra note 5, p. 600. For a different 
interpretation see Rupert Harwood, ‘Race Back from Equality: Has the CRE been breaching race equality law 
and has race equality law been working?’ Public Interest Research Unit, 2007, pp. 18–19. 
40 See e.g. Harwood, cit. supra note 39, pp. 149–166. 
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duty, not the implementation of that scheme.41 The duty has also been criticized for being too 
unspecific about the outcomes it seeks to achieve, which is at least partly attributable to the vague 
terminology used (the concept of ‘equality of opportunity’ in particular).42 The system, with its 
general and specific duties and statutory and non-statutory codes of practice, is also widely perceived 
as too complex. 
In No
prehensive review of the effectiveness of public sector duties. The report, which was drawn on the 
basis of a number of research undertakings and consultation processes, concludes that the duties have 
over a relatively short period of time effected a substantial change in how policy is made.43 The result 
has been a more informed and evidence-based policy that reflects the needs of individuals in terms of 
equality of opportunity and good relations. According to the report, effective consultation has been a 
particular success, giving rise to an inclusive policy making process. The report identifies several 
shortcomings as well, in particular with regard to identifying and measuring inequalities and the actual 
impact that policies are having in terms of reducing or removing those inequalities. It was also found 
that the public authorities were not always certain about such concepts as ‘good relations’ or 
‘screening’, and that they exercised caution in going beyond non-discrimination towards promotion of 
equality of opportunity. Authorities were not always sufficiently aware of the needs of the different 
groups in terms of equality of opportunity and good relations, which might to some extent be 
explained by the levels of capacity, skills and resources among the voluntary and community sector 
organisations concerned.44 
In Finland, almost two
atment Act were of the view that the Act has in fact promoted the achievement of equality and has 
had a positive impact on the attitude climate.45 In lieu of ethnic monitoring or other systematic 
evidence about the outcomes it is impossible to say whether this perception is correct and whether the 
duty has for instance increased the number of minority persons in the workforce. 
Quantitative and qualitative assessment of the equality plans may serve as 
cessfulness of the Finnish system. The results are somewhat discomforting: in 2007, more than 
three years after the duty to adopt an equality plan had come into effect, only 53% of the responding 
public bodies had adopted an equality plan, 12% said that they were in the process of drafting it, and 
35% had not even began the preparations for producing it.46 If anything, this shows a widespread lack 
of enthusiasm if not outright disregard of the equality law. There was also great diversity in the scope 
of the already adopted plans, with one third being regarded as too limited in scope or drawn in too 
general terms to be of much practical benefit. The authorities clearly had difficulties in putting in 
concrete terms what it means to ‘promote equality’, whereas the concept of non-discrimination was 
 
41 Great Britain Government Equalities Office, The Equality Bill – Government response to the Consultation 
(Stationary Office Limited, July 2008), p.  22.  
42 Fredman – Spencer, cit. supra note 5, pp. 600–601; Harwood, cit. supra note 39, pp. 21–22. 
43 Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, Section 75 – Keeping it Effective. Reviewing the Effectiveness of 
Section 75 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Final Report, November 2008, p. 4. 
44 Idem. 
45 Birgitta Lundström et al, Yhdenvertaisuuslain toimivuus. Tutkimusraportti viranomaisten käsityksistä sekä 
oikeus-, laillisuusvalvonta- ja lainvalvontakäytännöstä. Työ- ja elinkeinoministeriön julkaisuja 11/2008, p. 66 ff. 
46 Ibid, p. 74.  
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much more familiar.47 Even those plans that were classified as ‘comprehensive’ were lacking or vague 
in terms of timetables and attribution of responsibility, two central factors that affect success. 
Moreover, four out of five authorities had not in any manner involved representatives of the target 
groups in the preparation of the plan. On the positive side, almost all plans included a design for 
follow-up and review.48 
The Finnish experien
a necessary but not sufficient element of a proactive strategy. Where enforcement and sanctions are 
absent or unclear, many organizations will ignore their duties or adopt nominal compliance policies 
and not really reconsider their policies and practices.49 The trade-off between enforcement and 
effectiveness may not be as straightforward as it may first appear, however. The British experience 
shows that it takes more than duties and their enforcement to achieve any real transformation of 
institutional structures and policy making, and that enforcement may play an ambivalent part in that. 
In order to be practical, enforcement must be linked to tangible, ‘material’ outcomes such as the 
production of an equality scheme, because a broad and vague general duty does not in itself easily lend 
to any form of enforcement. This, however, carries with it the risk of minimal, formal compliance and 
may encourage focusing on the kind of action by which one is seen to comply with the letter of the 
duty, rather than action by which one is actually complying with the spirit of the duty. Also 
considering the wide variety of public bodies and their functions, the diversity of their work 
environments and the need to avoid the imposition of unnecessary burdens, any duties must be laid 
down in law in rather general terms and the organizations concerned must retain a degree of autonomy 
in their implementation. Too specific duties and/or too specific guidance may be counterproductive for 
organizational learning, forming a barrier to any real transformation. On the other hand, general duties 
that are not supported by any guidance will be hard to implement, as few organizations can be 
expected to have the time, expertise and resources necessary to work their way from the abstract 
principles to successful and thorough implementation thereof in practice,50 as there is no fail-safe 
toolbox of implementation measures that deliver without exception. The sheer number of public 
bodies that are subject to the duty – for instance in Britain the duty-bound authorities number around 
44 000 – makes  the systematic monitoring of compliance difficult or impossible in practice, unless 
enormous investments are made in establishing enforcement agencies across the country. The other 
option, the enabling of judicial review in which an individual or group can ask a court of law to 
scrutinize whether an organization has complied with its duties, may equally be a no-starter, if not for 
any other reason but because individuals seldom have the time, money and/or interest to pursue such 
action. All of this makes the efficient enforcement of equality duties difficult. 
Taking into consideration of the situation and needs of immigrants a
ticipation of the target groups, are often taken to be at the heart of equality duties and 
mainstreaming in particular. This raises major challenges, however: first, resorting to stereotyping 
should be avoided when minorities’ and immigrants’ interests are being considered, lest the action 
 
47 Idem. 
48 Ibid, pp. 66–88. 
49 See also Lowri Griffiths ‘Positive Duties to Promote Equality’ in Soraya Obura – Fiona Palmer (eds.) 
Strategic Enforcement: Powers and Competences of Equality Bodies (Brussels: Equinet, 2006). 
50 Discrimination Law Review, cit. supra note 1, p. 101 ff. 
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reinforces those stereotypes instead of eliminating them. For instance a Finnish study that compared 
immigrants’ preferences and needs in the housing market, and the housing authorities’ perceptions of 
their preferences and needs, found these to be diametrically opposite in some respects: the authorities 
were under the impression that immigrants wanted to live in close proximity to other immigrants and 
to their places of worship, whereas immigrants themselves preferred to live in ‘ordinary’ 
neighbourhoods and to have neighbours who were from the ethnic majority.51 The need to steer clear 
of stereotypes speaks for active involvement of the target groups, as otherwise it is assumed as 
opposed to real interests that are mainstreamed into decision-making.52 But this brings us to the 
second challenge: Which groups should be given a voice and who within each group? How to promote 
inclusion without engaging in identity politics and essentialism? There is a need to steer clear from a 
presumption of homogeneity, from the perception that “any immigrant can represent all immigrants”. 
Immigrants and minorities are not homogenous groups, let alone a homogenous group. It must also be 
recognized that there are other social divisions and other types of group-based injustices than ‘race’ 
and ethnicity – for instance those based on gender, age, sexual orientation, religion or disability – 
which criss-cross the former types of divisions and injustices.53 The radical plurality of identities and 
experiences mean that any consultation should be inclusive. Indeed, those organizing consultations 
with a view to developing equality policies should be aware of the need to avoid indirectly silencing 
dissenting voices through their choice of participants.54 These viewpoints suggest that careful 
consideration should go into the planning of the modalities of consultation and inclusion mechanisms, 
and that broad consultation is called for in any case. The groups concerned might also benefit from 
being democratically and otherwise well-organized.  
Organizations seldom welcome new burdens bein
e with private businesses operating in the competitive market economy environment. In addition, 
the private sector cannot perhaps be assumed to bear the same responsibility as the public sector in 
implementing social justice. That said, the private sector, given its weight in the areas of employment 
and delivery of goods and services, is also to a great degree if not chiefly responsible for bringing 
about the disadvantages experienced by the groups vulnerable to discrimination, and should therefore 
have a role in the eradication of those disadvantages. Businesses do not operate in some apolitical, 
amoral and asocial space, nor is their social impact neutral. In consequence, if the private sector is not 
part of the solution, it is part of the problem. The impact of the turn from a passive anti-discrimination 
strategy to a proactive equal treatment strategy will be highly limited unless the private sector takes 
part in it.55 As the present system relying on individual rights is a no-starter in terms of affecting 
                                                        
51 Nexhat Beqiri, Toiveena monipuolinen asukasrakenne. Sisäasiainministeriön julkaisuja 30/2008. 
52 Martin MacEwen ‘Concluding remarks’ in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement 
Social Theory (Oxford: Hart, 2002), p. 98. 
not required by federal contract compliance programs) in some affirmative action policy. 
(Ashgate 1997), p. 242. 
53 See e.g. Reza Banakar – Max Travers, ‘Critical Approaches’ in Reza Banakar – Max Travers (eds.), An 
Introduction to Law and 
54 Paola Ucellari ‘Multiple Discrimination: How Law can Reflect Reality’ The Equal Rights Review, Vol One 
(2008), pp. 42–43. 
55 In this context it should be noted that evidence from the USA suggests that only a few firms engage entirely 
voluntarily (i.e. where 
See e.g. Alexandra Kalev – Frank Dobbin – Erin Kelly ‘Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy 
of Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies’ American Sociological Review, 2006, Vol. 71 (August 
589–617). 
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governance; and linking public procurement with promotion of equality helps to engage the private 
                                     
change, also the private sector should be given a more proactive role in achieving equality. 
Furthermore, we should take into account the unique experience from Northern Ireland, where all 
employers with more than ten employees are required to register with the Equality Commission, to 
monitor the community background composition of the workforce, to conduct periodic reviews of the 
workforce and of employment practices and, where reasonable and appropriate, to take affirmative 
action. That experience is encouraging, as the earlier imbalances in fair participation in employment 
were to a substantial extent remedied in the course of 2001–2008.56  
That said, the imposition of positive duties on the private sector could at least in theory have a 
chilling effect on activity in general. Moreover, increases in the ‘costs’ related to employment risk 
leading some employers to invest not in employees, but in machinery capable of substituting them, or 
may encourage businesses to relocate to countries where there is less employment regulation. In light 
of these and other similar considerations, the question of whether private sector should be imposed an 
equality duty, or whether a contract compliance or some other programme would suffice, should 
perhaps be left for further and wider debates. For the time being there does not appear to be any broad-
based support for the introduction, across Europe, of positive equality duties upon the private sector. 
On the other hand, it is clear in light of practical experience that simple voluntary measures will not be 
sufficient. Measures such as signing diversity charters will be undertaken mostly by ‘best practice’ 
private sector employers who are already inclined to comply with the equality laws, which means that 
some further arrangements are necessary if the all-important private sector is to be engaged in the 
proactive work towards equality.57 
12.4 Conclusions 
The idea of positive equality duties is a promising innovation that links up with the recent call for new 
forms of governance to deal with social problems.58 The different individual strands of the duty 
promise many benefits: mainstreaming challenges the status quo of ‘business as usual’ and forces the 
organizations in question to ask the right questions; impact assessments uncover the disadvantaging 
properties of rules, practices and structures that appear neutral on their face; consultation and inclusion 
brings empowerment to the target groups, facilitating a shift from expert rule towards shared 
                   
56 See Equality Commission for Northern Ireland, 2008 Monitoring Report: Monitoring Report No. 19: A profile 
of the Monitored Northern Ireland Workforce, p. 20. Due to constraints of data, it is not possible at the time to 
give a conclusive answer to the question whether the earlier imbalances have entirely been corrected. 
57 The argument against relying on voluntary action might run like this: “We should assume…that organisations 
will only modify disapproved-of behaviour if faced with sufficient incentives. Where an organisation expects to 
benefit from infringing the law by continuing to act in a certain way, it is unlikely to change its behaviour unless 
the costs of doing so outweigh the anticipated benefits.” Christopher McCrudden, ‘International and European 
Norms Regarding National Legal Remedies for Racial Inequality’ in Sandra Fredman (ed.) Discrimination and 
Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 304–305. 
58 On new modes of governance and the protection of human rights, see Gráinne de Búrca ‘New Modes of 
Governance and the Protection of Human Rights’ in Philip Alston – Olivier de Schutter (eds.) Monitoring 
fundamental rights in the EU: the contribution of the fundamental rights agency (Oxford: Hart, 2005). 
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ircumscribing much of their 
effe
ive duties depends primarily on two things: first, the extent to which 
the
                                                       
sector in the quest for a more equal society. The implementation of the duties, and the drafting, 
implementation and monitoring of equality plans in particular, call for such organizational structures 
establishing responsibility (diversity committees, diversity staff positions) that empirical studies have 
found to be the key to unlocking a positive development in workforce diversity.59 Overall, the 
imposition of duties promises to affect the kind of long-term cultural and structural change in 
organizations that mere lawsuits are inherently incapable of achieving.    
Yet the introduction of duties is subject to challenges that risk c
ctiveness. The more stringent these duties are, and the more effectively they are enforced, the more 
likely such duties will generate resistance. There are political constraints linked to any introduction of 
new ‘regulatory burdens’ in particular on the private sector, the mobilization of which would be of 
high importance, as otherwise the impact of the approach is limited. Also other, more specific 
challenges abound. Mechanisms and modalities of target group inclusion require careful advance 
planning, lest they be counterproductive by means of reinforcing identity politics and stereotyping. 
The identification of problems and the progress made in their elimination – two aspects that are 
integral to equality duties – call for ethnic data collection, but this may not be an option for many 
countries, a fact which may to an extent undermine the potential effectiveness of certain kinds of duty-
based approaches. And most importantly, there is always the risk that without real commitment, 
particularly from the top of the organization, implementation of the duty collapses into one more 
bureaucratic routine aimed at meeting the minimum conditions of compliance, with no organizational 
learning or real transformation. 
In effect, the future of posit
 interested organizations and communities are able to put pressure on and persuade politicians and 
other key stakeholders to take the necessary action to impose duties; second, the extent to which 
workable solutions to the above-identified challenges are found. Even if these two conditions are met, 
social change will not take place overnight.  
 
59 Alexandra Kalev – Frank Dobbin – Erin Kelly ‘Best Practices or Best Guesses? Assessing the Efficacy of 
Corporate Affirmative Action and Diversity Policies’ American Sociological Review, 2006, Vol. 71 (August 
589–617). 
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13 Enforcement 
The introduction of the above-mentioned proactive strategies by no means has to come at the price of 
the exclusion of strategies based on litigation and other means of enforcement. Indeed, it should not 
come at that price, because no reasons have come up in light of which it could be expected that the 
proactive strategies could eliminate all forms of discrimination. Any progress that will be made by 
means of introduction of data collection, positive duties, positive action and other policies will be 
incremental and slow to emerge. These policies may, over time, affect a cultural change at the societal 
and organizational levels, and reduce stereotypes by means of promoting the opportunities, inclusion 
and material well-being of the target groups and by decreasing social distance between groups. 
Positive strategies will however be unlikely to affect a change in the mindset and behaviour of those 
who hold the most egregious forms of prejudices; some strategies may even be counterproductive by 
increasing the perceptions that immigrants and minorities are to an unjust extent at the receiving end 
of various public policy measures. The persistence of racism from a historical perspective, and its 
ability to take new forms under social pressure and legal and policy interventions, suggests that 
positive interventions may go some way towards achieving a more equal society, but they will hardly 
go all the way. Subtle, indirect and structural forms of discrimination will also be as hard to identify 
and combat as ever. In view of all of this we must proceed from the prediction that discrimination on 
the grounds of racial and ethnic origin will not be eliminated in any near future. There will therefore 
always be individuals in need of legal protection against discrimination, which is why there is a need 
to strengthen the enforcement of the related law. In effect, it is not just possible but also desirable to 
pursue a two-track strategy, to strengthen the enforcement of the law in addition to the pursuance of 
proactive policy measures. 
Specialized bodies, meaning bodies established to promote equal opportunities and/or to secure 
their enjoyment through judicial or quasi-judicial functions, play a crucial role in this. Such bodies 
have been established across Europe. Article 13 of the EU Racial Equality Directive requires EU 
member states to designate one or more equality bodies and to charge them with three functions: (i) to 
provide independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints about 
discrimination, (ii) conduct independent surveys concerning discrimination, and (iii) publish 
independent reports and make recommendations on any issue relating to such discrimination. The 
wording of the Article is notoriously imprecise,1 but it does provide a basis for further institutional 
development. This chapter suggests some specific arrangements, including several that have to do with 
the functions of the specialized bodies, that can be used to strengthen the legal protection from 
discrimination. Mere redesign of the functions of these bodies may however not be sufficient. In light 
 
1 See e.g. Gay Moon, ‘Chapter Eight: Enforcement Bodies’ in Dagmar Schiek – Lisa Waddington – Mark Bell, 
Non-Discrimination Law: Cases, Materials and text on National, Supranational and International Non-
Discrimination Law (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2007), p. 890; Colm O’Cinneide, ‘The Racial Equality Directive 
as a Basis for Strategic Enforcement’ in Janet Cormack (ed.) Strategic Enforcement and EC Equal Treatment 
Directives (Migration Policy Group, 2004), p. 49. 
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of the limited resources of the existing bodies,2 additional funding may be called for, though 
prioritization may also lead to more effective use of the existing resources. 
13.1 The legal infrastructure 
In drafting equality legislation, the legislator has to make a decision with regard to which branch of 
law to rely upon. Choices include constitutional law, criminal law, civil law, labour law and 
administrative law.3 The use of each of these has its positive and negative aspects, which are – in 
broad terms – summed up in the following table:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 The financial and human resources of existing bodies are summarised in the Appendix of Rikki Holtmaat, 
Catalysts for Change: Equality bodies according to directive 2000/43/EC – existence, independence and 
effectiveness (Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007). 
3 NB: The titles of the different areas of law vary between countries, especially between common law and civil 
law countries. 
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BRANCH OF LAW POSITIVE ASPECTS NEGATIVE ASPECTS 
Constitutional law - Carries authority, has symbolical 
value, defines core values of the 
society; 
- Frames, constrains and guides the 
actions of the legislator, the judiciary 
and the public administration; 
- Normally enjoys supremacy over 
ordinary laws. 
- Can hardly suffice on its own, as it is 
usually not directly applicable in situations 
not involving public authorities; 
- Is rigid in its content in the sense that 
chancing it often requires an extraordinary 
process. 
Criminal law - Expresses the society’s 
condemnation of discrimination; 
- Has a general preventive effect, the 
degree of which however depends 
upon the probability with which 
perpetrators are brought to justice; 
- Evidence is collected by the police 
and/or public prosecutor; 
- Usually low financial risk for the 
victim 
- Criminal proceedings are seldom brought 
about: in some European countries only 1–
2% of all victims of discrimination file a 
complaint; this can generate an impression 
that legal action is futile;  
- Higher threshold for proving 
discrimination i.e.  it is harder to win cases; 
- Victims have little or no control over the 
proceedings; this may contribute to the 
reluctance to bring cases; 
- Individual misconduct is usually at issue: 
a finding of discrimination often has little 
effect outside the particular circumstances; 
- Use is limited to situations involving 
criminal liability (mens rea); 
- The persons accused (employers, banks 
etc) often do not fit into the profile of a 
typical offender, which may make it harder 
for the police and prosecutors to see the 
crimes committed.4 
Civil law5 and 
Labour law 
- Burden of proof is shared; 
Civil law is best placed to impose 
positive duties; 
- The complainant has better control 
of the proceedings, and settlement is 
possible; 
- The available remedies (such as 
compensation for pecuniary and non-
pecuniary damages) are often 
appreciated by the victims.6 
- Responsibility for proving the case i.e. 
gathering evidence, is upon the 
complainant; This responsibility can be 
alleviated to an extent by shifting the 
burden of proof and/or by providing a right 
to obtain evidence; 
- Risk of potentially high litigation costs. 
                                                        
 
 
4 Paul Lappalainen ‘The challenges posed by the EU anti-discrimination directives’ Working paper presented at 
the Sixth International Metropolis Conference, 27 November 2001. 
5 In this context the term ‘civil law’ is used to mean the law that governs relations between private individuals. 
6 If damages are limited to mere compensation, this may be taken as a signal that the lawmaker is actually 
indifferent as to whether discrimination is a moral wrong. On the other hand, if damages are not limited to 
 
 
 
 
 
 
273
                                                                                                                                                                            
  
Whereas EU member states typically have anti-discrimination legislation that spans all branches of 
law, most member states transposed the EU equality directives through civil and/or labour law, with a 
minority also having introduced or amended criminal law provisions.7 Considerably many states opted 
for a type of equality legislation that covers different types of discrimination (ethnic, religion, age, 
gender, disability) in a single law. The traditional approach in the Nordic countries has been to opt for 
a combination of criminal law and labour law,8 but lately the tendency has been towards generally 
applicable legislative frameworks.9 The European Commission against Racism and Intolerance 
(ECRI) has, in its General Policy Recommendation No 7 on national legislation to combat racism and 
racial discrimination, recommended that anti-discrimination legislation should include provisions in 
all branches of law, as “only such an integrated approach will enable member States to address these 
problems in a manner which is as exhaustive, effective and satisfactory from the point of view of the 
victim as possible”.10 In light of the above table, which clearly shows how the use of each branch does 
have its particular advantages, this is sound advice.11 That said, civil law should arguably play the 
leading role, because it is necessary for the law to reach beyond situations that involve criminal 
liability, just as it is necessary for the law to reach beyond the actions of the public sector.12 Moreover, 
the imposition of positive duties can best take place in the context of civil law. In view of this, some of 
the views and recommendations made in the following subchapters specifically concern civil law 
arrangements. 
Upon considering a reform of the equality law, a national (or European) legislator may also wish 
to consider whether to opt for rules, the application of which to factual circumstances is more 
straightforward, or for more flexible standards, the application of which leaves more room for 
discretion.13 Rules appear to offer precision, certainty and compulsiveness, but suffer from mechanical 
over- and under-inclusion from the point of view of the lawmaker’s purposes. Standards, on the other 
hand, appear to leave more room for evolution and creativity, but their flexibility may also bring along 
arbitrariness and uncertainty. At the end of the day, real-life experience is the final arbiter as to what 
 
compensation, then this may have a deterrent or chilling effect on activity in general. Duncan Kennedy ‘Form 
and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ Harvard Law Review Vol 89, p. 1694. 
7 Mark Bell et al, Developing Anti-Discrimination Law in Europe: The 25 EU Member States compared 
(Luxembourg: OOPEC, 2007), p. 14. 
8 Reliance on criminal law has in a historical perspective often resulted from pursuing the fulfilment of 
international obligations, such as those set by the CERD Convention. 
9 Indeed, many contemporary experts are of the view that it is important to include broad civil law procedures 
and remedies to the framework of anti-discrimination law. See e.g. Michael Banton, Discrimination 
(Buckingham: Open University Press, 1994), p. 54 ff. 
10 ECRI, General Policy Recommendation No 7, adopted on 13 December 2002; see also the Explanatory 
Memorandum to the Recommendation, p. 11.  
11 Note however, that it has been warned that the multiplicity of pieces of law and institutions tackling 
discrimination may lead to disintegration of the efforts to fight discrimination. EU Network of Independent 
Experts on Fundamental Rights, Combating Racism and Xenophobia through Criminal Legislation: The 
Situation in the EU Member States. Opinion No 5-2005, 28 November 2005, p. 9.  
12 The use of civil law has other benefits too, see e.g. Peter R. Rodrigues ‘The Dutch experience of enforcement 
agencies: current issues in Dutch anti-Discrimination law’ in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law 
Enforcement (Ashgate 1997), pp. 55–57. 
13 The legislator should also consider what role voluntary arrangements, such as codes of practice or diversity 
declarations, could play. 
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approach best fits a given society at a given time. That said, judges and other legal professionals are 
not immune from having prejudices and stereotypes, and there is indeed research evidence suggesting 
that these factors do play a role in judicial decision-making.14 And as John Griffiths argues, “if we 
start from the assumption that in discrimination cases the victim will generally be less highly 
organised, less wealthy, and more socially marginal than the defendant, then a large body of literature 
tells us that, despite the legal system’s pretence of formal legal equality, the tactical advantage with 
regard to a whole range of matters will be strongly with the defendant.”15 Active review of court 
decisions by individuals and organizations committed to promoting equality, a form of informal social 
control, is also weak in Europe. These considerations speak for the use of rules as opposed to 
standards at this point of time in Europe. 
 
13.2 Strengthening enforcement 
Individual litigation 
 
Whereas the limits of a strategy based on individual litigation are clear, particularly as a means of 
ensuring general compliance with equality laws, this is no reason for not allowing individuals to take 
legal action. What is wrong with the present individual rights and individual litigation based approach 
is that it perceives legal action not as the last resort, as it perhaps should be, but as the only resort. 
Indeed, insofar as the proactive and preventive measures are not capable of curbing discrimination, 
victims of discrimination should be encouraged, not discouraged, to take their cases to courts, as that 
is necessary in order for them to obtain a remedy for the particular wrongs suffered – provided, of 
course, that the available remedies are adequate in terms of offsetting the harms and motivating the 
victim to seek the aid of the legal system.16 
Whether individual claimants are able to enforce their rights in practice depends on a number of 
factors. Individuals may, first of all, not have adequate information about equal treatment law and may 
not have access to legal help, or if they do have the access, the lack of trained and motivated lawyers 
may be a problem. They may, in addition, not know whether they have been discriminated against, or 
may be unsure about that because they do not have the requisite information about the reasons 
underlying the actions of the alleged discriminator. Judicial proceedings can be costly, lengthy and 
emotionally strenuous, and an individual who believes that she has for instance been denied 
employment on discriminatory grounds would have good reasons to arrive at the conclusion that it will 
take less time, money, effort and emotional engagement to find employment from some other place 
 
14 See e.g. Cyndi Banks, Criminal Justice Ethics: Theory and Practice (Sage 2004); Lars Holmberg – Britta 
Kyvsgaard, ‘Are Immigrants and their Descendants Discriminated against in the Danish Criminal Justice 
System?’ Journal of Scandinavian Studies in Criminology and Crime Prevention Vol. 4, No 2 (2003), pp. 125–
142. 
15 John Griffiths ‘The Social Working of Anti-Discrimination Law’ in Titia Loenen – Peter Rodrigues (eds.) 
Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative Perspectives (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), p. 326. 
16 Roger Cotterrell, The Sociology of Law, 2nd ed. (London: Butterworths, 1992), p. 53. 
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than to sue the discriminator, pursue the case in the court, win the case and finally obtain 
compensation – provided, of course, that all goes well. Potential complainants may also be subject to 
victimization or fear becoming subject to it. Taken together, the different challenges can effectively 
debar access to justice.17  
There are two broad and complementary groups of measures by which these challenges can to 
some extent be tackled. The first one involves training and the dissemination of information on anti-
discrimination law, the provision of support to victims of discrimination, adjustments of procedural 
rules, and the establishment of low-threshold specialist tribunals and/or bodies charged with 
alternative dispute settlement functions. In short, the first group of measures aims at enabling 
individuals to pursue legal action in practice. The second group of measures, on the contrary, consists 
of measures that aim at strengthening enforcement carried out by specialized agencies charged with 
that function, without necessarily requiring the involvement of individual victims of discrimination.  
 
Support structures for individual legal mobilization 
 
There are a number of general supporting measures that are essential for helping the anti-
discrimination law to be properly enforced. Useful measures include, first of all, the dissemination of 
information about it to a broad range of stakeholders, including groups primarily protected by anti-
discrimination law; businesses and other public and private organizations, particularly gatekeepers (for 
instance human resources personnel) within them; and the general public. A second useful measure is 
capacity-building for legal professionals, particularly judges, prosecutors and attorneys. This entails 
the arrangement of training in anti-discrimination law and its inclusion in law school curricula, and the 
availability of legal materials on anti-discrimination law. 
Specialist legal assistance is obviously a major asset wherever available, particularly if available 
free of charge. The EU Directive, as noted, requires each member state to have an equality body that 
provides “independent assistance to victims of discrimination in pursuing their complaints”. The 
Directive does not set out the nature or form of this ‘assistance’, but it is generally thought that the 
provision of advice for instance over telephone is probably sufficient to meet its requirements, and that 
the Directive by no means requires the relevant body to provide legal representation to each individual 
claiming to be a victim.18 That said, there is nothing in the Directive or in any other document to stop 
an equality body or some other organization from providing such services, and indeed many countries 
in Europe and elsewhere have bodies that give legal assistance through providing help with writing of 
complaints and in some cases representation in courts. However, it is a general experience that bodies 
offering legal assistance soon become overwhelmed with requests for assistance.19 Their resources, 
 
 
 
17 See also Peter R. Rodrigues, cit. supra note 12, pp. 56–57; Christopher McCrudden ‘Regulating 
Discrimination: Advice to a Legislator on Problems Regarding the Enforcement of Anti-Discrimination Law and 
Strategies to Overcome Them’ in Titia Loenen – Peter Rodrigues (eds.) Non-Discrimination Law: Comparative 
Perspectives (The Hague: Kluwer, 1999), p. 302. 
18 See e.g. Moon, cit. supra note 1, p. 892. 
19 See e.g. Eilís Barry, ‘Strategic Enforcement – From Concept to Practice’ in Janet Cormack (ed.) Strategic 
Enforcement and EC Equal Treatment Directives (Migration Policy Group, 2004), p. 6. Colm O’Cinneide 
reports that the Canadian Human Rights Commission, which used to be required to investigate each case referred 
to it in order to decide whether it should be sent forward to conciliation or to a tribunal or whether it should be 
rejected, used to have a considerable backlog and a high complaint rejection rate (possibly driven by an 
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even if substantial which is often not the case, will inevitably be insufficient in face of the huge 
demand. In practice, bodies that offer legal assistance, particularly in the form of representation, will 
have to be selective and thus engage in strategic litigation. Strategic litigation, while not of immediate 
help to the majority of potential claimants, does have its benefits too, in that the case work can be 
focused on those cases that stand out as likely to lead to the clarification of an important legal issue or 
lead to the adoption of a judgment which will affect large numbers of people.20 The selectiveness of 
strategic enforcement can result in claims, on part of the discriminated against groups, and particularly 
where flagrant discrimination is at issue, that the specialized body is not really of assistance to them; 
many may experience this as another broken promise on part of the mainstream society.21 In light of 
this it would be sensible to offer at least some help to all potential claimants, particularly in the form of 
advice. But at the end of the day, strategic litigation is better than no litigation at all, and the 
availability of low-threshold judicial or quasi-judicial avenues that require no specialist legal 
representation can do much to alleviate the problems of the non-availability of specialist legal help.  
Domestic rules on legal standing that allow for representative actions (also known as class 
actions) and/or public interest actions (also known as actio popularis) offer two more examples of 
ways in which enforcement can be strengthened. Representative actions allow an organization, such as 
a trade union or an equality body, to bring a discrimination claim on behalf of a number of individuals 
who been harmed in a similar way. This would be the case, for instance, where an employer 
systematically pays its foreign workers less than its ‘domestic’ workers for work of equal value. 
Representative actions are cost-efficient in that the cases of all potential complainants can be handled 
at once. In a public interest action, an organization brings a discrimination claim not in the interests of 
named individuals, but in the interests of the public or some section thereof. An interested 
organization might, for instance, have legal standing where an employer has publicly stated that it will 
not recruit immigrants, and where no identifiable victim exists because immigrants have not applied 
for work knowing that their applications would not be successful.22 The threat of representative 
actions and public interest actions can provide a further incentive to employers to get their policies and 
practices right. Despite the potential usefulness of these two legal devices, they are currently grossly 
underused in Europe.23  
 
administrative desire to reduce the backlog), which gave rise to “serious credibility issues and low staff morale”. 
He also reports that the US Equal Employment Opportunities Commission, to which employment equality cases 
commenced under the US federal equality law must first be filed for investigation, has developed major backlogs 
which peaked at 111 000 cases in 1995. O’Cinneide, cit. supra note 1, p. 51–52.    
20 Individual cases can be expensive, especially if lost and the agency ends up having to pay the legal fees for the 
other party. Litigation may also prove not to have the desired strategic outcome. Razia Karim ‘A legal Strategy 
to Combine and coordinate Different Tools Available’ in Janet Cormack (ed.) Strategic Enforcement and EC 
Equal Treatment Directives (Migration Policy Group, 2004), pp. 31–32. 
21 Moon, cit. supra note 1, p. 892. 
22 This was at issue in ECJ, Feryn, judgment of 10 July 2008. 
23 At the time of the writing, no EU country has introduced rules on representative actions in the field of 
discrimination law, though the issue is under consideration in the UK. Public interest actions are in use only in 
Belgium, Hungary and Romania. Bell et al, cit. supra note 7, pp. 88-90. Communication from the Commission 
to the European Parliament, the Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of 
the Regions, Non-discrimination and equal opportunities: A renewed commitment Community Instruments and 
Policies for Roma Inclusion, Brussels 2.7.2008, SEC(2008) 2172, p. 6. 
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A viable way to bypass the perceived and real complexities of legal proceedings brought before 
ordinary courts of law is to create specialized judicial or quasi-judicial bodies to resolve complaints. 
Specialist tribunals and quasi-judicial bodies have many advantages. First of all, access to justice 
comes without a great cost, as there are usually no court fees and, as at least in some jurisdictions, 
there is no risk of having to pay the other party’s expenses if one’s case fails.24 Processing before 
these bodies is usually informal, which makes legal representation unnecessary and which may be 
experienced as less strenuous emotionally. These bodies also have the kind of specialist expertise and 
experience that ordinary courts of law tend to lack in an area of relatively unpractised law.25 Indeed, 
complainants may be more assured that that their cases will be taken seriously in a Discrimination 
Tribunal or an Equal Treatment Commission than in a regular court of law where discrimination cases 
seldom enjoy priority. 
Mediation and other forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) have become increasingly 
popular tools for resolving complaints in Europe. ADR refers to any means of settling disputes outside 
of the courtroom, including mediation and arbitration.26 Most European equality bodies are 
empowered to use this tool, and for some equality bodies there is a legal requirement to try to reach a 
voluntary settlement before taking any other action.27 Alternative dispute settlement mechanisms have 
their benefits particularly when contrasted with legal proceedings, as they may be less disruptive of the 
relations between parties, require less legal expertise, and take less money and usually also less time. 
Excessive use of these mechanisms does have its drawbacks, however, as the impression may arise 
that equal treatment is negotiable and as pertinent confidentiality requirements keep problems under 
the radar of decision-makers and the wider society. Moreover, systematic recourse to these processes 
does not allow the development of case law that clarifies to the different stakeholders what the law 
actually requires. Sometimes the use of these mechanisms may also lead to early or unbalanced 
settlement, particularly where disputants have unequal skills and are under mediator pressure.28  
Adjustment of certain procedural rules concerning the discovery of documents may also 
significantly improve the chances of individuals to bring legal action in practice. One of the key 
challenges in bringing legal action is that to the extent that modern forms of discrimination are subtle 
and covert, they are also less easy to prove. Direct evidence of discrimination is rare, and where such 
direct evidence exists, corroboration is even rarer.29 In criminal proceedings the burden of an 
individual litigant to produce evidence is not a major problem, as it is typically up to the police, 
prosecutor or the court to investigate the facts. But the processes brought under civil and labour law 
 
24 This is the case for instance in Finland with respect to the national Discrimination Tribunal. 
25 Martin MacEwen ‘Promoting equal opportunity: the enforcement agency’, in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-
Discrimination Law Enforcement (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997), p. 6 and MacEwen ‘Concluding remarks’, in 
idem, p. 239. 
26 Mediation is a type of procedure that is resolved by an agreement between parties facilitated by a third party 
(the mediator), whereas arbitration is a type of procedure that is resolved unilaterally by a third party acting as a 
judge.  
27 Bell et al, cit. supra note 7, p. 67; Moon, cit. supra note 1, pp. 897–899. 
28 Jenny Goldschmidt ‘Enforcement of equal treatment: The role of the Equal Treatment Commission in the 
Netherlands’ in Martin MacEwen (ed.), Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997), p. 
148. 
29 Fitsum Alemu, Testing to prove racial discrimination: methodology and application in Hungary. An internet 
article available at: http://www.errc.org/cikk.php?cikk=1016 (visited 1.1.2006). 
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are adversarial in nature, where the onus of proving a fact is upon the party wishing to rely upon it.30 
A particular problem emerges in that context: in discrimination cases the factual evidence, or 
important parts thereof, is usually in the possession of the respondent, not the complainant – provided, 
of course, that the necessary information exists in the first place. Proper application of the shift in the 
burden of proof, as provided for by the EU Directive, may on occasion make it unnecessary for the 
complainant to rely on the information that is in the possession of the respondent, but this is not 
always the case as the complainant will still have to prove facts sufficient to make a prima facie case. 
The overwhelming majority of the EU countries address this problem through rules concerning 
discovery of documents, whereby a court may, on its own initiative or upon the request of one of the 
parties, order the other party to submit information that is in her possession and of relevance to the 
case.31 Where the respondent refuses to furnish the court with the requested information, without 
providing a satisfactory justification thereto, the court is usually entitled to freely appreciate the 
inferences it draws from that. The existence of this kind of arrangement is crucial, as otherwise an 
imbalance results in that the respondent can in practice decide to use the information in the 
proceedi
However, the rules concerning discovery only provide a partial answer to the problem. The civil 
procedure is not concerned with the process by which a potential complainant can discern whether he 
or she might have a legal claim. In consequence, complainants need as much information as possible 
already before commencing legal action, in order to assess whether a prima facie case of 
discrimination can be made. Some jurisdictions have adopted specific solutions to deal with this 
aspect. In Sweden, a person who applies for a job, promotion or training opportunity but is not 
selected has a right to request and receive written information from the employer regarding the 
education, work experience and other qualifications of the person who was selected, in order to be able 
to compare qualifications. A different type of arrangement exists in the UK, where an alleged 
discriminator can be asked for information, including statistical data, through the ‘questionnaire 
procedure’ before or after proceedings have been commenced (‘pre-litigation discovery’). Under this 
procedure, if the respondent does not fill in the questionnaire, or gives unreasonable answers, the court 
may find sufficient grounds to draw inferences and shift the burden of proof to the respondent. Though 
they do not have official standing, many discrimination cases have been won in the UK because of 
inadequately answered questionnaires, and specialized equality bodies routinely use them.32 
 
30 It is sometimes suggested that this difference between criminal and civil proceedings with regard to the need 
to produce proof has led to a situation where victims of discrimination prefer to bring criminal proceedings 
instead of civil proceedings. See e.g. Sophie Latraverse, Report on Measures to Combat Discrimination. Country 
Report – France. December 2004. European Network of Legal Experts in the non-discrimination field. Available 
at: www.non-discrimination.net (visited 1.1.2010). 
31 The respondent, e.g. an employer, is usually not required to provide material where it is not readily available, 
or where an employer would be required to begin a process of data collection that would add unnecessarily to the 
length and cost of a hearing. This is the case for instance in Britain, see Carrington v Helix Lighting Ltd [1990] 
ICR 125. Furthermore, in the case of criminal proceedings the principle against self-incrimination provides that a 
person charged with a criminal offence cannot be compelled to provide self-incriminating evidence. In some 
countries the scope of the obligation to submit documents or information is also in some specific circumstances 
limited by the domestic data protection laws. 
32 ERRC – Interights – MPG, Strategic Litigation in Europe: From Principles to Practice (Nottingham: Russell 
Press ltd, 2004), p. 72. For critical comments see Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2002), p. 165. 
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Discrimination lawyers in other European countries have adopted similar, though less formulaic, 
questionnaires.33 Pre-litigation discovery mechanisms, along these or some other lines, can therefore 
be highly valuable. 
 
Agency enforcement 
 
Some of the problems associated with the individual enforcement-oriented processes can be addressed 
by powers given to a specific body to conduct investigations into cases of suspected discrimination 
and/or conduct inquiries that are of a more general nature.34 This is particularly so where the process 
may be initiated without a formal complaint, and the body has strong information gathering powers, 
including the enforceable power to demand written or oral evidence and the discovery of documents, 
thereby overcoming difficulties arising from lack of access to information. A major benefit of 
inquiries in particular is their ability to address discriminatory patterns and structures instead of just 
individual incidents. 
Ombudsmen, or broadly speaking equivalent institutions that have been set up in many EU 
countries, are generally empowered to conduct investigations on the basis of specific complaints 
and/or on their own initiative.35 Usually these bodies are entitled to impose a fine, or to take some 
other enforcement action, if their request for appropriate information is not met. A finding of 
discrimination typically leads to the issuing of recommendations or advice and is without prejudice to 
the victim’s right to initiate legal proceedings, for instance with a view to obtaining compensation.36 
Labour inspectorates or equivalent bodies have been entrusted with the task of supervising 
compliance with the equality legislation in the field of employment in a number of countries.37 These 
authorities usually have broad powers to conduct on-site investigations and demand documentation 
that is in the possession of the employer. Usually labour inspectorates carry out their general 
supervisory tasks on an ongoing basis, conducting more specific investigations where they surmise 
that such might be needed or where they have been prompted to do so, usually by way of a non-formal 
complaint.   
Yet other types of bodies and procedures exist. For instance in the UK, the Commission for 
Equality and Human Rights (CEHR) has the power to conduct ‘inquiries’ and ‘investigations’. 
Inquiries are of a general nature, may target a branch or a sector, and may not involve the 
consideration of whether one or more persons have breached the law. Investigations, on the other 
hand, focus on finding out whether or not a legal or natural person has in fact complied with the 
equality laws. Investigations must be based on a suspicion that the equality laws have not been 
complied with, arising possibly, but not necessarily, out of the findings made in the course of an 
inquiry. If satisfied that unlawful acts of discrimination have occurred, the Commission can issue ‘an 
unlawful act notice’ to the respondent, requiring it to prepare an action plan for the purpose of 
avoiding repetition or continuation of the unlawful act and to recommend action to be taken for that 
 
33 Idem (ERRC et al). 
34 See generally Fredman, cit. supra note 32, p. 175. 
35 These countries include e.g. Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Lithuania, Slovenia and Sweden. For an 
analysis of the existence, independence and effectiveness of these bodies see Holtmaat, cit. supra note 2. 
36 Bell et al, cit. supra note 7, p. 67. 
37 These countries include e.g. Belgium, Finland, Hungary, Malta, Poland and Portugal. 
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purpose. In carrying out an investigation or an inquiry, the Commission may order, by way of giving a 
notice, a respondent to provide information in his possession, to produce documents in his possession 
or to give oral evidence. Non-compliance with a notice is considered an offence. The Commission 
shall publish a report of its findings on an inquiry or investigation, and can make recommendations as 
part of the report. A court or Tribunal may have regard to a finding of a report, but it shall not treat it 
as conclusive.38 
While the investigations can provide a significant means of fact-finding, and represent an 
important weapon in the armoury of equality bodies,39 experiences, especially from the UK, have 
shown that effectively carrying out investigations requires not just the existence of formal powers, but 
especially the availability of considerable amounts of financial resources, in the absence of which the 
coverage of the work can never be adequately comprehensive.40 Investigations can be complex and 
therefore resource-intensive. Their impact can also be mixed. Investigations and inquiries may not 
immediately benefit individuals who have been discriminated against, and may not have effects 
outside their direct targets if a wider audience is not listening.41 They may also be experienced by their 
targets as confrontational, therefore inhibiting any promotional work that the same agency may be 
undertaking. On the positive side, any changes made in response to the results of an investigation or 
inquiry carry long-term and wide benefits, provided that the audience is listening. Experience 
particularly from the UK suggests that formal investigations may be particularly effective where the 
discriminator is a repeat offender, meaning that litigation has not brought about a change in its 
practices or procedures, or where there is evidence of institutional and systemic discrimination that is 
not easy to reach by means of litigation, or where there is evidence of discriminatory practices but no 
identifiable victim to bring proceedings.42 At the end of the day, the use of investigations and 
inquiries, given the often limited resources and the consequent need to prioritize, calls for the use of 
careful consideration as to when their deployment is best warranted.43 
13.3 Informal invocation and enforcement of the law 
The aim of all regulation is, it is said, to modify the behaviour of those subject to regulation in order to 
generate a desired outcome.44 But how exactly does this ‘modification of behaviour’ take place? 
Those subject to anti-discrimination law include most people, from bus drivers to social workers to 
 
38 Schedule 2 to the Equality Act 2006, Sections 9–17. 
39 Brian Doyle ‘Disability discrimination and enforcement in Britain: future prospects’ in Martin MacEwen (ed.), 
Anti-Discrimination Law Enforcement (Aldershot: Avebury, 1997), p. 78 
40 It should also be noted that the UK commissions have been hampered by the fact that a ‘named person 
investigation’ cannot take place without the Commission suspecting that unlawful discrimination is occurring.  
41 Des Hogan ‘Inquiries within a wider functional strategy’ in Janet Cormack (ed.) Strategic Enforcement and 
EC Equal Treatment Directives (Migration Policy Group, 2004). 
42 Karim, cit. supra note 20, p. 33–34. 
43 For some of the considerations that may need to be taken into account, see Des Hogan, cit. supra note 41. 
44 Karen Yeung ‘Private Enforcement of Competition Law’ in Christopher McCrudden (ed.) Regulation and 
Deregulation: Policy and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Services Industries (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1999), p. 40. 
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teachers to each and every person employed in the public or private sector. In the social context, the 
totality of situations in which anti-discrimination norms are relevant is infinite in number, day in and 
day out. If anti-discrimination law is to do what it is supposed to do, then basically each and every 
person should know what exactly the law requires from them in these different situations of everyday 
life, and they should be willing to do what the la
Lawyers, policymakers and members of the public are always at the risk of a failure to appreciate 
that most of the use of legal norms is really by ordinary people in the course of their daily activities, 
not by legal professionals in the course of formal legal proceedings.45 But people seldom know (or 
even really want to know) about the intricacies of the law or how a particular provision should be 
applied in this or that particular circumstance. Even less frequently do they have the opportunity to 
consult a legal expert every time they are in a situation where the law is relevant. For most of people 
law proper is something that is outside the context of their ordinary lifeworld, something that is 
perceived to belong to the realm of the extraordinary world of lawyers and legal institutions. In 
consequence, for most people most of the time, the law of law books and precedents is not much more 
than an irrelevance.  
In practice, legal rules are of relevance to ‘non-professionals’ only indirectly, through social norms 
and social control. Social norms reflect culturally transmitted perceptions and beliefs about 
appropriate behaviour in particular circumstances. Due to their nature as social constructs, they may be 
specific to a society, group or organization, and any single person can be under the influence of a 
number of possibly conflicting sets of social norms. The connection between legal norms and social 
norms is not clear or simple.46 For legal rules to be effective in social life, they must have become 
transformed into social norms, into widely shared beliefs about appropriate ways of behaviour. For 
legal norms to transform into social norms they must be known to the public (or the more specific 
group in question) and be embraced by it, meaning that these norms cannot deviate much from what is 
considered reasonable within this group. Precision is lost by way of transformation, as social norms 
usually need to be clear and simple.47 There may also be distortion, as what people think that the law 
requires has been transmitted by non-specialist information sources such as the media, workmates, 
family members, and so on.48 At the end of the day, popular understandings of the law’s requirements 
may differ to a great extent from what the legislator has intended.49  
Progress towards the reduction of discrimination can take place through informal invocation of the 
pertinent social norms, by persons who feel that they are being discriminated against. A protest 
indicating that the treatment that one is being subjected to is illegal serves to remind the offender 
about normative aspects of the incident, repeated successful protests contributing to the vitality of the 
social norm. There can also be informal social enforcement, in the form of negative reactions by third 
parties to a breach of a social norm. This kind of informal social control of the observance of social 
 
45 Griffiths, cit. supra note 15, p. 321. Cotterrell, cit. supra note 16. 
46 See generally on this Cotterrell, cit. supra note 16, pp. 44–45. Much depends, for instance, on cultural 
evaluation of the law, whether strict obedience to legal norms itself is one of the social norms. 
47 Griffiths, cit. supra note 15, p. 327. 
48 See also ibid, p. 317. 
49 Social norms can, however, also be more progressive – from the point of view of promotion of equality – than 
the law, for example by means of requiring one to observe the principle of equal treatment even where the law 
does not require it.  
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norms can be an effective mechanism for de facto enforcement of social justice. Indeed, Griffiths 
argues that “when rules are effective, this is often likely to be due to enforcement by informal social 
control than enforcement by legal officials”.50 These observations call for active engagement by those 
members of the society who believe that unequal treatment should not be tolerated, to intervene 
whenever and wherever they encounter discrimination. The practical effectiveness of equality norms, 
given the economics of scale, can best be promoted through the fostering of a public culture that does 
not tolerate intolerance and discrimination.51  A promising factor is that opinion polls indicate that the 
principle of equal treatment enjoys a high degree of popular support, a fact which can significantly 
enhance the effectiveness of the related legislation.52 Capitalization of this support requires 
widespread mobilization, however, turning a critical mass of people into everyday activists. Whether 
this can and will happen remains to be seen, but high hopes should not be raised in this respect, as the 
reality is that many individuals - struggling with the tangible and immediate realities of their everyday 
life - do not have the time, energy or interest for matters of so
13.4 Conclusions 
There is no evidence before us on the basis of which it could be predicted that racial and ethnic 
discrimination are about to disappear. It rather looks as though we are only beginning to understand 
and appreciate the multidimensional and complex nature of inequality and its many causes and 
consequences. The perverse economics of discrimination, where for the discriminator discrimination 
pays (in one way or the other), and where the costs are borne by the victim and the rest of the society, 
are not going to wither away on their own.  
The belief that the law possesses power that by itself transforms the society into its image may be 
popular but is fundamentally mistaken. The best of laws is not worth the paper it is written on if it is 
not enforced; and in the case of frequently occurring infringements, frequently enforced. Effective 
access to justice is an empty slogan until the time when the people concerned are confident that it is 
worthwhile to bring about legal claims. This may call for legislative reform of procedural rules and the 
establishment of specialized procedures and bodies to deal with claims, and most of all, for the 
establishment of specialized bodies with the competence to provide legal help. Enforcement agencies 
may also come to play a major role. All of this requires substantial public funding. Indeed, a key 
measure of any government’s sincerity in keeping its promise to eliminate all forms of discrimination 
is the number of investments it makes in improving enforcement of the pertinent law.   
Yet this is just one side of the story. Banton may well have been right in claiming that “[t]he best 
protections against discrimination are those in the hearts of people who believe discrimination to be 
wrong”.53 The arm of the law, no matter how long, simply cannot reach all places at all times. This 
speaks for the invigoration of informal social control, where people who believe discrimination to be 
 
50 Griffiths, cit. supra note 15, p. 330. 
51 See e.g. Jan Niessen, ‘Making the Law Work: The Enforcement and Implementation of Anti-Discrimination 
Legislation’ European Journal of Migration and Law 5: 249–257, 2003. 
52 See also Cotterrell, cit. supra note 16, pp. 59–63. 
53 Banton, cit supra note 9, p. 36.  
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wrong make it known whenever they come across it. The problem with this, however, is that we need 
laws against discrimination so desperately precisely because it is so widely practiced, because the 
prevailing social norms are not able to constrain it.   
At the end of the day, the goal of eliminating discrimination is likely to continue to be as 
important, impressive and ultimately impossible to reach as ever. For many individuals it will be the 
case that they remain equal in law – at least in some respects – but unequal in fact. But for how many, 
it depends on us. 
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